By Ebru Akgün

Armenia is currently navigating its most significant geopolitical shift since its independence in 1991. The collapse of the traditional security architecture, which was built on the pillar of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), has forced Yerevan to embark on a perilous journey of "sovereign recalibration." By embracing Western civilian security instruments—most notably the European Union Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA)—while simultaneously hosting legacy Russian military infrastructure, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration has adopted a high-stakes "dual-track" strategy. However, this hedging mechanism is reaching its structural exhaustion. As regional geopolitics shift toward binary alignments and the South Caucasus becomes a primary theater for broader EU-Russia competition, Armenia's tactical flexibility is increasingly challenged by the reality of asymmetric pressures.

BACKGROUND:

​The central challenge for Armenia’s transition is the "security guarantee deficit." While Yerevan has successfully frozen its participation in the CSTO, citing the alliance’s failure to respond to incursions into Armenian sovereign territory in 2021 and 2022, it has not yet secured a formal military alternative. The Western response, though diplomatically robust, remains focused on "soft power" and monitoring rather than "hard power" defense obligations.

​The EUMA's mandate has been extended until 2028, providing a layer of "visibility-based deterrence." However, from a military perspective, a civilian mission cannot function as a permanent shield. Unlike the formal mutual defense obligations found in Article 4 of the CSTO treaty—which Armenia now views as a "failed promise"—the EU mission carries no legal mandate to intervene in the event of an armed conflict. The presence of European monitors on the border with Azerbaijan may increase the political cost of escalation, but it does not provide the physical protection necessary to stop an offensive.

​For Western policymakers, Armenia serves as a critical case study of the limits of small-state hedging under asymmetric pressure. The lack of a "hard" security partner leaves Yerevan in a state of strategic ambiguity. While France and the United States have increased their security assistance, these relationships are characterized by bilateral cooperation agreements rather than mutual defense pacts. This gap between monitoring and defense creates a period of strategic vulnerability that regional actors could exploit, especially if the diplomatic cost of military escalation is perceived as manageable by Baku or Moscow.

​A critical but often under-analyzed component of Armenia’s new security architecture is its integration into Western-backed transit networks, specifically the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) corridor. Launched as a flagship initiative to decouple the South Caucasus from Russian and Iranian monopolies, the TRIPP implementation framework signed in early 2026 aims to integrate Armenia into a Western-secured transit network.

​The TRIPP initiative seeks to link Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory (specifically the Syunik province) under Armenian sovereign and customs control. By promoting this "Crossroads of Peace" vision, the United States is attempting to create a vested economic interest in Armenia’s territorial integrity. If major Western corporations and U.S.-backed contractors become primary stakeholders in Armenia’s infrastructure, the logic follows that Washington will have a more explicit incentive to ensure the region's stability.

​However, the TRIPP corridor brings its own set of risks. While it offers an economic lifeline and a potential implicit security shield, it places Armenia at the heart of a "corridor war" between the West, Russia, and Iran. Tehran remains deeply wary of any increased Western presence in Syunik, which it views as its "red line" for northern connectivity. Meanwhile, Moscow views any corridor not controlled by its own FSB border guards as a violation of the November 2020 ceasefire arrangements. Therefore, the TRIPP corridor is as much a security challenge as it is an opportunity, requiring Armenia to balance American ambitions against the immediate geographical realities of its neighbors.

​Armenia’s military modernization efforts represent another pillar of its diversification strategy. Recent contracts for French GM200 radar systems and Mistral anti-air missiles, alongside the procurement of Indian Akash-1S missile systems and Pinaka rockets, mark a decisive break from the decades-long monopoly of the Russian defense industry.

​However, "buying Western" does not automatically translate into "Western security." Armenia faces an immense technical challenge known as the "interoperability trap." The nation’s current command-and-control (C2) architecture is built on Soviet-legacy systems that are historically transparent to Russian military intelligence. Integrating NATO-standard French radars or high-tech Indian artillery into this legacy environment is not just a logistical hurdle; it is a profound security risk.

​Without an entirely independent and secure C2 network—a project that would require billions of dollars and years of specialized training—Armenia’s new hardware remains vulnerable to electronic jamming or data interception by legacy Russian systems. Furthermore, the logistical chain for these Western systems is fragile. Unlike Russian equipment, which is supported by established rail links, Western hardware must be transported through Georgia’s ports or via complex Iranian routes, making the supply chain vulnerable to external political pressures. This technical sovereignty is the missing link in Armenia's military transition.

​The strategic direction of Armenia will face its ultimate domestic test in the upcoming June 7, 2026 parliamentary elections. These polls will function as a definitive referendum on the "Western pivot" and the "Fourth Republic" vision proposed by the Pashinyan administration. Public opinion in Armenia is currently characterized by "ambiguity fatigue." While trust in Western institutions has surged, a significant portion of the population remains skeptical that monitoring missions and "economic corridors" like TRIPP can replace the hard security guarantees once expected from Russia.

​The 2026 elections will be fought on two fronts: economic prosperity and national survival. If the government cannot demonstrate that its pivot has brought tangible security improvements or significant economic relief through projects like TRIPP before the elections, the opposition—likely backed by Russian narratives of "restoring traditional ties for safety"—may gain significant traction. The outcome of the 2026 polls will determine whether Armenia continues its pursuit of sovereignty through Western integration or is forced into a strategic reversal. The memory of the 2020 and 2023 conflicts looms large, and the electorate's patience for "strategic patience" is wearing thin.

IMPLICATIONS:

​Despite the rhetoric of "de-coupling," the physical and economic reality of Russian influence in Armenia remains a formidable obstacle. Russia still owns a majority of Armenia’s natural gas infrastructure through Gazprom Armenia and plays a critical role in the operation of the Metsamor nuclear power plant. To counter this, the European Union has pledged $500 million to enhance Armenia’s energy security and diversification, but the transition will take years.

​This economic asymmetry gives Moscow a "soft-kill" capability. The Kremlin does not need to launch a military intervention to destabilize Armenia; it can achieve similar results through "technical" border closures at the Lars crossing, energy price hikes, or logistical sabotage. The withdrawal of Russian FSB border guards from Zvartnots Airport was a symbolic victory, but Russian units still maintain a presence along the borders with Turkey and Iran. Any move that Moscow perceives as an "over-pivot" could trigger a devastating economic retaliation that the Armenian state is currently ill-equipped to handle.

​In this complex chess game, the role of Iran cannot be ignored. Tehran views the Syunik province as its essential gateway to the north. Any implementation of corridors—whether TRIPP or the Russian-backed Zangezur version—that changes the border status or introduces NATO-linked security actors is considered a "red line" by Iran. Armenia must navigate its pivot toward the West without alienating its southern neighbor, which remains its only other physical gateway to the world. This necessitates a delicate balance: engaging with the U.S. on TRIPP while reassuring Tehran that Armenia’s sovereign control over the route remains absolute and non-negotiable.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia is currently in a race against time. The dual-track strategy has provided essential short-term breathing room, allowing the state to begin the slow process of military modernization and diplomatic diversification. However, as the 2026 elections approach and the regional environment becomes more binary, the luxury of ambiguity is disappearing.

​For Armenia to survive as a sovereign actor, it must bridge the gap between "monitoring" and "defense." This requires moving beyond symbolic gestures toward a robust institutional framework that accounts for the state’s structural vulnerabilities. The TRIPP corridor and Western arms contracts are steps in the right direction, but they are not panaceas. Ultimately, Armenia’s ability to sustain its independence will depend on whether its Western partners are willing to provide actionable security pathways that go beyond binoculars and political statements. In a region where hard power still dictates the terms of sovereignty, Armenia’s "dual-track" must eventually find a single, solid, and defensible destination.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Ebru Akgün is an independent researcher specializing in the South Caucasus, regional security architecture, and transportation corridors. Her work focuses on the intersection of infrastructure development, military modernization, and geopolitical risk analysis in Eurasia. She actively monitors the evolving dynamics between Armenia, its neighbors, and global power enters. You can follow her latest research and professional updates via http://linkedin.com/in/ebruakgun

By Davit Gasparyan

Escalating tensions between the Armenian government and senior figures within the Armenian Apostolic Church are more than a domestic institutional dispute. The ongoing confrontation demonstrates Armenia’s broader geopolitical recalibration and growing concerns within Yerevan that Russian influence continues to operate through religious and cultural networks. While the Armenian Apostolic Church remains one of the country’s most trusted and historically significant institutions, the political behavior of certain ecclesiastical elites has intensified debates over sovereignty, national security, and foreign interference. The dispute is an example of how religious institutions across Russia’s neighboring countries can become entangled in geopolitical competition, particularly amid Armenia’s evolving foreign policy orientation and Russia’s continued reliance on soft power mechanisms.

BACKGROUND:

Relations between the Armenian government and the Armenian Apostolic Church have deteriorated significantly in recent years and particularly recent months, with public disagreements increasingly centered on Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s allegations of corruption, political interference, and questions surrounding the Church’s institutional accountability. While these tensions have often been portrayed as domestic disputes over governance and reform, Armenian political leadership has also framed the issue in broader geopolitical terms.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has explicitly linked his government’s concerns regarding church leadership to national security considerations. During a parliamentary question-and-answer session, Pashinyan stated that he “does not need a Catholicos who will obey him,” but rather one who “will not obey a senior lieutenant of a foreign special service” or report to foreign intelligence actors. Such remarks suggest that the Armenian government views elements within church leadership as potential conduits for external political influence rather than solely domestic institutional actors.

The Armenian Apostolic Church occupies a uniquely influential position in Armenian society. For centuries, it has served as a pillar of national identity, preserving Armenian cultural, linguistic, and spiritual continuity through periods of foreign domination, including Ottoman and Soviet rule. Public trust in the Church remains consistently high, making it one of the country’s most respected institutions according to the Caucasus Barometer, outperforming political parties and figures. This legitimacy, however, also renders the Church a powerful societal actor vulnerable to political instrumentalization.

Historically, segments of the Church’s senior leadership have maintained close institutional and symbolic ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state. These connections reflect broader historical patterns in which former Armenian political elites aligned closely with Moscow during Armenia’s post-Soviet transition and subsequent security dependence on Russia. Such relationships have periodically reinforced Russia’s ideological narratives across the region.

These ties became particularly visible following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II received a Russian state honor from President Vladimir Putin, clearly signaling the continuing closeness between Armenian and Russian religious leadership. More controversially, Archbishop Ezras (Nersisyan), head of the Russian Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church and brother of Garegin II, publicly blessed the Arbat Battalion in 2023, a military unit that includes ethnic Armenians associated with Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The act carried strong symbolic significance, depicting how certain church elites have engaged in activities aligning with and supporting Russia’s wartime mobilization narratives against Ukraine. Pashinyan later alleged in 2025 that Archbishop Ezras was recruited by the KGB.

Russian religious and political actors have also reacted sharply to Armenian government criticism of church leadership. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church have condemned perceived state interference in ecclesiastical affairs, portraying Armenian government actions as part of broader efforts to undermine traditional spiritual institutions. Russian political commentators and politicians, including Sergei Lavrov, have similarly framed Armenian reform efforts as destabilizing and influenced by Western political agendas.

The dispute has extended beyond Armenia’s borders into Russian streets. Russian authorities have permitted Armenian diaspora communities to mobilize publicly around disputes between the Armenian government and church leadership and to publicly criticize Pashinyan’s actions. These developments show how the Russian regime has allowed and implicitly endorsed such attacks on Pashinyan as such demonstrations would require extensive scrutiny and approval by Russian authorities.

IMPLICATIONS:

The confrontation between the Armenian government and segments of church leadership reflects a broader geopolitical struggle over Russia’s influence within Armenian society. Religious institutions have historically served as important channels of Russian soft power across the post-Soviet region, enabling Moscow to shape political narratives, reinforce cultural alignment, and maintain influence even where formal political leverage declines.

Russia’s use of religious networks as instruments of influence has been particularly evident in Ukraine. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion in 2022, tensions between Ukrainian authorities and Moscow-affiliated religious structures intensified. Kyiv’s eventual support for the establishment of an independent Orthodox Church reflected concerns that religious institutions could function as vehicles for Russian political influence and intelligence activity. Similar dynamics have been observed in Moldova, where Moscow-aligned religious organizations have maintained strong societal influence and occasionally reinforced pro-Russian political narratives. In Georgia, Russian-linked religious messaging has also been used to amplify conservative social discourse and skepticism toward Western integration.

Armenia’s current church-state tensions appear to follow comparable patterns. Pashinyan’s government has increasingly pursued foreign policy diversification, strengthening relations with the EU, the U.S., and regional partners while reducing reliance on Russian security and economic guarantees. These shifts have heightened the Armenian leadership’s sensitivity to domestic institutions perceived as linked to Moscow’s influence infrastructure.

Pashinyan has suggested that segments of church leadership have been used in forms of “hybrid warfare” targeting Armenian sovereignty. While such claims remain politically and legally contested and strongly rejected by church representatives, they highlight the degree to which religious institutions have become intertwined with national security discourse in Armenia. The framing reflects broader concerns within Armenian political circles that Russian influence persists through societal and cultural networks even as formal bilateral relations undergo strain.

The dispute also carries significant domestic political implications. Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections are expected to take place amid heightened geopolitical competition. Russia has historically demonstrated interest in influencing Armenian electoral processes and public discourse and there are reports that it already has commenced influence operations. Given the Armenian Apostolic Church’s deep societal legitimacy, internal church disputes could become politically mobilized, shaping electoral narratives and public perceptions of government legitimacy.

At the same time, aggressive state action against church leadership risks generating backlash among segments of Armenian society that view the Church as inseparable from national identity. Balancing institutional reform with respect for religious tradition will remain a very delicate political challenge for Armenian authorities. Certain Western human rights and religious organizations have already criticized the Pashinyan regime for its targeted crackdown on Armenian church members.

More broadly, Armenia’s experience demonstrates how religious institutions across Eurasia continue to operate at the intersection of identity, politics, and geopolitical competition. As Russia’s conventional political leverage in parts of the post-Soviet space declines, Moscow has increasingly relied on cultural and religious networks to preserve influence. Armenia’s internal church-state confrontation demonstrates how such networks can become focal points of broader geopolitical realignment.

CONCLUSIONS:

The escalating conflict between the Armenian government and senior figures within the Armenian Apostolic Church should be understood as both a domestic institutional dispute and a manifestation of broader geopolitical transformation. While the Church remains a foundational pillar of Armenian identity and social cohesion, the political, pro-Russian alignment of certain ecclesiastical elites has contributed to growing concerns regarding foreign influence.

Pashinyan’s confrontation with church leadership reflects Armenia’s efforts to redefine its geopolitical orientation and reduce Russian soft power penetration within Armenian society. The outcome of this struggle will likely influence not only Armenia’s internal political stability but also its future strategic alignment. As Armenia navigates a changing regional security environment on the eve of its 2026 Parliamentary elections, the interaction between religious authority, national identity, and external geopolitical competition will remain a critical factor shaping the country’s trajectory.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Davit Gasparyan researches security dynamics in the South Caucasus and Russia’s regional strategy. He conducts research with the Institute for Security and Analysis and previously served as a Russia researcher at the Institute for the Study of War, and has worked with the Carnegie Endowment and Caucasus Watch.

By Stephen Blank

While Central Asian cohesion and regional cooperation grow; the South Caucasus is fragmenting. This process increasingly affects the nature and scope of regional interactions with key international actors. Russian influence has declined precipitously in Armenia, which is turning to the West, and Azerbaijan, which is expanding its circle of partners. However, in Georgia the state increasingly resembles Russia in its autocratic and legal structure and thus its state practices.

BACKGROUND:

Writing in 2024, the Azeri scholar Gulshan Pashayeva observed that a defining feature of the Caucasus was its fragmentation. This fragmentation is deepening and in effect, relationships between the South Caucasus and key external actors have quickly grown and assumed new shapes in 2025. Georgia’s dependence on Russia has grown, whereas Russian influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan has visibly declined as these states are turning to Washington and Europe. 

Georgia is paying the supreme price of colonial status as it over time loses territory to Russia as both South Ossetia and Abkhazia virtually included in the Russian Federation. The Russian-driven borderization whereby Russian or pro-Russian forces either overtly or surreptitiously move border posts demarcating Russian-controlled from Georgian territories to expand Russia’s holdings occurs with impunity.

The mounting discord between the Georgian government and the EU also exemplifies Georgia’s regression. Georgia’s government, possibly at Moscow’s behest, is trampling upon processes necessary for Georgian admission into the EU and frustrating both Brussels’ conditions and the continuing support for EU membership among a majority of the Georgian population. 

Armenia’s government is implementing a program of democratic reform and ultimate membership in the EU while striving to make a conclusive peace with Azerbaijan and normalize ties to Turkey despite staunch resistance by domestic, diasporic elements, the Church and Russian influencers. None of these groups supports peace and many of them, including Russia, fear democratization as signaling a decisive political defeat at home as well as a threat to Russia. It is no surprise that the Church with Russian backing emerged as the leader of an attempted coup in 2025 to replicate Russia’s success in Georgia and reverse Yerevan’s turn to the West.

Azerbaijan’s case is even more striking. Beyond its military-diplomatic success in forging an alliance with Turkey and partnership with Israel to strengthen its military capability, it neutralized Russian support for Armenia while improving ties with key European states and the U.S. The Trump Administration has now built a permanent monument to its military-economic presence in the Caucasus, namely the Trump International Road for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This project brings Washington into the Caucasus as a permanent player and checks Iranian threats to Azerbaijan and links to Armenia, while giving Yerevan a tangible reward for its pro-Western and anti-Russian policies. Meanwhile, Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani airplane in 2024 and attacks on Azerbaijani residents in Russia have generated enormous resentment in Azerbaijan. 

IMPLICATIONS:

The Caucasus has become a battleground where the great powers and their favored local governments are not only on opposite sides, but where these powers’ rivalry also spills over into trade routes. The TRIPP has duly triggered Georgian apprehension since that project’s inauguration may well push aside Georgia as a preferred partner in the Middle Corridor project that ties together China, Central Asia, and ultimately Europe. But the significance of TRIPP far transcends its potential impact upon Georgia.

This project is only the latest manifestation of the declining Russian influence in the Caucasus and the parallel ensuing fragmentation of the region. While Moscow still holds many levers of influence and has no scruples about using them; they are fewer, less potent than before, and Russia faces a greater and more sustained foreign presence in the Caucasus than at any time since the disintegration of the USSR. Neither is this foreign influence strictly economic as in China’s case and as seen in its sponsorship of the Middle Corridor trade and transportation route through Azerbaijan that bypasses Russia. Türkiye’s alliance with Azerbaijan is of an explicitly military nature that provides an enduring supply of weapons, training, and presumably logistical and intelligence support for Azerbaijan. Türkiye also buttresses this support by providing the primary terminus for Azerbaijan’s increasing energy exports to Europe. Beyond these increasingly deep-rooted connections to Azerbaijan, through the Organization of Turkic States Türkiye now also has an institutional base for enduring outreach to Central Asia and the provision of all manner of military and economic ties to that region. 

Azerbaijan is also increasingly tied to the Middle East through its long-running defense and economic ties to Israel, their mutual collaboration against Iran and its membership in both the Abraham Accords and President Trump’s Board of Peace. Likewise, the EU and Azerbaijan have embarked upon a mutually rewarding series of ties independent of Russian influence and also primarily based on Azerbaijani energy exports in return for EU investment and political support.

Moreover, the advent of the TRIPP has launched what looks like a sustained U.S. presence in the Caucasus. This project is taking physical shape and Vice-President Vance’s visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan demonstrates that sustained interest. Under this project, “American companies could develop railways, roads, and pipelines linking Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave via a corridor through the south of Armenia’s Syunik Province.” Since Azerbaijan is now providing Armenia with energy, a formal peace treaty terminating the state of war over Nagorno-Karabakh under U.S. auspices seems likely. Beyond those signs of U.S. influence, President Trump has just stated that Vance’s tour will, “strengthen our strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, a beautiful Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with Armenia, Deals for our Great Semiconductor Makers, and the sale of Made in the U.S.A. Defense Equipment, such as body armor and boats, and more, to Azerbaijan.” If this lasting multi-domain U.S. presence materializes, it will represent a major blow to Russian ambitions but also codify the fragmentation of the Caucasus and exclude Georgia from the growing and long-term international competition in the region for a long time to come.

CONCLUSIONS:

Russia certainly still has cards to play. It has a long-term military base at Gyumri, Armenia, and well-established connections among the Armenian opposition that is both unreconciled to the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and to the Pashinyan government’s democratizing reforms and efforts to join the EU. Russia also has substantial economic connections to Georgia and what looks like a secure base of influence in Georgia’s government. 

Nevertheless, it is a declining power economically if not militarily and cannot stop the rising foreign presence in the Caucasus. Indeed, it depends on trade coming from Armenia and Central Assia to circumvent Western sanctions and access vital Western goods. Iran, whose back is to the wall due to combined U.S., Israeli, and European military-economic pressure, cannot bail it out. Nor will China, the primary sponsor of the Middle Corridor, rescue it in the Caucasus. Despite the Russo-Chinese “no-limits” partnership, Beijing has never lifted a finger to allow Russia to become a viable economic competitor across Eurasia or regarding inter-continental trade, transport, and connectivity issues.

Therefore, the fragmentation of the South Caucasus and the heightened presence of competing major international actors is likely to continue. Central Asian states, in contrast, forge ahead with mounting cohesion and collaboration. Indeed, those states, recognizing Azerbaijan’s critical geographic position and rising heft, have now included it in what used to be the 5+1 relationship with Washington, transforming it into a 6+1 formation. This development will also contribute to regional fragmentation. Azerbaijan is increasingly a power whose perspectives must embrace Washington, Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, not just the Caucasus.

The ethnopolitical rivalries that made the Caucasus a zone of conflict for a generation after 1991 may, however, be coming to an end as the new ties between Baku and Yerevan and greater foreign connections show. To the extent that Georgia can be helped to resolve its ethnic and other domestic cleavages that Russia continues to exploit, it may become possible for the South Caucasus to emulate the discernible regional cooperation now appearing in Central Asia.

That outcome would be to the benefit of the entire Caucasus as well as to its neighbors and interlocutors. While disappointing to Moscow, its regional clients and those “dead-enders” who wish to rekindle the fires of ethnic conflict, that way has been tried and founds wanting in the balance.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute (www.fpri.org.)

By Eldaniz Gusseinov & Sardor Allayarov, 

Following the conclusion of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia, three key trends are likely to shape the South Caucasus within broader global geoeconomic processes. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan may facilitate the emergence of the South Caucasus as a more integrated regional entity, rather than three distinct states occupying a shared geographic space. The region’s future can be understood through three interrelated dynamics: the expansion of overland infrastructure, intensified competition for markets, and increasing complexity in its geoeconomic architecture.

BACKGROUND:

An initialed peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was announced on August 8, 2025, under U.S. mediation, formally ended the protracted conflict and aimed to normalize bilateral relations. Despite sharing a common geographic space, the South Caucasus states differ markedly in their political, economic, and security orientations, which has historically constrained regional integration. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) while simultaneously expressing aspirations for EU membership. Georgia has maintained a broadly pro-Western orientation, though less pronounced than in the past, whereas Azerbaijan prioritizes integration within the Organization of Turkic States. At the same time, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have expressed interest in joining the SCO. Additionally, Azerbaijan has attained permanent status among the consultative meetings of the Central Asian heads of states. 

Similar processes can be observed in Central Asia, where the resolution of several border disputes enabled intensified cooperation through the integration of transport routes and energy hubs. Comparable developments may emerge in the South Caucasus, as border openings are likely to necessitate infrastructure expansion, followed by the harmonization of tariffs and customs procedures.

IMPLICATIONS:

At the initial stage, the institutionalization of meeting formats among South Caucasus leaders is likely to occur, both within a trilateral framework and through a 3+3 format involving other key regional actors. The Central Asia–South Caucasus format also appears promising, as the two regions are increasingly interconnected through the development of transport corridors.

The first trend is the growing demand for overland transport corridors driven by increased tensions between China and the U.S. Following significant progress in the normalization of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations, the South Caucasus, together with Central Asia, is likely to be perceived by Beijing as a relatively stable region for investment. In Central Asia, the development of overland routes is already well advanced. Kazakhstan, for example, has launched the second track of the 836-km Dostyk–Moyinty railway, increasing capacity fivefold to 60 pairs of trains per day. With a cost of nearly US$ 1 billion, it is the largest railway project undertaken since independence and a key enhancement of China–Europe transport connectivity. 

However, China’s westward transport expansion through Central Asia and the South Caucasus will also underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation. In this context, Beijing may seek deeper engagement within the SCO, potentially conflicting with Georgia’s and Armenia’s aspirations to strengthen cooperation with NATO and with Azerbaijan’s efforts to advance the military dimension of integration within the Organization of Turkic States.

Kazakhstan became the second country after Russia to utilize the opening of transit routes to Armenia via Azerbaijan. The new corridor (Kazakhstan/Russia–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Armenia) reduces logistics costs and enables regular deliveries, with Kazakhstan planning to transport up to 20,000 tons of grain per month.

In parallel, construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway is advancing rapidly. These dynamics are likely to extend to the South Caucasus as China and the EU seek to expand overland connectivity to facilitate trade and access stable markets. This process will further link Central Asia and the South Caucasus and will require enhanced coordination to improve connectivity among major economic centers, giving rise to a second trend: the increasing complexity of the region’s geoeconomic architecture.

Despite these developments, the South Caucasus continues to consist of three states sharing a common geographic space but pursuing distinct foreign policy orientations. A comparable situation previously existed in Central Asia and did not prevent regional consolidation, as multiple institutional platforms were leveraged to advance regional interests. Similarly, the EAEU can support trade with Russia, the SCO can provide additional security frameworks for transport corridors, and both the EU and China can serve as key financiers of transport infrastructure.

The third and most significant trend is that the opening of transport links in the South Caucasus will further liberalize the market and intensify competition. For Armenia, this is likely to result in more active competition between Russian and European food producers. Modeling-based studies suggest that Russia’s effective market share will decline as Armenia’s borders open, with Europe and Turkey gaining ground. The central challenge will be to maximize the benefits of this competition by creating conditions that allow actors who compete bilaterally to nonetheless engage in trade and pursue joint projects within the South Caucasus.

Armenia’s largest solar power plant, Masrik-1, with a capacity of 62 MW, was developed by FRV and commissioned in June 2025 in the Gegharkunik region, supplying clean energy to more than 21,000 households. The project was financed with support from international banks and an EU grant, while the main construction works were carried out by the Chinese state-owned corporation CMEC. This project represents one of the clearest regional examples of cooperation among competing powers and may serve as a model for other South Caucasus states.

CONCLUSIONS:

In sum, the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia constitutes a critical turning point for the South Caucasus, positioning the region as an increasingly important transit and connectivity hub linking Central Asia, Europe, and East Asia. The region’s future trajectory will be shaped by its capacity to manage a more complex geoeconomic architecture involving multiple external actors with overlapping interests. Divergent foreign policy orientations among regional states may create opportunities to leverage a wide range of institutional platforms and investment sources. Ultimately, the impact of the peace agreement will depend on whether the regional states can translate improved connectivity and heightened competition into cooperative economic projects. The long-term success of the regionalization process will therefore hinge on the ability of regional states to manage diversity in external partnerships by preventing geopolitical competition from obstructing economic cooperation. If effectively managed, the South Caucasus can move beyond a legacy of protracted conflict and emerge as a stable, competitive, and strategically significant component of broader Eurasian geoeconomic processes.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Eldaniz Gusseinov is a Head of Research and сo-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int. and a non-resident research fellow at Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of the Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul.

Sardor Allayarov is an International relations expert with a research focus on theories of international relations, international order, China, Eurasia, and foreign policy. He currently serves as a Research Assistant at Urgench State University in Uzbekistan.

By Suren Sargsyan

On November 17, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Alison Hooker visited Yerevan and Baku to promote the U.S. president’s vision of regional peace and security. During the visit, she discussed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project with the leadership of both countries. On November 18, Jonathan Asconas, Senior Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, visited Georgia to discuss the country’s possible participation in TRIPP. Beyond the economic implications of the route, these steps indicate an evolving regional U.S. approach toward the South Caucasus.

Credit: Diego Delso

BACKGROUND: The announcement regarding the construction of TRIPP and an increased U.S. activity in the South Caucasus has received significant political and analytical attention. However, five months after the announcement, it remains unclear what the timeline for implementation will be and which company will handle its operations. 

The announcement of the TRIPP project and the increase in U.S. activity in the South Caucasus have attracted significant political and analytical attention. However, five months after the announcement, it remains unclear what the implementation timeline will be and which company will be responsible for operating the project.

The central question is whether the U.S. is seeking a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, a goal it has historically avoided, or whether its involvement remains primarily economic and business-oriented. Washington’s previous approaches towards the South Caucasus have fallen short of both a coherent strategy or ambitions to establish a lasting strategic presence in the region. In light of developments over recent months, it is therefore important to assess how U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus is evolving under the revitalized approach of the Trump administration.

TRIPP is primarily a business project, but it also has the potential to develop into a strategic asset by giving Washington a new presence in a region traditionally viewed as Russia’s sphere of influence. While it would first create a commercial foothold, the route could acquire broader strategic importance by connecting Asia and Europe while bypassing both Russia and Iran. The inclusion of pipelines, oil and gas corridors, and railway links would also allow Central Asian energy resources to reach Europe through the Caspian Sea, fully circumventing Russian territory.

On December 17, 2025, the Armenia–U.S. Bilateral Working Group, established to support the outcomes of the August 8, 2025, Peace Summit, held its inaugural meeting. 

IMPLICATIONS: To establish lasting influence in the South Caucasus, a global power must exert leverage over at least two of the region’s three states. At present, no external actor meets this condition, unlike Russia, which for years maintained decisive influence by using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to exert control over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict-based dependence shaped their political priorities, foreign policy orientations, and economic choices, while also preventing the development of effective regional cooperation mechanisms.

Russia deliberately relied on the continuation of conflict as a tool of influence, a well-established method of maintaining strategic presence. When conflicts end, however, influence weakens and a vacuum emerges, which is often filled by another power. By contrast, the U.S. is seeking influence through the promotion of peace, economic development, and mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, presenting itself as an arbiter seeking to maintain long-term engagement in the region. The possible inclusion of Georgia in discussions on TRIPP further increases the strategic importance of this approach.

While Moscow relied on managed instability, Washington is investing in regional consolidation based on shared economic interests. This approach inevitably conflicts with the interests of states that oppose both TRIPP and the expansion of U.S. influence. Given the deep historical, institutional, and economic links between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, through organizations such as the EAEU, CSTO, CIS, and the Organization of Turkic States, any change in the balance of influence in one region will directly affect the other.

Within this broader framework, the Trump administration has sought to extend the Abraham Accords beyond their original Middle Eastern context. By including economically important, Muslim-majority but secular states such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, both of which already have strong relations with Israel, the aim is not normalization, but the institutionalization of cooperation. This approach represents another U.S.-led multilateral mechanism designed to promote regional prosperity while expanding long-term strategic influence.

Judging from recent practical developments, it becomes clear that current U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus is growing more complex and nuanced. On November 30, 2024, the U.S. suspended its strategic partnership agreement with Georgia, a document it had been the first among South Caucasus states to sign in 2009. Shortly thereafter, in the final days of the Biden administration, the U.S. signed a strategic partnership agreement with Armenia on January 14, 2025. On November 8, 2025, the Trump administration signed a memorandum with Azerbaijan to establish a working group tasked with preparing a strategic partnership agreement. At the same time, President Trump waived Section 907, enabling expanded cooperation between Azerbaijan and the U.S. across a range of areas. 

These steps suggest that the Trump administration is prioritizing a regional approach toward the South Caucasus. In addition, the U.S. provided Armenia with US$ 145 million in assistance as part of the first tranche of funding for the TRIPP project and related agreements reached on August 8. This support is intended to finance investments in trade, infrastructure, critical mineral supply chains, and border security.

As for Georgia, despite tensions in bilateral relations, the country continues to play an important role in U.S. regional policy. Georgia has sought to align itself with Washington’s agenda of promoting peace in the South Caucasus, while also discussing possible participation in the TRIPP project and its implementation. This approach appears to correspond with U.S. expectations, as Washington moves toward deeper engagement with Georgia within this framework.

Current U.S. policy extends beyond the bilateral level and has regional ambitions, seeking to strengthen cooperation with South Caucasus states individually while emphasizing shared regional priorities. 

CONCLUSIONS: Despite the apparent principled agreement of all parties on the route, its timeline for implementation and the duration of the process remain unclear. If realized, the route would give the U.S. a unique opportunity to establish a presence in the South Caucasus, and this commercial presence could evolve into a strategically significant one, especially if the route’s scale and capacity become significant enough for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the U.S. companies responsible for its operation and security. Whether the U.S. can counter the long-standing influence of Russia and Iran in the region, both of which may view the project as undermining their interests, will depend on the consistency of the Trump administration’s policy, its sustained commitment, and the broader competition among global actors in the South Caucasus.

According to Armenian authorities, Yerevan and Washington plan to establish a consortium that would act as the main company responsible for constructing and operating the railway. The consortium could also build, manage, and operate pipelines, power transmission lines, and other related infrastructure. In addition to road transport, rail capacity is crucial to sustain the transport of Chinese goods along this route in order to ensure its economic viability and maximize cargo volumes.

From this perspective, overall U.S.–China relations are also critical. As a result, the U.S. faces the compound challenge of promoting peace and stability in the region and limit potential spoilers, while simultaneously improving relations with China and resolving outstanding tariff issues, tasks that pose a particularly difficult test for the Trump administration.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.