Robert M. Cutler

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s April 2025 state visit to China, culminating in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marks a significant elevation in bilateral relations. The agreement is more than a symbolic gesture: it reflects a strategic convergence across infrastructure, energy, and digital development. It also signals a re-balancing of power in the South Caucasus in response to Western inertia. As China consolidates its position, the question is no longer whether the West leads but whether it has already surrendered the initiative.

BACKGROUND: The Second Karabakh War of 2020 abruptly exposed the obsolescence of entrenched diplomatic frameworks in the South Caucasus, most notably the OSCE Minsk Group. The November 2020 Trilateral Statement that ended the fighting, brokered under Russia’s aegis, signified an incipient restructuring of regional dynamics. Russia positioned itself as the nominal guarantor of stability, installing a contingent of so-called peacekeepers on Azerbaijani territory. Yet this maneuver, driven by residual influence and opportunistic calculus, underscored Moscow’s determination to preserve a semblance of relevance amid shifting fault lines.

While Russia acted following long-established and well-defined interests, the U.S. and the EU hesitated. The initiatives introduced by Western actors, preoccupied with internal crises and other entanglements, lacked coherence, confidence, and strategic vision. The mediation efforts were fragmented and the summits were ad hoc. As a result, the promising diplomatic overtures failed to generate substantive traction. The reactive nature of Western engagement post-2020 contrasts starkly with the proactive moves of regional and other stakeholders having more immediate stakes in the evolving South Caucasus order.

Turkey’s deepening military partnership with Azerbaijan, formalized through the Shusha Declaration of 2021, epitomized pragmatic alignment. Kazakhstan, seizing the moment, accelerated its integration into the emergent Middle Corridor, bolstering East-West logistics networks through the Caspian basin. Concurrently, Gulf states capitalized on Azerbaijan’s post-war stabilization by channeling substantial investments into renewable energy infrastructure, particularly solar and wind projects in the liberated territories. These tangible gestures did not just reflect geoeconomic calculations but represented a recognition of the region’s latent economic potential.

In this context, China modified its traditionally cautious posture in the South Caucasus. Historically deferential to Russia’s informal sphere of influence, Beijing began to reassess the region’s strategic significance following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The resulting destabilization of Eurasian corridors, compounded by Western sanctions and the geopolitical weaponization of supply chains, propelled the South Caucasus from peripheral concern to a central axis in China’s connectivity strategy. This shift was not reflexive or opportunistic. Rather, it reflected China’s measured strategic assessment of the structural transformations in the architecture of Eurasian trade.

By 2022, the foundations for a deepening Sino-Azerbaijani partnership had been firmly established. The signing of a joint declaration on strategic partnership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in July 2024 signaled a decisive commitment to broaden bilateral economic ties. The two countries’ trade in 2024 was over 20 percent above its 2023 level, reaching nearly US$ 3.74 billion. Chinese enterprises expanded into sectors previously peripheral to their Eurasian ambitions: telecommunications, green energy, and transport logistics. President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Beijing in April 2025 did not initiate this trend but rather consolidated it. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) agreement was the logical culmination of sustained and deliberate moves that anchored Azerbaijan’s strategic realignment toward the East.

IMPLICATIONS: The realignment is not mere economic opportunism. Rather, it signals a deeper geopolitical evolution driven by the inadequacy of Western engagement and the region’s preparedness to respond to actors willing to match rhetoric with decisive action. The failure of Western policy is not just about inattentiveness, but also about an inability to grasp the interplay between regional agency, emerging connectivity frameworks, and the geopolitical vacuum created by Russia’s shifting posture. In this unfolding dynamic, Azerbaijan has moved beyond waiting for Western recognition or support. It has instead begun to assert its own role within a rapidly realigning Eurasian order.

For China, Azerbaijan serves as a gateway not only to Europe through the Middle Corridor but also toward the Middle East, reinforcing China’s broader trade architecture and strategic depth in the region. The CSP is not a symbolic gesture. Its scope is broad and consequential, encompassing coordinated industrial development, infrastructure harmonization, technology transfer, and streamlined customs protocols. These measures are underpinned by capital investments and long-term industrial partnerships. 

For Azerbaijan, the CSP consolidates a deliberate move to attenuate traditional dependencies on Western and Russian interlocutors. It embodies Azerbaijan’s long-articulated aspirations for economic diversification, substantiated now by tangible capital flows and operational partnerships. The CSP’s provisions span petrochemicals, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and renewables. Agreements on aerospace and intellectual property signal a strategic depth, eschewing transactional engagement in favor of embedded, systemic collaboration. 

The transport dimension alone is reshaping regional dynamics. The Middle Corridor, stretching from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian basin, and into the South Caucasus and Europe, has demonstrated rapid growth. While still smaller in scale than northern routes traversing Russia, its year-on-year expansion has been notable. A trilateral joint venture among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia’s rail operators is actively synchronizing digital customs tracking and reducing delivery times to enhance competitiveness.

The Port of Alat, central to Azerbaijan’s maritime logistics, has already undergone substantial upgrades. Cross-border road transport agreements and operational protocols with China, concluded in 2024 and 2025, are streamlining east–west trade flows. China’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan as a "central transit node" underscores the strategic weight of this integration.

The significance of the CSP extends beyond ports and pipelines. Digital infrastructure has emerged as a foundational pillar. Huawei and ZTE, longstanding presences in the region, have solidified their positions through new agreements establishing joint research centers, expanding data infrastructure, and modernizing e-government frameworks. These initiatives are embedding Chinese technological standards into the South Caucasus and positioning Baku as a nascent digital hub.

Energy collaboration has similarly accelerated. China’s Universal Energy is backing the Gobustan solar project, with further discussions ongoing over potential wind energy developments along the Caspian coast. These initiatives are paralleled by an expansion of Chinese soft power, from Confucius Institutes to cultural exchanges and educational programs.

Azerbaijan has not “abandoned” the West. The reality is starker: the West has failed to keep pace with Azerbaijan’s evolving strategic calculus. President Aliyev’s visit to Beijing and the CSP with China are less an embrace of Beijing than a commentary on the chronic insufficiencies of Western engagement. For years, Baku signaled openness to deeper commercial ties, infrastructure investments, and a balanced diplomatic posture. What it often received were half-measures, symbolic gestures, and ideological critiques. 

The waning of Western diplomatic leverage in the South Caucasus is not a sudden anomaly. It is the cumulative outcome of incremental miscalculations, fragmentary approaches, and the persistent failure to integrate regional realities into a coherent strategic vision. The 2020 Second Karabakh War marked a decisive inflection point. Azerbaijan’s reintegration of its formerly occupied territories exposed the impotence of frameworks long regarded as the bedrock of resolution efforts. The abrupt reassertion of Azerbaijani territorial sovereignty in 2020, and its completion in 2023, underscored the extent to which Western actors had become disconnected from the region’s evolving dynamics.

Europe’s Global Gateway initiative, though nominally prioritizing the Middle Corridor, remains hesitant and underfunded. The U.S., preoccupied with broader geopolitical contests, has failed to sustain a coherent South Caucasus policy. When attention does surface, it is often filtered through domestic advocacy agendas misaligned with both regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. Thus, under the influence of domestic lobbies, two of the Biden administration’s last acts were to decline to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which bans direct assistance to the Azerbaijani government, and to sign a bilateral strategic partnership charter with the Armenian government.

CONCLUSIONS: The South Caucasus has shifted from constituting a peripheral zone to a strategic nexus. Capital and influence from East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are converging upon the region. Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf states have become active participants in this evolving matrix. Azerbaijan, far from merely serving as a bridge, has assumed the role of architect and builder of new routes. Aliyev’s visit to Beijing is emblematic of this shift. Baku no longer waits for external recognition; it engineers its own relevance. 

The West must recognize this not as a defection, but as an adaptation to opportunity over nostalgia. The coming months will be decisive. If the West wishes to remain a meaningful player, it must replace rhetorical overtures with substantive commitments: joint infrastructure ventures, credible support for energy transition, and diplomatic engagement rooted in regional realities rather than encumbered by historical preoccupations.

Azerbaijan’s choice is not between China and the West, but between agency and irrelevance. It has already chosen. The question now is whether the West retains both the capacity—and the will—to respond.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

S. Frederick Starr

March 20, 2025

This article was originally delivered as a speech in March 2025 at an Asian Development Bank conference on connectivity and trade under their Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program. 

Read Coordinating the Corridors (PDF)

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

At the conclusion of a five-day visit to China by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on February 8, China and Pakistan issued a joint statement urging the Taliban government to take decisive measures to eliminate all terrorist organizations operating within Afghanistan and to prevent the use of Afghan territory for hostile activities against other nations. Over the past three years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban administration of providing refuge to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for attacks on Pakistani security forces and Chinese nationals within Pakistan. Despite being the largest foreign investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, China has thus far remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Pakistan is poised to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of Afghan territory that extends to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan and Pakistan. This corridor not only facilitates China's direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia but also holds strategic significance, positioning it as a potential focal point in China's evolving geopolitical interests in the region.

Photo by Ninara.

BACKGROUND: The airstrikes conducted by Pakistan inside Afghanistan on December 24 heightened tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, leading to an increase in skirmishes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan targeted TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, resulting in the deaths of 46 individuals. In response, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on multiple locations along the Pakistan border, killing one Pakistani soldier.

This was not the first instance of Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan. In March 2024, Pakistani airstrikes targeted TTP bases within Afghan territory, resulting in the deaths of eight militants. The strikes occurred a day after President Asif Ali Zardari pledged retaliation following an attack by the TTP in Pakistan's northwestern tribal are bordering Afghanistan, which claimed the lives of seven soldiers, including two officers. 

As tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalate and border clashes intensify, Pakistan is reportedly preparing to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of territory in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province that extends 350 kilometers to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region. Control of Wakhan would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan, effectively bypassing Afghanistan. In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s top intelligence official to Tajikistan on December 30, 2024, holds particular significance. Tajikistan hosts the leadership of the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. During his visit, the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Asim Malik, met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe. The ISI chief is believed to have been on a strategic mission to establish an alliance with the NRF as a counterbalance against the Taliban. 

China' has remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although a potential conflict between the two countries could jeopardize Chinese investments worth billions of U.S. dollars in both states, Beijing has opted for a "wait and watch" approach toward the ongoing hostilities. However, China is closely monitoring developments in the Wakhan Corridor, a strategically significant passage that provides direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

On December 30, 2024, during the visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Dushanbe, China’s Ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, was simultaneously meeting with Afghanistan’s acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. This meeting took place amid media reports suggesting that Pakistan’s military was advancing to seize control of the Wakhan Corridor. Both sides emphasized the corridor’s strategic significance for bilateral trade. Taliban authorities dismissed claims regarding the presence of foreign (Pakistani) military forces in the corridor and pledged to address any security threats along Afghanistan’s borders. In September 2023, the Taliban government inaugurated a 50-kilometer road extending from the Wakhan Corridor to the Chinese border.

IMPLICATIONS: A key factor behind China’s silence on the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is its own security concerns regarding Uyghur militancy in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares a border with Afghanistan. The Taliban could potentially leverage the "Uyghur card" to destabilize Xinjiang, given that the previous Taliban regime (1996–2001) provided sanctuary to Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. The Taliban has issued a warning to Beijing against adopting a pro-Pakistan stance in the ongoing conflict, cautioning that Islamabad is attempting to draw China into its proxy war. China remains apprehensive that Uyghur jihadists could gain ideological and operational support under Taliban rule. Consequently, Beijing has consistently sought to avoid antagonizing the Taliban, opting instead for diplomatic engagement and substantial investments in Afghanistan’s energy, infrastructure and mining sectors following the US withdrawal from the war-torn country in 2021.

The Taliban’s warning to China came just days after China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, visited Islamabad in November 2024 and stated that at least 20 militant groups were operating in Afghanistan, posing security threats to China. 

Strategically positioned at the intersection of three major mountain ranges—the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and Pamir—the Wakhan Corridor has the potential to become the focal point of China’s evolving geopolitical strategy in the region. At present, control over the Wakhan Corridor appears to be at the center of the geopolitical contest in Afghanistan, with Pakistan and Afghanistan seemingly acting as mere pawns in this larger game. As a silent yet influential player, China is subtly maneuvering these pawns on the regional chessboard. 

Pakistan aligned itself with China’s broader ambitions to expand its influence across South and Central Asia through Afghanistan long before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. However, rather than directly involving itself in the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, China appears committed to a strategy of cautious observation, continuously monitoring shifting geopolitical dynamics. Beijing seems to be waiting for an opportune moment to assert its influence. 

For China, the Wakhan Corridor—often referred to as Afghanistan's "chicken neck"—serves as a crucial strategic node for establishing and securing connectivity with South and Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This narrow strip of land has the potential to function as a pivotal junction, enabling China to expand its geopolitical and economic influence across the broader region. 

However, security concerns remain a significant challenge in China's plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the BRI, into Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

Several strategic projects planned or initiated by China align with its broader geopolitical strategy. One such initiative involves China's plans to establish a military base in Wakhan to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities. China has already set up a military base in eastern Tajikistan, near the Wakhan Corridor. A military foothold in Wakhan would serve as a critical buffer, preventing terrorism and instability from spilling over from Afghanistan into China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 

Additionally, China has constructed the Taxkorgan Airport on the Pamir Plateau in northwest Xinjiang, situated at an altitude of 3,258 meters and in close proximity of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Beyond providing a new "air passage" that enhances connectivity between Central and South Asia, this ultra-high-altitude airport reinforces China's military and economic influence in the region. 

While Beijing continues to invest in Afghanistan—despite its global isolation and international sanctions—it is simultaneously financing multiple projects under the US$ 62 billion CPEC in Pakistan. However, despite its deep economic and strategic engagements in both countries, China has remained silent regarding the escalating armed confrontations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

CONCLUSION: China should take an active role in mediating the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict rather than attempting to balance its interests with both sides. Leveraging its influence over both states, Beijing can push for diplomatic negotiations to address their disputes. At present, neither Islamabad nor Kabul is in a position to disregard China's calls for restraint, making it a crucial player in de-escalating tensions and ensuring regional stability. 

China should take a definitive stance and clarify its official position on the TTP, which has been responsible for attacks on Chinese nationals and security forces in Pakistan. Beijing should deliver an unequivocal message to Kabul, asserting that if the Taliban government fails to dismantle terrorist networks operating from Afghan territory, China will align with Pakistan in conducting targeted airstrikes against anti-China militant hideouts within Afghanistan. 

While China has remained silent on escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, the U.S. has endorsed Pakistan’s stance regarding the Taliban’s policy of sheltering terrorist groups, which violates the U.S.-Taliban Doha Accord. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 enabled the TTP to operate with greater impunity. For Islamabad, the Afghan endgame has effectively become a zero-sum game. In response, some factions within Pakistan have advocated for collaboration with the U.S. to carry out airstrikes targeting terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan. 

AUTHOR BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation. Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Vali Kaleji

By promoting its concept of "Chinese-style modernization" (henceforth CSM) China seeks to project an image of economic development and growth in Central Asia that is non-hegemonic, non-interventionist, and non-imposing, positioning itself as an alternative to both Russian and Western models. Given that CSM is rooted in China's authoritarian communist framework, it aligns with the secular authoritarian structures of Central Asian states and the interests of the pro-Chinese oligarchic networks within the region. However, despite its foundations in Chinese tradition, Confucianism, a distinct interpretation of Marxism, and uneven development, China's model of economic development and CSM has yet to establish itself as the dominant paradigm in Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: The concept of CSM, formulated in the late 1970s, has gained significant attention among Chinese leadership and researchers since the start of this decade. The emphasis on distinguishing CSM from Western and Soviet models highlights the theoretical possibility of offering a new developmental perspective to other nations. It also encourages these countries to design independent modernization strategies tailored to their unique national characteristics.

As the world’s second-largest economic power, it is crucial for China to promote its model of development and modernization within the international sphere. In this context, the development and evolution of the concept of CSM are closely linked to other key concepts proposed by China over the past few decades, such as "Peaceful Rise" and "Peaceful Development," which offer alternatives to the dominant Western development model and modernization pathways. Since September 2021, Beijing has introduced no fewer than three “Global Initiatives” focusing on development, security, and civilization. Together with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), these initiatives now constitute the four pillars of President Xi Jinping’s “Community for a Shared Future” framework, which China promotes as a blueprint for “world peace and stability,” “a powerful driver of global development,” and a foundation for a “New World Order.”

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, during the transition from the Soviet development model to the Western one, the concept and model of CSM emerged as a potential alternative for Central Asian countries. While Western modernization paths emphasized liberal democratic values, transparency, a free-market economy, reduced state ownership, and the growth of private enterprises, CSM offered a different approach. It combined state control and ownership of key infrastructure with the expansion of private enterprises, notably without incorporating liberal democratic principles. The rapid and remarkable growth of China’s economy, its rising influence in global trade, and its emergence as the primary economic and trade partner of Central Asian nations—along with the One Belt, One Road initiative (the modern Silk Road) and the significant inflow of Chinese capital, labor, and companies into Central Asian markets—prompted Beijing to promote the Chinese modernization model within the region.

Given that CSM is rooted in China's authoritarian communist framework, it aligns closely with the secular authoritarian structures of Central Asian countries. This model, characterized by top-down development, differs from both Soviet and Western development approaches. Unlike the fully state-controlled development model of the Soviet era, it is not entirely government-driven, and unlike the Western model, it does not rely fully on private enterprise. Instead, it represents a hybrid system that blends state control with market-oriented mechanisms.

IMPLICATIONS: The CSM complements and strengthens China’s substantial investment and significant trade relations with Central Asia. Over the past 22 years, China has channeled approximately US$105 billion into the region through development financing, with the China Development Bank (CDB) serving as a key player in this process. By promoting CSM, Beijing appears to be aiming to stabilize and secure its investments while ensuring sustained commercial and economic influence in Central Asia.

Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, economic development and growth have been central to the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, an approach that can appeal to the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia seeking to enhance their own political legitimacy. CSM aligns with the interests of the pro-Chinese oligarchic network in Central Asia, encompassing a diverse range of actors, from politicians to owners and managers of both public and private enterprises. While the Western development model, based on a bottom-up approach, emphasizes transparency, CSM, characterized by a top-down approach often associated with ambiguity, lack of transparency, and, in many cases, corruption, is particularly attractive to the region’s oligarchic networks and shadow economy. Moreover, the thousands of Central Asian students who graduate annually from Chinese universities under Chinese government scholarships—especially in fields such as economics, business, management, and finance—play a crucial role in disseminating and promoting the CSM throughout the region.

CSM also serves as a key element of China’s "soft power," its so-called "Chinese Marshall Plan," and "soft hegemonism" in Central Asia. It aims to offer a development model tailored to the cultural, national, and ethnic values of the region, complementing China’s growing economic and commercial influence. By promoting this model, China seeks to project an image of non-hegemonic, non-interventionist, and non-imposing development, positioning it as an alternative to the Russian and Western models. Additionally, the promotion of CSM plays a crucial role in China’s strategy to counter rising anti-Chinese sentiment and Sinophobia in Central Asia. In this context, a Chinese researcher suggests that CSM, as a new form of modernization, emphasizes "human modernization" as its distinctive realization. This concept reflects China’s efforts to present a soft, humane image of development and modernization. 

Yet CSM in Central Asia faces significant constraints and obstacles. This model stems from a unique approach rooted in Chinese traditions, Confucian principles, and a distinct interpretation of Marxism, making it difficult to replicate effectively in other regions, including Central Asia. Even in Southeast Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand—nations with stronger linguistic, historical, and cultural ties to China—the Western model of development and modernization has emerged as the dominant paradigm. Moreover, CSM adopts an unbalanced approach to development, prioritizing economic growth while neglecting political development. This imbalance reduces its appeal, particularly among the middle class and educated young people in Central Asia, who tend to favor parallel development and embrace the values associated with Western liberal democracy.

Furthermore, several additional obstacles hinder the establishment of CSM as a dominant and unrivaled model in Central Asia. These include widespread anti-Chinese sentiment, along with ethnic and religious sensitivities, particularly regarding China’s policies in Xinjiang. There is also significant criticism of the performance of Chinese companies and contractors operating in Central Asia, particularly concerning issues such as labor discrimination, where Chinese workers are often given preferential treatment over local workers, and Beijing’s debt trap diplomacy in the region. 

CONCLUSIONS: Although China has been the leading economic and trade partner of Central Asian countries for the past two decades, its economic development model has yet to establish itself as the dominant model in the region. Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia continues to struggle with selecting a definitive development and modernization pathway. Various aspects of the Russian, Chinese, Western, and even the Turkish model—particularly after the Justice and Development Party came to power—have been adopted to varying degrees, but no single model has prevailed. Instead, the region operates within a mixed or hybrid framework, characterized by a blend of government control and authority, free-market principles, corruption and shadow economies, private sector activity, and foreign investment.

These circumstances are the outcome of a complex interplay of factors inherent in societies transitioning from tradition to modernity in Central Asia. Key among these factors are the challenges of reconciling religion, traditions, and ethnic and national beliefs with the demands of development and modernization, as well as the region’s unique political-economic structures. Additionally, the lack of consensus among leaders and ruling elites regarding the selection of a specific development model further complicates the process. The economic, financial, and commercial interests of the oligarchic network and the shadow economy also play a significant role in shaping the region’s developmental trajectory. To address or obscure these contradictions, regional leaders often emphasize the creation and promotion of a distinct, indigenous model of development and modernization tailored to their specific national contexts.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at   This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

China is moving forward with the long-delayed 523-kilometer railway connecting Kashgar in northwest China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, proposed in the 1990s, officially began construction on December 27 in Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan. This route offers a faster, cheaper alternative to existing connections between China and Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia.

Excluding Russia from the project has drawn criticism from Moscow, which views Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, Russia, heavily reliant on China due to Western sanctions over its 2022 Ukraine invasion, is unable to oppose the development.

The CKU railway, seen as a regional game-changer, promises to enhance trade and connectivity across Central xAsia. However, it also raises security concerns, as the route may facilitate cross-border activities of drug traffickers, terrorist groups, and militant organizations.

BACKGROUND:  The CKU railway, first conceived in 1997, faced significant delays due to financial, political, technical, and geopolitical challenges. A major obstacle was political instability in Kyrgyzstan, which stalled progress for 15 years. The project was revitalized in 2012 following a visit to Beijing by then-Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, renewing momentum for this strategic initiative under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Geopolitical factors also contributed to delays in the CKU railway project. Kazakhstan and Russia opposed the new route connecting China to Europe, as they benefited significantly from the existing northern corridor via Russia, which generated substantial revenue. Concerns over losing this economic advantage fueled their resistance. Financing the mega-project was another major challenge. In 2023, reports emerged suggesting the CKU railway’s postponement for an indefinite period due to unresolved funding issues.

Technical complexities have also hindered the execution of the CKU railway project. A key issue is the incompatible railway gauges between China and Central Asian countries. While China uses a standard gauge of 1,435 mm, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan rely on a broader gauge of 1,520 mm. This mismatch has posed significant logistical and engineering challenges to the project's implementation.

Another factor contributing to delays was the failure of participating countries to reach a consensus on the railway route due to conflicting interests. China and Uzbekistan favored a southern route, which offered shorter and faster transit to Europe. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan advocated for a northern route that, while longer and more expensive, would connect the north and south of Kyrgyzstan, fostering development and boosting its economy. Ultimately, under pressure from China and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan conceded to the shorter and less costly southern route.

In May 2023, China and Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement to commence the CKU railway project during an official visit by the Kyrgyz President to Beijing, with the China Railway Construction Corporation completing a feasibility study the same year.

In June 2024, officials from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement to implement the project, establishing a robust legal framework for constructing the railway. The line will begin in Kashgar, Xinjiang, pass through Kyrgyzstan, and extend into Uzbekistan, with future plans for extensions to West and South Asia.

After nearly three decades of deliberation, the CKU rail corridor is now progressing. The project promises to reduce freight transit times by one week and shorten the China-Europe route by 900 kilometers, marking a significant milestone in regional connectivity.

IMPLICATIONS: Beijing's decision to advance the CKU railway project represents a strategic masterstroke, poised to deepen China's influence across Central Asia and beyond. The initiative comes at a critical juncture, as Russia remains embroiled in the Ukraine conflict and faces crippling Western sanctions, creating a vacuum in the region's geopolitical landscape.

The CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes by providing a direct, efficient corridor to the continent. This development not only strengthens China’s connectivity but also enhances its role as a dominant trade and infrastructure player in the region.

In the future, the CKU railway could become a central hub for rail connectivity in Asia, linking Central Asia with South and West Asia. Once completed, the railway may be expanded east-west or north-south by integrating it with other countries' rail networks. Potential extensions include a route from Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Additionally, Uzbekistan's existing connections with Turkmenistan and Iran could position the CKU railway as one of the shortest routes between China and Western Europe.

With the CKU corridor operational, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are set to emerge as vital transit countries for Chinese exports. Both nations stand to gain significant economic benefits from transit fees, enhancing their economic roles in regional and global trade.

As a pivotal element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the CKU railway represents a strategic project to enhance China's connectivity with Central Asia. This landmark railway will traverse the challenging terrain of western China and Kyrgyzstan’s highest mountains, linking the railway networks of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In its final phase, the project aims to integrate with railway systems in Europe, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Türkiye.

The CKU rail corridor is poised to boost regional trade, foster economic cooperation, and provide the landlocked nations of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with critical access to global markets. Furthermore, the project will deliver essential infrastructure to both countries, strengthening their economic resilience and regional standing.

The CKU railway project is estimated to cost US$ 8 billion, with US$ 4.7 billion allocated for constructing the Kyrgyz section. Given Kyrgyzstan’s GDP of $9 billion, this expenditure represents a significant economic burden. As a result, the financially constrained country has sought a US$ 2.35 billion loan from China to fund its portion of the project, raising concerns about Kyrgyzstan potentially falling into a Chinese debt trap.

Once completed, the CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes. Geopolitically, this project is crucial for China, offering an alternative to the current route through Russia and reducing reliance on Moscow for trade with Europe.

On the other hand, the CKU railway raises significant security concerns as it will pass through opium-producing areas, potentially creating a new route for drug smuggling. The corridor could also facilitate the cross-border movement of terrorist and militant groups. This poses a particular threat to China’s Xinjiang province, which has been targeted by separatist and Islamic extremist groups. The railway’s potential to exacerbate regional security challenges underscores the need for robust measures to address these risks.

CONCLUSIONS: The CKU railway has the potential to be a transformative project for Central Asia, elevating the region’s significance as a transit hub between China and Europe. It marks the realization of Beijing’s decade-long ambition to expand its connectivity with Eurasian countries.

The ongoing Ukraine war and Western sanctions against Russia, following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have further amplified the importance of the CKU corridor. This new route provides an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia, currently the primary transit route between East and West, thereby diminishing Moscow’s strategic relevance in regional trade.

Geopolitically, Beijing views the timing as opportune to advance the CKU railway project in Russia's so-called backyard, leveraging the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. The launch of this mega project is poised to enhance China’s influence in Central Asia, potentially shifting the balance of power between Beijing and Moscow in the region.

However, the project carries significant security risks. The presence of drug smugglers and militant groups in the region raises concerns that the CKU corridor could be exploited by these armed groups, further complicating Central Asia's already fragile security environment.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .