By Vali Kaleji

Over the past decade, “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has emerged as a significant instrument for China to advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The inability of certain nations, such as Sri Lanka and various African countries, to repay their loans has resulted in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure, including ports and mines. However, the repercussions of China’s debt-trap diplomacy vary across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable within the region. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, leveraging gas exports to China, do not encounter substantial difficulties. Conversely, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most susceptible Central Asian nations to China’s “Debt-trap Diplomacy.”

BACKGROUND: The concept of “Debt-trap Diplomacy” was first introduced by Indian academic Brahma Chellaney in 2017. This term describes a relatively new policy tool employed by China in connection with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The strategy involves China extending excessive loans to low-income, heavily indebted countries that are unable to repay them. Consequently, these borrowing nations are compelled to cede strategic assets to China in a debt-for-equity swap to alleviate their debt burden. Recent studies indicate that Beijing has also become a significant emergency rescue lender to these same countries, many of which are struggling to manage their debts. Between 2008 and 2021, China allocated US$ 240 billion to bail out 22 countries, predominantly those involved in Xi Jinping’s BRI. Countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Mongolia, Zambia, Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia have been notably impacted by China’s debt-trap policy in recent years. A prominent example of this policy is the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. The Chinese government provided a loan for the port’s development, which was carried out by Chinese contractors. When Sri Lanka failed to meet its loan repayments, China leased the port for 99 years as a form of debt repayment. This 99-year lease is strategically significant for Beijing, particularly in the context of its competition with India in the Indian Ocean. In Central Asia, statistical data indicate that with the expansion of China’s economic and commercial influence, the debt owed by countries in this region to Beijing has increased significantly. By the first half of 2023, Central Asia’s collective debt to China had reached US$ 15.7 billion, representing 7.6 percent of the region’s external debt. Kazakhstan, in particular, has accumulated a substantial amount of hidden debt. According to central bank data, as of January 1, 2024, Astana owed US$ 9.2 billion, primarily to the China Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank). However, this debt constitutes only about 3.5 percent of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (GDP), a figure that has remained relatively stable over the past three years. Tajikistan, on the other hand, owes an estimated US$ 3.3 billion to foreign investors, with half of this amount owed to China, equating 27 percent of its total GDP. Consequently, China is Tajikistan’s primary creditor. According to the Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan, as of early 2024, the country’s debt to China stood at US$ 900 million, which accounts for 27.8 percent of its total external debt. By the end of 2023, Uzbekistan’s debt to China amounted to US$ 3.775 billion, representing just under 13 percent of its total external debt. Notably, by 2022, the China Development Bank (CDB) held US$ 2.2 billion of this debt, making it Uzbekistan’s third-largest creditor. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, has approximately US$ 4 billion in outstanding loans to China, which constitutes around 40 percent of its total GDP. This equates to roughly US$ 700 owed to China per Kyrgyz citizen. The country’s bilateral concessional loans exceed US$ 2 billion, or 44 percent of its total debt. Of this, 36.7 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt is owed to the Export-Import Bank of China, amounting to US$ 1.7 billion in 2023. Akylbek Japarov, the chairman of the Kyrgyz Cabinet of Ministers, has stated that the country has reached the peak of its external debt payments. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov has expressed optimism that, if the current situation remains stable, the country’s foreign debt could be paid off by 2035. Regarding Turkmenistan, the information available is limited and unclear. The only notable instance is a statement by then-President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov on June 12, 2021, asserting that Turkmenistan had fully repaid loans provided by China for the pipeline and the first stage of the Galkynysh gas field development on time and in full.

IMPLICATIONS: Over the past two decades, China has supplanted Russia as the primary economic and trading partner of Central Asian countries. Debt-trap diplomacy plays a crucial role in solidifying this shift. The inability of Central Asian nations, particularly those with weaker economies like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their loans could result in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure within these countries. For instance, China might gain control over the Kyrgyz thermal power plant in Bishkek, the Datka-Kemin power transmission line, and the road connecting the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, China could potentially own and manage Tajikistan’s gold and silver mines. Consequently, the capacity of Central Asian countries, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their debts to China holds significant and long-term strategic implications. Debt repayment can sustain China as a crucial economic and trade partner for Central Asian countries, which is vital for maintaining a balance against Russia. However, the inability to repay these loans will lead to a strong dependence on China, creating conditions similar to Russia’s relationships with Belarus and Armenia. In 2002, under the “Property for Debt” agreement between then-President of Armenia Robert Kocharian and the Russian Federation, Armenia’s inability to repay its loans resulted in the Russian government taking ownership of significant economic infrastructure, including electricity, gas, telecommunications, and railways. This process has significantly contributed to Armenia’s strong dependence on Russia. Even after two decades, despite considerable dissatisfaction with Russia, Nikol Pashinyan’s government has struggled to establish a more independent and diverse foreign policy. Similarly, debt-trap diplomacy and China’s potential ownership of infrastructure could lead to comparable outcomes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, akin to the situation in Armenia or the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. This scenario poses a serious challenge for these small Central Asian countries in terms of “diversifying” and “balancing” their foreign policies. This challenging process has led to a rise in anti-Chinese sentiments and Sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in recent years. Notably, in 2011, Tajikistan resolved a border dispute by ceding land, a move believed to be part of a debt relief agreement with China. Furthermore, in 2018, over 30,000 Chinese migrants, many of whom were construction workers on BRI-funded projects, arrived in Kyrgyzstan. Given this context, there are serious concerns about the negative and potentially dangerous consequences of China’s debt-trap diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojanov has warned that accumulating Chinese debt is “playing with fire,” as it could serve as a pretext for political and geopolitical expansion at any moment. However, leaders and experts close to Central Asian governments dismiss these concerns as Western propaganda against China. They argue that borrowing and repayment are part of economic interdependence in today’s world, which can foster economic growth. This perspective is reflected in signs around Tajikistan’s capital that read: “Assistance from China for a common future.” On the other hand, the lack of transparency in Chinese loan agreements, coupled with infrastructure investments, has exacerbated issues of corruption and oligarchy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appear to face fewer challenges and threats from China’s debt-trap diplomacy, largely due to their stable and growing economies. Additionally, Turkmenistan stands out as the only Central Asian country with a positive trade balance with China, primarily due to its gas exports. Consequently, the loans and debt to China, whose full extent remains unclear, do not pose a significant threat to Turkmenistan’s economy.

CONCLUSIONS: Over the past 22 years, China has invested US$ 105 billion in Central Asia through development finance, with the China Development Bank (CDB) playing a pivotal role in this process. “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has become a crucial tool for advancing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it enters its second decade. During a virtual summit in January 2022, marking 30 years of diplomatic ties with Central Asian countries, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would provide US$ 500 million in aid to Central Asia over the next three years to support socially significant projects. Furthermore, in October 2023, at the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, China and Central Asian states adopted a joint action plan for developing green technology in the region. Given these developments, it is expected that China’s loan policies and debt-trap diplomacy will continue in Central Asia. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine presents an opportunity for China to further expand its economic and financial influence in the region, similar to the Ruble Crisis of 1998. However, the impact of China’s debt-trap diplomacy varies across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable by regional standards. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, with its positive trade balance due to gas exports to China, do not face significant challenges. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most vulnerable to China’s debt-trap diplomacy. If these countries are unable to repay their substantial debts to China, which constitute a significant portion of their GDP, they may face situations similar to those experienced by Sri Lanka and Armenia. This could pose serious challenges to their efforts to diversify and balance their foreign policies.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Emma Krdzalic

In the heart of Central Asia, Kazakhstan has been steadily asserting itself as a regional powerhouse. At the sixth consultative meeting of Central Asian leaders in Astana in August 2024, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev convened with his counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to discuss regional unity and a shared vision for the future. This pivotal gathering, which produced the ambitious “Central Asia – 2040” development concept, was a testament to the groundwork Tokayev laid in his 2023 address on sustainable development and prosperity the previous year. His speech then outlined Kazakhstan’s goals of evolving into a stable middle power by fostering deeper cooperation among Central Asian states, and the 2024 summit reinforced his vision with concrete actions and agreements. By merging strategic foresight with regional collaboration, Tokayev is positioning Kazakhstan as a mediator and a leader capable of navigating Central Asia through modern geopolitical challenges.

BACKGROUND:  Kazakhstan’s journey to middle-power status has been driven by several factors, including its rich natural resources, strategic location, and a sensible foreign policy that balances relationships with global powers including Russia, China, Iran, and the West. The country’s role as a key player in the Central Asian region is further cemented by its participation in global organizations such as the United Nations, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Kazakhstan faces significant challenges in its role as a mediator and middle power due to the decline of the liberal international order, which has traditionally supported such nations. The erosion of norms that regulate state behavior has diminished Kazakhstan’s ability to act as a mediator in global conflicts, particularly in an era of heightened tensions between Russia and the West. Additionally, increased cooperation among revisionist powers like Russia, China, and Iran further complicates Kazakhstan’s strategic position, as these nations challenge the liberal international system that Kazakhstan relies on. The ongoing economic tensions between Russia and the West have disrupted key trade routes, forcing Kazakhstan to seek costlier alternatives and exacerbating the challenges of being landlocked. Despite these obstacles, Kazakhstan is adapting by leveraging its geographic advantages, strengthening regional partnerships, and exploring new trade routes that may offer fresh opportunities for influence and collaboration. Internally, President Tokayev has demonstrated a keen understanding of Kazakhstan’s challenges, particularly in maintaining political stability and responding to public demands for reform. The events of early 2022, when an attempted coup exposed rifts within the elite, highlighted the need for Tokayev to consolidate power and initiate meaningful reforms. While some steps have been taken to address these challenges, such as regaining control over state institutions and exploring new regional partnerships, the government faces a delicate balancing act. It must navigate the competing interests of various elite groups, respond to public demands for change, and maintain its strategic position in a shifting global landscape. The success of Kazakhstan’s “New Kazakhstan” initiative will largely depend on its ability to implement genuine reforms while maintaining stability and leveraging its geographic advantages in an increasingly complex international environment. While Tokayev has succeeded in regaining control over state institutions, the underlying tensions within the political elite remain, posing long-term challenges to the country’s stability. 

IMPLICATIONS:  To address these challenges, Tokayev has prioritized reforms aimed at improving governance, expanding human capital development, and enhancing the country’s competitiveness on the global stage.  A key aspect of these reforms is Tokayev’s focus on education and culture. Kazakhstan has actively expanded its partnerships with top universities and invited Central Asian youth to study in the country, recognizing the importance of education in fostering innovation and economic growth. This strategy not only builds a more skilled workforce but also strengthens Kazakhstan’s regional influence by creating educational ties with neighboring countries. Pouring resources and effort into this cause, if done well, will ultimately give Kazakhstan long-term solutions and results that not only support the current state of the country but also build an overall more educated population that fosters stability and cooperation within the region. Additionally, Tokayev has called for greater cooperation in information and analytics, suggesting the creation of joint media products and even a pan-regional TV channel or internet news portal. This initiative is part of a broader effort to enhance Kazakhstan's soft power in the region and promote cultural and humanitarian cooperation. By investing in these areas, Tokayev aims to build a more cohesive regional identity while showcasing Kazakhstan as a model for development and modernization. On August 9th, President Tokayev underlined Kazakhstan’s strategic course for strengthening regional partnerships and increasing the role of Central Asia on the global scale at the sixth consultative meeting of Central Asian heads of state. This showed that Kazakhstan, as a middle power, has a unique role in shaping the future of Central Asia. Its geographic location as a bridge between the Caspian Sea and China, coupled with its economic interests across the region, positions Kazakhstan as a key player in the East-West corridor. However, Kazakhstan’s success as a middle power will depend not only on its ability to manage relationships with great powers but also on its cooperation with other regional states. Tokayev proved himself to be making consistent and conscious efforts to promote these ideals in this meeting through his speech, which supported models and roadmaps for continuous cooperation in a variety of sectors for Central Asia. Additionally, Tokayev’s advancements in cooperation with states like Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan support his claim to commit to regional cooperation that would stabilize the Central Asian region. The partnerships with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, both of which are emerging as aspiring middle powers, are crucial for the stability and development of Greater Central Asia. These partnerships facilitate trade, security cooperation, and regional integration, while also counterbalancing the influence of larger powers like Russia and China. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s role in stabilizing smaller states in the region, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is essential for maintaining peace and security in Central Asia. Tokayev’s efforts to reinforce Kazakhstan’s influence are evident in his focus on strengthening regional alliances, particularly with Uzbekistan. Recent visits to Astana by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev have marked a new era of cooperation between the two countries, leading to strategic partnerships in the trade, transport, energy, and agriculture sectors. The leaders signed key documents, including the 2040 Concept for Regional Development and a roadmap for industrial cooperation, deepening economic and cultural ties. With nearly 70 joint projects valued at over US$ 3 billion and employing 14,000 people, the partnership aims to enhance connectivity and create new trade corridors. Additionally, agreements on water resource management and cultural cooperation for 2024-2025 further highlight the countries’ commitment to regional sustainability and shared values.

CONCLUSIONS:  Kazakhstan’s rise as a middle power is a complex balancing act that requires both internal reforms and strategic external partnerships. In his August speech, President Tokayev outlined a clear vision for Kazakhstan’s future, emphasizing sustainable development as a pathway to long-term prosperity. The country’s middle-power status depends on its ability to navigate geopolitical challenges while fostering strong regional alliances, particularly with Uzbekistan, and ensuring internal stability through meaningful reforms. President Tokayev’s response to Kazakhstan’s rise as a middle power reflects a forward-looking strategy emphasizing regional cooperation, domestic reforms, and global engagement. By expanding educational and cultural ties, enhancing cooperation in information and analytics, and strengthening alliances with neighboring countries, Tokayev is positioning Kazakhstan as a key player in the future of Central Asia. However, the challenges posed by geopolitical tensions, economic disruptions, and internal political dynamics remain significant. Tokayev’s ability to navigate these challenges will determine whether Kazakhstan can sustain its middle-power status and continue to play a stabilizing role in the region. Tokayev’s efforts as Kazakhstan moves forward to maintain its middle-power role have not gone unnoticed as Kazakhstan confirms and fortifies its partnerships with countries like Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, as well as its engagement with Central Asia and the broader international community. The path it remains on will be key to its success in shaping the future of Central Asia and beyond.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Emma Krdzalic is a current intern at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), where she researches National Security dynamics, Russia, Russia-Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. She is a student at the University of Georgia, pursuing her studies in International Relations, Political Science, and Russian while interning in Washington, D.C. through the Washington Semester Program.

by Svante E. Cornell

In August 2024, the leaders of Central Asian states met in Astana, Kazakhstan, for their sixth summit since 2018. This summit – at which regional leaders further committed to deepen regional cooperation – was an important development, indicating that Central Asian states are determined not to be pawns in rising great power competition.

BACKGROUND: Since the states of Central Asia gained independence three decades ago, a key question has been whether the region’s future will be determined by the countries of the region itself, or by outside powers. The decline of international norms in recent years is a decidedly unwelcome one for Central Asian states, which find themselves at the fulcrum of great power competition on the Eurasian continent. Dividing lines became stronger around them, and the region confronts the risk of coming under the domination of an emerging axis of revisionist powers consisting of Russia, China and Iran.

In recent years, the relationship among these three revisionist powers has become stronger. The growing coordination between Russia and China has been visible for the world to see, even though their relationship in Central Asia is more complex than it seems. Similarly, there has been a steadily expanding alignment between Russia and Iran. Iran’s active support for Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought the two powers closer, and led to heightened risks that coordination between them can expand to matters relating to Central Asia and the Caucasus. China and Iran have also increased their coordination, not least in circumventing U.S. sanctions. Beyond this, there has been increasing coordination between the three revisionist powers, including joint maritime drills in the Gulf of Oman, the latest in April 2024.

The extent of the trilateral axis between Russia, China and Iran has been subject to considerable debate. Some have correctly pointed out that it remains largely rhetorical and relies mainly on three bilateral relations. Still, the axis has the potential to strengthen, particularly if the U.S.-China relationship further deteriorates and a crisis in the Taiwan straits causes Beijing to turn with renewed interest to Russia and Iran.

It is to the good fortune of Greater Central Asia that it has so far been largely spared from the direct and military intervention of these revisionist powers. Still, the emergence of this new axis changes the parameters for the region, creating new elements of vulnerability and threatening to confront it with a fait accompli of being subsumed under this new axis.

In the face of these challenges, however, Central Asian states have maintained their independent approach to the world. They have shown that they are no longer “pawns” in a “Great Game,” or at the mercy of great powers. Quite to the contrary, states in the region are developing an ability to impact the region surrounding them, gaining sufficient power to assert their own priorities – not least strengthening cooperation among each other.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the most defining developments that has made this possible is the rise of Middle Powers in Central Asia. The first state to emerge as a Middle Power is Kazakhstan, which did so through a combination of its economic strength, foreign policy strategy, and multilateral initiatives; more recently, Uzbekistan is also emerging as a Middle Power.

The concept of Middle Powers is particularly relevant to Central Asia because the region lacks a functioning collective security mechanism. This is all the more concerning because of the size differential between regional states and surrounding powers – and the fluctuating relations among those surrounding powers further contributes to instability.

This instability makes the role of Middle Powers crucial in order to anchor Central Asian security. A Middle Power has the ability to impact, to some extent, the policy of great powers and stabilize the interaction among them in its region. It can raise the situation in the region to the attention of multilateral organizations and external powers. More importantly, a Middle Power can help organize neighboring states so that otherwise smaller and weaker states can band together and pool resources.

Kazakhstan began to emerge as the first Middle Power in greater Central Asia a decade or so ago. It did so for several reasons, which include both objective attributes as well as choices its leadership made. First, Kazakhstan’s economy is by far the most developed of the region. Second, it has taken a proactive approach to developing a foreign policy to handle the competition among great powers. Third, it is taking a leading role in promoting regional cooperation. Fourth, it plays a crucial role in the connectivity of the region. Fifth, Kazakhstan has gone beyond the region with international initiatives that cemented its role. Finally, its internal reforms make its status as a Middle Power increasingly sustainable.

The August 8 summit of Central Asian leaders is an example of how Kazakhstan exercises this role as a Middle Power. Ahead of the Summit, Kazakhstani leaders had indicated their efforts to “strengthen the region’s international subjectivity,” as leaders now term their effort to build regional institutions. At the Summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev commented that these meetings have “given regional cooperation a systematic, comprehensive and, above all, reliable character.”

Key to this success is also the increasingly tight cooperation between Kazakhstan and Central Asia’s most populous state, Uzbekistan. With the two larger states taking the lead, Central Asia has begun to resemble the Franco-German cooperation in post-war Europe that led to the process of European Integration.

CONCLUSIONS: The rise of Middle Powers in Central Asia has considerable implications. It should lead to a fundamental rethink in many quarters about how the Greater Central Asian region should be understood. Too often, the region is still viewed in terms of a “Great Game,” where large power compete for influence, while local states are seen as helpless and possibly hopeless satrapies that lack agency of their own. 

That description of the region is now not just inaccurate but misleading. Furthermore, for external forces – be it powers such as the EU, US or Japan, or international organizations – the emergence of Middle Powers in Greater Central Asia present an important opportunity. The strategies adopted by foreign states toward the region have yet to explicitly acknowledge the emergence of Middle Powers that can serve as key partners with which foreign powers can safeguard their interests in the region.

The United States and EU both developed strategy documents toward Central Asia in the late 2010s. These strategies took a step toward acknowledging the regional states as subjects rather than objects of international relations. Events since then have largely made these strategies obsolete. As these strategies are revised, it is imperative that they reflect the new reality in the region – the emergence of Middle Powers that have considerable agency in helping shape their region for the future.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Joint Center.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

On September 17, 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz participated in the second Germany-Central Asia Summit held in Kazakhstan. His three-day visit to the region commenced in Uzbekistan, followed by engagements in Kazakhstan, where he also held meetings with the leaders of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. At present, Germany is confronted with the necessity of refining its regional policy to effectively respond to the evolving challenges in Central Asia. While it seeks to deepen its relations with the region, the specific approach it will adopt to address these challenges remains uncertain.

BACKGROUND: Germany's interest in Central Asia has significantly increased in recent years, as evidenced by a series of high-level visits and diplomatic initiatives. In 2023, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, followed by the inaugural Germany-Central Asia Summit. These engagements have consistently emphasized the importance of strengthening ties with the region, with particular focus on Kazakhstan. With a trade volume of $4 billion, Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Germany and is viewed as a strategic country within the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan has recently begun to draw attention as well. Germany has also demonstrated its capacity for swift action in responding to the challenges Europe has faced since 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The increasing perception of Russia as a security threat has forced Germany, along with other European nations, to make critical decisions. Recognizing the necessity of adopting a more proactive stance, particularly in terms of military and energy policies, Germany has taken measures to address its concerns with Russia indirectly, while positioning itself as a key actor in the broader regional context. The decision to deepen relations with the Central Asian republics represents a significant development during this period. The growing consensus that Germany must adopt a more active role in the region than it has in the past is shaping the current government’s strategic approach. Alongside issues such as migration, security, energy, and the Middle Corridor, the broader challenge of regional competition has also emerged as a priority on the government’s agenda. In this context, it is essential to acknowledge that China's influence in Central Asia is as significant as Russia's. Germany has emphasized that its efforts to reduce the influence of both Russia and China in the region are undertaken on behalf of all European countries, reflecting a coordinated response to these geopolitical dynamics. During her 2022 visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock expressed this sentiment, stating: “It is important to me that the future holds more for them than merely the choice between being straitjacketed in Russia’s front yard or being dependent on China. And so my main aim in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is to listen to the hopes and expectations that people there are pinning on Europe in the current circumstances.” The German-Central Asian Summit and the recent strengthening of ties with the region have emerged as key developments in recent years. The second summit took place at a time when Chancellor Scholz indicated a more proactive approach toward Central Asia. This shift raises important questions about how Germany will manage its relations with the region, whether it will pursue a selective policy approach, and how closely its actions will align with the expectations of the international community. These factors will be critical in shaping Germany's long-term strategy and influence in Central Asia amidst a complex geopolitical environment.

IMPLICATIONS: In September 2024, Chancellor Scholz began his meetings in Uzbekistan as part of a strategy to provide regional balance. The German government described his visit as an effort "to breathe life into this regional partnership," reflecting Germany's growing interest in Uzbekistan’s increasing economic strength. During his meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Scholz emphasized Germany’s firm commitment to deepening bilateral relations. The two parties signed several agreements, including those relating to the Green Central Asia Initiative and critical minerals. However, the migration agreement attracted the most attention. This deal aims to address the legal challenges faced by Uzbek citizens by facilitating the movement of skilled workers to Germany, enabling them to work in various sectors. For Uzbekistan, which had long awaited this development, the agreement marked a significant achievement in its relations with Germany. On the other hand, the German media has reported that another significant aspect of the agreement pertains to the deportation of Afghan nationals who have committed crimes in Germany. In June 2024, it was revealed that Germany would work with Uzbekistan to facilitate this process without directly engaging with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has expressed its willingness to cooperate and is expected to play a crucial role in the deportation of Afghan individuals from Germany. During the talks, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted the historical depth of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Germany, dating back to the 18th century, and stressed the importance of strengthening these ties in the current era. Both parties agreed to enhance cooperation in various sectors, particularly in politics, security, defense, and culture. The trade volume, which was approximately $1.3 billion in 2023, is expected to increase significantly in the near future. As a result, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, has emerged as one of the key countries receiving special attention from Germany. After Uzbekistan, Scholz visited Kazakhstan, where the summit was to take place, signaling Germany’s new Central Asia policy. Scholz gave a statement highlighting Central Asia’s importance: “We want to continue and further intensify this... Especially in times of global uncertainty, we need close, trusting international partners.” Chancellor Scholz's remarks indirectly referenced the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting instability. Since early 2022, the war has brought significant disruption to Europe, leading to negative consequences that have directly and indirectly affected Germany. Issues ranging from energy security to the defense of the European Union's borders have highlighted Russia's continuing presence as a multifaceted threat, contributing to what Scholz has referred to as "global uncertainty." Central Asia, once regarded by Russia as its "near abroad," has now been redefined by Germany as a region of "trustworthy partners." Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who hosted the summit, outlined six key areas of cooperation with Germany. He emphasized the importance of increasing trade volume and called for collaboration in energy, industry, transport, water resource management, and efforts toward global peace. Central Asian countries view their relations with Germany as a strategic opportunity to attract technical and technological investments while leveraging Germany as a gateway to strengthen ties with the broader European Union. Consequently, the recent meeting underscored a strong interest in Germany's technical expertise. Proposals were put forward to further develop the Middle Corridor and to involve Germany in the Green Energy Line project connecting Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, both sides expressed interest in expanding cooperation on hydrogen energy to encompass the entire European Union. In the broader context of regional affairs, the European Union's Global Gateway strategy remains crucial. This initiative, which has received praise from President Tokayev, is valued for its role in enhancing transport connectivity between Central Asia and the EU. However, Germany’s Central Asia policy is now facing growing pressure and heightened expectations from multiple stakeholders. Many media outlets and academics interpret the Global Gateway as a competitive response to China's influence in the region, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, which has been active since 2013. China's role has faced criticism from various perspectives, leading to increasing calls for Western-centered initiatives. As a key player, Germany is expected to promote policies that advance European strategies across different regions. Nevertheless, the long-term advantages of a regional strategy focused on competing with China remain uncertain for Germany, raising questions about the sustainability and impact of such an approach. International organizations have increasingly urged Germany to adopt a more proactive stance on human rights issues in Central Asia. Human Rights Watch, for example, has called on Germany to address persistent challenges in the region. However, the long-term impact of Germany’s involvement in sensitive matters such as human rights abuses, ethnic conflicts, authoritarian regimes, and non-transparent elections remains uncertain. Scholz has expressed doubt about Germany’s ability to take a leading role on these issues at this time. How Germany navigates these concerns will significantly influence its position within Europe and its reputation as a reliable partner in Central Asia. Afghanistan, on the other hand, continues to pose a major challenge for Germany. Scholz has condemned the Taliban’s rise to power as “illegitimate” and described the situation in Afghanistan as "depressing." However, his stance has been interpreted in varying ways by countries in the region. While Germany can adopt a more selective approach to its relations with Afghanistan, Central Asian states do not have the same flexibility due to their geographical and political proximity. As a result, Germany's attempts to influence the policies of regional countries concerning Afghanistan could lead to unintended negative consequences. Germany's involvement in the regional strategies of Afghanistan's neighbors—such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—could potentially create tensions and adverse repercussions, complicating its broader Central Asian policy.

CONCLUSIONS: Germany now stands at a critical juncture, facing important decisions regarding its role in Central Asia. The country has the opportunity to establish a solid presence in the region by adopting a win-win strategy, leveraging its technical expertise, and fostering collaborative relationships with Central Asian countries. Conversely, Germany could also choose to act as an indirect pressure mechanism by criticizing, commenting on, or interfering in the internal affairs of these nations, potentially limiting its influence and creating friction within the region. The way Central Asian republics perceive the notion of "trustworthy partners" will become clearer over time as these dynamics unfold. Although the ambitious rhetoric of leaders like Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Chancellor Scholz may initially seem promising for Germany and Europe, any negative consequences arising from the region’s complex realities could be viewed as a political failure for the German government. In this context, it would be more prudent for Germany to align its policies with the expectations of the Central Asian republics. Rather than taking a top-down approach, policies should be crafted on an equal footing, emphasizing mutual respect and shared interests to ensure a sustainable and constructive partnership.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs.

WILL THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION RECONFIGURE REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION?
By Rafis Abazov

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana has rekindled discussions on the role of the organization in reshaping regional educational cooperation. Historically known for its focus on security and economic issues, the SCO is increasingly recognizing education as a cornerstone for sustainable development and regional stability. This shift is significant for member states—China, Russia, India, and several Central Asian countries—as they navigate the complexities of globalization and seek to bolster their human capital. The main question is whether declarations at the summit denote a shift in the regional educational architecture.

BACKGROUND: Since its inception in 2001, the SCO has primarily concentrated on security cooperation and economic integration among its member states. However, the need for a skilled workforce, capable of driving innovation and economic growth, has brought education into the spotlight. The Astana SCO-2024 Summit underscored this shift, highlighting the potential of educational cooperation to foster mutual understanding, enhance economic ties, and promote cultural exchanges. In recent years, the SCO has launched various educational initiatives. The establishment of the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and regional scholarship themes led to a sharp increase in regional student mobility – for example China reached a milestone in 2022 by attracting one million foreign students, while Kazakhstan attracted almost 30,000. Indeed, these efforts facilitated academic exchanges, joint research projects, and cultural interactions among students and scholars from member countries. The Astana summit built on these foundations, proposing a more structured and collaborative approach to educational cooperation, as almost one quarter of the 31 agreements signed during the summit were dedicated to the area of science and education. On top of this, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education hosted the regional conference “Cooperation in the field of higher education and production integration,” focused on developing a unified approach to accreditation, curriculum design, quality assurance, student mobility and mutual recognition of qualifications.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the important areas discussed at the Astana summit was the enhancement of academic exchanges and research collaborations. By fostering partnerships between universities and research institutions across member states, the SCO aims to create a robust network of knowledge and innovation. Such collaborations can lead to significant breakthroughs in various fields, from science and IT technology to social sciences and smart agriculture. 

The proposed initiatives include exchange programs for students and faculty, joint research projects, and the creation of cross-border academic networks and joint research labs to study the impact of climate change at the regional and sub-regional levels. These efforts are expected to enhance the quality of education and research in member states, making them more competitive on the global stage. Another critical focus is the harmonization of educational standards across SCO countries. This alignment would not only enhance educational opportunities but also support a more integrated approach to developing double diploma programs between universities. 

The summit proposed the creation of a common framework for higher education within the SCO. This framework would include standardized guidelines for curriculum development, accreditation processes, and quality assurance mechanisms. Such harmonization can make it easier for students to transfer credits between institutions in different countries and for professionals to have their qualifications recognized across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of digital education and technological integration. 

The SCO members acknowledged that there is a rapid shift towards online learning, and an urgent need to invest in digital infrastructure and resources. The Astana summit highlighted the potential for collaboration in developing e-learning platforms, distance education programs, and digital literacy initiatives. In this context, the leading Chinese universities (such as Chinese Agriculture University) took initiatives to exploring ways of leveraging technology to bridge the digital divide among member states by promoting access to quality education and facilitating lifelong learning and upskilling, essential for adapting to the rapidly changing job market.

The creation of cohesive and inclusive frameworks would help to upscale the internationalization of education by integrating educational systems, and organizational cultures across SCO member states, and developing joint digital infrastructure. However, these initiatives require significant investments. Indeed, economic disparities among member states pose significant challenges. While some countries have advanced educational and digital infrastructures, others may struggle with limited resources and capacity. At least three countries – China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – have allocated significant resources for bridging this gap, supporting deeper educational collaboration, and accelerating the adoption of online learning, access to digital tools and other resources.

CONCLUSION: The Astana summit SCO-2024 has set the stage for the SCO to play a transformative role in regional educational cooperation. As member states work to align their educational systems and policies, the organization is poised to reshape the regional educational architecture significantly. With a focus on academic collaboration, standardization, and digital innovation, the SCO is on a path to create a more integrated and dynamic educational ecosystem. 

The success of future initiatives will depend on building on the foundations laid by existing programs. Strengthening and expanding platforms like the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and numerous educational consortiums can provide a solid base for more ambitious projects. These platforms can serve as hubs for collaboration, innovation, and cultural exchange. Effective implementation requires the active engagement of various stakeholders, including governments, educational institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Collaborative efforts and partnerships can ensure that initiatives are well-designed, adequately funded, and effectively implemented.

The SCO has the potential to reconfigure regional educational architecture by enhancing educational cooperation and recognizing education as a cornerstone for regional development and peaceful integration. The outcomes of the Astana meeting signal a promising future for educational collaboration in the SCO region, with the potential to yield significant economic, social, and cultural benefits. As the SCO continues to evolve, its focus on education can play a transformative role in shaping the region’s future. By fostering a more interconnected and innovative educational landscape, the SCO can contribute to a more prosperous, stable, and cohesive region. 

The Astana summit has marked a new chapter in this journey, setting the stage for the SCO to reconfigure the regional educational architecture in meaningful and impactful ways. Joint research projects and academic exchanges can generate new ideas, technologies, and solutions to common problems. This, in turn, can drive economic growth and increase competitiveness, positioning the SCO region as a leader in various fields.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and participated at the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan.