By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

In pursuit of rare earth elements (REEs), U.S. President Donald Trump hosted the leaders of five Central Asian states at the White House on 6 November. China currently controls about 90 percent of global REE processing and, amid its trade conflict with the U.S., expanded export restrictions in October, constricting U.S. access to critical minerals. For an REE-dependent Washington, Central Asia offers an attractive opportunity for sourcing refined materials, particularly via the Middle Corridor linking the region to Europe through the South Caucasus. China holds nearly all rare-earth mining leases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Russia remains the dominant actor in Kazakhstan, which possesses the world’s third-largest REE reserves. This competition for control over REEs positions Central Asia as a potential focal point of a twenty-first-century “Great Game.”



                                                                    Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Rare earth elements (REEs) constitute critical minerals essential to the production of twenty-first-century high-technology systems, including smartphones, wind turbines, electric vehicles, advanced weaponry, and fighter aircraft.

In 2024, the International Energy Agency projected that global demand for critical minerals will increase fourfold by 2040. This projection has further elevated the strategic importance of resource-rich Central Asia, as Western governments intensify efforts to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on China, which dominates global production and processing of rare earths and other rare metals.

China, which accounts for nearly 70 percent of global REE mining, introduced new export restrictions on critical rare earths and rare metals in October, intensifying global competition for control over these strategic resources. Central Asia’s substantial and largely untapped reserves of critical minerals have consequently drawn heightened attention from major powers seeking to secure alternative supply sources. The region’s significance is further underscored by the fact that it produces approximately half of the world’s uranium.

The U.S. Geological Survey classifies the 17 rare earth elements as critical minerals due to their essential role in national and economic security. This strategic importance underpins the United States’ interest in gaining access to Central Asia’s substantial untapped REE reserves. For instance, Kazakhstan possesses one of the world’s largest undeveloped tungsten deposits, a metal integral to the production of projectiles, ammunition, and other defense-related technologies in the U.S.

In March, Uzbekistan announced the discovery of deposits containing more than 30 rare metals, including tungsten, molybdenum, magnesium, lithium, and titanium. The government simultaneously unveiled plans to implement 76 projects dedicated to the extraction and processing of rare metals over the next three years, with a projected investment of US$ 2.6 billion. In July, the head of Tajikistan’s Geology Department reported the discovery of significant niobium and tantalum deposits in the country’s Rasht Valley. Both metals are considered strategically important: niobium is widely used in the aerospace and construction industries, while tantalum is essential for the manufacture of advanced electronic components.

China and Russia have been the principal importers of Kazakhstan’s critical minerals. In 2023, Kazakhstan exported critical minerals valued at US$ 3.07 billion to China and US$ 1.8 billion to Russia, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), an online trade analytics platform.

In September, Kazakhstan concluded a US$ 4.2 billion agreement with the U.S. rail manufacturer Wabtec during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. Under the terms of the deal, the U.S. company will supply 300 locomotives to support the modernization of Kazakhstan’s railway system and will additionally participate in the development of regional transport corridors linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus.

In light of China’s recent export restrictions, the U.S. is increasingly turning its attention to resource-rich Central Asia in an effort to diminish Beijing’s dominance over global critical-mineral supply chains. In October, the U.S. government facilitated negotiations between a U.S. firm and Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund aimed at developing the country’s largest untapped tungsten deposits.

President Donald Trump held bilateral meetings in the Oval Office with officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as he hosted the Central Asian leaders in Washington for a high-profile summit on November 6.

IMPLICATIONS: Pursuing their own competing strategic agendas, China, Russia, the U.S., and the EU are increasingly engaged in what has been described as the “Great Game of the twenty-first century,” catalyzed in part by China’s newly imposed export restrictions on critical minerals. At the center of this geopolitical contest lies the effort to secure control over Central Asia’s vast, untapped reserves of rare earth elements (REEs).

Bound by the war in Ukraine since February 2022, Russia remains unwilling to cede influence in Central Asia, particularly as Western engagement in the region’s critical mineral sector continues to grow. At the same time, the U.S. is poised to increase investment in Central Asia’s undeveloped rare earth deposits as it seeks to reduce its dependence on China.

Leveraging its geographic proximity and extensive processing capacity, China has already established itself as the dominant actor in Central Asia’s rare earths sector. In a move to further consolidate its control over critical minerals, Beijing imposed prohibitions on the export of key processing technologies. Seeking to counter U.S. and European efforts to restructure global supply chains and diminish Chinese influence, China has also moved to secure mining rights directly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

China’s dominance in rare earth mining, processing, and refining enables it to employ these resources as a geopolitical instrument vis-à-vis Western competitors. In 2010, Beijing demonstrated this leverage by halting REE exports to Japan during a maritime dispute, disrupting Japan’s high-technology sector. Today, China’s influence in global trade, negotiations, and technological competition remains closely tied to its control over REE production and processing.

Moscow views China’s expanding role in Central Asia’s rare earth sector as a counterbalance to growing U.S. and EU influence. At the same time, Russia seeks to preserve its own position in the region, particularly in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry. Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer, depends heavily on Russia for transportation and processing, and remains a key supplier to Russia, which also holds ownership stakes in several Kazakh uranium mines.

There is substantial potential for a U.S.–Central Asia partnership grounded in shared interests in the critical minerals sector. The U.S. urgently requires access to the region’s uranium, antimony, tungsten, and other strategic minerals to strengthen its supply chains, while Central Asian states seek significant U.S. investment to develop their resource bases. Reflecting this alignment, the Trump administration has prioritized deeper engagement with the region. As Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor emphasized at the November summit, the president’s commitment ensures that Central Asian leaders “have a direct line to the White House” and receive the attention the region “very much deserves.”

Regional connectivity and security will be central to U.S. efforts to extract and transport Central Asia’s critical minerals. Establishing safe and reliable trade routes is essential, and Washington is likely to back corridors that bypass Russia and link the region directly to Western markets. In this context, the Middle Corridor, which circumvents Russia by connecting China to Europe through the South Caucasus, holds particular strategic appeal alongside Central Asia’s substantial mineral reserves.

China’s dominance in processing critical metals in Central Asia is facilitated by weak regulatory frameworks that allow environmentally harmful practices. For the U.S. to compete effectively, it would likewise face pressure to follow suit.

CONCLUSIONS: Geopolitically, the principal challenge for the U.S. and its Western partners is to offset the influence of China, which dominates the global REE supply chain. By expanding infrastructure investment and deepening partnerships with Central Asian states, the U.S. can position the region as a reliable partner in its rare earth supply networks.

As U.S. interest in Central Asia’s largely untapped critical mineral reserves grows, the region stands to benefit from increased investment and expanded partnerships with Washington. Such engagement would reduce Central Asia’s reliance on China and Russia and help counterbalance their influence in the region.

China’s geographic proximity and extensive REE processing capacity give it a significant advantage over the U.S. in the competition for Central Asia’s rare earth resources. Central Asian states are likely to remain dependent on Chinese and Russian supply chains unless they can surmount persistent political, infrastructural, and environmental constraints.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.  Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .