By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

At the conclusion of a five-day visit to China by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on February 8, China and Pakistan issued a joint statement urging the Taliban government to take decisive measures to eliminate all terrorist organizations operating within Afghanistan and to prevent the use of Afghan territory for hostile activities against other nations. Over the past three years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban administration of providing refuge to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for attacks on Pakistani security forces and Chinese nationals within Pakistan. Despite being the largest foreign investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, China has thus far remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Pakistan is poised to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of Afghan territory that extends to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan and Pakistan. This corridor not only facilitates China's direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia but also holds strategic significance, positioning it as a potential focal point in China's evolving geopolitical interests in the region.

Photo by Ninara.

BACKGROUND: The airstrikes conducted by Pakistan inside Afghanistan on December 24 heightened tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, leading to an increase in skirmishes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan targeted TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, resulting in the deaths of 46 individuals. In response, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on multiple locations along the Pakistan border, killing one Pakistani soldier.

This was not the first instance of Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan. In March 2024, Pakistani airstrikes targeted TTP bases within Afghan territory, resulting in the deaths of eight militants. The strikes occurred a day after President Asif Ali Zardari pledged retaliation following an attack by the TTP in Pakistan's northwestern tribal are bordering Afghanistan, which claimed the lives of seven soldiers, including two officers. 

As tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalate and border clashes intensify, Pakistan is reportedly preparing to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of territory in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province that extends 350 kilometers to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region. Control of Wakhan would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan, effectively bypassing Afghanistan. In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s top intelligence official to Tajikistan on December 30, 2024, holds particular significance. Tajikistan hosts the leadership of the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. During his visit, the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Asim Malik, met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe. The ISI chief is believed to have been on a strategic mission to establish an alliance with the NRF as a counterbalance against the Taliban. 

China' has remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although a potential conflict between the two countries could jeopardize Chinese investments worth billions of U.S. dollars in both states, Beijing has opted for a "wait and watch" approach toward the ongoing hostilities. However, China is closely monitoring developments in the Wakhan Corridor, a strategically significant passage that provides direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

On December 30, 2024, during the visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Dushanbe, China’s Ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, was simultaneously meeting with Afghanistan’s acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. This meeting took place amid media reports suggesting that Pakistan’s military was advancing to seize control of the Wakhan Corridor. Both sides emphasized the corridor’s strategic significance for bilateral trade. Taliban authorities dismissed claims regarding the presence of foreign (Pakistani) military forces in the corridor and pledged to address any security threats along Afghanistan’s borders. In September 2023, the Taliban government inaugurated a 50-kilometer road extending from the Wakhan Corridor to the Chinese border.

IMPLICATIONS: A key factor behind China’s silence on the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is its own security concerns regarding Uyghur militancy in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares a border with Afghanistan. The Taliban could potentially leverage the "Uyghur card" to destabilize Xinjiang, given that the previous Taliban regime (1996–2001) provided sanctuary to Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. The Taliban has issued a warning to Beijing against adopting a pro-Pakistan stance in the ongoing conflict, cautioning that Islamabad is attempting to draw China into its proxy war. China remains apprehensive that Uyghur jihadists could gain ideological and operational support under Taliban rule. Consequently, Beijing has consistently sought to avoid antagonizing the Taliban, opting instead for diplomatic engagement and substantial investments in Afghanistan’s energy, infrastructure and mining sectors following the US withdrawal from the war-torn country in 2021.

The Taliban’s warning to China came just days after China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, visited Islamabad in November 2024 and stated that at least 20 militant groups were operating in Afghanistan, posing security threats to China. 

Strategically positioned at the intersection of three major mountain ranges—the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and Pamir—the Wakhan Corridor has the potential to become the focal point of China’s evolving geopolitical strategy in the region. At present, control over the Wakhan Corridor appears to be at the center of the geopolitical contest in Afghanistan, with Pakistan and Afghanistan seemingly acting as mere pawns in this larger game. As a silent yet influential player, China is subtly maneuvering these pawns on the regional chessboard. 

Pakistan aligned itself with China’s broader ambitions to expand its influence across South and Central Asia through Afghanistan long before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. However, rather than directly involving itself in the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, China appears committed to a strategy of cautious observation, continuously monitoring shifting geopolitical dynamics. Beijing seems to be waiting for an opportune moment to assert its influence. 

For China, the Wakhan Corridor—often referred to as Afghanistan's "chicken neck"—serves as a crucial strategic node for establishing and securing connectivity with South and Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This narrow strip of land has the potential to function as a pivotal junction, enabling China to expand its geopolitical and economic influence across the broader region. 

However, security concerns remain a significant challenge in China's plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the BRI, into Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

Several strategic projects planned or initiated by China align with its broader geopolitical strategy. One such initiative involves China's plans to establish a military base in Wakhan to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities. China has already set up a military base in eastern Tajikistan, near the Wakhan Corridor. A military foothold in Wakhan would serve as a critical buffer, preventing terrorism and instability from spilling over from Afghanistan into China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 

Additionally, China has constructed the Taxkorgan Airport on the Pamir Plateau in northwest Xinjiang, situated at an altitude of 3,258 meters and in close proximity of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Beyond providing a new "air passage" that enhances connectivity between Central and South Asia, this ultra-high-altitude airport reinforces China's military and economic influence in the region. 

While Beijing continues to invest in Afghanistan—despite its global isolation and international sanctions—it is simultaneously financing multiple projects under the US$ 62 billion CPEC in Pakistan. However, despite its deep economic and strategic engagements in both countries, China has remained silent regarding the escalating armed confrontations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

CONCLUSION: China should take an active role in mediating the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict rather than attempting to balance its interests with both sides. Leveraging its influence over both states, Beijing can push for diplomatic negotiations to address their disputes. At present, neither Islamabad nor Kabul is in a position to disregard China's calls for restraint, making it a crucial player in de-escalating tensions and ensuring regional stability. 

China should take a definitive stance and clarify its official position on the TTP, which has been responsible for attacks on Chinese nationals and security forces in Pakistan. Beijing should deliver an unequivocal message to Kabul, asserting that if the Taliban government fails to dismantle terrorist networks operating from Afghan territory, China will align with Pakistan in conducting targeted airstrikes against anti-China militant hideouts within Afghanistan. 

While China has remained silent on escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, the U.S. has endorsed Pakistan’s stance regarding the Taliban’s policy of sheltering terrorist groups, which violates the U.S.-Taliban Doha Accord. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 enabled the TTP to operate with greater impunity. For Islamabad, the Afghan endgame has effectively become a zero-sum game. In response, some factions within Pakistan have advocated for collaboration with the U.S. to carry out airstrikes targeting terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan. 

AUTHOR BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation. Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

Nargiza Umarova

March 12, 2025

In the current geopolitical realities, Central Asia seeks to restore its historical role as a land-based transportation and logistics hub, facilitating connections between East and West, as well as North and South. Most of the region’s countries promote their own projects including railways, gas pipelines, and power lines through Afghanistan, which offer them substantial economic and geopolitical advantages. However, the intervention of major powers, including Russia, China, India, and Iran, could create a serious conflict of interest on the trans-Afghan track. To mitigate risks, Central Asian states should implement a coordinated policy for developing the southern transit direction on a mutually beneficial basis.

Read What the Extension of Transport Corridors in Afghanistan Means for Central Asia (PDF) 

By Nargiza Umarova

In recent years, the Taliban government has successfully garnered the support of most Central Asian countries for the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure. Notably, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have demonstrated significant engagement in this endeavor, with each country advancing its own railway project traversing Afghanistan to reach the borders of Pakistan. These routes are expected to compete with one another, a dynamic that is anticipated to enhance their profitability through the implementation of flexible tariff policies aimed at maintaining sufficient cargo flow. The establishment of trans-Afghan rail corridors holds strategic significance not only for fostering connectivity between Central and South Asia but also for advancing Iran’s aspirations to develop efficient transportation links with China via Afghanistan—a goal that the Taliban government has expressed its willingness to support.

Photo by Pahari Sahib

BACKGROUND: In May 2023, Afghan authorities approved the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor project, which spans 1,468 kilometers. A year later, plans were announced for the construction of the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, signaling the intention to extend the Kandahar route to Pakistan. Turkmenistan promptly capitalized on this development by proposing an alternative version of the Trans-Afghan Corridor, extending along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak route.

Subsequently, Kazakhstan joined the project at the invitation of Ashgabat, and in September 2024, the foundation was laid for a 22-kilometer railway line connecting the border station of Torghundi to Sanobar. This section will serve as the initial segment of the Torghundi-Herat transport corridor.

The Turkmen version of the trans-Afghan railway is regarded as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor (the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway), although the latter route is significantly shorter. Competition between the western route (originating from Turkmenistan's border) and the eastern route (originating from Uzbekistan's border) appears inevitable. However, this competition is expected to yield positive outcomes, particularly through the reduction of transportation costs resulting from the launch of additional trade routes through Afghanistan. This cost efficiency is a critical factor driving the interest of external stakeholders in the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure.

The establishment of the Torghundi-Spin Boldak international transport corridor holds particular importance for Tehran, which intends to develop a railway link with Afghanistan through the border town of Zaranj.

Since 2020, as part of the broader development of Iran's deep-sea port of Chabahar, construction has been underway on the Chabahar-Zahedan railway. This railway is planned to extend further into Afghanistan, reaching the provinces of Nimroz and Kandahar. Recently, Afghan authorities announced the completion of engineering surveys for the construction of the Zaranj-Kandahar railway. This integrated infrastructure will provide Iran with an additional avenue to access Afghanistan, while also establishing a direct connection to Herat—one of Afghanistan's largest and most strategically significant cities.

Tehran’s long-term strategic vision positions Herat as a pivotal hub for transit routes connecting Western, Central, and Eastern Asia. This perspective stems from the concept of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor, commonly referred to as the "Five Nation Road." Iran has already initiated the practical implementation of this vision through the construction of the Khaf-Herat railway, which is scheduled to become operational in 2025. Once completed, the route will extend to Kashgar in China via Central Asia, covering an approximate distance of 2,000 kilometers.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran has consistently encouraged Afghan authorities to collaborate with their Central Asian partners in advancing the railway corridor connecting Khaf to Kashgar.

In 2017, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached an agreement to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif-Sheberghan-Maimana-Herat railway. Integrating this new route with the Khaf-Herat railway would enable Uzbekistan to establish an alternative transit corridor to Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, bypassing Turkmenistan. Additionally, this development would have a substantial impact on the implementation of the Five Nation Transit Route, as the Khaf-Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway constitutes a critical segment of the Afghan portion of this corridor. From Mazar-i-Sharif, transportation links would only need to be extended to Sherkhan Bandar in Kunduz province to connect with Tajikistan's border.

However, in 2018, Tashkent introduced a new trans-Afghan railway project toward Pakistan, known as the Kabul Corridor, effectively placing the implementation of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat route on hold. This decision was likely influenced by the recognition that the railway to Herat could undermine Uzbekistan’s transit interests. By prioritizing the Kabul Corridor, Uzbekistan sought to secure its role in servicing freight flows from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to Iran, Turkey, and Europe.

Despite these developments, progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor continued. In 2019, Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed an agreement to construct the Jaloliddini Balkhi (Kolkhozobod)-Panji Poyon-Sherkhan Bandar railway. To finance the feasibility study for this project, Dushanbe sought assistance from prominent international donor organizations, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

At that time, establishing a railway connection between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was also pivotal for the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan (TAT) transport corridor, initiated in 2013. This corridor extends from the Tajik border into northern Afghanistan, passing through the cities of Kunduz, Khulm, Mazar-i-Sharif, Sheberghan, and Andkhoy. At the Akina checkpoint, the railway crosses into Turkmenistan, from where it can connect to the Caspian Sea. This route aligns with the concept of reviving the ancient Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which aims to provide Afghanistan with direct access to European markets via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

In 2016, Turkmenistan completed the first stage of the TAT railway, spanning the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Akina route. By early 2021, the Akina-Andkhoy railway line also became operational. However, the abrupt change of power in Afghanistan during the summer of 2021 led to the suspension of work on these projects. This pause stemmed from uncertainty regarding the Taliban government's approach to relations with neighboring countries and its foreign policy on transport communications. Yet contrary to initial expectations, the new leadership in Afghanistan adopted a notably more pragmatic stance on these matters.

The Taliban have reactivated nearly all regional and interregional transport projects. Announcements have been made regarding the planned launch of the Andkhoy-Sheberghan and Sheberghan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway lines in the coming years, as well as the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway. These initiatives aim to bridge critical gaps in major trade corridors, including the TAT and the Five Nation Railway Route.

Notably, even Tajikistan, despite its tough stance toward the Afghan government, has become more active in advancing trans-Afghan transport initiatives. In July 2024, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) signed a protocol to develop a feasibility study for a 51-kilometer Jaloliddini Balkhi-Panji Poyon railway, which will connect to Afghanistan via the Sherkhan Bandar checkpoint. As previously mentioned, this railway will form part of the TAT.

Integration into such international transport corridors will offer Tajikistan a strategic advantage on southern transit routes. However, the modernization of existing infrastructure and the construction of new railways demand significant financial resources, which Dushanbe struggles to provide. Tajikistan relies heavily on China for foreign investment. Beijing has a vested interest in developing fast and efficient transportation routes to access emerging markets in South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

If the Taliban succeed in persuading Tajikistan to collaborate on developing trade routes to China, this could significantly reshape Central Asia's transport architecture while enhancing Afghanistan's strategic importance as a regional transit hub. Iran would also benefit from a direct connection to China that bypasses Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

For Tashkent, however, this development could present a serious challenge given the resolve of its neighbors to complete the TAT. 

CONCLUSIONS: The proactive efforts of the Taliban government in developing international transport links has heightened the interest of most Central Asian states (with the exception of Tajikistan) in strengthening trade and economic ties with Kabul. This includes the potential implementation of joint investment projects, such as the construction of railways, gas pipelines, and power lines, which could foster regional connectivity and economic growth.

External major powers are also eager to capitalize on these transformations, but their interference in establishing trans-Afghan transport infrastructure could have adverse consequences for Central Asia.

Iran’s ambitions to establish a transport corridor to China via Afghanistan pose the potential to alter the balance of power within the regional transit system. Such a development would bolster the positions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are currently in a transport deadlock and reliance on Uzbekistan for access to global markets.

The development of new trade routes through Afghanistan represents a positive trend that will inevitably influence Central Asia due to the region’s geographical proximity. This shift offers regional states the opportunity to enhance their transit and trade capacities, albeit accompanied by increased competition. To mitigate the risks of intense rivalries, the Central Asian republics must reconcile their interests in light of Afghanistan’s growing significance as a transit hub and formulate a coordinated strategy to advance interregional transport corridors, ensuring equitable benefits across the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Her research activities are focused on studying developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of big powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Vali Kaleji

The construction of the first phase of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline (TAPI) gas pipeline constitutes a key component of the Taliban's broader strategy to revive significant energy transfer and transit projects that were suspended following their return to power. The successful implementation of these initiatives is expected to enhance the internal legitimacy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, unlike the preceding two decades, the leadership of Pakistan and India have not participated in the construction of the first phase of the TAPI gas pipeline. Adopting a pragmatic and incremental approach, the Taliban leadership has chosen to advance this energy transfer project in collaboration with Turkmenistan in a phased manner. It appears that Pakistan and India have cautiously opted to wait and watch regarding their involvement in the TAPI gas pipeline.

BACKGROUND:  The transfer of Turkmenistan’s gas resources to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India has faced numerous challenges over the past three decades and remains unimplemented. This initiative has been referred to by various names over time, including “Trans Afghan” (1995), “Consortium of Central Asia Gas Pipeline, CentGas” (1997), “Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline, TAGP” (2002), and TAPI (2010). These projects proposed the construction of a 1,814 kilometer pipeline to transport natural gas from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan, the world’s second-largest gas field, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. The Afghan section of the pipeline, spanning 816 kilometers, will traverse the provinces of Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar. The pipeline will enter from Quetta in Balochistan and pass through Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Fazilka, a city at Indian border 150 kilometers from Multan. From Fazilka, the pipeline will enter India. 

The pipeline was designed with an estimated annual transmission capacity of 33 billion cubic meters (bcm). It will supply 5 percent of the gas to Afghanistan, 47.5 percent to Pakistan, and 47.5 percent to India during its 30-year operational period. Afghanistan will receive 500 million cubic meters of gas for the first decade, 1 bcm in the second decade, and 1.5 bcm in the third decade. 

To implement the TAPI pipeline project, Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani, Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and India’s Vice President Hamid Ansari convened in 2015, in Turkmenistan’s remote Karakum Desert, to inaugurate the proposed pipeline. However, the construction was hindered by several factors, including financial constraints, insecurity in Afghanistan, and the terrorist activities of groups such as the Taliban, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda. Additionally, persistent tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and India, further obstructed the project’s progress.

A decade later, on September 10, 2024, the construction of the Serhetabat-Herat section of TAPI was inaugurated on the border of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. The ceremony was attended by Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, as well as the Acting Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Afghanistan, Mullah Mohammed Hasan Akhund.

Unlike the earlier inauguration, the leaders of Pakistan and India were notably absent from this event. The ceremony marked the commencement of TAPI’s first phase, spanning from Serhetabat (formerly Gushgy) in Turkmenistan to Herat in Afghanistan. The subsequent three phases are planned to extend the pipeline from Herat to Helmand, from Helmand to Kandahar, and finally from Kandahar to the Pakistan border.

Adopting a pragmatic and phased approach, the Taliban leadership has chosen to advance the TAPI project in collaboration with Turkmenistan in four distinct stages. This incremental strategy enables the Taliban regime to demonstrate its political resolve, operational capacity, and ability to ensure the security of the project to Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and India.

Over the past two years, the Taliban has achieved significant milestones, including the completion of the first phase of the TAP-500 energy system project (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan), the inauguration of the Herat Noor-ul-Jihad Substation and Turkmenistan electricity transmission project, the opening of a 177-meter railway bridge on the Serhetabat–Torghundi railway at the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border, the initiation of the Shatlyk-1 gas compressor station construction at the Shatlyk field in Mary Province, the launch of a fiber-optic communication line along the Serhetabat-Herat route, and the commencement of the 22-kilometer Torghundi-Sanabar railway construction, marking the first segment of the Torghundi-Herat railway.

These accomplishments have likely bolstered the Taliban’s confidence as they proceed with the implementation of the first phase of TAPI.

IMPLICATIONS:  The project is a critical element of the Taliban’s broader strategy to revive significant energy transfer and transit projects, including CASA-1000 (the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission line), the Lazorde project (linking Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), the Chabahar port transit initiative (connecting Afghanistan, Iran, and India), and the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan railway route. These projects, which were suspended following the Taliban's return to power, are expected to generate employment and income for various provinces in Afghanistan, thereby bolstering the Taliban’s domestic legitimacy. 

In line with these efforts, the Taliban declared a public holiday in Herat province on September 11, 2024, coinciding with the inauguration of TAPI’s first phase. This move appears to reflect a deliberate effort at public diplomacy or propaganda, aimed at showcasing the Taliban’s commitment to national development and infrastructure revival.

If TAPI becomes operational, it will create jobs for over 12,000 Afghans, and the project could generate approximately US$ 1 billion annually in revenue for the country. This gas supply will be crucial for meeting the energy needs of urban and rural areas, as well as supporting industrial and production centers in densely populated and strategically important regions such as Herat, Helmand, and Kandahar.

Furthermore, the successful implementation of significant energy transfer and transit projects, such as TAPI, holds the potential to strengthen the Taliban’s diplomatic and economic ties with neighboring countries. Such developments are particularly critical for the Taliban leadership, given its international isolation. 

An important aspect of the TAPI project is the decision to construct its four phases without reliance on international financial aid. Both Turkmenistan and the Taliban recognize that, given the lack of international recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, securing financial assistance or loans from institutions such as the Asian Development Bank is not feasible. This constraint likely influenced the decision to proceed with the phased implementation of TAPI exclusively within Afghanistan, excluding the active participation of India and Pakistan at this stage.

The construction and operation of the pipeline are overseen by TAPI Pipeline Company Limited (TPCL), based in Dubai. TPCL is a joint venture between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, with each country holding a stake in the project. The state-owned company Turkmen Gas holds a dominant 85 percent share in TPCL, while the remaining 15 percent is equally distributed among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Consequently, it is anticipated that TPCL will finance the construction of the four phases of the TAPI pipeline within Afghanistan.

Should the pipeline be extended to Pakistan and India, the financing strategy would likely involve not only allocating the respective shares of Pakistan and India from TPCL but also securing additional funding through financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank to support the broader extension.

Another significant implication of TAPI, even if limited to its four phases within Afghanistan, is the increased diversification of Turkmenistan’s gas export destinations and routes. Over the past three decades, Turkmenistan has developed gas export pipelines along three primary routes: northern (Russia), eastern (China), and western (Iran and Turkey). The implementation of TAPI would establish a new southern route, enhancing Turkmenistan’s gas export network. This diversification is expected to strengthen Turkmenistan’s position in the regional gas market, providing the country with greater leverage and bargaining power in negotiations.

Additionally, Turkmenistan remains attentive to the dynamics of its competitors, particularly Iran. International sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in the past, along with unilateral sanctions by the U.S. in recent years, have significantly curtailed Iran’s foreign investment, production, and export capacity. These sanctions have also stalled major gas transmission initiatives, most notably the Peace Pipeline (Iran-Pakistan-India). In this context, the successful implementation of TAPI could position Turkmenistan as a more reliable and influential player in the regional energy market, capitalizing on opportunities that competitors like Iran have been unable to pursue.

However, Turkmenistan will need to secure additional foreign investment to expand its gas production capacity to ensure a sustainable supply for its growing base of gas-consuming customers. The country’s ability to meet this challenge will be crucial as it seeks to maintain its role as a reliable energy supplier in an increasingly competitive regional and global market.

This challenge will become even more pronounced if Turkmenistan succeeds in implementing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project in collaboration with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the European Union. Such a project, aimed at supplying gas to European markets, would further strain Turkmenistan’s production capacity. The increased demand would necessitate significant investments in infrastructure and technology to scale production while ensuring the reliability and sustainability of its gas exports across multiple routes and to diverse markets.

CONCLUSIONS:  The full implementation of TAPI will hinge on several critical factors. These include the political will of the leaders of the four participating countries—Turkmenistan, Afghanistan under Taliban leadership, Pakistan, and India—along with the ability to ensure security throughout all stages of construction and operation. Particular attention must be given to mitigating threats from groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Additionally, effective operation and distribution of gas through rural and urban areas, as well as the mobilization of the substantial financial resources required for this ambitious project (estimated at US$ 7 to 8 billion), are essential for its success.

Moreover, the project must remain insulated from the complex and often contentious disputes between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. The successful completion of the current four phases of TAPI is seen as a critical test for the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate in demonstrating its capability to execute such a significant energy transfer initiative after three decades of delay.

Pakistan and India are seemingly opting to wait and watch to assess the feasibility and progress of the project under the Taliban’s stewardship. Should the Taliban successfully implement these initial phases, Pakistan and India can be anticipated to join efforts to extend the project further.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi 

On January 2, 2024, Mullah Baradar, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in the Taliban administration, announced that construction of the Wakhan Corridor, a strategic route connecting Afghanistan to China, remains underway. Baradar highlighted that the new road through Wakhan in Badakhshan Province is expected to establish a direct trade link between Afghanistan and China, thereby greatly enhancing bilateral trade opportunities. Taliban officials have underscored the geopolitical significance of the corridor, as it is positioned at a pivotal intersection of regional interests, potentially influencing broader dynamics in Central and South Asia.

BACKGROUND:  Mawlawi Ayub Khalid, the Taliban-appointed governor of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, reported to Al Jazeera that, following five months of continuous work, they have constructed a road physically connecting Afghanistan and China. This milestone is anticipated to catalyze economic development across the region. The section of the road under construction spans 49 kilometers, with nearly 40 percent of the work completed to date. In the coming years, this road is projected to extend into China’s Xinjiang region, further solidifying the direct trade link between the two nations. The Wakhan Corridor, an ancient segment of the Silk Road connecting Afghanistan and China, first appeared on maps in 1895 as a buffer zone strategically positioned between the Russian Empire and British India, emphasizing its enduring geopolitical significance. Although the Sino-Afghan border was formally delineated in 1963, no border checkpoints were established, despite the two countries sharing a direct border. External factors, including the prolonged presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and concerns over the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) affecting China's security, had historically hindered the development of closer ties between Beijing and Kabul. China's strategic engagement with the Taliban underscores its long-term interests in Afghanistan’s remote Badakhshan province, specifically the Wakhan Corridor. This engagement reflects China’s cautious preparation for a regional realignment that began well before the U.S. withdrawal, as China employed diplomacy and development initiatives to strengthen ties with Afghanistan. Since 2012, China’s military and strategic involvement in the Wakhan region has gradually expanded, leveraging its location at the nexus of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. In 2017, China pledged over US$ 90 million to support infrastructure projects in northeastern Afghanistan, including fiber optic connections and a segment of road through Wakhan. However, the presence of U.S. forces, delays in funding, and various political obstacles impeded progress on these initiatives. Despite previous setbacks, China’s vision for regional integration has remained steadfast. In 2021, the Taliban’s Ministry of Public Works announced plans for a road linking Afghanistan's Ishkashim district to China’s Xinjiang province through the Wakhan Corridor, part of a broader regional development strategy. Since the Taliban assumed control, China’s investments in Afghanistan have significantly increased, with substantial funding directed toward regional infrastructure projects. The long-anticipated construction of this critical corridor—expected to serve as a major trade and transit route between Afghanistan and China—has now officially commenced, signaling a renewed commitment to connectivity and economic collaboration between the two nations.

IMPLICATIONS:  The Wakhan Corridor is emerging as a pivotal element in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape, with China and Pakistan actively involved in its development. Former Afghan Information Minister Mohammad Karim Khuram has highlighted that Pakistan had previously sought to utilize the corridor to establish strategic connections with Central Asia and China; however, these efforts were met with resistance under President Karzai’s administration. In early 2022, the situation evolved when the Pakistani military, in coordination with Chinese forces, crossed into the Afghan side of the corridor to adjust border demarcations originally established under the 1895 Russo-British agreements. This move provoked widespread backlash on Afghan social media, prompting the Taliban to deploy forces to reassert the historic boundary. Recently, the Taliban, with significant Chinese support, has committed to advancing the infrastructure within the Wakhan Corridor, underscoring China’s clear interest in integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). High-level visits by Taliban officials and the Chinese ambassador to the corridor in August 2024 further emphasize the project’s strategic importance. Local communities believe that the corridor could play a crucial role in fostering economic stability, facilitating streamlined exports between Afghanistan and China, and promoting the development of surrounding areas. The Wakhan Corridor project illustrates China’s strategic intent to dominate Afghanistan’s economy, positioning itself as a key trade partner while outmaneuvering competitors such as Uzbekistan, Iran, the UAE, and India. By establishing a direct trade route, China seeks to circumvent more expensive, indirect pathways through Pakistan or Uzbekistan, thereby consolidating its economic influence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the project aligns with Pakistan’s broader goal of enhancing its trade connections with Central Asia, sidelining India’s influence in the region. From a security perspective, the Wakhan Corridor provides China with a buffer zone to secure its sensitive Xinjiang region. Concerns regarding groups like ETIM and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have driven China to create a “security belt” along the corridor, supported by two dedicated security units and coordinated patrols with the Taliban to reinforce local stability. China’s growing investment in Afghan infrastructure projects, including those in resource-rich areas such as the Amu Darya oil fields, further underscores its strategy of embedding economic initiatives that enhance regional security while serving its broader geopolitical interests. Although China and the Taliban have forged a cooperative relationship, a level of mutual distrust endures, adding complexity to their interactions. The Wakhan Corridor project thus functions as both a diplomatic bridge and a strategic instrument for China, enabling it to manage regional threats while embedding itself economically and geopolitically in Afghanistan’s future. The Wakhan Corridor holds substantial strategic potential, positioning itself as a critical link that could connect China to Iran and onward across Central and South Asia through Afghanistan. This vision aligns with Iran’s aspirations for regional connectivity but faces opposition from India, whose border tensions with Pakistan in the Azad Kashmir region complicate cooperation on such initiatives. Functioning as a contemporary extension of the ancient Silk Road, the corridor is poised to have far-reaching economic and security ramifications, likely reshaping the regional balance of power. Its development could redefine trade routes, potentially offering more efficient access between East and West, while also bolstering China's influence across a corridor that traverses key geopolitical frontiers. As both a trade artery and a security buffer, the Wakhan Corridor embodies the intersection of historic ambitions and modern strategic interests, with the capacity to influence the economic and political landscape of Central and South Asia for years to come.

CONCLUSIONS:  China’s present approach to Afghanistan reveals a meticulously crafted strategy that emerged following the U.S.-led withdrawal in 2021. With the exit of Western forces, Chinese policymakers identified a strategic window to establish direct engagement with the Taliban. This shift allowed China to reinvigorate major projects, including the Amu Darya oil fields, as well as gold mining operations in Takhar and Badakhshan, while reconsidering the long-stalled Mes Aynak copper mine project, originally awarded to China in 2010. However, China’s deepening involvement in the Wakhan Corridor signals a focus that extends beyond economic objectives, highlighting a pronounced interest in regional security and geopolitical stability. The Wakhan Corridor not only represents an opportunity to secure valuable resources but also functions as a strategic zone for monitoring and mitigating regional threats. Through this multifaceted engagement, China is navigating a balance between bolstering Afghanistan’s infrastructure and securing its own influence, underscoring the corridor's importance within a broader vision of Central and South Asian stability and security. China’s presence in the Wakhan Corridor serves as a calculated measure to counter threats from extremist groups, particularly ETIM, which poses potential risks to the stability of its border regions, especially Xinjiang. This approach aligns seamlessly with China’s broader strategy to reinforce stability across Central Asia—a region where China has made substantial investments and is consolidating its role as the dominant economic force. For the U.S., China’s expanding footprint along the Wakhan Corridor is a growing point of concern, as it threatens to reduce U.S. influence within Eurasia, particularly in areas related to counterterrorism and regional diplomatic leverage. Washington remains closely attuned to China’s evolving role in Afghanistan, apprehensive that deepening Beijing-Kabul relations could disrupt U.S. strategic interests in the region. This shifting dynamic underscores the broader geopolitical contest over influence in Central and South Asia, where China’s calculated moves may challenge the United States' longstanding objectives in both regional security and diplomatic outreach. The unique geography of the Wakhan Corridor offers China a strategic opportunity to establish an efficient trade and energy route into Central Asia, potentially shortening pipeline distances and bolstering its energy security. If successfully developed, this initiative would solidify China’s position as both a dominant economic and military power in the region. The corridor serves as a critical junction where China’s economic ambitions converge with its security priorities, creating a dual-purpose pathway that addresses both its energy needs and regional stability concerns. As a result, the Wakhan Corridor could serve as the foundation for a robust Chinese presence that is likely to influence the regional order for the foreseeable future, shaping economic relations and security dynamics across Central and South Asia.

AUTHORS’ BIOS:

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. She is a 2024 CAMCA Fellow. 

Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Research Fellow on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.