By Umair Jamal

Pakistan has upheld a policy of non-recognition of Israel since 1948, maintaining that diplomatic relations are contingent upon the establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital. However, in late 2025, Islamabad’s mediation in the Gaza ceasefire and its conditional readiness to contribute forces to a UN-mandated International Stabilization Force have elevated its diplomatic profile with the U.S. and Gulf partners. Washington, alongside Saudi and Emirati counterparts, appears intent on expanding the Abraham Accords following credible progress toward a two-state solution. Pakistani participation would constitute a historic shift and unlock new economic corridors extending into Central Asia, enhancing regional connectivity to global markets.

                                                          Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Pakistan’s official position on Israel remains firmly grounded in support for Palestinian self-determination, a stance that resonates strongly with domestic public opinion and has guided foreign policy since the country’s founding in 1947. Pakistani diplomatic passports explicitly prohibit travel to Israel, and public discourse frequently interprets the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through the lens of historical injustice, particularly the mass displacement of Palestinians in 1948.

Anti-Israel sentiment intensified across the Muslim world, including in Pakistan, following Israel’s large-scale military offensive in Gaza, which began in October 2023 in response to the Hamas attacks. The operation has thus far resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian casualties and extensive physical destruction across the territory.

A majority of Pakistanis regard recognition of Israel as untenable in the absence of a sovereign Palestinian state. At the governmental level, however, pragmatic considerations have increasingly shaped Islamabad’s approach amid intensifying economic pressures, including a foreign debt burden exceeding US$ 130 billion and continued dependence on international financial institutions.

In September 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took part in a multilateral summit convened by U.S. President Donald Trump, alongside leaders from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, to endorse a 20-point framework for a Gaza ceasefire. The initiative, which enabled hostage releases and expanded humanitarian access, marked a significant instance of Pakistan’s active mediation, coordinated through Doha and other Middle Eastern diplomatic channels.

Subsequently, in November 2025, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed Pakistan’s willingness to contribute troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803. He stressed, however, that the mission’s primary focus would be civilian protection and post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza rather than the disarmament of Palestinian groups. “Our job is peacekeeping, not peace enforcement,” Dar stated when questioned about the prospective deployment of Pakistani forces. This position aligns Pakistan with a coalition of eight Muslim-majority states cooperating with the U.S. to support efforts toward stabilizing Gaza.

These developments coincide with the strengthening of Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, formalized through a mutual defense pact signed in Riyadh on 17 September. The agreement commits both states to regard an attack on one as an attack on the other and encompasses broad provisions for military cooperation and joint deterrence. It underscores the two countries’ shared strategic interests amid heightened regional instability.

Saudi Arabia has signaled its openness to joining the Abraham Accords—a framework for the normalization of relations with Israel—conditional on credible progress toward a two-state solution. In recent remarks to President Trump, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that Riyadh is prepared to participate in the Accords but seeks to secure “a clear path toward a two-state solution.”

Similarly, U.S. officials, including envoys from the Trump administration, appear to have encouraged Pakistan’s inclusion in this framework as a way to extend normalization efforts beyond the Gulf region. Although Islamabad continues to emphasize that any movement in this direction would depend on firm guarantees of Palestinian statehood, reports of backchannel exchanges suggest that discussions on the issue are evolving.

These shifts carry significant implications for Central Asia. States such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are actively pursuing diversified connectivity options to reduce overreliance on Russian and Chinese infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s formal accession to the Abraham Accords in November 2025 illustrates this strategy, with the potential to strengthen its economic linkages with Israel and Western partners, particularly the U.S.

The prospective inclusion of Pakistan in the Accords could function as a pivotal connective link, but sustaining momentum would require careful management of domestic public opinion and sensitive regional dynamics.

IMPLICATIONS: If U.S. officials were to achieve their apparent objective of incorporating Pakistan into an expanded Abraham Accords framework, an outcome likely dependent on Saudi Arabia’s formal participation following progress toward a two-state solution, it would have significant ramifications for Central Asia’s economic landscape. The region’s republics, rich in hydrocarbons, uranium, and rare earth minerals yet constrained by geographic isolation, would benefit significantly from deeper integration into multimodal trade networks.

Foremost among these initiatives is the U.S.-backed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which incorporates Israeli routes and seeks to streamline freight transport from South Asia through Gulf ports to Europe. Designed to circumvent traditional chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the corridor could reduce transit times by up to 40 percent. Pakistan’s participation could extend IMEC’s eastern flank through its ports at Gwadar and Karachi, interfacing with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to provide Central Asian exporters, particularly those in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. with viable southern outlets.

Such diversification would mitigate the vulnerabilities inherent in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which, although operational, continues to face bottlenecks in Caspian Sea transit and persistent geopolitical frictions. In this context, enhanced Israeli technological inputs, such as advanced logistics software and desalination expertise, could improve the efficiency of these corridors, potentially generating annual trade gains amounting to billions of dollars for Central Asia by facilitating access to Mediterranean markets.

From a security standpoint, Pakistan’s prospective deployment of Islamic Security Forces (ISF) in Gaza, framed as a humanitarian stabilization mission, could serve as a model for multilateral engagement and potentially inspire analogous C5+1–style frameworks for managing Afghanistan’s borders. The Saudi–Pakistani defense pact concluded in September 2025 already signals deeper intelligence-sharing cooperation, which could extend northward to counter ISIS-K incursions threatening the frontiers of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s recent entry into the Abraham Accords, announced on 6 November during President Tokayev’s visit to the White House, further underscores this momentum.

Clear obstacles exist to the realization of this trajectory. Public opinion in Pakistan remains strongly opposed to normalization in the absence of Palestinian sovereignty, as demonstrated by sustained public protests and formal parliamentary resolutions. Consequently, any perceived capitulation to U.S. pressure could trigger political instability. Iranian concerns that IMEC represents an encirclement strategy, combined with its rivalry with Israel, could provoke proxy disruptions extending beyond Afghanistan into Central Asia. Moreover, China and Russia are likely to pursue countermeasures through their entrenched Belt and Road Initiative commitments, which already exceed US$ 25 billion in loans to Central Asian states. This could undermine regional cohesion and potentially exacerbate divisions, pitting Turkic-aligned states against Persian-influenced Tajikistan.

Yet a carefully calibrated strategy, linking reforms in Palestinian governance with the concurrent advancement of the IMEC corridor and an expanded role for Pakistan, could yield durable, region-wide dividends.

Israeli agricultural and water-management technologies, which have demonstrated effectiveness in arid environments, could contribute to the rehabilitation of the degraded Aral Sea basin and support the creation of tens of thousands of jobs across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Meanwhile, concrete U.S. incentives, such as the designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally Plus or the provision of security guarantees, could reinforce Islamabad’s willingness to resolve longstanding disputes with Afghanistan and India, facilitate full normalization with Israel, and finally enable the implementation of long-stalled connectivity projects, including the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway and the Trans-Afghan corridor.

The potential payoff could be transformative. Landlocked Central Asia would gain direct and competitive access to the warm-water ports of Gwadar, Karachi, and Mundra, unlocking billions of dollars in annual trade. This shift would also enable the region to diversify away from reliance on Russian and Chinese transit routes, thereby converting decades of geopolitical isolation into sustained economic prosperity.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan has conditioned recognition of Israel on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state for more than seven decades. That longstanding red line now appears to face its greatest pressure to date, as Islamabad’s effective mediation in Gaza and potential peacekeeping role have attracted praise from Washington and Riyadh. The U.S. is actively seeking to expand the Abraham Accords and aims to incorporate both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan once a credible two-state pathway is established. Should Pakistan ultimately accede, the economic payoff for Central Asia could be immediate, through faster IMEC and Trans-Caspian routes, expanded access to Gulf capital, and Israeli technology reaching the landlocked republics. Above all, this development could inaugurate a new era of integration adjacent to Central Asia that would benefit the region greatly.

Absent genuine Palestinian statehood, however, domestic opposition within Pakistan and regional resistance primarily from Iran could undermine these prospects. Ultimately, the outcome hinges on two factors: whether Pakistan can advance toward normalization with Israel without destabilizing its domestic political order, and whether the U.S. can deliver sufficient progress toward a credible and equitable two-state solution to provide Islamabad and other Muslim-majority states with the legitimacy required to take this step and unlock the region’s economic future.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Nargis Kassenova

The dramatic events of 2022 - the January unrest in Kazakhstan and Russia’s war against Ukraine - upended the status quo in Kazakhstan-Russia relations. Astana must now address both long-standing vulnerabilities—security, political, and economic—and new pressures in areas such as inter-elite relations (as they shape up in the process of "denazarbayevization"), nuclear energy, and history writing. The Tokayev government seeks to accommodate Russia as much as possible while advancing Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, which requires constant adjustments and trade-offs.

Read Kazakhstan-Russia Relations After 2022: Sources of Contention, Points of Pressure

By Stephen Blank

Just as Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to a cease-fire on October 19, representatives of the Taliban were in New Delhi reviving India’s long-standing ties with Afghanistan, demonstrating the interconnections between Afghanistan, Central Asia as a region, and the rivalries that drive Asian politics, i.e. the Indo-Pakistani-China triangle. In turn, this signifies the region’s increasing importance to major external actors as well as the growing importance and agency of Central Asian states. 

                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: India’s rapprochement with Afghanistan follows the examples of China, Russia, and Central Asian states. Although Pakistan promoted the Taliban during the insurgency against the U.S., their relations have deteriorated since 2021. Pakistan has increasingly charged the Taliban with sheltering and supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for a surge of deadly attacks inside Pakistan. This tension has led to frequent and sometimes deadly border clashes, airstrikes, and the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Despite the latest cease-fire, continued tensions can be expected along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

There are compelling reasons for India and Afghanistan to resume ties and connections, e.g., air flights from New Delhi to Kabul. Prior to the Taliban takeover, India had a thriving, strategically motivated, relationship with Afghanistan. India is in a permanent state of tension with Pakistan, which continues to sponsor terrorist attacks on India, while China supports Pakistan to prevent India from rivalling it as an Asian great power. These two states have consistently sought with considerable success to isolate India from Central Asia, thereby giving China a freer hand in the region.

Pakistan has long strived to have hegemonic influence over Afghan governments. It previously sponsored the Taliban against the pro-Western and pro-Indian Karzai and subsequent governments in Afghanistan. Consequently, as Taliban ties to Pakistan eroded and the need for economic support from abroad grew, India has emulated other actors in Central Asia to resume ties with Afghanistan.

India, Central Asian governments, Russia, and China have congruent economic-political reasons for restoring ties to Kabul. The same is true for Washington, although to a lesser degree. All these governments have concluded that if they wish to prevent the Afghan government from sponsoring terrorism, whether against Russia, Uzbekistan, or China, they must engage seriously, and enter into diplomatic relations, with Afghanistan.

Similarly, by virtue of its geographical location Afghanistan is instrumental to transcontinental trade and transportation routes, including the Middle Corridor and Belt and Road, leading from China through Central Asia to Europe. The construction of such corridors is now one of the most urgent issues on the agenda for these states, making a reasonably secure and robust economic engagement with Afghanistan a necessity for both Central Asian states and China. As a result of this awareness, we now see numerous proposals for a railway and other transportation routes connecting Central Asia and China. The Afghan government also evidently grasps the need for secure and thriving economic links with its Central Asian neighbors, China, and Russia.

The enhanced understanding on all sides of the urgent need for improved connectivity obliges foreign governments to press for an end to support for terrorists. It remains to be seen if Kabul can or will terminate this support. If it does not, it will be shunned by its neighbors and potential partners.

Great power interest in Afghanistan is also fueled by the fact that previous international studies estimate that Afghanistan is sitting on an estimated US$ 1 trillion of rare earths and minerals. As access to these goods has now become a central issue in global politics, and especially Sino-American relations, there is an intensifying competition to gain secure and uncontested access to them. Once again, Afghanistan could become a central arena for great power rivalry.

Moscow needs good ties to Kabul to reinforce its overall Central Asian policy goals and prevent domestic terrorism; and also aspires to sell arms to Kabul. Soviet arms sales provided the basis for its earlier influence in Afghanistan, and Russia hopes to repeat this especially as it has little to offer economically compared to Beijing and Washington. The Trump Administration, apart from its growing obsession with rare earths, wants to regain access to Bagram Air Base to monitor Chinese military developments. 

IMPLICATIONS: Rising interest in ties with Afghanistan across the board opens the way for the Taliban to play the traditional small state game of hedging and balancing among competing foreign governments. However, the developments outlined above tell us things about Central Asia that are prospectively much more important. First, Central Asian states that are displaying ever more interest in regional cooperation and integration now acknowledge that their region is incomplete if Afghanistan does not or cannot participate in it. This insight applies with equal force to economic issues as well as security concerns. For them, no discussion of the regional future is complete without including Afghanistan. Therefore, they are promoting bilateral and regional plans for projects to expand trade, transport, and technology projects to Afghanistan.

Second, it appears that all of the major foreign state actors appreciate the fact that for economic, political, and strategic reasons they all need to engage not only Afghanistan but the entire region. This awareness enhances their mutual rivalries throughout Central Asia but also prospects for Central Asian states to acquire much needed foreign assistance, on better terms than if they were dependent on only one foreign provider. This foreign rivalry enhances their economic and security capabilities while also creating a possibility to pacify Afghanistan’s domestic and foreign policies.

However, as is often the case, these potential benefits come at a price. Although Central Asian states, India, China, Russia, and the U.S, are all engaging Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they can induce it to stop supporting terrorism even if it is directed at Pakistan, itself a known supporter of terrorism. Thus, Central Asian states that depend to some degree on the economic-political development of Afghanistan cannot escape involvement in the tangled relations of South Asia. To the extent that Central Asian states hope to include Afghanistan in their future projects this involvement is unavoidable.

Meanwhile, Pakistan and China work steadily to impede India’s engagement with Central Asia. Chinese analysts increasingly frame the Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions with reference to a wider Indian role as manifested in India’s ties to Afghanistan. Pakistan fears such connections and strongly objected to the references to Jammu and Kashmir in the Indo-Afghan communique.

Moreover, Uzbekistan is now expressing its interest in obtaining a permanent berth at the Iranian port of Chabahar in Iran. It has held meetings with Iranian and Indian officials to gain this position because this port, apart from figuring prominently in Iran’s regional commercial ambitions, is critical to India’s efforts to leapfrog or bypass Pakistani obstruction of its Central Asian policies.

The entanglement in South Asia’s rivalries is part of a larger trend where Central Asia is increasingly tied to developments in other regions. Central Asian economies are profoundly affected by the war in Ukraine. Similarly, there is mounting interest in Central Asian countries joining the Abraham Accords, a move that increases their political and strategic involvement in the Middle East on top of their growing economic ties with states of the Persian Gulf.

CONCLUSIONS: The impending Sino-American rivalry over rare earths cannot but draw Central Asian states, including Afghanistan, into the Sino-American, and possibly Sino-European tensions. Thus, what we are now seeing in the spillover of South Asian tensions into Central Asia and vice versa, given the TTP raids into Pakistan, signify the full arrival and agency of Central Asian states as individual and regional actors of more than local significance. These trends will undoubtedly continue but how they develop depends on the actions of all the relevant policymakers involved. While those actions cannot be foreseen, Central Asian states will not be merely the object of other states’ designs but independent actors whose policies, be they support for terrorism or large-scale connectivity projects, will impact trends far beyond their borders.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

By Umair Jamal

The June 25 meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers in China illuminated how enduring tensions between Pakistan and India are hindering the bloc’s counterterrorism initiatives while compounding New Delhi’s diplomatic challenges within the organization. India’s refusal to endorse the meeting’s joint communiqué, following its unsuccessful attempt to include references to the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, demonstrated its waning influence in Eurasian multilateralism. Whereas Pakistan succeeded in presenting the unrest in Baluchistan as a matter of SCO concern, India was unable to garner support for its narrative on Kashmir. Concurrently, China’s advocacy for a more pronounced Iranian role in the SCO—evident in the forum’s condemnation of Israeli military actions, which India opposed—suggests a growing divide, potentially transforming the organization into a venue for great-power rivalry. This impasse accentuates India’s strategic dilemma: it must either align with the SCO’s emerging anti-Western consensus or risk marginalization within the China-dominated security framework of Central Asia.

The 2022 Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in Samarqand, Uzbekistan. Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

BACKGROUND: The SCO evolved from the 1996 Shanghai Five, initially established as a Sino-Russian initiative aimed at stabilizing Central Asia. However, its enlargement in 2017 to include both Pakistan and India introduced volatile bilateral dynamics into the organization. Traditionally, the SCO has concentrated on combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, yet the divergent stances of India and Pakistan have increasingly politicized these very concerns. Pakistan characterizes India’s actions in Kashmir as constituting state terrorism. Islamabad maintains its support for the region’s right to self-determination and remains committed to a negotiated resolution of the dispute. In contrast, India accuses Pakistan of facilitating cross-border militancy, resulting in an impasse that has repeatedly obstructed consensus within the SCO.

The April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, which resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, along with India’s subsequent missile strikes on Pakistan, significantly escalated bilateral tensions in the weeks leading up to the SCO meeting in China. India’s effort to raise the Kashmir issue during the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting proved unsuccessful, as references to the matter were excluded from the preliminary joint communiqué intended for endorsement by all member states. In contrast, Pakistan’s inclusion of references to unrest in Baluchistan in the draft appeared to align more closely with the organization’s stance against external interference, thereby garnering broader resonance within the bloc.

China’s discreet yet consistent support for Pakistan has altered the internal dynamics of the SCO in recent years. On multiple occasions, Beijing has permitted Islamabad to obstruct India’s terrorism-related narratives, while simultaneously advancing its own conception of the SCO as a counterweight to the U.S.-led international order. For example, India’s recent refusal to endorse the SCO’s condemnation of Israel’s attack on Iran further isolated New Delhi from the prevailing consensus within the group, highlighting its increasing divergence from the bloc’s anti-Western trajectory. This discord is structural in nature. India’s strategic alignments with the U.S. through frameworks such as the QUAD and I2U2 are at odds with the SCO’s objectives, whereas Pakistan’s China-backed diplomatic strategy aims to leverage the organization to constrain India’s influence. With Iran’s accession as a full member, the SCO is likely to intensify its anti-Israel and anti-American rhetoric, thereby compelling India to confront progressively more difficult diplomatic trade-offs.

IMPLICATIONS: The persistent tensions between India and Pakistan during SCO meetings are generating substantial obstacles for the organization while reshaping regional power dynamics. India increasingly finds itself in a strategic quandary. Remaining within the SCO necessitates engagement with both Pakistan and China on contentious issues such as Baluchistan and may compel tacit support for initiatives aligned with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conversely, a complete withdrawal from the forum would entail forfeiting strategic influence in Central Asia, thereby ceding greater regional influence to China and Russia.

Recent military confrontations between India and Pakistan underscore how their bilateral disputes are impeding the SCO’s capacity to foster effective security cooperation. Although the U.S. facilitated a ceasefire between the two countries following the latest clashes, the underlying issue persists: India aspires to leadership within the Global South, yet its strategic vision diverges from the SCO’s predominantly anti-Western orientation. India’s choice not to utilize the SCO platform to present its case against Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack reflects a diminishing confidence in the organization. Despite actively engaging Western capitals to highlight the issue of cross-border terrorism in the aftermath of its retaliatory strikes, India conspicuously refrained from advancing its position during the SCO summit.

This pattern of selective engagement suggests that New Delhi perceives the China-led forum as increasingly peripheral to its core security interests—a perception that stands in sharp contrast to its intensified diplomatic outreach to the U.S. and EU in recent weeks. India’s disengagement from the forum conveys a clear signal to states such as Pakistan and China: New Delhi prioritizes its Western alliances over participation in Eurasian multilateral mechanisms. By choosing not to raise the Pahalgam incident within the SCO framework, India implicitly acknowledged the organization’s limited utility in addressing its counterterrorism agenda. However, this strategy entails certain risks, as India’s terrorism-centric narrative, promoted primarily through its Western partnerships, has recently received limited international traction. Many states remain preoccupied with the potential nuclear implications of India-Pakistan tensions, while terrorism-related issues have garnered comparatively little global attention.

India’s marginalization within the SCO may inadvertently enhance Pakistan’s standing as the more engaged and consistent Eurasian partner, thereby exposing the limitations of New Delhi’s multi-alignment strategy. Pakistan has strategically leveraged the SCO platform to elevate its international profile, presenting itself as a cooperative actor aligned with the organization’s principles. 

Meanwhile, Islamabad actively seeks to obstruct Indian statements that conflict with its strategic interests, while simultaneously reinforcing its alliance with Beijing. By focusing on shared security concerns—such as terrorism—that resonate with Central Asian member states, Pakistan positions itself as a more constructive and cooperative actor within the SCO framework. In contrast, India’s persistent emphasis on Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism in Kashmir is perceived by other members as invoking a protracted bilateral conflict that necessitates substantive dialogue between the two parties. Within this context, the SCO is viewed as a potential facilitator, but only if both countries demonstrate a willingness to engage. While Pakistan has signaled openness to such mediation through the SCO, India has consistently rejected third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute.

China appears to be the primary beneficiary of the ongoing India-Pakistan rivalry within the SCO. It leverages these divisions to diminish India’s influence in Eurasian institutions, to assess the reliability of Russia—traditionally a neutral actor—and to advance its own financial mechanisms as alternatives to Western systems. In this context, Iran’s accession as a full member introduces additional complexities for India, compelling it to navigate between aligning with SCO positions and preserving its expanding strategic relations with Israel. Moreover, Iran’s inclusion is likely to enhance coordination between China and Pakistan on issues such as Afghanistan and regional energy initiatives, thereby increasing the risk of India’s marginalization within the organization.

India’s challenges within the SCO undermine its credibility as a self-proclaimed leader of the Global South. Its positions frequently diverge from those of the majority of member states, thereby casting doubt on its representative claims. The SCO’s counterterrorism cooperation has also been significantly impeded by the India-Pakistan impasse, which prevents joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and meaningful dialogue on bilateral tensions. This persistent dysfunction has historically provided greater operational latitude for militant groups and carries the risk of escalating into open conflict, as illustrated by the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack.

CONCLUSIONS: The SCO has arrived at a critical juncture, as the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to obstruct its operational efficacy. India’s marginalization at recent meetings underscores its difficulty in reconciling strategic partnerships with the U.S. and effective engagement within a China-led multilateral framework. Meanwhile, Pakistan—bolstered by Chinese support—has adeptly utilized the SCO as a platform to contest India’s stance on Kashmir and to portray itself as a constructive and responsible partner in counterterrorism efforts.

Looking ahead, three scenarios appear increasingly plausible. First, the existing stalemate may persist, with India continuing to obstruct references to Kashmir and Baluchistan while opposing proposals perceived as anti-Western. Second, Iran’s recent accession to the forum may consolidate an anti-U.S. and anti-Israel bloc within the SCO, further marginalizing India’s influence. Third, China may exploit these internal divisions to transform the SCO into a vehicle for advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, thereby diminishing India’s strategic role within the organization.

For the SCO to retain its relevance, it would need to play a constructive role in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan; however, China’s evident alignment with Pakistan renders this prospect improbable. The organization’s viability as a significant security platform now hinges on its capacity to transcend its current status as merely another stage for persistent India-Pakistan rivalry. With each successive meeting concluding without consensus, the prospects for such a transformation appear increasingly uncertain.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The downing of three expensive French-made Rafale fighter jets by low-cost, Chinese-manufactured J-10C aircraft during the Pakistan–India aerial conflict on May 7 highlighted the affordability and operational capability of Chinese fighters. In light of this encounter, several countries are now reassessing their Rafale procurement plans. Uzbekistan, which had previously expressed interest in acquiring 24 Rafale jets, is currently engaged in negotiations with China to purchase JF-17 aircraft. China has increasingly focused on expanding arms exports to Central Asia, a market traditionally dominated by Russia.

BACKGROUND: On May 7, India launched missile strikes against six locations in Pakistan, attributing responsibility to its long-standing rival for the April 22 attack that claimed the lives of 26 tourists in Pahalgam, located in Indian-administered Kashmir. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) deployed Chinese-manufactured J-10C fighter jets, which succeeded in downing five Indian aircraft, including three Rafale jets recently procured from France. Pakistan utilized China’s advanced PL-15E air-to-air missiles to carry out the strikes on the Indian fighters. The India–Pakistan confrontation, characterized by missile exchanges, drone attacks, and artillery shelling, concluded on May 10 following a ceasefire agreement brokered by the U.S. 

In 2016, India concluded a US$ 8.8 billion agreement with France for the procurement of 36 Rafale fighter jets. Pakistan entered into a US$ 1.525 billion deal with China for the acquisition of 20 J-10C aircraft.

China ranks as the fourth-largest supplier of conventional weapons globally, following the U.S., France, and Russia. The country produces the majority of its military equipment domestically and primarily exports to developing nations. China is increasingly asserting itself as the dominant arms exporter in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, while also expanding its presence in Central Asia. Chinese aircraft have gained recognition as cost-effective alternatives to Western models, particularly among developing states. 

China has been consolidating its defense partnerships with Central Asian nations in recent years. In 2015, it supplied FD-2000 long-range air defense systems to both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, following defense equipment contracts signed by the two countries with China in 2013. The FD-2000 is capable of intercepting a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, armed helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles. In 2022, China further deepened its regional security ties by signing bilateral security cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan during a visit by former Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe. 

China has now emerged as a principal defense supplier to Central Asia. At the China–Central Asia Summit in 2023, Beijing articulated its intention to strengthen military cooperation and security engagement with the region at a time when Russia is increasingly preoccupied and resource-constrained due to its ongoing war in Ukraine.

China is actively capitalizing on the current geopolitical landscape. Last year, it supplied EVOMax unmanned systems to Kazakhstan, whereas Tajikistan in 2024 procured the Chinese-manufactured HQ-17AE air defense system, which significantly enhances its capacity to defend against a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Uzbekistan also continues to enhance its military cooperation with China, procuring FM-90 and KS-1C air defense systems in February. The FM-90, an upgraded version of the HQ-7, is designed for short-range defense against threats such as cruise missiles and drones. In contrast, the KS-1C serves as a medium-to-long-range air defense system. Together, these systems provide Uzbekistan with a layered and integrated air defense architecture capable of countering a broad spectrum of aerial threats.

China’s defense exports to Central Asia were minimal between 2010 and 2014, accounting for only 1.5 percent of the region’s total arms imports. However, this figure rose substantially to 18 percent during the 2015–2019 period, reflecting a marked increase in Beijing’s regional defense engagement. According to one estimate, Russia’s arms exports to Central Asia declined by 64 percent between 2020 and 2024. This downturn created a vacuum, which other suppliers—including India and China—moved to fill. During this period, China accounted for 17 percent of the replacement in arms supply, further solidifying its growing influence in the region’s defense sector.

BACKGROUND: The performance of Chinese-manufactured aircraft during the brief military confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian Air Forces has not only reignited global interest in Chinese defense technology but also challenged the perceived superiority of Western military hardware.

China has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the recent India–Pakistan conflict. The market valuation of Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC)—a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and the producer of the J-10C fighter jets—surged by over US$ 7.6 billion following the aerial engagement on May 7. On the same day, CAC’s share price on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange rose by more than 17 percent, coinciding with Pakistan’s Defence Minister’s confirmation that five Indian fighter jets had been downed overnight.

The air warfare offered China an opportunity to showcase its advancements in aviation technology on the global stage, underscoring the effectiveness of China’s “low-cost, high-capacity” production model in the defense sector. The performance of Chinese J-10C against French Rafale, which is over three times more expensive, highlights the operational competitiveness of more affordable Chinese alternatives. This event is likely to accelerate the expansion of China’s military exports in the coming years. Although the Rafale retains technological advantages over Chinese platforms such as the JF-17 Thunder and J-10C, the results of this live combat scenario is expected to adversely affect the export prospects of France’s Dassault Aviation.

The J-10C fighter jet is scheduled to make its debut at the 2025 Paris Air Show—one of the world’s premier aerospace exhibitions, historically dominated by Western manufacturers. The inclusion of the J-10C in this prestigious event signifies a growing recognition among global industry leaders of China’s rising aerospace capabilities.

In the aftermath of the India–Pakistan aerial confrontation, China’s J-10C and JF-17 Thunder fighter jets have gained increased appeal among Central Asian countries. For instance, Uzbekistan expressed interest in purchasing 24 Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tashkent in November 2023. However, Uzbekistan has earlier this year engaged in negotiations with China to procure JF-17 jets. The recent air combat between India and Pakistan is likely to further incentivize Tashkent to finalize a deal with Beijing. China’s appeal as an arms supplier is also enhanced by its willingness to facilitate technology transfers to recipient states. Notably, China is assisting Uzbekistan in establishing its own domestic defense industry. 

China is poised to capture a significant share of Central Asia’s arms market, capitalizing on shifting regional dynamics. All five Central Asian republics have increased their defense expenditures at a time when Russia’s long-standing dominance in arms sales to the region has eroded following the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. 

CONCLUSIONS: The live air combat between India and Pakistan has significantly elevated the global market value and demand for Chinese arms and aircraft, strengthening Beijing’s defense sales narrative, particularly in Central Asia. The recent acquisition of Chinese defense systems by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signals a departure from traditional defense alignments in the region, reflecting a broader pivot among Central Asian states toward Chinese military technology. 

China views Central Asia as a strategic gateway to West Asia and the Black Sea region. Its growing security engagement and expanding arms sales serve as crucial instruments for deepening its strategic foothold in the region through sustained defense collaboration with Central Asian states. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email,  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .