By Nargiza Umarova

The fourth session of the India–Central Asia Dialogue at the level of foreign ministers convened in New Delhi on 6 June 2025. The concluding communiqué underscored the significance of Iran’s Chabahar Port in advancing trade connectivity between the Central Asian republics and India, and beyond. 

The Indo-Iranian Chabahar initiative competes with the port of Gwadar, a pivotal component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which envisages the integration of Central Asia through the development of a trans-Afghan railway. Concurrently, Russia is pursuing its distinct agenda by engaging with the Taliban to extend the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) into Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the Central Asian republics face the risk of becoming entangled in a cycle of great power competition, thereby endangering their own national interests.

BACKGROUND: Since 2020, Uzbekistan has engaged in dialogue with India and Iran regarding the joint utilization of the deep-water port of Chabahar, which provides direct access to the Indian Ocean. Situated in southeastern Iran, the port constitutes a critical component of Tashkent’s strategy to develop southern transit corridors and diversify freight transportation routes. Chabahar functions as a commercial gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan, affording major global economies—especially India—access to key regional resources. This underlies New Delhi’s commitment to upgrading the Shahid Beheshti terminal in Chabahar and enhancing the surrounding transport infrastructure. 

Moreover, transit through Iran reduces the cost and duration of Indian cargo shipments to and from Central Asia by nearly one-third relative to maritime routes via Europe or China. India’s objective extends beyond securing efficient and affordable access to uranium, oil, coal, and other raw materials from Central Asia; it also involves circumventing its principal rival, Pakistan.

The Indian transit corridor to Central Asia, originating at Chabahar, may proceed through both Iran and Afghanistan. In 2020, Iran commenced construction of the 628-kilometer Chabahar–Zahedan railway line, with financial assistance from India. Work on this segment is nearing completion. The route is projected to continue toward the Turkmenistan border, traversing the northern Iranian cities of Mashhad and Serakhs. En route, the Chabahar–Zahedan–Mashhad railway will diverge toward the city of Khaf, where the inaugural cross-border rail link between Iran and Afghanistan begins.

The construction of the 225-kilometer railway linking Khaf to Herat in Afghanistan is also approaching completion. Its designed capacity is estimated at up to three million tons annually, with transit cargo expected to comprise more than half of this volume. Consequently, the Khaf–Herat railway is poised to be integrated into a broader China-led transport initiative connecting East and West through Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran. Owing to its direct linkage with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan stands to benefit from this configuration by enhancing its own transit capacity. The Taliban administration seeks comparable advantages for Afghanistan and is actively encouraging Tashkent to extend the railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat. While such an extension would grant Uzbekistan additional access to Chabahar by circumventing Turkmenistan, it could also redirect China–Europe–China transit cargo toward other neighboring states bordering Afghanistan. 

IMPLICATIONS: For several years, Iran has actively pursued the realization of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran railway corridor, commonly referred to as the “Five Nation Road.” The Afghan segment of this 2,100-kilometre overland route will primarily comprise the railway currently under construction between Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. From Mazar-i-Sharif, the transportation network would require only an extension to Sherkhan Bandar in Kunduz Province to establish a connection with the Tajik border. This development would facilitate Tajikistan’s access to Iran through Afghan territory, thereby definitely weakening Uzbekistan’s competitive position in regional transit logistics.

The Taliban regard the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat railway as an integral element of a broader initiative aimed at establishing a Trans-Afghan corridor extending through Kandahar to Pakistan, analogous to Uzbekistan’s proposed Kabul Corridor. In 2023, the Afghan authorities announced plans to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar railway, which, according to media sources, is projected to provide the shortest overland route between Moscow and New Delhi via Afghanistan. Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and even Turkey have been invited to invest in the venture. 

The attractiveness of the Kandahar Corridor lies in its capacity to extend toward both Iran and Pakistan. Ashgabat and Astana are already advancing a new transit route from the Torghundi railway station, located at the Afghan–Turkmen border, toward Pakistan, traversing western Afghanistan. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced the initiation of a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan railway, covering the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar–Chaman route. 

Without reaching Kandahar in the city of Delaram, both lines could be redirected westward and linked to Iran’s Zahedan via Zaranj in Nimroz Province, ultimately reaching the port of Chabahar.

Consequently, the Central Asian states will gain an additional opportunity to access the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. However, this scenario presents significant implications for Uzbekistan. Foremost, the advancement of the Kandahar Corridor—regardless of whether it extends toward Iran—raises concerns regarding the viability of the Trans-Afghan Railway via Kabul, which Tashkent has identified as a core interest. The simultaneous operation of both routes will inevitably result in competition for transit cargo, thereby impacting their overall profitability. Uzbekistan is will unlikely be able to impede the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat railway, as the initiative partially aligns with the interests of Russia, India, Iran, and China. Under such circumstances, preserving the relevance of the Kabul Corridor—particularly amid funding constraints—becomes exceedingly challenging.

Secondly, the construction of the Zaranj–Delaram railway line will establish conditions conducive to the redistribution of cargo flows transiting Afghanistan toward South Asia and beyond, in favor of Chabahar. This development represents a direct challenge to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the most costly and prominent flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative, which prioritizes the expansion of the Gwadar port on Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast. Enhancing Chabahar’s transit capacity through the creation of a comprehensive network of rail and roads linking the port to neighboring countries and regions within Iran’s periphery may diminish the significance of the Kabul Corridor as a land bridge between the poles of continental Asia.

Should the Kandahar route be developed and extended into Iran, Gwadar will be compelled to share prospective cargo flows with Chabahar, thereby intensifying the rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing. Russia must also be considered, as it views the Trans-Afghan Railway as a means to extend its flagship International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) into Afghanistan. Preliminary estimates place the volume of Russian cargo on the Trans-Afghan route at between 8 and 15 million tons annually. In light of escalating tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, as well as the generally unstable security climate in Pakistan—particularly in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, through which two proposed railway branches from Central Asia to Indian Ocean ports are planned—Russia may opt to reroute a portion of its exports to Chabahar via Afghanistan. Over time, this shift could also influence freight transit patterns from Northern Europe to India.

Nevertheless, the ongoing escalation of armed conflict between Iran and Israel introduces significant uncertainty regarding the feasibility of such transport configurations. A protracted period of hostilities, accompanied by potential political destabilization within Iran, will unavoidably impact the reliability of established logistics networks in West Asia, potentially necessitating their complete reconfiguration. Under these conditions, both the trans-Afghan corridors leading to Iran and the Indian access route to Central Asia via Afghanistan will be placed at considerable risk. This situation will undoubtedly compel stakeholders to revise their strategies concerning the Chabahar project and to place greater emphasis on leveraging Pakistan’s transit capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s proactive engagement in the development of a network of trans-Afghan trade routes is anticipated to yield both economic and political advantages by enhancing its national and regional transit capacity. However, realizing these outcomes will require Tashkent to navigate carefully among the interests of global and regional powers, whose influence may significantly shape the implementation of specific transport initiatives within Afghanistan.

For the Central Asian states, maintaining diversified access to the southern ports of Iran and Pakistan is advantageous, provided that intra-regional competition is avoided, as such rivalry could undermine their collective competitiveness along the trans-Afghan corridor. Accordingly, it is essential to implement a coordinated policy aimed at identifying and advancing mutually beneficial transport routes through Afghanistan. Reaching consensus on a unified negotiating stance in engagements with the Afghan leadership is vital to mitigate the risk of the Taliban enacting externally influenced political decisions that may contradict the interests of Central Asian states.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi

On March 31, 2025, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation submitted a proposal to the Supreme Court to allow the Taliban to operate in the country. On April 17, 2025, the Supreme Court officially removed the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations. A year earlier, there had been no legal mechanism to delist terrorist groups. That mechanism was introduced through amendments to the Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice in May 2024, with the endorsement of President Vladimir Putin. The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list is the product of a steady normalization of Russia’s relations with the Taliban.

BACKGROUND: Russia’s complex relationship with the Taliban dates back to the movement’s rise to power in the 1990s. After the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, Russia made several attempts to restore relations, despite having supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Russian diplomats traveled to Pakistan and met with both Pakistani and Taliban officials to explore the possibility of recognizing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Moscow’s key concern at the time was the Taliban’s recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which Russia viewed as a serious threat to its territorial integrity. However, the Taliban, still wary of Moscow’s role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, rebuffed Russian overtures.

In August 1998, the Taliban embassy in the United Arab Emirates informed Kabul that a Russian delegation, led by Alexander Oblov, intended to visit Afghanistan to discuss reopening the Russian embassy and possibly recognize the Taliban regime. Yet, the Taliban Foreign Ministry instructed officials not to issue visas to any Russian representative, citing Moscow's role in the destruction of Afghanistan and stating that “all the troubles of our nation are due to Russian interference.”

The rise of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and growing security threats in Central Asia pushed Moscow toward a pragmatic re-engagement with the Taliban. Russia’s concerns over ISIS-K have grown significantly since 2014, especially in light of the group's ability to operate in northern Afghanistan, close to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These concerns have helped shift Russia’s strategic calculus.

Uzbekistan’s involvement in the peace process with the Taliban—including its invitation to a high-level Taliban delegation to visit Tashkent—prompted Russia to deepen its own engagement. Moscow responded by inviting the Taliban for separate discussions, as well as joint talks alongside the Afghan government delegation, to address the peace process and the post-withdrawal landscape following the exit of U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai played an instrumental role in reshaping Moscow's perception of the Taliban. Karzai has argued that ISIS-K has no Afghan roots, and its fighters were introduced from abroad to destabilize the region. According to Karzai, only the Taliban are capable of effectively fighting ISIS-K. This narrative found a receptive audience in Moscow, which has long feared the potential spillover of instability into the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and a former ambassador to Kabul, has been central to the evolution of Russia’s Taliban policy. Known for his deep knowledge of Afghan affairs, Kabulov has publicly advocated for recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate political force. Under his guidance, Moscow hosted several rounds of intra-Afghan talks, including Taliban representatives, even before the group's return to power in 2021. In November 2016, reports emerged that Russian representatives had allegedly met with Taliban commanders at a Russian military base in Tajikistan, and that unidentified helicopters delivered weapons to Taliban fighters in Badakhshan province, claims that Moscow, Tajikistan, and the former Afghan government denied. Still, the optics suggested a growing convergence of interests between Russia and the Taliban, particularly in countering ISIS-K and limiting Western military influence in the region.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s return to power, Russia was among the few countries that kept its embassy in Kabul operational. While Moscow has not formally recognized the Taliban government, it has significantly expanded its diplomatic engagement. Taliban delegations have visited Moscow multiple times, and Russia has reciprocated by including Taliban officials in regional security dialogues such as the Moscow Format.

The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list reflects the culmination of this slow but steady normalization. According to Russian officials, this step is primarily aimed at fostering dialogue and enhancing regional security cooperation. While some critics in Russia have questioned the wisdom of legitimizing a group with a violent past, proponents argue that engagement with the de facto authorities in Kabul is a geopolitical necessity. Moreover, economic considerations have also played a role. Since 2022, Afghanistan has expressed interest in purchasing Russian oil and wheat. The Taliban have also invited Russian companies to invest in mining, infrastructure, and energy projects. Removing the terrorist designation facilitates such cooperation, especially given Western sanctions that have pushed Moscow to diversify its foreign partnerships.

The removal of the Taliban from Russia’s terrorist list is likely to have a ripple effect across Central Asia and beyond. For Central Asian countries, Russia’s policy shift may serve as a green light to expand their own engagement with the Taliban. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which share borders with Afghanistan, have already established pragmatic relations with the Taliban, primarily driven by security and economic interests. Uzbekistan’s active involvement with the Taliban on trade and transit connectivity to South Asia has influenced Russian policymakers to adjust their strategy in favor of smoother economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Russia viewed Uzbekistan as a regional competitor. The recent Termez Dialogue, hosted by Uzbekistan with the participation of Central Asian countries and the Taliban, heightened Moscow’s concerns over Uzbekistan’s growing role as a regional player and the potential challenge it poses to Russia’s influence in Central Asia.

Tajikistan has also begun expanding trade and transit relations with Kabul, opening joint border markets in the Badakhshan provinces of both countries, as well as utilizing Sher Khan Port in Kunduz province. The extension of electricity exports to Afghanistan and the recent CASA-1000 meeting in Dushanbe—attended by a Taliban delegation—signal a growing interest in fostering mutual economic ties between Kabul and Central Asia. However, this normalization also comes with risks. The Taliban's refusal to form an inclusive government or ensure basic human rights—particularly for women and minorities—has prevented broader international recognition. By legitimizing the Taliban without demanding reforms, Moscow risks enabling continued repression and governance failures that could fuel further instability.

In terms of security, closer cooperation between Russia and the Taliban might strengthen the fight against ISIS-K, particularly in northern Afghanistan. However, it may also deepen regional rivalries, especially if Iran, China, and Russia begin to compete for influence in post-U.S. Afghanistan. The recent participation of Taliban officials in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) dialogue formats and The Termez Dialogue in Uzbekistan signals a growing desire among regional powers to integrate Afghanistan into new security architectures that exclude the West. Economic and political relations between the Central Asian countries and the Taliban are growing fast.

Finally, the implications extend to the global geopolitical sphere. Russia’s embrace of the Taliban may signal a broader strategy of contesting Western norms by engaging with non-Western, often pariah, regimes. Moscow’s willingness to engage with the Taliban mirrors its outreach to other sanctioned or controversial governments, from Syria to North Korea. This aligns with the Kremlin’s effort to promote a multipolar world order, one that challenges U.S.-led international structures.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations marks a pivotal moment in its Afghanistan policy. While it reflects pragmatic calculations tied to regional security concerns and economic interests—particularly in light of Central Asia’s growing engagement with the Taliban—it also signals a broader shift in Moscow’s diplomatic approach amid sanctions and geopolitical isolation. The long-term success of this engagement will depend not only on the Taliban’s capacity to deliver security, uphold governance, and respect international laws and human rights, but also on Russia’s ability to balance its strategic ambitions with regional stability and global legitimacy.

AUTHORS’ BIOS: Aigerim Turgunbaeva, journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

At the conclusion of a five-day visit to China by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on February 8, China and Pakistan issued a joint statement urging the Taliban government to take decisive measures to eliminate all terrorist organizations operating within Afghanistan and to prevent the use of Afghan territory for hostile activities against other nations. Over the past three years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban administration of providing refuge to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for attacks on Pakistani security forces and Chinese nationals within Pakistan. Despite being the largest foreign investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, China has thus far remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Pakistan is poised to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of Afghan territory that extends to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan and Pakistan. This corridor not only facilitates China's direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia but also holds strategic significance, positioning it as a potential focal point in China's evolving geopolitical interests in the region.

Photo by Ninara.

BACKGROUND: The airstrikes conducted by Pakistan inside Afghanistan on December 24 heightened tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, leading to an increase in skirmishes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan targeted TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, resulting in the deaths of 46 individuals. In response, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on multiple locations along the Pakistan border, killing one Pakistani soldier.

This was not the first instance of Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan. In March 2024, Pakistani airstrikes targeted TTP bases within Afghan territory, resulting in the deaths of eight militants. The strikes occurred a day after President Asif Ali Zardari pledged retaliation following an attack by the TTP in Pakistan's northwestern tribal are bordering Afghanistan, which claimed the lives of seven soldiers, including two officers. 

As tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalate and border clashes intensify, Pakistan is reportedly preparing to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of territory in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province that extends 350 kilometers to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region. Control of Wakhan would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan, effectively bypassing Afghanistan. In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s top intelligence official to Tajikistan on December 30, 2024, holds particular significance. Tajikistan hosts the leadership of the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. During his visit, the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Asim Malik, met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe. The ISI chief is believed to have been on a strategic mission to establish an alliance with the NRF as a counterbalance against the Taliban. 

China' has remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although a potential conflict between the two countries could jeopardize Chinese investments worth billions of U.S. dollars in both states, Beijing has opted for a "wait and watch" approach toward the ongoing hostilities. However, China is closely monitoring developments in the Wakhan Corridor, a strategically significant passage that provides direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

On December 30, 2024, during the visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Dushanbe, China’s Ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, was simultaneously meeting with Afghanistan’s acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. This meeting took place amid media reports suggesting that Pakistan’s military was advancing to seize control of the Wakhan Corridor. Both sides emphasized the corridor’s strategic significance for bilateral trade. Taliban authorities dismissed claims regarding the presence of foreign (Pakistani) military forces in the corridor and pledged to address any security threats along Afghanistan’s borders. In September 2023, the Taliban government inaugurated a 50-kilometer road extending from the Wakhan Corridor to the Chinese border.

IMPLICATIONS: A key factor behind China’s silence on the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is its own security concerns regarding Uyghur militancy in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares a border with Afghanistan. The Taliban could potentially leverage the "Uyghur card" to destabilize Xinjiang, given that the previous Taliban regime (1996–2001) provided sanctuary to Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. The Taliban has issued a warning to Beijing against adopting a pro-Pakistan stance in the ongoing conflict, cautioning that Islamabad is attempting to draw China into its proxy war. China remains apprehensive that Uyghur jihadists could gain ideological and operational support under Taliban rule. Consequently, Beijing has consistently sought to avoid antagonizing the Taliban, opting instead for diplomatic engagement and substantial investments in Afghanistan’s energy, infrastructure and mining sectors following the US withdrawal from the war-torn country in 2021.

The Taliban’s warning to China came just days after China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, visited Islamabad in November 2024 and stated that at least 20 militant groups were operating in Afghanistan, posing security threats to China. 

Strategically positioned at the intersection of three major mountain ranges—the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and Pamir—the Wakhan Corridor has the potential to become the focal point of China’s evolving geopolitical strategy in the region. At present, control over the Wakhan Corridor appears to be at the center of the geopolitical contest in Afghanistan, with Pakistan and Afghanistan seemingly acting as mere pawns in this larger game. As a silent yet influential player, China is subtly maneuvering these pawns on the regional chessboard. 

Pakistan aligned itself with China’s broader ambitions to expand its influence across South and Central Asia through Afghanistan long before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. However, rather than directly involving itself in the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, China appears committed to a strategy of cautious observation, continuously monitoring shifting geopolitical dynamics. Beijing seems to be waiting for an opportune moment to assert its influence. 

For China, the Wakhan Corridor—often referred to as Afghanistan's "chicken neck"—serves as a crucial strategic node for establishing and securing connectivity with South and Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This narrow strip of land has the potential to function as a pivotal junction, enabling China to expand its geopolitical and economic influence across the broader region. 

However, security concerns remain a significant challenge in China's plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the BRI, into Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

Several strategic projects planned or initiated by China align with its broader geopolitical strategy. One such initiative involves China's plans to establish a military base in Wakhan to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities. China has already set up a military base in eastern Tajikistan, near the Wakhan Corridor. A military foothold in Wakhan would serve as a critical buffer, preventing terrorism and instability from spilling over from Afghanistan into China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 

Additionally, China has constructed the Taxkorgan Airport on the Pamir Plateau in northwest Xinjiang, situated at an altitude of 3,258 meters and in close proximity of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Beyond providing a new "air passage" that enhances connectivity between Central and South Asia, this ultra-high-altitude airport reinforces China's military and economic influence in the region. 

While Beijing continues to invest in Afghanistan—despite its global isolation and international sanctions—it is simultaneously financing multiple projects under the US$ 62 billion CPEC in Pakistan. However, despite its deep economic and strategic engagements in both countries, China has remained silent regarding the escalating armed confrontations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

CONCLUSION: China should take an active role in mediating the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict rather than attempting to balance its interests with both sides. Leveraging its influence over both states, Beijing can push for diplomatic negotiations to address their disputes. At present, neither Islamabad nor Kabul is in a position to disregard China's calls for restraint, making it a crucial player in de-escalating tensions and ensuring regional stability. 

China should take a definitive stance and clarify its official position on the TTP, which has been responsible for attacks on Chinese nationals and security forces in Pakistan. Beijing should deliver an unequivocal message to Kabul, asserting that if the Taliban government fails to dismantle terrorist networks operating from Afghan territory, China will align with Pakistan in conducting targeted airstrikes against anti-China militant hideouts within Afghanistan. 

While China has remained silent on escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, the U.S. has endorsed Pakistan’s stance regarding the Taliban’s policy of sheltering terrorist groups, which violates the U.S.-Taliban Doha Accord. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 enabled the TTP to operate with greater impunity. For Islamabad, the Afghan endgame has effectively become a zero-sum game. In response, some factions within Pakistan have advocated for collaboration with the U.S. to carry out airstrikes targeting terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan. 

AUTHOR BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation. Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

Nargiza Umarova

March 12, 2025

In the current geopolitical realities, Central Asia seeks to restore its historical role as a land-based transportation and logistics hub, facilitating connections between East and West, as well as North and South. Most of the region’s countries promote their own projects including railways, gas pipelines, and power lines through Afghanistan, which offer them substantial economic and geopolitical advantages. However, the intervention of major powers, including Russia, China, India, and Iran, could create a serious conflict of interest on the trans-Afghan track. To mitigate risks, Central Asian states should implement a coordinated policy for developing the southern transit direction on a mutually beneficial basis.

Read What the Extension of Transport Corridors in Afghanistan Means for Central Asia (PDF) 

By Nargiza Umarova

In recent years, the Taliban government has successfully garnered the support of most Central Asian countries for the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure. Notably, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have demonstrated significant engagement in this endeavor, with each country advancing its own railway project traversing Afghanistan to reach the borders of Pakistan. These routes are expected to compete with one another, a dynamic that is anticipated to enhance their profitability through the implementation of flexible tariff policies aimed at maintaining sufficient cargo flow. The establishment of trans-Afghan rail corridors holds strategic significance not only for fostering connectivity between Central and South Asia but also for advancing Iran’s aspirations to develop efficient transportation links with China via Afghanistan—a goal that the Taliban government has expressed its willingness to support.

Photo by Pahari Sahib

BACKGROUND: In May 2023, Afghan authorities approved the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor project, which spans 1,468 kilometers. A year later, plans were announced for the construction of the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, signaling the intention to extend the Kandahar route to Pakistan. Turkmenistan promptly capitalized on this development by proposing an alternative version of the Trans-Afghan Corridor, extending along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak route.

Subsequently, Kazakhstan joined the project at the invitation of Ashgabat, and in September 2024, the foundation was laid for a 22-kilometer railway line connecting the border station of Torghundi to Sanobar. This section will serve as the initial segment of the Torghundi-Herat transport corridor.

The Turkmen version of the trans-Afghan railway is regarded as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor (the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway), although the latter route is significantly shorter. Competition between the western route (originating from Turkmenistan's border) and the eastern route (originating from Uzbekistan's border) appears inevitable. However, this competition is expected to yield positive outcomes, particularly through the reduction of transportation costs resulting from the launch of additional trade routes through Afghanistan. This cost efficiency is a critical factor driving the interest of external stakeholders in the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure.

The establishment of the Torghundi-Spin Boldak international transport corridor holds particular importance for Tehran, which intends to develop a railway link with Afghanistan through the border town of Zaranj.

Since 2020, as part of the broader development of Iran's deep-sea port of Chabahar, construction has been underway on the Chabahar-Zahedan railway. This railway is planned to extend further into Afghanistan, reaching the provinces of Nimroz and Kandahar. Recently, Afghan authorities announced the completion of engineering surveys for the construction of the Zaranj-Kandahar railway. This integrated infrastructure will provide Iran with an additional avenue to access Afghanistan, while also establishing a direct connection to Herat—one of Afghanistan's largest and most strategically significant cities.

Tehran’s long-term strategic vision positions Herat as a pivotal hub for transit routes connecting Western, Central, and Eastern Asia. This perspective stems from the concept of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor, commonly referred to as the "Five Nation Road." Iran has already initiated the practical implementation of this vision through the construction of the Khaf-Herat railway, which is scheduled to become operational in 2025. Once completed, the route will extend to Kashgar in China via Central Asia, covering an approximate distance of 2,000 kilometers.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran has consistently encouraged Afghan authorities to collaborate with their Central Asian partners in advancing the railway corridor connecting Khaf to Kashgar.

In 2017, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached an agreement to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif-Sheberghan-Maimana-Herat railway. Integrating this new route with the Khaf-Herat railway would enable Uzbekistan to establish an alternative transit corridor to Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, bypassing Turkmenistan. Additionally, this development would have a substantial impact on the implementation of the Five Nation Transit Route, as the Khaf-Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway constitutes a critical segment of the Afghan portion of this corridor. From Mazar-i-Sharif, transportation links would only need to be extended to Sherkhan Bandar in Kunduz province to connect with Tajikistan's border.

However, in 2018, Tashkent introduced a new trans-Afghan railway project toward Pakistan, known as the Kabul Corridor, effectively placing the implementation of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat route on hold. This decision was likely influenced by the recognition that the railway to Herat could undermine Uzbekistan’s transit interests. By prioritizing the Kabul Corridor, Uzbekistan sought to secure its role in servicing freight flows from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to Iran, Turkey, and Europe.

Despite these developments, progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor continued. In 2019, Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed an agreement to construct the Jaloliddini Balkhi (Kolkhozobod)-Panji Poyon-Sherkhan Bandar railway. To finance the feasibility study for this project, Dushanbe sought assistance from prominent international donor organizations, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

At that time, establishing a railway connection between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was also pivotal for the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan (TAT) transport corridor, initiated in 2013. This corridor extends from the Tajik border into northern Afghanistan, passing through the cities of Kunduz, Khulm, Mazar-i-Sharif, Sheberghan, and Andkhoy. At the Akina checkpoint, the railway crosses into Turkmenistan, from where it can connect to the Caspian Sea. This route aligns with the concept of reviving the ancient Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which aims to provide Afghanistan with direct access to European markets via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

In 2016, Turkmenistan completed the first stage of the TAT railway, spanning the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Akina route. By early 2021, the Akina-Andkhoy railway line also became operational. However, the abrupt change of power in Afghanistan during the summer of 2021 led to the suspension of work on these projects. This pause stemmed from uncertainty regarding the Taliban government's approach to relations with neighboring countries and its foreign policy on transport communications. Yet contrary to initial expectations, the new leadership in Afghanistan adopted a notably more pragmatic stance on these matters.

The Taliban have reactivated nearly all regional and interregional transport projects. Announcements have been made regarding the planned launch of the Andkhoy-Sheberghan and Sheberghan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway lines in the coming years, as well as the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway. These initiatives aim to bridge critical gaps in major trade corridors, including the TAT and the Five Nation Railway Route.

Notably, even Tajikistan, despite its tough stance toward the Afghan government, has become more active in advancing trans-Afghan transport initiatives. In July 2024, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) signed a protocol to develop a feasibility study for a 51-kilometer Jaloliddini Balkhi-Panji Poyon railway, which will connect to Afghanistan via the Sherkhan Bandar checkpoint. As previously mentioned, this railway will form part of the TAT.

Integration into such international transport corridors will offer Tajikistan a strategic advantage on southern transit routes. However, the modernization of existing infrastructure and the construction of new railways demand significant financial resources, which Dushanbe struggles to provide. Tajikistan relies heavily on China for foreign investment. Beijing has a vested interest in developing fast and efficient transportation routes to access emerging markets in South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

If the Taliban succeed in persuading Tajikistan to collaborate on developing trade routes to China, this could significantly reshape Central Asia's transport architecture while enhancing Afghanistan's strategic importance as a regional transit hub. Iran would also benefit from a direct connection to China that bypasses Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

For Tashkent, however, this development could present a serious challenge given the resolve of its neighbors to complete the TAT. 

CONCLUSIONS: The proactive efforts of the Taliban government in developing international transport links has heightened the interest of most Central Asian states (with the exception of Tajikistan) in strengthening trade and economic ties with Kabul. This includes the potential implementation of joint investment projects, such as the construction of railways, gas pipelines, and power lines, which could foster regional connectivity and economic growth.

External major powers are also eager to capitalize on these transformations, but their interference in establishing trans-Afghan transport infrastructure could have adverse consequences for Central Asia.

Iran’s ambitions to establish a transport corridor to China via Afghanistan pose the potential to alter the balance of power within the regional transit system. Such a development would bolster the positions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are currently in a transport deadlock and reliance on Uzbekistan for access to global markets.

The development of new trade routes through Afghanistan represents a positive trend that will inevitably influence Central Asia due to the region’s geographical proximity. This shift offers regional states the opportunity to enhance their transit and trade capacities, albeit accompanied by increased competition. To mitigate the risks of intense rivalries, the Central Asian republics must reconcile their interests in light of Afghanistan’s growing significance as a transit hub and formulate a coordinated strategy to advance interregional transport corridors, ensuring equitable benefits across the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Her research activities are focused on studying developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of big powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .