By: Stephen Blank 

Much has been written about the decline of Russian influence in Central Asia and the rising self-assertion of local governments. Most of this commentary focuses on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two richest and strongest states in Central Asia. However, the decline of Russia’s capacity for dominating Central Asia and local governments’ greater freedom of action has become equally visible to states like Tajikistan that are often overlooked. Dushanbe cannot and has not gone as far as Astana and Tashkent and frequently acts out of necessity as much as choice.  Nevertheless, the signs of its growing capacity and of Russia’s parallel decline are mounting. 

BACKGROUND:

Even though Tajikistan imported 91 percent of its petroleum products from Russia in the first half of 2026, it began importing Iranian oil in August because it cannot rely exclusively on continuing Russian supplies. Ukraine’s attacks on Russian refineries have forced Moscow to impose export restrictions that have rebounded on Central Asian countries like Tajikistan. Thus, while most of its energy imports originate in Russia, Tajikistan has had to risk falling afoul of U.S. sanctions on Iran to sustain its economy and other Central Asian states have also had to follow suit for the same reason.

This is far from the only example of Russia’s decline. Hitherto, Russia has been virtually the sole source of Central Asian militaries’ armaments. Now, due to the pressures imposed by the demands emanating from the war in Ukraine, foreign sanctions on components, and the lackluster performance of Russian weapons, that is no longer the case for all the Central Asian states. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have acquired India’s Akash air-defense system. Tajikistan has also purchased China’s HQ-17AE air defense systems, whereas Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also operate Chinese systems. 

These purchases of diverse and heterogeneous systems from multiple suppliers generate challenges of management and integration into a functioning whole. Nonetheless, they send an unmistakable message that Russia can no longer play an exclusive role as the sole regional security manager. In many cases, Russia will not be able to maintain supply chains or provide repairs to aging equipment, thus its ability to provide for Tajikistan’s security is obviously declining. 

This does not imply that Tajikistan can or will go as far as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have gone in diversifying their foreign policy options to enhance their actual sovereignty and independence. For example, Tajikistan, in an apparent effort to placate Russia, has begun the procedure for withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has indicted President Vladimir Putin for war crimes in the war against Ukraine. Indeed, when Putin visited Dushanbe in 2025, Tajikistan refused to arrest him. This led the ICC to find Tajikistan in breach of its obligations, leaving it no choice but to initiate the withdrawal.  In a contest between the ICC and Russia, Tajikistan obviously chose Russia.

IMPLICATIONS:

Nevertheless, Tajikistan has shown and will continue to show that it is responsive to international developments beyond Russia. Tajikistan’s Humo Bank warned its Russian clients that unless they visited one of its offices in Tajikistan and submitted to a biometric identification by September 30, their cards would be blocked starting on October 1.  Although Humo Bank cited the need to protect its clients from fraud; apparently the real reason was Western pressure operating through Visa Direct to threaten sanctions unless Humo Bank stopped allowing certain clients to use it to circumvent sanctions.  

Although Humo Bank operates in Tajikistan under license from the government; it is owned by the Japanese Investment holding firm, Gojo & Co, and is therefore vulnerable to Western pressure. However, what is interesting in this case is that Tajikistan acceded to that pressure targeting its Russian customers. 

Moreover, in this context Humo Bank was not the only bank that yielded to Western pressure. For example, Revolut Bank stopped accepting top-ups from credit cards issued in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for EU residents, claiming that payment systems had classified those countries as high-risk. Tajikistan took advantage of foreign pressure to limit Russian influence in its banking system. And it did so despite the fact that its economy depends to a great degree on remittances from Tajik migrant workers in Russia and the ensuing unimpeded flow of capital through Russian banks.

None of this suggests that Tajikistan can or will emulate the actions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in making extensive deals with Washington, Brussels, the Gulf states, and others. Tajikistan does not have these capabilities, nor will it attain them anytime soon. Its ability to play China off against Russia, and to balance other external actors against Moscow and Beijing, is much lower than that of Astana and Tashkent. 

Yet the decline of Russia’s capability in the economic as well as the military sector is both creating more space for independent action on Tajikistan’s part and the necessity for it to defend its own interests. Moreover, Russia’s decline has led other foreign actors, including Western banking and financial interests as well as Chinese and Indian defense exporters, to fill the ensuing vacuum created by Russia’s increasing incapacity.  

In cases where the costs to Tajikistan from striking at Russian interests outweigh the benefits it might gain, as in the example of the ICC, Dushanbe has refused to antagonize Moscow. This pattern is likely to continue for some time to come, especially since the situation in and around Afghanistan, which is a vital security interest of Tajikistan that it cannot manage by itself, becomes more precarious. However, as Tajikistan continues to work more cooperatively with other Central Asian and foreign governments, its ability to stand up for itself will grow.

CONCLUSIONS:

Increasingly the trends towards regional self-assertion and involvement with partners beyond Russia and China are becoming more prominent in Central Asia’s politics. The fact that this is occurring not only with regard to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but also in Tajikistan’s case suggests that these trends are putting down lasting roots.  Therefore, despite the imbalance of capabilities between Moscow and Dushanbe, we should expect to see more examples Central Asian including Tajik self-assertion. Yet we should also, based on the mounting constraints upon Russia, see more examples of its growing incapacity to enforce unilateral dominance over local governments.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org. 

By Lindsey Cliff

The Organization of Turkic States has evolved its approach toward Tajikistan, shifting from explicit support for Kyrgyzstan during border conflicts to more inclusive language. Early OTS statements emphasized brotherly solidarity with Kyrgyzstan while implicitly attributing blame to Tajikistan, prompting sharp criticism from Dushanbe. Following diplomatic progress culminating in the March 2025 Kyrgyz-Tajik border treaty, OTS rhetoric shifted significantly. The organization’s March 2025 statement on the trilateral Khujand summit explicitly included Tajikistan among three brotherly nations, marking the first time such fraternal language extended to a non-Turkic state. This evolution reflects practical necessity—avoiding alienation of a major regional state—and organizational maturation as the OTS launches its plus framework for engaging non-member states.

BACKGROUND:

Tajikistan has been the topic of six official OTS statements since 2021—all in the context of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border conflict. Through these statements runs a common thread: member solidarity among Turkic states. Yet the rhetoric has evolved significantly, tracking changes in the situation on the ground and reflecting the OTS's maturation as a regional organization.

Understanding this evolution reveals how the OTS is navigating the tension between its ethnolinguistic foundation and the practical requirements of regional cooperation. The trajectory of OTS statements on Tajikistan offers insight into whether the organization can transcend ethnic boundaries to become an inclusive platform for regional stability.

The early statements from 2021-2022 established clear patterns. The April 2021 statement, issued during border clashes, referred to "brotherly Kyrgyzstan, the founding member of the Turkic Council," explicitly emphasizing ethnic and cultural kinship while omitting similar recognition of Tajikistan. The statement appealed to shared Islamic and cultural identity as the moral basis for peace: "In the holy month of Ramadan, we need to do our utmost to further unite and put aside our differences." This extended an intra-Turkic appeal rather than adopting a neutral, diplomatic tone.

The statement emphasized "the contribution of the Kyrgyz side to the re-establishment of peace," without mentioning Tajikistan's efforts, implying the ongoing conflict was the fault of Tajikistan's failure to commit to peace. The closing line committed the Secretariat to remain "in close contact with the Government of brotherly Kyrgyzstan," signaling preferential solidarity with the Turkic side of the conflict.

The January 2022 statement followed similar patterns. Again, the OTS expressed "support to the efforts of the Kyrgyz Republic to find a peaceful solution" while calling for dialogue "based on mutual understanding, mutual respect, good neighborliness and coexistence." The contrast was striking: "good neighborliness and coexistence" for Tajikistan versus "brotherly" solidarity for Kyrgyzstan. The September 2022 statement went further, explicitly condemning "the aggression with the use of heavy military weapons against civilians and civilian infrastructure" while expressing support for "the efforts of the Kyrgyz Republic, founding member of the OTS, for a peaceful solution."

IMPLICATIONS: 

The Tajik government clearly noticed this pattern. Following the September 2022 statement, Tajikistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the OTS Secretary General's statement as "hindering the efforts of the Tajik and Kyrgyz sides to resolve all bilateral issues exclusively by political and diplomatic means." The Ministry called the OTS statement "deeply regrettable, as it is at odds with the goals declared by the Organization, one of which is to make a joint contribution to ensuring peace and stability throughout the world."

This response illustrates the practical impact of one-sided statements. The Tajiks claimed the OTS impeded progress on peaceful diplomatic solutions through its skewed narrative. For an organization aspiring to regional significance, alienating a key Central Asian state posed obvious problems. Tajikistan shares borders with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and China, making its exclusion from regional cooperation mechanisms a significant limitation.

The turning point came with actual progress in the border dispute. On March 13, 2025, the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a Treaty on the State Border in Bishkek. The OTS issued two statements on this development that marked a subtle but significant shift in rhetoric. The statements welcomed the agreement warmly and noted it was "achieved through diplomacy and dialogue." While these statements still didn't explicitly call Tajikistan "brotherly," they avoided the one-sided emphasis of earlier statements.

More significant was the March 31, 2025 statement on the trilateral summit of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in Khujand. For the first time, the OTS Secretary General referred to "three brotherly nations," explicitly including Tajikistan in the fraternal vocabulary previously reserved for Turkic states. The statement called the summit "epochal" and praised "the unwavering efforts of the three brotherly nations in deepening regional partnership."

This represented a genuine shift—but one that maintained certain boundaries. The concluding sentence pledged support for "unity and cooperation among Turkic and neighboring states," still categorizing Tajikistan as neighboring rather than fully integrated. Tajikistan was offered a relationship within the already-defined Turkic community rather than recognition as its own self-defined actor. Nevertheless, the shift from implicit antagonist to "brotherly nation" marked significant evolution.

CONCLUSIONS: 

What explains this shift? The most obvious factor is the changed situation on the ground. As long as armed clashes continued along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, the OTS faced pressure to support its member state. Once diplomatic progress produced actual agreements, the organization could adopt more inclusive language without appearing to abandon Kyrgyzstan.

The OTS's broader ambitions also likely influenced this evolution. At the 2025 Gabala Summit, the organization launched the "OTS plus" framework to structure relationships with non-Turkic states. Maintaining openly hostile rhetoric toward Tajikistan while proposing inclusive mechanisms would appear contradictory. The trilogy of summits—Kyrgyz-Tajik bilateral agreement, Kyrgyz-Uzbek-Tajik trilateral summit, and the OTS Gabala summit—created momentum toward regional cooperation that required softer rhetoric.

Uzbekistan's role may have been particularly important. As the OTS member bordered by Tajikistan and the country hosting the trilateral summit, Uzbekistan had clear interests in promoting inclusive regional cooperation. Uzbekistan's enthusiastic embrace of OTS membership from 2019 onward coincided with President Mirziyoyev's broader policy of improving relations with all neighbors. Uzbekistan likely advocated internally for more inclusive OTS approaches to Tajikistan.

The evolution of OTS rhetoric on Tajikistan thus reflects both practical necessity and organizational maturation. An organization aspiring to regional significance cannot indefinitely alienate major regional states. The shift from implicit antagonism to tentative inclusion suggests the OTS recognizes this reality. Whether "OTS plus" will genuinely integrate non-Turkic states as equal partners, or merely formalize their status as perpetual outsiders, remains to be seen. But the trajectory of OTS statements on Tajikistan—from pointed solidarity with Kyrgyzstan to inclusive "brotherly" language—indicates the organization is navigating tensions between its ethnic foundation and regional cooperation requirements.

For policymakers both within and outside the region, this evolution merits attention. It suggests the OTS may prove more flexible and pragmatic than its ethnolinguistic foundation initially implied. How the organization manages the tension between Turkic identity and inclusive regionalism will significantly impact its effectiveness as a platform for addressing shared challenges in security, transportation, and economic development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Lindsey Cliff is a junior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, who is also pursuing a Master’s degree at Georgetown University in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies.

By Aleksandar Ivanović 

On October 10, 2025, the CIS heads of state summit was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The leaders established the “Commonwealth of Independent States Plus” (CIS+) format, further integrating external partners in CIS initiatives. Turkmenistan was chosen to chair next year’s summit in October. Multiple packages of documents were signed, targeting trade, crime, and most importantly, security. Security challenges from Afghanistan, including extremism and border conflicts, have continued since the Taliban takeover, and these recent agreements make up another component of Central Asia’s lengthy efforts to reduce the recurring concerns that can potentially spill over into their territories.

                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon hosts high-ranking representatives from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Belarus in Dushanbe for this year’s CIS Heads of State Summit, their annual tradition marks another year of important security partnerships.

The leaders signed multiple packages of documents, including the decision “on the Program of cooperation of the member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the field of countering terrorism and extremism for 2026-2028, strengthening border security at external borders for 2026-2030,” and military cooperation until 2030.

Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed Russia’s open support for the signed proposals, stating that “an important area of joint work among the CIS states is the fight against terrorism, extremism, corruption, and so on.” Russia has been a victim of terrorism in the past, most notably in March 2024 when a bomb detonated in a Moscow concert hall killed 144 and wounded more than 500. The attack was carried out by ISIS-recruited Tajiks from both sides of the Afghan border, demonstrating how Afghanistan-based extremism can strike major regional powers.

The summit occurs at a critical juncture where the regional balance of power undergoes an increasingly global shift. Russia and China have taken significant actions to cooperate with Afghanistan, where the now-Taliban run state poses a greater challenge to regional security. China has offered economic-based strategies, accelerating infrastructure investments like its copper mining project at Mes Aynak, which is possibly the world’s second-biggest copper deposit. Russia, taking a more political route, formally recognized the Taliban government in July 2025, becoming the first country to do so.

The recent moves from external powers have complicated Central Asia’s own efforts to manage threats relating to Afghanistan. However, its leaders were also eager to comment on how to address security while pursuing economic opportunities with the Taliban. In his remarks, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined his interest in developing economic partnerships in Afghanistan, mentioning “joint participation in the implementation of major investment and infrastructure,” and stating that “Uzbekistan is resolutely committed to ensuring long-term peace, stability, and sustainable development in Afghanistan.” Despite its relatively small border, Uzbekistan is in a constant battle with extremist activity and border conflicts coming from its unstable southern neighbor. As a result, Tashkent has approached the Taliban government with a more open-minded attitude compared to its Central Asian counterparts to support the Afghan economy and infrastructure, hoping to address poor economic indicators that instigate external threats including extremism.

IMPLICATIONS: The documents signed in Dushanbe mark another example of Central Asian resilience and solidarity in assuring regional security, and for dealing with Afghanistan in the future. Central Asian states have already grappled with these efforts since 2021 and have collectively reflected on Afghanistan on multiple occasions. In August in Tashkent, special representatives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan stressed the importance of fighting threats emanating in Afghanistan, highlighting extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, and cross-border crime.

Extremism stemming from Afghanistan has most significantly been propagated by ISIS-K, the Islamic State’s branch in the historic Khorasan region. It mostly consists of non-Pashtun minority ethnic groups living in the northern region of Afghanistan, including Uzbeks and Tajiks. A portion of their fighters also include extremists or government dissidents in Central Asia, who go to Afghanistan and join their cause. ISIS-K seeks to radicalize and recruit young men from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and spread propaganda through media to appeal to extremists and those dissatisfied with their governments. Major campaigns include criticizing governments for poor economic conditions in their respective countries, and the Taliban, a majority-Pashtun group and adversary that has undermined the presence of ethnic minorities like Uzbeks and Tajiks in Northern Afghanistan. President Rahmon has publicly acknowledged the issue, and has deemed ISIS-K a “plague,” and that “hell awaits” any Tajik that joins ISIS.

In addition to its media strategy, the group also actively works against the Taliban’s effort to build partnerships and expand security efforts in Central Asia. A notable example was when Uzbekistan, which holds the most cooperative relationship with the Taliban, was attacked in its border region by ISIS-K missiles in 2022, a strike aiming to undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy and security assurances to Central Asian governments.

Collective efforts with Afghanistan to combat extremism have not been substantial. With an already strengthened regional presence of ISIS-K, the Taliban’s internal power dynamics further complicate security assurances to Central Asia. The tension between Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in the southern city of Kandahar and the more accessible and pragmatic Sirajuddin Haqqani in Kabul creates uncertainty about whether commitments to suppress extremist groups will be honored consistently across Afghan territory.

Central Asian states have mostly conducted autonomous campaigns to limit the spread of extremist groups and their potential influence. In February 2024, the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan neutralized multiple extremist groups and detained 23 individuals, including adherents of destructive religious movements, in 8 regions of Kazakhstan for promoting terrorism. Tajik forces similarly followed three months later, raiding villages in its Eastern region to arrest 30 people for connections to their terrorist group Jamaat Ansarullah, Tajik extremist allies of the Taliban.

Tajikistan, the most vocal state, was the only Central Asian government to call out the Taliban and categorize it as purely a threat. Dushanbe refused to send a diplomatic mission after the Taliban seized political power and has demonstrated security concerns through conducting multiple military drills along the Afghan border, some in cooperation with the Uzbek military. In a June 2024 session of the CSTO Parliament Assembly in Almaty, Rustom Emomali, son of the Tajik president, declared Afghanistan a “breeding ground of terrorism.” The Taliban has repeatedly assured Central Asian governments that it will not allow its territory to serve as a platform for extremist groups to strike its neighbors. However, this assurance has lately been viewed more as a desperate plea for legitimacy rather than a valid promise, as hostile attacks by ISIS-K and the presence of other terrorist groups like Jamaat Ansarullah continue.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have pursued a dual-track approach, recognizing that economic engagement may prove more effective than isolation. Both countries expect to conduct US$ 3 billion worth of trade with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 2025, viewing the country as their most important underdeveloped economic opportunity. They also seek to revitalize the historic Great India Road trade corridor which runs through Afghanistan, and it remains their highest priority for reducing dependence on northern routes through Russia. However, this strategy requires delicate balancing – economic ties that could reduce the sources of extremism must not legitimize a regime that harbors terrorist groups.

CONCLUSIONS: The past four years have demonstrated that Central Asian states face a complex trilemma: they must counter immediate security threats from Afghanistan, pursue long-term economic integration through Afghan territory, and navigate the competing interests of Russia and China – both now deeply engaging with Kabul.

The CIS summit’s security packages represent one pillar of this strategy, but they can only succeed through continued economic and diplomatic initiatives. What defines this unique current moment in Afghanistan is the erosion of Western engagement following the near-complete cessation of U.S. humanitarian assistance under the Trump administration. This vacuum has allowed Russia and China to position themselves as Afghanistan’s primary external partners, potentially foreclosing Central Asian hopes for a more balanced regional order. The next couple of years will test whether Central Asian solidarity, as demonstrated in Dushanbe, can effectively manage Afghan challenges without becoming dependent on their northern and eastern neighbors. How these dynamics unfold will indeed remain an essential conversation in Turkmenistan next year.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Aleksandar Ivanović is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council
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By Emil Avdaliani

The EU’s deepening engagement with Tajikistan through the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (ECPA) aligns with Brussels’ broader economic and political outreach toward Central Asia. This strategy represents another phase in the Union’s increasingly active policy toward the region. The EU’s interest is driven by the Central Asia’s significance amid intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China over control of supply chains critical for battery and electric vehicle production. A further factor strengthening EU–Central Asia relations is the regional states’ pursuit of multi-alignment. Wary of dependence on either Russia or China, the Central Asian governments seek partnerships with other major powers.

                                                                     Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: On July 18, the European Union and Tajikistan initialed the EPCA. This accord will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that has been in place since 2010, establishing a legal framework to advance reforms in Tajikistan. The EPCA corresponds closely with the EU’s strategic priorities in Central Asia, which call for a more reinvigorated approach to the strategically significant region. It also seeks to establish a basis for future relations, reflecting emerging economic and political conditions on the ground. Brussels and Dushanbe foresee cooperation in trade as well as in human rights, sustainable development, education, energy, and related areas.

Similarly, in July the two parties discussed the present state of cooperation and prospects for launching new joint projects in mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and the food industry. Additional areas include the mining sector, with particular focus on the extraction and processing of critical raw materials. Officials from Tajikistan and the EU also considered Dushanbe’s potential participation in the EU Global Gateway initiative, designed to promote sustainable infrastructure and reinforce strategic linkages across Eurasia.

The EPCA builds upon already established cooperation across multiple sectors. For example, during the past five years, 500 Tajik students have studied in Europe through EU funding. The Union has financed projects in the healthcare sector and promotes digital transformation, including initiatives to expand digital access via satellite technology. The EU also contributes to the development and modernization of green energy production in Tajikistan. With European support, the Nurek, Sebzor, and Kayrakkum hydroelectric power station projects are under implementation, and Brussels is assisting the establishment of infrastructure to transmit electricity to South Asia through the CASA-1000 transmission line.

IMPLICATIONS: The EPCA was concluded after several years of bilateral negotiations, a timeframe regarded as relatively brief for agreements of this nature. The EU remains committed to serving as a partner in Tajikistan’s future development and seeks to broaden cooperation across a range of key sectors, from education to investments in critical infrastructure.

Tajikistan is particularly interested in attracting additional European investments and technologies for the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station and the modernization of the Nurek facility. Moreover, Dushanbe seeks to advance the implementation of a “green” economy, a topic addressed in discussions between President Emomali Rahmon and the President of the Council of the European Union, António Costa. Tajikistan has articulated ambitious plans to transform the country into a significant producer of green energy. In June, the leadership announced that by 2037 the country would generate electricity exclusively from renewable sources. Although perhaps unrealistic, these plans underscore Dushanbe’s rising aspirations.

The EU’s intensified engagement with Tajikistan corresponds to Brussels’ broader involvement in Central Asia. The summit convened by the EU with the five Central Asian states in Samarkand earlier this year represented a significant development in bilateral relations. Under the Global Gateway program, the EU announced a €12 billion investment package for Central Asian countries, including €3 billion for transport, €2.5 billion for critical minerals, and allocations for other sectors. Initiated in 2023, the EU–Central Asia summits have become central to bilateral ties, reflecting the region’s increasing significance for Brussels following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion altered Eurasian connectivity, elevating the importance of Central Asian routes for both China and the EU. As part of the Middle Corridor, Central Asia is integrated into the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, designed to advance sustainable and interconnected infrastructure projects worldwide.

Tajikistan places particular value on connectivity opportunities arising from the EU’s engagement with Central Asia. Historically, the country has remained peripheral to major transit routes, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan assuming more central roles in linking China with global markets. Recently, however, Dushanbe has sought to capitalize on evolving Eurasian connectivity. Central Asia’s interaction with Afghanistan constitutes one potential avenue, but given Tajikistan’s cautious stance toward Afghanistan, the country is instead considering transit routes through Iran. Relations between Tehran and Dushanbe have improved in recent months, and Tajikistan is now actively pursuing the use of Iranian ports to gain access to India and the Gulf region.

Another transregional project pursued by Tajikistan is the Middle Corridor. In June, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced that Dushanbe is actively cooperating with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and other partners on agreements providing mutual discounts on rail transportation to facilitate trade flows. This activism is not confined to Tajikistan but reflects a broader trend observable in the conduct of other regional states, including even the most closed one, Turkmenistan.

For the EU, Tajikistan holds particular importance in light of Brussels’ growing focus on securing rare earth resources, which are vital for multiple industries where competition with China has intensified. Estimates suggest that the country possesses approximately 800 mineral deposits containing critical materials demanded in global technological production. In late 2024, Tajikistan announced the discovery of 15 new major deposits of rare earths. In July of this year, authorities further reported the identification of rare earth metals—niobium and tantalum—in the Rasht Valley. Tajikistan also possesses considerable hydropower potential, with its 13,000 glaciers accounting for 68 percent of Central Asia’s water resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The EU’s engagement with Central Asia, and Tajikistan in particular, demonstrates that the Union has adopted an increasingly geopolitical orientation toward the region. To compete effectively with China, Russia, the U.S., and other powers, Brussels must shift its focus from rhetorical emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion to more tangible measures, including investment in critical sectors of cooperation with Central Asian states. The EU is regarded as a reliable partner owing to its adherence to high environmental standards in investment and the long-term benefits derived from them. While Central Asian states anticipate deeper EU involvement, they also acknowledge the constraints of bilateral cooperation. Geographic remoteness and underdeveloped infrastructure remain significant obstacles. Furthermore, the EU allocates fewer financial resources to the region than Russia, and particularly China, while its bureaucracy, unlike China’s, is less adaptable to the needs of individual Central Asian states.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva

On March 31, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in the Tajik city of Khujand to officially announce that all territorial disputes between their countries had been resolved. While future tensions cannot be ruled out, the region’s leaders now seem to believe that cooperation brings more benefits than conflict. For the Ferghana Valley, that shared outlook may be the strongest hope for lasting peace. 

BACKGROUND:  On March 13, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed a landmark treaty in Bishkek that definitively demarcates the entire 1,000-kilometer border between the two countries. The signing ended decades of intermittent clashes and unresolved territorial disputes rooted in the Soviet-era administrative boundaries. The agreement has been heralded as a major achievement in Central Asia’s regional integration efforts. Yet, the circumstances under which the deal was brokered—notably the lack of transparency, absence of public debate, and suppression of dissent—raise important questions about governance, public trust, and the future of cross-border relations.

The border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has long been a source of friction, shaped by convoluted Soviet-era administrative divisions that ignored ethnic, geographic, and cultural realities. When both countries gained independence in 1991, these internal lines hardened into contested international borders. Enclaves, disputed villages, and overlapping claims turned the border zone—particularly Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region—into a hotbed of tension.As scholars have noted, Soviet planners in the 1920s and 1930s deliberately drew borders in ways that divided ethnic groups in order to weaken potential nationalist movements, creating enduring fault lines.

Violent clashes over land, roads, and water access occurred frequently, notably in 2014, 2021, and 2022. The 2022 conflict, which left more than 100 people dead and forced over 100,000 Kyrgyz citizens to flee their homes, was the deadliest to date. Civilian infrastructure, including schools and homes, was destroyed, exacerbating mistrust and trauma. Yet this tragedy also marked a turning point, prompting both governments to prioritize renewed negotiations. Talks resumed in late 2022 and intensified through 2023 and 2024, culminating in the March 2025 agreement.

Years of border-related violence left deep scars on both Kyrgyz and Tajik communities. Skirmishes often began with disputes over water access or road usage but escalated quickly due to the presence of military and paramilitary forces in civilian areas. Armed confrontations resulted in civilian casualties, displacement, and destruction of property. The 2021 and 2022 conflicts in particular revealed how unresolved borders and competing nationalist narratives can turn small incidents into full-scale battles.

These events created a humanitarian crisis, especially on the Kyrgyz side. Thousands were displaced multiple times, while cross-border trade and local economies ground to a halt. Despite multiple ceasefires and ad hoc agreements, durable peace remained elusive until the new treaty.

IMPLICATIONS: The treaty signed in Bishkek demarcates the full 972-kilometer boundary and resolves all outstanding territorial claims. While the full text of the agreement remains undisclosed, officials have confirmed that contentious zones like the Tajik exclave of Vorukh and surrounding Kyrgyz villages like Dostuk were key components of the deal. Reports suggest that land swaps and security guarantees played central roles in achieving consensus. Ceremonial gestures — including the reopening of checkpoints and reciprocal presidential visits — symbolized a new era of cooperation. Both governments framed the agreement as a diplomatic triumph. 

The March 2025 agreement is notable not just for what it achieves, but how it came to be. After over three decades of deadlock, the treaty represents the first time that both governments have fully delineated and mutually accepted their shared border. While the specifics of the final map have not been made public, officials claim that all 972 kilometers have been agreed upon, including previously disputed enclaves and water-sharing arrangements.

Unlike past negotiations, which were often derailed by public outrage and nationalist pressures, the latest talks were conducted in near-total secrecy. Kyrgyz President Japarov pursued a top-down approach, sidelining parliamentary debate and civil society in favor of closed-door diplomacy with Dushanbe. Critics argue that this strategy undermined democratic oversight. At least two prominent Kyrgyz activists — including opposition figure Ravshan Jeenbekov — were detained for criticizing the deal and calling for public input on territorial concessions.

Despite these concerns, the breakthrough likely stemmed from a convergence of political incentives. For Japarov, resolving the border conflict bolsters his image as a strong and pragmatic leader, particularly after facing domestic backlash over economic stagnation and governance issues. For Rahmon, the agreement strengthens Tajikistan’s security and eases pressure on a regime that has faced increasing scrutiny over human rights abuses and political repression.

Moreover, international pressure and quiet diplomacy may have played a role. Both Russia and China—key players in the region—have interests in stabilizing Central Asia’s volatile borderlands. Beijing in particular has invested heavily in cross-border infrastructure and trade routes under its Belt and Road Initiative, and further conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan risked disrupting its regional ambitions. Despite both countries being CSTO members, Russia has kept its distance from the Kyrgyz-Tajik conflict. After invading Ukraine, Moscow lost interest in regional mediation. In October 2022, President Putin admitted Russia had “no intention of playing a mediating role,” offering only Soviet-era maps to aid negotiations. The Kremlin’s reluctance stems from earlier setbacks. A 2020 offer to mediate was met with a protest from Tajikistan, and Moscow’s failure to resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict made it cautious about another potential diplomatic failure in its perceived sphere of influence. Russia’s limited role has highlighted Uzbekistan’s emergence as a key regional mediator. Since 2018, President Mirziyoyev has led efforts to revive regional dialogue through Central Asian summits without outside powers like Russia or China. By 2025, Tashkent had helped reopen communication between Rahmon and Japarov — who until recently would not even shake hands. Uzbekistan’s active diplomacy was especially visible in early 2025, when the prime ministers of all three countries met to discuss border issues.

The Kyrgyz-Tajik border accord could set a precedent for resolving similar disputes in Central Asia. Yet, the long-term success of the Kyrgyz-Tajik deal remains uncertain. Much depends on how the treaty is implemented on the ground. Villagers affected by the redrawn boundaries have voiced concerns about losing access to farmland, water sources, and ancestral homes. Without robust compensation mechanisms or inclusive dialogue, displaced or dissatisfied communities may become flashpoints for renewed tensions.

In Kyrgyzstan, the lack of transparency has already fueled public distrust. Some residents of Batken—the region most impacted by the deal—have protested what they see as the government’s unilateral ceding of territory without adequate consultation. Japarov’s administration has struggled to control the narrative, resorting to arrests and censorship to stifle dissent. If local grievances are ignored, the agreement could backfire, becoming a source of instability rather than peace.

Regionally, the agreement may also shift the balance of power. Tajikistan, a historically more authoritarian state, appears to have secured favorable terms in some contested areas, raising concerns in Kyrgyzstan about unequal negotiations.

Nonetheless, the border agreement represents a significant, if imperfect, step forward. It removes a major source of armed conflict, potentially allowing both governments to redirect resources toward economic development and infrastructure. It also provides a foundation for cross-border cooperation on water management, trade, and regional security, if both sides are willing to engage beyond security optics.