By Farkhod Tolipov

On November 14-15, 2025, the 7th Consultative Meeting of Heads of States (CMHS) of Central Asia took place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The meeting constituted a milestone in the 34 years of Central Asia integration since 1991. Long-awaited signs of institutionalization of this process emerged alongside the decision to grant Azerbaijan membership in this regional format. This was the hitherto most consequential CMHS, giving rise to potentially serious implications concerning the further evolution of Central Asian regionalism and its geopolitical implications. 



                                                       Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoev initiated the format of CMHS of Central Asia in 2017; and six meetings have been held since. This new format was introduced after almost 10 years of “frozen” integration from 2006 to 2016, during which the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, maintained mostly bilateral relations.

Regional integration, which had seen some progress between 1991 and 2005, was interrupted due to the merger of the regional structure Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES) after Russia joined CACO. Central Asian states could not restore their own regional structure until 2018 when the first Consultative Meeting was held in Astana, Kazakhstan. Five consecutive meetings took place in Tashkent, November 2019; in Avaza, Turkmenistan, August 2021; in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, July 2022; in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, September 2023; and in Astana, August 2024.

The CMHS has had a controversial dual effect. They consistently demonstrated seemingly resolute political will to strengthen and advance regional cooperation, while at the same time the participating presidents persistently refrained from rhetorical commitments to integration – perhaps out of concern that stronger integration could undermine their sovereignty. The regional cooperation/integration dilemma has thus constrained strategic choices and visions for the future.

In particular, this tendency was reflected during the 6th CMHS when the presidents adopted the Conception of Regional Cooperation “Central Asia-2040” which does not envisage integration at all. Yet the 7th Meeting included steps towards the establishment of institutions pertinent to a full-fledged regional organization. Although the presidents still avoid speaking in terms of real integration, they decided on four important issues: the creation of a permanent Secretariat; renaming the CMHS “Central Asian Community”; raising the status of National Coordinators of Consultative Meetings to Special Representatives of Heads of States; and adopting the Conception of Regional Security based on the Catalog of Risks.

However, the most controversial decision was the admission of Azerbaijan to the “C5” structure.

IMPLICATIONS: The first institutional forms of regional integration in Central Asia were set up in the 1990s. At that time, institutions such as the Council of Heads of States, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Councils were created, and attempts were even made to establish a Central Asian parliament. Central Asian leaders now make efforts to revitalize the initial integration process, albeit without articulating the very concept of “integration.”

The preceding six CMHS have yielded important experiences in terms of maintaining the impulse and rhetoric of regionalism as such. Moreover, the CMHS not only reintroduced the regional format of cooperation but also stipulated a geopolitical recalibration in and around Central Asia. One manifestation of this is the proliferation of so-called “C5+1” formats which reflected, among other things, the emerging regional order in Central Asia.

It was expected that Uzbekistan, as the initiator of CMHS and chair of the 7th Meeting in Tashkent, would push the pro-integration agenda forward. This intention appeared successful. Renaming the regional format the Central Asian Community (CAC) associates with the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) which functioned between 1994 and 2000. The successful operation of CAEC led the overall process of creating CACO. Hopefully, CAC can also promote stronger political unity among the states concerned. However, the new name must signify not only a positive disposition but also the real new political status of this community of five states. The “old” challenges remain in this “new” stage when it comes to their constantly repeated mantra about conducting common foreign policy concerning key international and regional issues.

A significant decision in this regard was taken regarding the Concept of regional security and stability as well as the Catalogue of security risks in Central Asia and measures to address them for 2026-2028. The idea of establishing a regional security architecture was articulated also in the previous CMHS. This is, indeed, a very crucial strategic task to be addressed urgently, requiring coordination of foreign policies. The content of the Catalogue clarifies what these risks are and how the regional security system will be created. Indeed, since Central Asian states have strategic partnership agreements and alliance relationships with each other, now is the time to test them by agreeing on the Catalogue to address regional security challenges.

Mirziyoev also proposed another, normative, idea: “based on our values and traditions of public diplomacy, we believe it would be appropriate to create a Council of Elders consisting of renowned public figures with extensive life experience. We believe this will contribute to generational continuity in our countries, as well as to strengthening regional solidarity and identity.” This message points to the importance of a common regional identity for the peoples of Central Asia. It was a call to engage citizens in regional integration and bring this process to the broader public. Indeed, broader involvement of civil society in regional integration has hitherto been lacking and this was a signal to the Central Asian public to contribute to making the region a real community.

In Tashkent, the five presidents were accompanied by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev. The summit adopted the decision to admit Azerbaijan into the Central Asian structure, which gave rise to a number of questions regarding the transformation of the five-lateral CMHS format into a six-lateral one and producing an equation with one unknown variable. Azerbaijan is a South Caucasian state, not a Central Asian one. How this seemingly bi-regional format will evolve in terms of future integration remains to be seen.

Uzbekistan’s former foreign minister Abdulaziz Komilov noted in an interview that Azerbaijan joining the CMHS as a member created a new geopolitical reality. The admission of Russia into CACO in 2004 was fatal for this organization and destroyed it. Azerbaijan, in contrast, is not an imperial state and does not have hegemonic ambitions. Azerbaijan’s membership in CMHS coincides with the transformation of this format into CAC.

Azerbaijan already has close relations to Central Asian states; together with Azerbaijan, four Central Asian states (excluding Tajikistan) are members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Azerbaijan is also a geopolitically experienced state and can in many respects pose a good example for Central Asians. At the same time, its membership in CMHS can profoundly impact the regional integration process. Whether Baku can play a special geopolitical role in Central Asia depends on its ability to contribute to what Central Asians have so far lacked in their regional and international actions – a single agency in the international system. The extent to which they will be able to achieve this together with Azerbaijan remains an open question.

The Tashkent summit also gave rise to another surge of criticism in Russian media and analytical circles. Especially Azerbaijan’s intensified participation in Central Asian regional affairs was described as a cause for concern and as concealing a pro-Western geopolitical design.

CONCLUSIONS: Previous CMHS have produced several positive statements and documents. The time has now come to address crucial practical questions regarding the new institutional structures agreed upon. Determining the actual content of the Catalog of Risks is an important issue. So is the status of the newly instituted high-ranking Special Representatives, and whether they will become more visible and engage with the broader public. Stronger visibility will undoubtedly motivate broader public engagement and thereby add more dynamism to the integration process. Another important issue is whether the Secretariat will be a transparent structure. It should avoid the risks of becoming overly bureaucratic and becoming preoccupied with the narrow interest in maintaining national sovereignty at all costs.

It also remains to be seen whether Azerbaijan’s membership is only eclectic – a mechanical expansion for the sake of showcasing regionalism; or a strategic enlargement based on a long-term and well calculated decision for the sake of confronting a new round of geopolitical challenges.

The Central Asian five-lateral format will experience a new round of geopolitical challenges related to great power rivalry in and around this region, especially in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine; the diversification of international transport and other connectivity in Central Asian states; and the rising profile of Central Asia in terms of its strategic autonomy in the international system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge Caravan”) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

By Rafis Abazov

As the global race for digital supremacy accelerates, Kazakhstan is positioning itself not merely as a participant, but as a regional architect of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure and foresight. Over the past decade, the Republic of Kazakhstan has methodically repositioned itself not just as a raw-material exporter in Central Asia but as a proactive knowledge and innovation actor. The recent launch of the AI Silknet initiative by the National Academy of Sciences marks a pivotal step in the country’s broader digital transformation strategy—one that seeks to fuse scientific modernization, regional leadership, and strategic foresight into a cohesive national vision. It may well mark its transition into a digital actor on a regional scale.

                                                                                Credit: Pexels

BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan’s digital transformation journey has been steadily gaining momentum over the past decade. From the “Digital Kazakhstan” program to the more recent “Digital Bridge” forums, the country has signaled its intent to become a regional hub for innovation and technology. The Government of Kazakhstan has invested over US$ 100 million into flagship AI-Sana (meaning “consciousness” or “intelligence” in Kazakh), a state-funded program launched to develop the country’s National AI Platform and position Kazakhstan as a regional leader in artificial intelligence.

In this context, the AI Silknet project, developed in partnership with the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information (KISTI), represents a new step in this trajectory. AI Silknet is not merely a technological platform; it is a national knowledge infrastructure designed to consolidate scientific, technological, and socio-economic data into a unified digital ecosystem. Its core function is to provide predictive analytics and strategic foresight for decision-makers, researchers, and policymakers. By integrating machine learning algorithms with vast datasets, the system aims to anticipate trends, model development scenarios, and support evidence-based governance.

This initiative reflects a growing recognition within Kazakhstan’s leadership that digital transformation must be underpinned by robust institutional frameworks. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), long a bastion of academic excellence, is now being retooled as a digital think tank, one capable of generating real-time insights and long-term strategies through AI-powered analysis.

The collaboration with South Korea’s KISTI illustrates Kazakhstan’s attempt to improve the management of the national economy and planning process. South Korea’s own transformation into a digital powerhouse offers a compelling model for Kazakhstan, particularly in the realm of AI-driven science and innovation policy. The AI Silknet project draws directly from KISTI’s experience with the NTIS (National Science & Technology Information Service), adapting its architecture to Kazakhstan’s unique developmental context.

This partnership is not merely technical, it is strategic. It signals Kazakhstan’s intent to align with leading digital economies while maintaining agency over its own data and development priorities. In doing so, Kazakhstan is crafting a hybrid model of digital modernization: one that leverages global expertise while reinforcing national sovereignty and regional relevance, improving efficiency of budget management and making its national economy more competitive.

IMPLICATIONS: The name of the initiative: AI Silknet, is no accident. It evokes the historical Silk Road, positioning Kazakhstan as a digital bridge between East and West. But unlike its ancient predecessor, this new Silk Road is not about the movement of goods; it is about the flow of data, knowledge, and innovation.

Kazakhstan’s leadership in AI infrastructure has significant implications for Central Asia. As the region grapples with uneven digital development, Kazakhstan’s model offers a scalable blueprint for integrating AI into national planning, education, and economic diversification. By opening AI Silknet to regional collaboration, Kazakhstan could catalyze a new era of scientific diplomacy and data-driven cooperation across borders.

Moreover, the initiative aligns with broader geopolitical trends. As global powers compete for influence in Eurasia’s digital space, Kazakhstan’s proactive stance allows it to shape—not merely respond to—the emerging rules of engagement. In this sense, AI Silknet is not just a tool of governance; it is a statement of intent.

At its core, AI Silknet is a foresight engine. It is designed to help Kazakhstan anticipate technological disruptions, model policy outcomes, and align national priorities with global trends. This is particularly critical in a world where the pace of change often outstrips the capacity of traditional institutions to respond.

Embedding AI into the heart of its scientific and policy apparatus carries many risks and uncertainty yet Kazakhstan is embracing a new paradigm of governance—one that is anticipatory, adaptive, and analytically grounded. This shift has the potential to transform how decisions are made, how resources are allocated, and how national goals are pursued.

The system’s ability to integrate diverse datasets, from academic publications to patent filings, from demographic trends to economic indicators, makes it a powerful tool for cross-sectoral analysis. Organizers claim that it can, for example, identify emerging research clusters, forecast labor market shifts, or simulate the impact of policy interventions. In doing so, it empowers decision-makers with the kind of strategic intelligence that is increasingly indispensable in the 21st century.

No digital transformation is complete without a corresponding investment in human capital. Kazakhstan’s AI Silknet initiative is closely tied to efforts to modernize the country’s education system and cultivate a new generation of data scientists, AI engineers, and digital policymakers.

The NAS, in collaboration with universities and research institutes, is developing training programs that align with the competencies required to operate and expand the AI Silknet system. These include courses in machine learning, data governance, computational modeling, and science policy.

CONCLUSION: Kazakhstan’s AI Silknet is more than a technological upgrade — it is a strategic platform for national renewal and regional leadership. By investing in predictive analytics, institutional capacity, and international collaboration, Kazakhstan is laying the groundwork for a digital future that is inclusive, intelligent, and interconnected.

By embedding the technologies into its national economy and new skills into academic curricula and professional development pathways, Kazakhstan is not only building technical capacity—it also aims at improving governance, budget spending and creating thousands of new jobs in the IT and AI sectors. This is essential to ensure that AI Silknet remains a living system—continuously evolving in response to new challenges and opportunities. According to estimates by Tengrinews Agency, Kazakhstan could undergo a workforce shift or restructuring affecting up to one million positions over the next 5 to 10 years due to automation and the implementation of AI.

As Central Asia navigates the complexities of digital transformation, Kazakhstan’s experience offers valuable lessons. It demonstrates that with vision, partnerships, and a commitment to data-driven governance, even mid-sized states can shape the contours of regional development.

In the years ahead, the success of AI Silknet will depend not only on its technical sophistication but on its ability to foster trust, transparency, and shared purpose—both within Kazakhstan and across its borders. If it succeeds, it may well become the backbone of a new digital Silk Road, linking the region’s past to its most promising futures.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), An Effective Project Manager (2025) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and facilitated the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The Caspian Sea is increasingly emerging as a focal point of geopolitical competition. The joint military exercises conducted by Russia and Iran in July, following similar drills by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the northern Caspian a month earlier, underscore the region’s rapid transformation into a nexus of strategic rivalries and evolving security alignments. Among the littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are assuming particularly prominent roles in shaping the strategic landscape. Their efforts are supported by Turkey, which is facilitating the naval expansion of these three Turkic nations. Russia’s ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine has significantly weakened Moscow’s capacity to assert dominance over the Caspian Sea and to effectively utilize it as part of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Russia to Iran and India.


                                                            Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The Caspian Sea was widely regarded as a “Russian lake” during the Soviet era, as Iran, possessing only a short Caspian coastline, showed little interest in utilizing it for power projection. For decades, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla maintained dominance over the waters of the inland sea. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Moscow sought to preserve the existing balance of power in the Caspian. In 2018, Russia secured an agreement among the five Caspian littoral states on territorial delimitation, excluding the military presence of non-littoral actors in the sea.

The region experienced a significant geopolitical shift in 2020 after Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey provided military assistance to Azerbaijan during the conflict. Following the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, the Caspian littoral states expanded their navies. Turkey continues to support Azerbaijan’s requirements for modern weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister, Zakir Hasanov, affirmed that Ankara was Baku’s principal partner in military cooperation.

Over the past five years, Turkey has facilitated the naval expansion of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. These countries, along with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are members of the Turkey-backed “Pan-Turkic Union.” Through this framework, Turkey has assumed a leading role in diminishing Russia’s influence over the military development of these states.

In 2023, Turkey’s Asfar and YDA Group, together with Kazakhstan’s Uralsk Plant “Zenit” JSC, concluded an agreement for the construction of offshore platforms in the Caspian Sea. The agreement included the production of various naval vessels, including main surface combat ships, to fulfill the operational requirements of the Kazakh Navy. Likewise, the deepening relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan signify a broader shift in energy geopolitics and highlight their shared strategic interests. The Bayraktar TB2, Turkey’s first domestically produced unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), is deployed within Turkmenistan’s armed forces. In February, the two countries signed a gas supply agreement that offers Turkmenistan a new export channel while consolidating Turkey’s position as a regional energy hub.

In 2024, the joint military exercises Birleistik (Unity) 2024 were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast, marking the first such drills held without Russian participation. The armed forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly participated in the exercise.

In April, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan announced plans to conduct the joint military exercises Caspian Breeze – 2025 in the northern part of the Caspian Sea near Russia’s coastline. The exercises commenced in June at Aktau, Kazakhstan, with the objective of strengthening the protection of maritime economic infrastructure, naval bases, and shipping routes. A month later, Russia and Iran initiated their own joint naval exercises, CASAREX 2025, under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” These drills were designed to enhance maritime security and promote deeper naval cooperation between the two states.

The two joint military exercises within the span of a single month demonstrate a changing regional balance of power. The Caspian littoral states have expanded their naval capabilities in recent years, thereby challenging Russia’s long-standing hegemony in the Caspian region.

IMPLICATIONS: The navies of the three Turkic littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, have experienced substantial growth and deepened cooperation in recent years. Through a series of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and supported by Turkey, these states have enhanced their strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. These developments have not only strengthened the collective influence and military capacity of the Turkic states but have also posed a significant challenge to Russia’s longstanding naval dominance in the Caspian.

Security cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states in the absence of Russian participation signifies a major geopolitical realignment in the Caspian region. For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have agreed to employ their joint naval forces to protect pipelines on the seabed and vessels operating on the surface. The regional geopolitical competition is likely to intensify following Iran’s decision to resume drilling operations in the Caspian after a 30-year hiatus. This development could generate tensions with the three Turkic littoral states, which are already deeply engaged in offshore oil and gas extraction within the Caspian Sea.

Turkey plays a pivotal role in the ongoing militarization of the Caspian Sea. It initially strengthened Azerbaijan’s defense capabilities, subsequently supported Turkmenistan, and is now actively engaged in enhancing Kazakhstan’s naval power. According to Yuri Lyamin, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), “Kazakhstan is following the ongoing, multi-year process of strengthening the navies of Caspian states. The reasons and necessity of this can be debated, but it is a long-standing trend driven by prestige and the desire to keep up with its neighbors. Over the past decade and a half, Turkmenistan has built a very strong navy in the Caspian, including with Turkey’s assistance. It was to a Turkish design that Turkmenistan’s largest ship, and one of the largest warships in the Caspian, the corvette Deniz Khan, was commissioned and constructed in 2021. A considerable number of missile, missile-artillery, and other boats for the Turkmen border guards were also built based on Turkish designs.” The growing number of actors in the region is complicating Moscow’s ability to utilize the area for strategic connectivity projects. One of these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a Russia-led project designed to connect Russian ports with Iran, the Gulf region, and the Indian Ocean. The INSTC agreement was initially signed in 2000 by Russia, Iran, and India, was later joined by Azerbaijan and several Central Asian states. Meanwhile, Iran is actively seeking alternative trade routes to the EU, including via Armenia.

Conversely, Azerbaijan’s Port of Baku serves as a critical hub within the east–west Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, which links China to the EU via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby bypassing Russia. The Middle Corridor endows Baku’s with an important role for both Europe and Central Asia by providing a viable alternative to Russian transit routes, facilitating efficient east–west connectivity across the Caspian and through the South Caucasus.

Similarly, Turkey promotes the integration of Turkmenistan in the Middle Corridor, which would advance Turkey’s long-standing ambition to position itself as a strategic logistical bridge linking Asia and Europe.

The 2018 agreement grants the Caspian states the right to construct gas pipelines across the seabed. Ankara aims to channel Caspian gas to its territory via Azerbaijan, and onward to the EU, elevating Turkey’s role as a pivotal energy hub. However, this directly contradicts Russian interests and the potential exists for heightened tensions or even confrontation between the Turkey-backed Turkic states and the Russia-Iran alliance over control of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The geopolitical competition between the three Turkey-backed Turkic littoral states and the Russia–Iran alliance could intensify as both sides continue to expand their economic and military presence in the Caspian region. The increase in military exercises conducted over the past two years underscores the emergence of new security alignments within the Caspian basin.

Turkey has taken on a leading role in advancing the naval capabilities of the three Turkic littoral states, a position that was traditionally held by Russia. As Turkey’s involvement in the region deepens, Moscow’s ability to shape the military development of these countries will likely be further marginalized. Russia, meanwhile, continues to bear significant geopolitical costs for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the onset of the conflict, Moscow’s influence across Central Asia and other regions, including the Caspian, has steadily declined and other powers such as China and Turkey have begun to fill the resulting vacuum.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

By Sergey Sukhankin

Kazakhstan has finalized its decision regarding the bidder selected to construct its inaugural nuclear power plant (NPP). Contrary to earlier projections favoring a Chinese provider, the Russian state corporation Rosatom has assumed the leading role within the international consortium. However, this outcome is unlikely to marginalize Chinese interests: a Chinese firm is expected to lead the construction of a subsequent NPP, while Chinese companies are concurrently gaining prominence in other vital sectors of Kazakhstan’s (and Central Asia’s) economy, including renewable energy and water management. Western firms appear to be the principal losers, as their capacity to expand into the most lucrative and strategic segments of Kazakhstan’s economy is likely to diminish.

 The Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia. Image Courtesy of IAEA Imagebank  

BACKGROUND: In October 2024, following a national referendum in which over 71 percent of voters supported the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Kazakhstan, local authorities prouced a shortlist of prospective bidders. This included China’s CNNC, Russia’s Rosatom, South Korea’s KHNP, and France’s EDF. The selection process extended beyond economic rationale and was clearly shaped by geopolitical considerations: although Kazakhstani authorities initially intended to make a decision by the end of 2022, the deadline was repeatedly postponed. Despite widespread confidence among local experts that CNNC would prevail, and notable public support for the French and South Korean contenders, on June 14 it was officially announced that Russia’s Rosatom would lead the international consortium responsible for building the NPP.

However, appointing Rosatom to oversee Kazakhstan’s first NPP does not signify exclusive Russian dominance in the country’s emerging nuclear sector. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had previously stated that, to avert a foreseeable energy shortage, Kazakhstan would require not one but three NPPs. Furthermore, Minister of Energy Almasadam Sätqaliev publicly indicated that CNNC would likely head the consortium for the construction of another NPP. Tokayev later reaffirmed this during a meeting with Xi Jinping, assuring the Chinese leader that, given Kazakhstan’s need for 2–3 NPPs, CNNC is regarded as a reliable strategic partner with a secured role in the domestic market.

IMPLICATIONS: In many respects, Kazakhstan’s decision to appoint Rosatom as the head of the international consortium is readily explicable and can be attributed to two principal factors. First is the logic of “do-not-poke-the-bear” thinking. A combination of adverse developments and humiliations—the stalled “three-day war” in Ukraine, increasing economic and political isolation, and a series of setbacks in the Middle East—has rendered the Russian political elite particularly sensitive to any potential rejection of its bid by Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has once again declined to join BRICS, a move that visibly displeased Moscow. At this juncture, it is worth recalling that on May 29, Vladimir Putin met with Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev—an event that, according to some experts, may be interpreted as part of Russia’s exertion of political pressure on Kazakhstan’s current leadership in relation to the NPP project.

Despite Russia’s ongoing decline, Kazakhstan’s accommodation of Russia’s NPP-related interests is not unexpected: when cornered, the Russian regime is capable of undertaking retaliatory measures—such as provocations, subversion, or other forms of pressure—against the significantly smaller Kazakhstan. Conversely, experts have acknowledged that the selection of Rosatom may also possess an element of rationality. Analysts based in Kazakhstan emphasize Russia’s notable competitive advantages, which include cultural and linguistic proximity as well as logistical and technological compatibility. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s decision to finalize an agreement for the construction of a small NPP—an agreement that has since been upgraded in scope—may have further influenced Kazakhstan’s preference for Rosatom. Importantly, Rosatom is not subject to international sanctions, and the likelihood of its inclusion on such lists does not appear imminent.

That said, uncertainty remains regarding how Kazakhstan would respond should the corporation become subject to Western sanctions or if Russia’s macroeconomic conditions deteriorate further. Although Russia reportedly offers Kazakhstan favorable credit terms—details of which remain undisclosed—Kazakhstan-based experts highlight that Russia has previously failed to fulfill its commitments to finance energy infrastructure projects in three Kazakhstani cities. Moreover, citing the Belarusian case, anonymous Russian sources caution that partnering with Rosatom may ultimately impose a financial burden on Kazakhstan, despite the apparent economic appeal of the offer, and could also give rise to significant safety concerns over time.

Russia, however, will not be the sole dominant actor in Kazakhstan’s emerging nuclear energy sector. As previously noted, the local ruling elite regards China as a crucial component of the equation and, seemingly, as a counterbalancing force to Russia. For its part, Beijing will capitalize on several competitive advantages as it seeks to expand its influence within the country and its nuclear industry.

First, China is intensifying its cooperation with Kazakhstan in the field of water management, a domain of critical importance given the deteriorating conditions in the Caspian Sea. For example, during a recent meeting between Chinese and Kazakh water management experts, it was agreed that China Energy International Group would provide comprehensive training and expertise to its Kazakh counterparts. Additionally, it was disclosed at the meeting that the company is actively exploring the construction of a hydroelectric power facility in Kazakhstan and has expressed interest in participating in projects focused on the digitalization and automation of the country’s water management sector. Beyond current challenges with water supply, Kazakhstan’s ambitious plans to develop green hydrogen—which demands significant water resources—underscore water management as a strategic priority, and China is poised to expand its involvement in this area.

Second, China is rapidly enhancing its role in one of Kazakhstan’s most promising economic sectors—its uranium industry. Kazakhstan ranks first globally in uranium production and holds the second-largest uranium reserves after Australia, where production may decline due to growing public opposition. In light of ongoing geopolitical instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kazakhstan and Canada are likely to remain the two leading uranium producers, maintaining dominance in the global market. In this context, China could support Kazakhstan in addressing two major constraints limiting the full exploitation of its uranium resources: the absence of domestic enrichment capabilities and the continued reliance on Russia for uranium export logistics.

It is thus worth noting that Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group recently concluded an agreement with the Chinese firm SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, a subsidiary of the State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Under this arrangement, the Russian party transferred its shares in uranium production sites located in Northern Kazakhstan (Northern Khorasan) to its Chinese counterpart. Although experts remain divided on China’s rationale for acquiring stakes in what is viewed as a relatively depleted and marginal uranium site, many interpret this as a strategic move to further expand China’s presence in Kazakhstan. In any case, an increasing foothold in the country’s uranium sector could serve as a compelling argument in China’s favor in its pursuit of the NPP project.

Finally, Kazakhstan must recognize the potential consequences it may face in the near future if it fails to deepen its cooperation with China in nuclear and other forms of clean energy. Many experts contend that China’s rapid shift toward renewable energy signals a troubling trend for its hydrocarbon suppliers, including Kazakhstan. At present, renewable sources account for 80 percent of China’s energy and electricity demand, while fossil fuels still constitute approximately 62 percent of its overall energy consumption. However, the proportion of non-renewable energy in China’s energy mix is expected to decline further. This trajectory suggests that Kazakhstan should proactively explore alternative areas of economic cooperation—such as critical metals, renewable energy, and nuclear power—with its principal economic partner, especially in light of Beijing’s strategic direction and the intensifying competition from regional actors like Uzbekistan, where China is also expanding its presence.

CONCLUSIONS: Kazakhstan’s decision to appoint Rosatom de facto as the lead entity in constructing its first nuclear power plant (NPP) reflects a blend of economic, geopolitical, and symbolic considerations. The second NPP will most likely be built by China, which is simultaneously consolidating its position in Kazakhstan’s water management and renewable energy sectors—domains poised to drive economic growth across Central Asia for decades to come. For Russia, weakened and humiliated in Ukraine and the Middle East, the opportunity to construct Kazakhstan’s inaugural NPP represents a highly symbolic gesture, acknowledging its ongoing role in bilateral relations. Kazakhstan’s choice to prioritize a Sino-Russian consortium—though the long-term stability of this partnership remains uncertain—for shaping the country’s nuclear future effectively establishes a duopoly in this sector of the national economy. This development may be unwelcome news for Western actors, whose companies are unlikely to secure significant contracts in Kazakhstan’s most strategic economic sectors.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Sergey Sukhankin

In early January 2025, operations at the uranium-producing Kazakhstan-based Joint Venture Inkai LLP (JV Inkai) were temporarily halted – the venture, established in the early 1990s, has been jointly managed by Kazatomprom (which holds a 60 percent stake) and the Canadian company Cameco (with 40 percent) – resulting in a brief decline in the share prices of both firms in New York and evident concern among Canadian investors. After a short interruption, activities at Inkai resumed without disruption. This event – though seemingly a minor occurrence that largely escaped the attention of many analysts – reflects broader and more concerning trends (particularly for the West) emerging within the global uranium market, in which Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role.

Photo source: NAC Kazatomprom JSC

BACKGROUND: The strategic significance of uranium extends well beyond its military applications. The rapidly increasing global interest in nuclear energy—among both economically advanced and developing countries—is contributing to uranium’s emergence as a commodity of critical strategic value. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA), in addition to the existing 420 nuclear reactors worldwide, 63 new reactors are currently under construction, and the operational lifespan of a further 60 reactors is being extended. As a result, uranium's importance is projected to grow steadily in the years ahead. The present and future stability of the global nuclear energy sector is therefore highly contingent upon reliable access to substantial, readily extractable uranium reserves located in politically stable and predictable nations. It is precisely in this context, however, that significant challenges begin to surface.

Following the onset of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Western access to two critical sources of both enriched and unenriched uranium has been partially obstructed. U.S. sanctions targeting Russian uranium have jeopardized U.S. access to this supply, while geopolitical instability—marked by a pronounced anti-Western orientation—in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, has effectively severed France’s access to locally sourced unenriched uranium. Exacerbating this situation, other major African uranium producers, including Namibia and Tanzania, are increasingly inclined to cooperate with Russia and China in uranium extraction activities. This emerging alignment places them in growing opposition to Western companies and their strategic interests.

At present, the already limited list of geopolitically stable, world-class uranium-producing nations has effectively narrowed to just three: Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia. Among them, Kazakhstan stands as the global leader in the production of unenriched uranium, accounting for over 40 percent of total global output, and ranks as the second-largest country in terms of uranium reserves.

The primary concern lies in the fact that, despite its considerable wealth in natural resources, Kazakhstan is unable to fully leverage its vast resource potential. The country remains heavily dependent on two dominant geopolitical actors—Russia and China—both of which exert significant influence over the direction and development of Kazakhstan’s uranium-producing sector. Most critically, these two states maintain increasingly strained relations with the West.

Consequently, certain Kazakhstan-based analysts have voiced suspicions that the underlying cause of the operational halt at Inkai was pressure exerted by Russia, allegedly in response to Kazakhstan’s post-2022 efforts to alter the logistics of its uranium exports by decreasing reliance on Russian transit routes and instead utilizing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (commonly referred to as the Middle Corridor) as an alternative to exporting uranium through Russian territory.

IMPLICATIONS: The global uranium industry is currently characterized by rapidly increasing demand alongside growing uncertainty regarding the reliability of supply, driven largely by global and regional geopolitical disruptions. Within this context, Kazakhstan’s role as a resource-rich and historically stable supplier of uranium has acquired a qualitatively new significance. Notably, Kazakh authorities have publicly committed to boosting uranium production in 2025 and to diversifying both their export destinations and logistical routes, aiming to reduce the country's reliance on Russia. Nevertheless, the “Inkai incident”—which allegedly represents only the visible portion of deeper structural dynamics affecting Kazakhstan’s uranium sector—raises three key concerns.

First, can Kazakhstan successfully restructure its existing logistical routes and thereby reduce its strategic dependence on Russia? On the surface, such a shift appears feasible. According to statistics provided by Kazakh authorities, the country has made tangible progress in increasing uranium shipments through the Middle Corridor. Available data indicate that approximately 64 percent of West-bound uranium exports are now transported via this route. Moreover, Kazakhstan has also expanded its uranium exports to Western markets, with shipments destined for the United States gaining particular prominence.

The reality, however, appears significantly more complex. Despite recent efforts to diversify transit routes, a substantial portion of Kazakhstan’s uranium exports continues to be transported through Russian territory. Furthermore, Russia’s state-owned corporation Rosatom maintains (in)direct control over at least five of Kazakhstan’s fourteen major uranium production sites, reinforcing Russia’s strategic influence over the sector. In addition, the Middle Corridor presents notable challenges. Geopolitically, Georgia—an essential transit country along the route—occupies a critical position, and its political leadership has demonstrated increasing alignment with Moscow, potentially complicating matters should Russo-Western relations further deteriorate. From a logistical standpoint, representatives of the Canadian firm Cameco have expressed concerns, stating that the Middle Corridor “has proven to be neither reliable nor predictable,” due to the complex network of countries traversed and the numerous permits required for transit.

Compounding these challenges is the apparent ambivalence within Kazakhstan regarding the exclusion of Russia from its current uranium transportation framework. Specifically, Kazakh officials have indicated that the country does not intend to significantly expand the use of the Middle Corridor for uranium exports. Additionally, many Kazakhstan-based experts express skepticism about any prospective reduction in cooperation with Rosatom (i.e., Russia). On the contrary, a prevailing view among these analysts is that bilateral collaboration in the uranium sector is likely to deepen in the future.

Second, what is the actual role of China in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry and how will this role evolve? At present, China is the world’s second-largest consumer of uranium, following the United States, and its demand is expected to continue rising. Kazakhstan serves as China’s primary source of uranium: according to several studies, over half of Kazakhstan’s uranium output is currently exported to China, with some estimates suggesting this figure may be as high as 60 percent. This situation, as noted by representatives of major Western uranium-related enterprises, “raises concerns about reduced availability for Western markets, potentially exacerbating global supply constraints,” a challenge that is already beginning to manifest within the industry.

Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group recently concluded an agreement with the Chinese firm SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, a subsidiary of the State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Under this arrangement, the Russian side transferred its shares in uranium-producing sites located in Northern Kazakhstan (Northern Khorasan) to its Chinese counterparts. At present, there is no consensus among experts regarding China’s rationale for acquiring stakes in what is considered a relatively depleted and comparatively minor uranium production site.
While some analysts contend that the acquisition primarily serves China’s geoeconomic objectives—particularly in light of projections indicating a substantial increase in the country’s uranium consumption over the coming years—others emphasize a more overtly geopolitical dimension to China’s actions. Notably, Stanislav Pritchin of the Central Asia Department at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences has drawn attention to China’s established practice of acquiring “unpromising” oil and natural gas deposits. In his view, such acquisitions function as instruments for expanding China’s strategic presence within the host country.

Third, what is the future role of Western companies in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry? Given that neither China nor Russia appears willing to reduce their involvement in the sector—thereby sustaining Kazakhstan’s strategic dependency on both actors—serious concerns have emerged regarding the potential marginalization or even eventual withdrawal of Western firms from the country’s uranium landscape. Indeed, some Kazakhstan-based experts have implicitly acknowledged a widely discussed notion circulating in Western policy and business circles: the ongoing bifurcation of the global uranium industry. This refers to the emergence of a distinct segmentation of uranium supply chains along geopolitical lines, with one stream aligned with the West and the other with the China-led bloc. Within this context, it is feared that Kazakhstan may ultimately be compelled to align more closely with the latter and reduce its cooperation with Western partners accordingly.

Undoubtedly, such a scenario would only be likely to materialize in the event of a further deterioration in political and economic relations between China (and, under certain conditions, Russia) and their Western counterparts. While this scenario remains hypothetical at present, it is by no means implausible.

CONCLUSION: Although Kazakhstan and its political leadership have expressed strong interest in expanding foreign—particularly Western—participation in the country’s uranium industry, the influence of external geopolitical dynamics cannot be overlooked. As uranium increasingly assumes a role in the global energy mix comparable to that historically occupied by fossil fuels, the issue of access to and supply of this resource has transcended purely economic considerations and has firmly entered the realm of geopolitics.

In light of the intensifying geopolitical competition between East and West over access to emerging markets and spheres of influence, it is conceivable that China and its strategic partners may seek to curtail Western access to Kazakhstan-based uranium—mirroring developments in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Western firms are increasingly being displaced from uranium-related ventures. To avert a potential supply shock—akin to that experienced in the oil and natural gas sector following Russia’s attempt, in the aftermath of February 2022, to weaponize hydrocarbon exports as a means of exerting geopolitical pressure on the West—it is imperative that Western companies (and, arguably, governments) begin to explore alternative uranium sources to sustain their nuclear energy agendas. Given the small number of globally significant suppliers, increased attention should be directed toward Canada and Australia, which possess substantial uranium reserves and are regarded as geopolitically stable and reliable partners.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).