By Sergey Sukhankin

In late 2025, during his visit to Kyrgyzstan, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin declared Russia’s readiness to build a small modular nuclear power reactor (SMR) in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signaling Moscow’s intention to move beyond traditional trade relations toward projects in long-term strategic infrastructure. Russia’s proposal may be justified by the need to address Kyrgyzstan’s persistent problem of frequent energy shortages, caused by rising consumption, aging energy infrastructure, and overreliance on hydropower as the primary source of electricity generation. At a deeper level, however, the initiative reflects Moscow’s post-2022 strategy, premised on exporting high-technology solutions to politically friendly states and anchoring influence through capital-intensive projects with multi-decade life cycles, such as SMRs. Undoubtedly, if successfully constructed, an SMR could strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s energy security. Yet, it would also exacerbate the country’s strategic dependence on Russia by locking it into long-term technological, financial, and regulatory reliance, rendering the project arguably more geopolitical in nature than economic.

BACKGROUND:

Kyrgyzstan’s energy system has long suffered from structural fragility stemming from the country’s overarching dependence on hydropower: more than 90 percent of electricity generation derives from this source, largely produced by the Toktogul cascade. Exposed to multiple risks and weaknesses, such as droughts, aging Soviet-era infrastructure, and rapidly growing domestic demand, the system has shifted from experiencing occasional electricity deficits to facing a structural crisis. In 2023, the government introduced a state of emergency in the energy sector, explicitly acknowledging the inability of existing generation capacity and demand-management tools to ensure uninterrupted supply. Experts note that persistent electricity shortages could further undermine Kyrgyzstan’s socio-economic stability and, in the longer term, generate political repercussions posing serious challenges to the country’s leadership. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan appears unable to address this challenge independently. Beyond economic constraints, particularly the high fixed costs associated with hydropower generation, recent water shortages have further exacerbated the problem. In this context, Kyrgyz authorities have expressed interest in developing nuclear energy projects, with external financial support, as a potential solution to the country’s long-term electricity supply challenges.

This interest emerged in parallel with Russia’s broader strategic effort to diversify its export portfolio beyond raw materials. In this context, Moscow has actively promoted the deployment of an SMR in Kyrgyzstan as part of a wider push to export high-value energy technologies. The origins of this initiative can be traced to early 2022, when Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, and the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy signed a non-binding memorandum on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Beyond signaling technical cooperation, the memorandum laid the groundwork for potential SMR construction and the gradual development of a national regulatory framework, indicating a long-term and structurally embedded approach rather than a short-term energy solution. Following the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 and Russia’s exposure to an expanding array of international (Western) sanctions, the idea gained renewed momentum.

Given Kyrgyzstan’s highly specific socio-political environment, distinct from that of other Central Asian states, public opinion on nuclear energy is an issue the ruling elite cannot afford to ignore. Available evidence suggests that societal attitudes toward nuclear power remain ambivalent. According to public opinion surveys conducted in 2024, 58 percent of respondents expressed support for the development of nuclear energy, while 38 percent voiced categorical opposition. Support is largely driven by expectations that nuclear power could help meet the country’s growing electricity demand and create new employment opportunities. At the same time, significant concerns persist regarding nuclear safety, environmental risks, seismic vulnerability, and the state’s institutional capacity to regulate complex and high-risk technologies. As a result, nuclear energy remains a politically sensitive and potentially contentious issue within Kyrgyzstan’s domestic political landscape.

IMPLICATIONS:

Should the Kyrgyz political leadership respond positively to Russia’s proposal, the country would face a combination of potential benefits and risks, which can be broadly categorized as follows.

First, meeting energy needs and ensuring system stability. From an energy-security perspective, the emergence of an SMR could positively affect Kyrgyzstan’s electricity balance. Unlike hydropower, nuclear generation provides continuous baseload output independent of seasonal water availability. Russian officials have indicated that Kyrgyzstan could be offered a plant based on the RITM-200N reactor design, with total capacity ranging from approximately 110 to 440 MW, depending on configuration. This output could supply electricity to between 66,000 and 352,000 households simultaneously. Even at the lower end of this range, such capacity could reduce imports and ease pressure on hydropower assets during dry periods. That said, to fully realize these benefits, Kyrgyzstan would need to meet several conditions: the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory framework, an independent nuclear safety authority, trained operators, emergency-response systems, and long-term arrangements for fuel supply and waste management. For Kyrgyzstan, this would entail either creating much of this infrastructure from scratch or delegating these functions to Russia, a choice that would inevitably deepen institutional dependence on Russia.

Second, the issue of economic costs and long-term dependence. Although SMRs are often presented as cheaper and more flexible than conventional large nuclear plants, they remain capital-intensive projects with long payback periods. In practice, this would require Kyrgyzstan to assume long-term financial obligations while ceding significant control over critical components of its energy system to a foreign state with a documented record of using energy as a geopolitical instrument of pressure. Moreover, dependence would extend well beyond construction, encompassing fuel supply, maintenance, software, spare parts, and periodic upgrades. For Kyrgyzstan, this would narrow future strategic options and increase the cost of diversifying away from Russian technology for decades to come.

Third, implications for domestic politics. Nuclear projects frequently face public resistance even in countries with strong institutions. In Kyrgyzstan, where trust in state decision-making is limited and political competition is intense, an SMR could become a focal point for opposition mobilization, particularly in the event of an incident or if Russia were perceived as leveraging Kyrgyzstan’s dependence. Without transparent consultations, credible safety assurances, and clearly articulated local benefits, the project risks appearing as an externally imposed geopolitical arrangement rather than a sovereign national development choice.

Fourth, intra-regional geopolitical effects. The Central Asian “water–energy–food” nexus is inherently conflict-prone due to divergent seasonal priorities: upstream states, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, seek to maximize winter electricity generation, while downstream countries depend on summer water flows for irrigation. From a policy perspective, the deployment of an SMR could offer a structural advantage by providing reliable winter baseload generation, thereby reducing reliance on hydropower and creating space for more predictable and cooperative water–energy arrangements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, this opportunity entails significant trade-offs. An SMR would deepen long-term technological and financial commitments to an external partner and could become entangled in regional and extra-regional geopolitical bargaining. If politicized, the project risks undermining trust, constraining policy flexibility, and further securitizing energy governance in Central Asia rather than contributing to its stabilization.

CONCLUSIONS:

Russia’s proposal to build an SMR in Kyrgyzstan represents a pivotal choice that extends well beyond energy policy. While the project could substantially enhance electricity security and reduce vulnerability to hydrological shocks, it would also bind Kyrgyzstan to long-term technological, financial, and regulatory dependence on Russia. In a politically pluralistic and socially sensitive environment, such dependence entails significant domestic and regional risks. Ultimately, the project’s impact will depend on whether Kyrgyz authorities can balance short-term energy gains against strategic autonomy, address public concerns transparently, and prevent the SMR from becoming an instrument of geopolitical leverage rather than a catalyst for sustainable development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Ambassador David Dondua

Georgia’s democratic backslide has shocked observers at home and abroad. Once a “beacon of democracy” and a frontrunner of European integration, the country has lost its standing within the European democratic family in a remarkably short time. While this shift may appear sudden, it reflects deeper vulnerabilities—lessons that matter not only for Georgia but also for other small states navigating similar geopolitical crossroads.

BACKGROUND:

The rapid erosion of Georgia’s democratic and pro-Western trajectory cannot be explained by a single decision, policy, or political figure. Rather, it is the result of a complex combination of factors. At the most general level, it reflects the success of a long-term Russian hybrid and cognitive operation against Georgian society, an operation that ultimately proved much more effective than the 2008 military invasion.

As a result of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russia occupied only 20 per cent of Georgia’s territory. In the decade that followed, however, Moscow achieved something far more consequential. Through sustained political influence, economic leverage, disinformation, and elite capture, it gradually penetrated Georgia’s state institutions. Government, parliament, the presidential administration, courts, security services, police, armed forces, and the foreign service all became vulnerable to influence. Most importantly, Russia succeeded in distracting the country from its European integration trajectory and sowing mistrust toward democratic reforms and Western aspirations. Strategically, this amounted to the cognitive occupation of the entire state.

Blaming this reversal solely on Russian hybrid attacks, the pro-Russian stance of the ruling Georgian Dream government, or the role of the de facto ruler, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, would be too simple. The reality is more complex. Among the many political, social, and institutional factors that shaped Georgia’s vulnerability, one has remained largely unrecognized, rarely discussed, and almost entirely absent from public debate.

In the late 1980s, as the collapse of the Soviet Union became inevitable, Georgian society engaged in intense debates about the future of the independent state. Constitutional arrangements, models of governance, economic systems, currency, and even sporting affiliations were openly discussed. One issue, however, was never truly debated: the foreign policy orientation of independent Georgia.

On this question, there appeared to be complete consensus. Becoming part of the West was treated as self-evident—almost sacred. It was widely perceived as the fulfilment of centuries-long aspirations to align Georgia with Europe. No alternatives were discussed, not because they were examined and rejected, but because few dared to articulate them. In a diverse, multi-ethnic society that had lived under Russian rule for more than two centuries, it is unlikely that such alternatives were entirely absent. Yet for the next three decades, this unchallenged consensus shaped both Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy.

IMPLICATIONS: 

From today’s perspective, this unquestioned consensus appears to have been a missed opportunity for deeper and informed societal consolidation. This observation should not be misunderstood as questioning Georgia’s European choice. The author firmly believes that the European path was and remains the right choice for Georgia. Yet accepting this choice without deep public reasoning, open discussion, or even heated debate left society ill-prepared to fully understand and defend it.

Georgian society is often characterized by emotional radicalism, reinforced by a lack of democratic traditions. This leaves limited space for critical reflection. As a result, key aspects of EU and NATO integration were rarely discussed in a fact-based and accessible way. Public support, therefore, remained largely emotional rather than knowledge-based.

This gap became visible whenever misinformation spread. Claims that EU regulations would ban or severely restrict traditional agricultural products, force the uprooting of vineyards—widely perceived as an attack on Georgia’s cultural heritage—or exclude most of local goods from European markets due to strict quality standards repeatedly triggered public outrage. Such narratives exposed how shallow public understanding often was, despite consistently high levels of declared support for European integration.

Insufficient effort was made to explain to citizens that compromise is inherent in joining any international organisation. Government officials and even NGOs promoting the EU and NATO integration often avoided discussing trade-offs and long-term costs. Citizens were rarely told that today’s difficulties are frequently the price of tomorrow’s benefits—choices that can only be made consciously by an informed society.

Following the adoption of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), the state should have launched a large-scale educational effort to demonstrate how this instrument could be applied in practice, particularly for small entrepreneurs and rural communities. While some initiatives were undertaken, largely with donor support, they were insufficient. For many citizens, European integration remained an abstract promise rather than a lived experience.

A fundamental contradiction of Georgia’s post-independence politics is that all Georgian governments over the past three and a half decades have claimed to be pro-Western and have promised the population a European democratic future, including NATO membership. Even the current ruling party, Georgian Dream, publicly declared the same until recently. Yet in practice, the actions of all those governments, without exception, have often fallen short of democratic standards, at times even sharply contradicting them. 

Against this backdrop, today, the ruling party has deliberately cast Europe as a convenient scapegoat for almost all of the country’s past and current difficulties, whether stemming from poor governance, institutional weaknesses, corruption, reform costs, or external developments beyond Georgia’s control. Georgian Dream has transformed ordinary challenges into a political weapon to erode public trust in democratic reforms and derail the country’s European path.

As noted above, in every election, including the watershed 2012 vote, virtually all political actors pledged a European future to voters; even marginal candidates openly backed or courted by the Kremlin used pro-Western rhetoric. Unlike in Ukraine, Moldova, or Armenia, where societies were exposed to competing geopolitical visions and, over time, could observe different policy orientations, compare outcomes, and distinguish between credible and non-credible strategic paths, Georgian voters were never offered a genuine choice. They were offered reassurance that the European path was uncontested and secure. This monopoly of a single geopolitical orientation meant that alternatives were neither seriously articulated nor openly debated. Paradoxically, the absence of pluralism later became a vulnerability: because the European choice was never collectively debated and consciously affirmed, it failed to generate a strong sense of public ownership.

Today, pro-Russian actors exploit this gap by asking: “Who decided that Georgia must choose Europe?” The ruling Georgian Dream has increasingly reinforced this narrative by claiming that the European course was imposed on Georgia by some phantom foreign forces. 

At the same time, fully replacing Europe with Russia remains politically tricky in the short term, given prevailing public attitudes. Instead, the government has sought to cultivate the idea of “state neutrality” as an ostensibly safer alternative to Western integration, one that promises stability while allowing Georgians to preserve their traditions, identity, and way of life without external pressure. Packaged in this way, neutrality appears as a return to normalcy and sovereignty. Such a narrative can gain traction precisely because the European path was never thoroughly debated, internalised, and embraced on the basis of knowledge.

In reality, however, neutrality functions as a transitional narrative rather than a genuine option. Given Georgia’s geography, security environment and economic dependencies, let alone historical experience, neutrality is simply not workable. In practice, abandoning Western integration is the fastest route to renewed subordination to Russia and the gradual erosion of Georgian statehood.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s democratic and geopolitical setback is not the result of abandoning Europe overnight. It is the consequence of failing to cultivate deep understanding, ownership, and resilience around the European choice over three decades. Strategic orientations cannot survive on consensus alone; they require constant explanation, public debate, and civic education.

For years, Georgia proudly cited overwhelming public support for European integration. Yet emotional endorsement without understanding is fragile. A society that genuinely comprehends how Western institutions function and what integration realistically entails is far more resilient to manipulation. In retrospect, 50 or even 40 per cent of firm, knowledge-based support would have been more durable than 80 per cent of symbolic approval. This underscores that the key to Georgia’s recovery lies not in numbers alone but in cultivating genuine understanding and ownership among citizens.

This moment, however, is not irreversible. What was insufficiently addressed in the past can still be corrected. Periods of crisis often force societies to replace inherited assumptions with conscious choices. Continued engagement by Georgia’s Western partners is therefore essential—not less, but more focused on education, communication, and societal resilience.

Europe has not disappeared from Georgia’s collective identity. If reinforced through knowledge rather than slogans, it can still serve as the foundation for democratic recovery and a sustainable return to the European path.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ambassador David Dondua is a diplomat and political analyst. He serves as Chairman of the EU Awareness Centre, a Brussels-based think tank focused on European integration, democratic resilience, and countering hybrid threats in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

China is reshaping Central Asia’s nuclear energy sector, challenging Russia’s long-standing dominance in the region. In September 2025, Uzbekistan explored a contingency agreement with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), amid concerns that the contract signed in June with Russia’s state-owned nuclear monopoly, Rosatom, for the construction of nuclear power units might face delays. While Rosatom leads the consortium responsible for building Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, CNNC has emerged as the principal alternative competitor. Under current plans, CNNC would assume a leading role in the construction of Kazakhstan’s second and third nuclear power plants.

BACKGROUND: Nuclear energy has been a central instrument through which Russia has sustained its presence in Central Asia. Experts argue that nuclear power projects tend to create long-term dependencies for host states, particularly when nuclear energy constitutes a significant share of national electricity generation. Such projects also entail security risks, including the potential for sabotage. A 2023 study on Russian nuclear energy diplomacy published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs notes that “Central Asia has a special place in Russian nuclear energy diplomacy because of the post-Soviet heritage, meaning that Rosatom’s operations in the region are easier and smoother than elsewhere.”

Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 intensified Russia’s diplomatic isolation, undermining its dominance in Central Asia’s nuclear energy sector. As a sanctioned and increasingly isolated Russia gradually loses its influence in the region’s nuclear landscape, Beijing is capitalizing on the opportunity to secure new clients for its nuclear reactor technology.

During a visit to Uzbekistan in 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement with Tashkent for the construction of a 2.4-gigawatt nuclear power plant, valued at approximately US$ 11 billion. However, the project failed to progress as planned and was revised in 2024, when the two sides concluded a new agreement for a facility comprising six small reactors, each with a capacity of 55 megawatts (MW).

In June 2024, Russia concluded an agreement with Uzatom to carry out a feasibility study on constructing a nuclear power plant comprising two to four VVER-1000 reactors in Uzbekistan. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan held discussions with Rosatom on a small nuclear power plant with a capacity of 110 MW. However, the talks failed to progress after Bishkek lost interest.

In June 2025, Kazakhstan announced the selection of Rosatom to lead the construction of the country’s first nuclear power plant. In a separate statement, however, Astana also confirmed that CNNC would head the development of the country’s second nuclear facility. In August 2025, Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar further stated that CNNC would also lead the construction of the country’s third nuclear power plant. In September 2025, Uzbekistan’s nuclear agency, Uzatom, unveiled an upgrade plan for its two small nuclear reactors (RITM-200N), scheduled for completion by 2030, and for two large nuclear units (VVER-1000) by the mid-2030s. By pursuing a multi-vector diplomatic strategy, Uzbekistan has signed nuclear energy agreements with both Russia and China.

China’s nuclear energy cooperation in Central Asia is expanding rapidly. In September 2025, Beijing–Tashkent nuclear cooperation featured prominently in a meeting between Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Shen Yanfeng, Chairman of CNNC, held on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China. Following the Mirziyoyev–Yanfeng meeting, new mining agreements valued at US$ 5 billion, including a uranium mining deal, were announced.

IMPLICATIONS: Energy-constrained Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have looked to Rosatom, the world’s leading constructor and exporter of nuclear reactors. International sanctions imposed on Russia over its war in Ukraine have cast uncertainty over Rosatom’s future. As a result, Russia’s clients in Central Asia are increasingly turning to China as an alternative partner for nuclear energy cooperation. It was against this backdrop that Tashkent, in September 2025, discussed a contingency agreement with China for the construction of nuclear power plants, supplementing a deal signed with Rosatom in June 2025. While Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant is being built by Russia, China is set to lead the construction of the country’s second and third nuclear facilities.

China’s growing involvement in the nuclear energy sector is significantly eroding Russia’s long-standing dominance in the region. CNNC has emerged as a strong competitor to Russia’s Rosatom in nuclear projects in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as both Central Asian states expand their nuclear energy programs.

CNNC is posing strong competition to Russia’s Rosatom on cost considerations in nuclear energy projects. For Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, CNNC sought to attract Kazakh authorities by proposing the construction of two nuclear units with a combined capacity of 2.4 gigawatts at a cost of US$ 5.47 billion, a significantly lower bid. The comparatively lower cost of Chinese nuclear reactors gives China a competitive advantage over Russia in Central Asia, where affordability is a critical factor in ensuring the financial sustainability of host countries.

China’s policy of sharing nuclear technology and granting host countries full control over the nuclear fuel cycle emphasizes energy independence in states developing nuclear power projects. This approach is particularly attractive to Central Asian countries and gives China a competitive advantage over Russia. In Kazakhstan, for example, this policy aligns with Astana’s long-term objective of reducing dependence on external powers in the nuclear energy sector, and CNNC has offered technology transfer along with full control of the fuel cycle. By contrast, Russia follows a model that retains control over fuel supply and requires the repatriation of spent fuel for the duration of a plant’s operation in non-nuclear states.

Faster delivery timelines are another factor that make China more attractive to Central Asian countries than Russia in nuclear energy projects. Chinese companies typically complete nuclear power projects in seven years or less, whereas Rosatom generally requires between six and nine years to construct nuclear reactors.

Despite China’s competitive advantages in cost and delivery speed, Chinese nuclear projects involve technical and environmental risks. China does not provide Central Asian states with a long-term, reliable solution for radioactive waste management. Consequently, in the absence of advanced and transparent safety protocols, safety concerns remain a major obstacle to China’s nuclear ambitions in the region.

In September 2025, Almassadam Satkaliyev, Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency, emphasized the importance of ensuring safe operations at nuclear facilities. He stated that Kazakhstan would continue to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and nuclear fuel production to electricity generation at nuclear power plants, while strictly adhering to the country’s international obligations regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

CONCLUSIONS: Despite international sanctions imposed in response to the war in Ukraine, Russia is making concerted efforts to maintain its influence over nuclear energy projects in Central Asia. However, sanctions have increasingly eroded Russia’s primary source of leverage, nuclear cooperation, allowing China to challenge Moscow’s long-standing dominance in the region’s nuclear energy sector.

China’s nuclear power initiatives are poised to solidify its long-term strategic influence in Central Asia. These projects necessitate decades of engagement through fuel supply chains, technology transfer, and sustained operational oversight.

China is reshaping Central Asia's nuclear landscape by leveraging cost competitiveness, technology transfer, and expedited project timelines to erode Russia's traditional dominance in energy cooperation. However, despite these advantages, concerns persist regarding China’s comparatively lax safety standards.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation. Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Nargiza Umarova

The Islamic Republic of Iran is intensifying its transport diplomacy with Central Asian states, driven by a shared interest in enhancing their competitive positions in transit transport amid the growing importance of east–west and north–south land corridors. Despite international economic sanctions and sustained pressure from the U.S., Iran continues to pursue mutually beneficial partnerships with neighboring countries to consolidate its role as a regional transit hub. This strategy is particularly evident in its promotion to Europe of the Southern Corridor, which involves virtually all Central Asian states, as well as China

BACKGROUND: In recent years, Central Asia has emerged as a focal point in the transformation of Eurasia’s transport architecture, reinforcing momentum for the development of sustainable trade routes through Iran to West and South Asia and to Europe. This trend aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Iran formally joined in 2021 following the signing of a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with Beijing.

China has shown growing interest in operating the southern branch of the New Silk Road, as heightened maritime tensions and the war in Ukraine, which have constrained the Northern Corridor through Russia and Belarus, have compelled Beijing to redirect part of its Europe-bound cargo to continental routes. Central Asia and the South Caucasus provide an alternative through multimodal transport across the Caspian and Black Seas. China is already engaged in trans-Caspian logistics: in 2024, cargo volumes transported from China via the Middle Corridor exceeded 27,000 containers, representing a 25-fold increase compared to 2023. At the same time, Beijing is pursuing the development of the Southern Transit Route for both economic and geopolitical reasons.

The EU is China’s second-largest trading partner. Mutual trade reached US$ 762 billion in 2024 and rose to almost US$ 850 billion in 2025. Given that Chinese exports to the EU are dominated by high-technology goods, Beijing naturally prioritizes containerized transport for overland logistics. From a technical perspective, the transit corridor through Iran is particularly well suited to this purpose. This corridor is expected to become monomodal following the completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the railway line linking Marand in Iran with Cheshmeh Soraya and onward to the Turkish border in the Aralık region. The latter project will eliminate the need for ferry transport across Lake Van in Turkey, which currently constrains the smooth functioning of the Southern Corridor.

In 2025, Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development announced plans to construct nine transit railway corridors with a total length of 17,000 kilometers, at an estimated cost exceeding US$ 10 billion. Upon completion, Iran’s rail network is expected to handle up to 60 million tons of cargo annually. Several of these projects, including the 200-kilometer Marand–Cheshmeh Soraya railway, are aligned with the Southern Railway Corridor and are intended to position it as the shortest trade route between East and West.

IMPLICATIONS: The granting of exclusive rights to the U.S. to develop the Zangezur Corridor, proposed to be named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), is increasingly prompting China to provide tangible support for the Southern Corridor through Iran. A joint venture, the TRIPP Development Company, has been announced, with the U.S. holding a 74 percent stake. Beijing may interpret this initiative as an effort by Washington to gain leverage over freight transport along the Middle Corridor. To mitigate this risk, China requires reliable transport routes that bypass the Caspian Sea.

China is currently constructing the Sarakhs railway terminal on the Turkmenistan–Iran border, a project expected to accelerate container transport along the China–Central Asia–Iran–Turkey–EU and Gulf routes. In August 2025, Iranian authorities reported that more than half of the project had been completed.

Beijing and Tehran have also agreed to electrify a 1,000-kilometre railway section from Sarakhs to Razi on the Turkish border. The project includes the construction of additional track segments, which are expected to triple freight capacity to 15 million tons annually.

Meanwhile, Iran and Turkmenistan plan to lay additional 1,435 mm- and 1,520 mm-gauge tracks between the Sarakhs stations to accelerate freight movement and expand border-crossing capacity. The objective is to raise cross-border freight volumes to 20 million tons annually, including up to 6 million tons transported by rail. Both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the Southern Railway Corridor westward and the Central Asia–Persian Gulf multimodal transport corridor, the latter launched in 2016 under the Ashgabat Agreement by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Oman.

Uzbekistan’s policy of diversifying its trade flows and establishing efficient transport links with global markets has provided significant momentum to the development of the southern branch of the East–West transit corridor. As early as 2022, Tashkent, in cooperation with Ankara, launched freight rail services along the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey route. This corridor, with potential extension to the EU, was presented as the fastest and most efficient option for bilateral export and import deliveries.

Tashkent views the Southern Corridor, whose current capacity is limited to 10 million tons per year for technical and political reasons, as a potential driver of its own economic growth through a significant expansion of transport service exports. This prospect is closely linked to the completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, scheduled for 2030. Once integrated with Iran’s rail network within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s unified transport space, the East Asia–Europe route will be shortened by approximately 900 kilometers, reducing delivery times by seven to eight days. As a result, the Southern Railway Corridor is expected to become the shortest monomodal link between these two economically advanced regions. In parallel, the construction of an international highway connecting China with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is projected to generate additional cargo flows in the Iran–Turkey direction and to support the development of the China–Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU multimodal transit corridor. Pilot implementation of this project is expected in 2026.

At the same time, the China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU and China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU railway corridors are under development. Their advancement is being coordinated through regular consultations among the railway authorities of the six participating countries, with two meetings held in 2025. The first took place in Tehran in May, after which China dispatched its first freight train from Xi’an to Aprin, Iran’s largest dry port, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This route reduces delivery times to approximately 15 days, around half the duration of maritime transport. By the end of 2025, 40 cargo trains had been dispatched from China to Iran, compared to only seven over the previous seven years. The significance of these developments extends beyond China–Iran trade, contributing to broader improvements in transport connectivity between East Asia and Europe.

On August 2, 2025, the heads of the railway companies of Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey held a further round of negotiations in Beijing on the operation of the southern branch of the East–West Corridor. Building on the May meeting, the parties elaborated a preliminary agreement establishing uniform transport tariffs along the China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU railway route, as well as measures to increase freight volumes, including standardized delivery times and simplified procedures.

Central Asian states seek transit through Iran not only to access Turkey and Europe by land, but also to reach the Indian Ocean via Iran’s major southern ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas. In 2023, Uzbekistan announced plans to build a terminal and warehouse facilities at Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar. In 2025, Kazakhstan declared its intention to construct a transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Seaport, part of the Bandar Abbas Port. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan likewise attach high priority to transport cooperation with Tehran and are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure via Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These developments reflect the accelerated expansion of multimodal transport corridors along the north–south axis and the growing importance of Central Asia in global logistics.

CONCLUSIONS: Amid ongoing transformations in Central Asia’s logistics landscape, cooperation between the region’s states and Iran, whose geography provides ocean access and a diversified transport infrastructure ranging from highways to major seaports, is becoming increasingly critical. Despite international sanctions, the five Central Asian republics have adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach toward Iran, using transport diplomacy to strengthen their transit capacities. The key challenge ahead is the collective resolution of bottlenecks along the Southern Transit Corridor. This will require harmonization of transport policies and legislation, technical and technological standards, the adoption of unified transport documentation, and the establishment of a coordinating body to align the activities of the railway administrations along the route. 

It is equally critical to develop a consolidated approach to the conflict-generating situation in Iran, which poses a serious threat to the prospects of regional transport projects. In this context, Central Asian states should clearly define and defend their interests vis-à-vis Western partners, including the U.S., by seeking favorable conditions for promoting trans-Iranian routes.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Farkhod Tolipov

In mid-December 2025, several Russian state-controlled media outlets spread a rumor that Russia could apply for membership in the Central Asian Community. This statement followed Azerbaijan’s entry into the regional grouping in November at the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent. The rumor reminded of Russia’s accession to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization in 2004, which led to the merger of that body with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community. Once again, Russia seeks to join the Central Asian Community, potentially worsening geopolitical tensions in the region.

BACKGROUND: Twenty years ago, in 2004, Russia applied for membership in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). At that time, the presidents of two key states, Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev of and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, were unable to refuse Moscow. This external membership in CACO eventually led to the organization’s collapse. One year after Russia’s admission, CACO was merged with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES) on the grounds that the two organizations duplicated each other. Uzbekistan withdrew from EvrAzES in 2008. The structure itself existed until 2014, and in 2015, it was replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Only two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are now members of the EAEU. 

In 2019, the Russian side suddenly announced that Uzbekistan could become a member of the EAEU. Uzbekistan never confirmed either its desire or the possibility of such membership but decided in December 2020 to become an observer in the EAEU. Since then, Moscow has constantly and officially reminded Uzbekistan that the EAEU is waiting. Recently, the President of Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko even stated that “we are looking forward to Uzbekistan’s membership in the EAEU.” Notably, such statements come only from Russia or Belarus; other EAEU states are not focused on this, and Uzbekistan does not show a strong interest in joining the organization.

Against this backdrop, two geopolitical issues cause concern in Moscow. First, without Uzbekistan in the EAEU, Central Asia cannot be brought under full Russian control. Second, the EAEU remains a very small entity, consisting of only five former Soviet republics. This limited composition does not support Russia’s image as a great power but, on the contrary, highlights its difficulty in asserting such a status.

It has become a tradition that the informal summits of the EAEU and the CIS are held in Saint Petersburg on the same days. On 22–23 December 2025, both events took place in the city. Reports on the CIS/EAEU summits were quite modest and contained no serious statements, except positive remarks about increased trade within the CIS/EAEU during the year. These largely symbolic events took place against the background of the war in Ukraine, which has dealt a serious blow to Moscow’s international reputation. In this context, Russia is using different means to preserve its influence in Central Asia while losing control over other parts of the former Soviet space.

IMPLICATIONS: Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev did not attend the EAEU summit, citing his country’s non-membership in the organization. He also did not travel to Saint Petersburg for the CIS summit, referring to his busy schedule. However, in November Azerbaijan became a full participant in the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia (CMHS).

Although Baku’s accession to the CMHS is assessed differently across the region, this expansion of the “C5” format into a “C6” is likely viewed in Moscow as a new challenge to Russia’s position in the region of the “stans.” This may explain the appearance of rumors that Russia could apply for membership in the CMHS. At the same time, the increasingly pro-Russian policies of all Central Asian states, whether genuine or aimed at avoiding Moscow’s displeasure, raise concerns that history may repeat itself and that the Central Asian Community could again open its doors to Russia.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev delivered a speech at the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council that resembled a statement from a full member. He described EAEU countries as “our strategic and natural partners.” According to the president, Uzbekistan actively participates in all key Eurasian formats. He also stated that “we believe it is necessary to strengthen coordination between the institutions of the CIS and the EAEU.”

Mirziyoyev highlighted several issues, including the elimination of trade barriers and the creation of an Uzbekistan–EAEU coordination group on tariff and non-tariff barriers; the development of industrial cooperation and the launch of joint projects in machinery, energy, agriculture, and the chemical sector; the digitalization of trade and customs administration; participation in EAEU technological platforms, from biomedicine and new materials to robotics; and the creation of a unified tourism space that would combine products of the Union’s member states.

Overall, the narrow, trade- and business-centered rhetoric surrounding the EAEU does not indicate the emergence of a shared regional identity among its member states, which is both a key condition for and an outcome of meaningful integration. In contrast, a broader vision of Central Asia, based on a natural sense of common identity among its peoples, is far stronger than a solely economic grouping of states. Indeed, the November summit of Central Asian leaders in Tashkent produced notable signs of deeper regional integration. In particular, it was announced that the CMHS format could be transformed into a Community of Central Asia (CCA).

Despite this major trend in Central Asia, the pro-Russian, or seemingly pro-Russian, policies of regional leaders may have a reverse effect and lead to a repetition of history, including a renewed Russian application for membership in the CCA for purely geopolitical reasons. In a recent and telling statement, Russia’s ambassador to Uzbekistan claimed that “Uzbekistan assured the Russian Federation that the era of the Great Game has passed into oblivion.” The remark suggests the opposite: the Great Game may be entering a new phase in which it is not Uzbekistan or other Central Asian states that shape geopolitical rivalry, but Russia itself, which continues to view the region through the lens of great-power competition. Throughout its independence, Uzbekistan has sought to avoid geopolitical entanglements. Therefore, if assurances about the end of geopolitical games are needed, they should come from great powers themselves, rather than from Central Asian states.

Moscow may believe that Russia’s membership in CAC would signal the end of the Great Game, whereas in reality it would represent yet another expression of Russia’s enduring geopolitical modus vivendi.

CONCLUSIONS: Central Asia is entering a new round of the geopolitical Great Game, and this game is being driven primarily by Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, this outcome is hardly surprising. Moscow’s foreign policy and its broader international behavior are clearly dominated by geopolitical considerations.

At present, one can observe the emergence of two opposing geopolitical configurations, the “Eurasian Five” of the Eurasian community versus the “Central Asian Six” of the Central Asian Community. The paradox of this dual trend, however, is that two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are members of both EAEU and CAC.

In 2004, Russia’s accession to CACO distorted, weakened, and ultimately destroyed the organization and the broader process of integration among the five Central Asian states. As a result, regional integration was halted for a decade and revived only in 2017. Integration in Central Asia is a distinct phenomenon: from the outset, it has been shaped in part to avoid geopolitical entanglements. By its nature, Central Asian integration cannot include any major power, regardless of which one it is, because such inclusion would inevitably introduce a dimension of geopolitical competition into the integration process.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge Caravan”) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.