By Rafis Abazov

Kyrgyzstan's ability to achieve sustainable development and transitioning to a greener economy hinges on a proactive approach by the country’s government, regional and international collaboration in addressing the impact of climate change and promoting long-term economic growth. However, Kyrgyzstan is grappling with significant environmental challenges, ranging from deforestation to water pollution, which threaten its long-term sustainability. In recent years, Kyrgyzstan has made significant strides in integrating green economy principles into its national development agenda. This shift reflects a broader commitment to achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and transitioning toward a more environmentally conscious, sustainable economy. The question remains: can Kyrgyzstan, a cash-strapped country with limited financial and human resources, mobilize enough resources to implement its green agenda and truly become sustainable?

Photo Credit: Pavel Fertikh

BACKGROUND: Kyrgyzstan’s environmental landscape is a mix of alpine wild woodland and man-made tree plantations. While the country boasts the beauty of its national parks and natural reserves, including major rivers like the Naryn and Talas, preserving forests and wild natural habitats remain pressing concerns. Three decades of economic and social transition have left a legacy of underfunded environmental policies, and addressing these issues remains critical to Kyrgyzstan’s green future.

One factor is the rapid rural population growth and collapse of the rural economy in recent decades, which have exacerbated the pressure on biodiversity. Impoverished farmers have turned to the extensive use of land resources, including the use of land in protected wild areas to support their income as a significant portion of the population still depends on subsistence agriculture and livestock production. This has led to deforestation, overgrazing, and land degradation threatening Kyrgyzstan’s biodiversity and rural livelihood. A second factor is corrupt business practices as some private companies enrich themselves from large-scale illegal logging, overgrazing and collecting wild harvest, further contributing to soil erosion and deforestation.

In fact, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), between 1990 and 2015 the forest area in Kyrgyzstan declined by approximately 10.1 percent and currently forest covers a meager 4.3 percent of its land area, one of the lowest in Central Asia. The third factor is the lack of law and regulation enforcement and lack of funding for the implementation of national and international programs for preserving biodiversity and natural habitats.

The government has incorporated green economy principles into its national strategies, such as the “National Development Strategy 2040” and the “Green Economy Development Program.” These policies emphasize sustainable resource management, environmental protection, and the promotion of renewable energy sources. The SDG Agenda 2030 was designed to solidify Kyrgyzstan’s pledge to address environmental and economic challenges in a balanced, inclusive manner. By integrating green principles into its national development strategy, Kyrgyzstan seeks to ensure that future growth is both environmentally sustainable and economically beneficial.

However, the government must undertake significant efforts to advance sustainability and more effectively address environmental concerns and challenges. In recent years, the impacts of climate change have become increasingly evident, making the protection of investments and donor funding crucial for ensuring long-term economic resilience. 

IMPLICATIONS: Kyrgyzstan’s success in achieving its green economy objectives will hinge on its ability to effectively manage its existing budget and collaborate with regional and international partners. The country has already made strides in this area, having engaged in several key partnerships with international organizations and foreign governments. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union (EU) have provided technical and financial support for sustainable development projects, including those focused on climate adaptation, biodiversity conservation, and energy efficiency.

One such initiative is the “Green Economy for Sustainable Development” program (2018), supported by the UNDP and aimed at strengthening Kyrgyzstan’s capacity to achieve the SDGs. The program focuses on enhancing the country’s policy frameworks, improving environmental governance, and building the capacity of key institutions.
Additionally, Kyrgyzstan has received support from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to fund green infrastructure projects and improve environmental resilience. Regional cooperation is also slowly emerging as Kyrgyzstan is deeply integrated into Central Asia’s complex water and energy systems. Over the past few years, Bishkek began promoting collective progress toward sustainable development and collaboration with neighboring countries, particularly on water management, biodiversity management and forest preservation projects. Efforts to revitalize the “Green Central Asia” initiative, which aims to enhance regional cooperation on climate resilience and environmental protection, could be instrumental in supporting Kyrgyzstan’s green transition.

Furthermore, the Kyrgyz government would like to introduce initiatives to promote renewable energy sources, particularly in the hydropower sector. According to the UNDP it needs to raise at least US$ 8.5 billion by 2030 for its green transition. Investments into small and medium-sized hydropower plants are encouraged, as well as exploration of the potential for solar and wind energy. The government’s willingness to explore innovative energy solutions indicates its recognition of the importance of diversifying its energy portfolio and reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Moreover, the Kyrgyz government works to address structural and institutional challenges for achieving green goals. Over the past three years it conducted a series of activities to address corruption and institutional ineffectiveness, which have historically undermined the effective implementation of environmental policies.

If the country is to “become green again,” addressing the green agenda must be prioritized, along with enacting policies to mitigate further degradation. Alibek Matiev, Head of the Green economy and tourism unit at the Ministry of Economy and Commerce declared that “The task ahead is not just ambitious, but urgent for our nation’s survival.”
Kyrgyzstan has limited financial resources and therefore needs to mobilize sufficient capital to fully implement the SDG Agenda 2030 and achieve its green economy objectives. Kyrgyzstan’s government faces significant fiscal constraints, with high levels of public debt and a reliance on foreign aid and remittances to support its economy. As such, raising the necessary funds to implement large-scale environmental and green economy projects remains a daunting task. The Kyrgyz government should recognize the importance of mobilizing private sector investments to support its green agenda. It needs to develop a positive business environment for attracting private investments, green technologies and infrastructure. To overcome this barrier, the government needs to create a more favorable business environment for sustainable investments by improving regulatory transparency, reducing bureaucratic hurdles, and offering incentives for green investments.

In the past, the cash-strapped Kyrgyz government has often relied on international organizations, such as the World Bank, ADB, EBRD, UNDP and others to finance its green projects and to address its economic weaknesses. However, in the current environment Bishkek should turn to other forms of financing especially from regional players – public and private – to raise funds for its green energy agenda. For example, neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan heavily rely on the water resources coming from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and frequent conflicts have erupted over transboundary water use. It is time that all Central Asian counties identify mutually beneficial business collaboration opportunities and refrain from confrontation.

CONCLUSION: The formation and implementation of Kyrgyzstan’s environmental policy is a complex and multifaceted process that requires a balanced approach to environmental, economic, and social challenges. Kyrgyzstan’s path to becoming green again is fraught with both opportunities and risks. The Kyrgyz government should develop strong institutional frameworks and regulatory enforcement mechanisms to promote sustainable practices, especially in industries like mining and agriculture, which are critical to the national economy but also major contributors to environmental degradation.

AUTHOR BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and facilitated the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries.

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi

On February 22, 2025, during a meeting with Uzbekistan'ss Prime Minister Abdullah Aripov, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, representing the Taliban, called for Uzbek investment in repairing crucial infrastructure, including the Mazar-e-Sharif–Herat railway and the second Salang tunnel. These projects are seen as vital for improving communication and trade between Central and South Asia. Baradar reaffirmed the Taliban's commitment to regional stability and enhancing economic relations, while Uzbekistan expressed support for deepening cooperation and advancing joint initiatives. The Taliban's diplomacy in Central Asia is increasingly focused on economic cooperation, prioritizing infrastructure development and trade expansion.

BACKGROUND: Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) entered Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries aligned with the US by providing military support, road access, and airspace. Initially, these countries opposed the Taliban, backing anti-Taliban movements. However, over time, as the Taliban adapted their strategy and reduced their overt support for Central Asian militant groups, some regional countries shifted to a more neutral stance on Afghanistan.

During the Doha peace process, delegates from Central Asian countries held several meetings with the Taliban negotiating team, laying the groundwork for post-U.S. withdrawal relations. When American forces withdrew in August 2021, the Taliban regained control, creating security concerns for neighboring Central Asian states. This shift in power forced regional actors to reassess their approach, balancing security risks with economic and geopolitical interests.

Despite these concerns, most of Central Asian countries kept their embassies open in Kabul and initiated political and economic engagement with the Taliban. For its part, the Taliban, facing a financial crisis due to sanctions, frozen assets, reduced foreign aid, a water crisis, and a lack of international recognition, pursued an economic-oriented foreign policy. This included announcing expanding transportation infrastructure, such as the Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor (1,468 km), approved in May 2023, and the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, set to connect Central Asia to South Asia in 2024.

IMPLICATIONS: The Taliban’s return to power has significantly reshaped regional geopolitics and economic ties. With the US withdrawal creating a power vacuum, regional actors have sought to strengthen their positions. The Taliban, in turn, have sought new partnerships to break their political and economic isolation.

As Central Asian nations engage with the Taliban while remaining wary of potential instability, they have also strengthened ties with other powers like China and Russia. This shifting landscape raises critical questions about Afghanistan's evolving role in the region, particularly in terms of security cooperation, counterterrorism efforts, and border management.

Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian country to host a Taliban delegation, receiving Acting Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in Termez in September 2021. Both sides signed a security and trade protocol, exchanged diplomats, and expanded economic relations. On April 13, 2023, Uzbekistan hosted the 4th meeting of Afghanistan’s neighboring foreign ministers in Samarkand to discuss the Afghan situation.

As the Russia-Ukraine war disrupts trade, Uzbekistan—where three of its eight transit corridors depend on Russia—has accelerated efforts to find alternative routes. In August 2024, the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss trade and investment projects, resulting in 35 MoUs worth $2.5 billion. Trade between the two countries reached $860 million. Additionally, Uzbekistan has played a key role in infrastructure development, co-signing a trilateral agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 2023 for the Trans-Afghan Railway, linking Mazar-e-Sharif to Pakistan’s ports, with a projected cost of $6 billion.

In February 2025, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar led a high-ranking Taliban delegation to Uzbekistan to deepen economic, trade, and transport cooperation. Tashkent also committed to completing the "Khalqlaar Bazar" border market and providing Afghan citizens with a 15-day visa-free regime.

As for Kazakhstan, Afghanistan's top wheat, flour, and edible oil supplier, it maintained its embassy in Kabul after the Taliban’s takeover. Both sides exchanged ambassadors, strengthening diplomatic ties. Since 2023, three business forums in Astana, Almaty, and Kabul have facilitated agreements worth $1.5 billion. In April 2024, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul for an Afghanistan-Kazakhstan business forum, exploring investment in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical industries. Bilateral trade grew to $700 million in 9 months of  2024, a 14% increase from 2023, with projections reaching $3 billion in five years.

Kazakhstan also joined Turkmenistan’s initiative to build a logistics hub in Herat and expressed interest in the Trans-Afghan Railway, initially agreed upon by the Taliban, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan in 2021, to access South Asian and Gulf markets.

Historically neutral, Turkmenistan has maintained close ties with the Taliban since the 1990s. It remains a major oil and gas supplier to Afghanistan, with trade valued at over $500 million. Turkmen investments in Afghanistan exceed $1.5 billion, including infrastructure projects such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. In 2024, top Taliban officials met Turkmen leaders to resume work on TAPI, sign MoUs worth $200 million, and explore oil and gas transit routes linking Russia to South Asia via Afghanistan. Additionally, the two sides signed a $7 million agreement for three railway projects in September 2024.

With a 1,360 km border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan was initially the most vocal opponent of the Taliban, demanding an inclusive government with ethnic and gender representation. Anti-Taliban figures gathered in Tajikistan, drawing criticism from Kabul. However, economic cooperation persisted, with Tajikistan continuing electricity exports and opening five joint border markets in September 2023. The Jalaluddin Mohammad Balkhi-Sher Khan Port railway project, first signed in 2019, resumed, enhancing connectivity with Central Asia. Trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan reached $120 million in 2024. A recent unofficial meeting between top Tajik security officials and the Taliban signaled a thaw in relations.

Concerned about the rights of the Afghan Kyrgyz minority in the Pamir region, Kyrgyzstan established early contacts with the Taliban. In September 2021, Deputy Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with the Taliban Foreign Minister. Trade and transit discussions continued, with Kyrgyzstan serving as a transit route for Afghan goods to China and playing a key role in the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project.

In September 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet Chairman Akylbek Japarov met with Taliban representatives, expressing interest in expanding trade, transportation, energy, and agriculture cooperation. Some Afghan Kyrgyz, facing economic hardship and limited educational opportunities, have requested relocation to Kyrgyzstan. In response, the Taliban recently established the “Pamir” district for the Kyrgyz ethnic minority.

CONCLUSIONS: To better understand the Taliban’s role in Central Asia, it’s crucial to examine their balancing act between China and Russia, two regional powers with different interests. While China seeks stability in Afghanistan to secure trade routes under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and prevent extremism near Xinjiang, Russia focuses on managing the security risks spilling over into its Central Asian sphere. The Taliban, in turn, is strategically leveraging its position as a buffer state, engaging both countries diplomatically while positioning itself as a key player in regional security.

Since retaking power, the Taliban have pursued economic diplomacy, reassuring Central Asian neighbors of border security and promoting trade expansion. This shift has redirected Afghanistan’s trade partnerships from Pakistan toward Central Asia and Russia. The Taliban have leveraged Afghanistan’s geographic position to sign infrastructure MoUs, including railways and transit corridors, inviting regional investment in large-scale projects.

Central Asian states are balancing their engagement with Afghanistan while securing their interests. However, ongoing security risks, potential shifts in Taliban leadership, and external geopolitical pressures could alter the region’s engagement strategy. Future developments, such as increased intelligence cooperation or shifts in global economic alignments, may further impact Afghanistan’s regional role.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. She writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, and Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. He writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.  

By Sergey Sukhankin

Weakened by economic sanctions and bearing significant consequences for their geopolitical endeavors, Iran and Russia have solidified their post-2022 partnership, elevating it to the status of a comprehensive strategic partnership. The imperative to secure their borders and mitigate the impact of economic sanctions positions the South Caucasus and certain areas of the Caspian Sea as the focal points for deepening cooperation between Tehran and Moscow. Among the smaller regional actors, Azerbaijan is likely a primary beneficiary due to its geographically strategic location. Simultaneously, Russia may be inclined to reclaim some of its regional influence. This prospect is both precarious and potentially destabilizing for the region, as Russia’s historical engagement in the area has been characterized by conflict and disruptive interventions.

BACKGROUND: On January 17, Russia and Iran signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marking the first high-level agreement between the two nations since 2001. Although historically characterized by tension and complexity, bilateral relations have undergone a significant transformation after 2022, in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its resulting international isolation. This period has seen a rapid elevation of Russian-Iranian ties, with some experts even suggesting the formation of an Entente.

The primary impetus behind this strengthening of relations lies in the challenges faced by both states. Politically isolated and subjected to extensive sanctions, Russia has become embroiled in a protracted and costly war. With limited strategic alternatives, Russian leadership has increasingly aligned itself with authoritarian regimes and internationally marginalized states—such as North Korea and Belarus—in an effort to mitigate the effects of its diplomatic and economic isolation and to secure critical military support.

Iran’s situation is arguably even more precarious. In addition to ongoing economic struggles and internal social unrest, Iran experienced a series of significant geopolitical setbacks between 2023 and 2024. At the end of 2024, the Tehran-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown by the Turkish-supported opposition. Furthermore, the Israel-Hamas war inflicted severe damage on another of Iran’s key Middle Eastern proxies. These developments have reportedly exacerbated internal divisions within the Iranian political establishment, leading segments of Iran’s military-political elite to adopt a more critical stance toward Moscow.

Despite these disagreements, Russia and Iran remain compelled to act as close partners—if not outright allies—in the domains of defense and security, and perhaps even more so in trade and economic cooperation, as both seek to mitigate the detrimental effects of international sanctions. In this context, collaboration in the Caspian Sea region—particularly in specific areas of the South Caucasus—is expected to play a pivotal role in reinforcing Russo-Iranian ties.

IMPLICATIONS:  The strengthening ties between Russia and Iran are expected to have a significant impact on the geo-economic landscape. As emphasized by Russian President Vladimir Putin, "the essence of the Treaty [between Russia and Iran] is about creating additional conditions [...] for the development of trade and economic ties. We need less bureaucracy and more action." This objective is explicitly outlined in Clause 13 of the Treaty.

At present, economic and trade cooperation between Tehran and Moscow remains limited. In 2024, the reported trade volume between the two countries did not exceed US$ 4 billion. However, this may change in the future, primarily due to Russia’s evolving geopolitical strategy. Given its significantly weakened global position after 2022, Moscow increasingly views Iran as its “window to Asia”—a crucial conduit for circumventing Western-imposed economic sanctions and mitigating their severe economic impact.

In pursuit of this objective, Russo-Iranian cooperation is expected to strengthen in two key domains. First, there will likely be an intensification of trade along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—a 7,200-kilometer multimodal freight route encompassing ship, rail, and road networks that connects India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Central Asia. The INSTC is increasingly regarded as a viable alternative to traditional maritime trade routes such as the Suez Canal and the Bosphorus Strait.

Within this framework, Azerbaijan stands to be a primary beneficiary, as its strategic geographic position between Iran and Russia will elevate its role as a crucial transportation hub, significantly enhancing its economic and geopolitical importance within the region.

Azerbaijan’s role could be further reinforced if the two countries proceed with the construction of a natural gas pipeline through Azerbaijani territory. Initially agreed upon in 2022 and reaffirmed in late 2024, this project represents a significant expansion of regional energy cooperation. In his most recent statement on January 17, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the proposed pipeline would have a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas—equivalent to the Nord Stream 1 capacity—and could potentially be extended to Pakistan and even India.

However, some Russian experts question the economic viability of the project, arguing that its feasibility remains uncertain. They suggest that the pipeline could serve as a political instrument for Russia to exert pressure on China, possibly as a means of persuading Beijing to strengthen its energy ties with Moscow. Nevertheless, if both the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the gas pipeline are successfully implemented, the South Caucasus—and Azerbaijan in particular—will see a marked increase in geopolitical and economic significance as a critical Eurasian transportation and energy corridor.

Although defense and security are not the primary focus of the Russo-Iranian Treaty, as explicitly stated by Iran’s Ambassador to Russia, Kazem Jalali, certain shifts in the regional security landscape are nonetheless anticipated.

One key factor influencing these dynamics is the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020), resulting in an undisputed victory for Azerbaijan which not only received strong backing from Turkey but also enjoyed tacit Russian support. This outcome significantly weakened Iran’s position in the South Caucasus, while simultaneously bolstering its strategic adversary, Turkey. In addition to consolidating its influence over Azerbaijan, Turkey also strengthened economic, political, and energy ties with both Azerbaijan and Georgia, marking a substantial geopolitical success for Ankara and further diminishing Tehran’s leverage in the region.

However, in the post-2022 period, the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus has undergone further transformations, creating additional common ground for Russo-Iranian cooperation. The increasing prominence of Turkey, which directly contradicts the strategic interests of both Russia and Iran, has been a key factor in this shift.

Simultaneously, Russia’s influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan has weakened. Armenia’s signing of a Charter on Strategic Partnership with the U.S. implies a diversification of its geopolitical partnerships, potentially reducing Moscow’s leverage in Yerevan. 

Moreover, by the end of 2024, anti-Russian sentiment became more pronounced in Abkhazia, a breakaway region that has been heavily reliant on Moscow. These developments have raised alarms among Russian analysts, some of whom have warned of Russia’s "approaching loss of the South Caucasus." While such statements may be premature and alarmist, they nonetheless reflect Moscow’s growing concerns regarding its long-term strategic foothold in the region.

Iran and Russia appear to prioritize a shared geopolitical objective: the de-Westernization of the South Caucasus and the prevention of strengthened U.S. regional influence. This strategic alignment is explicitly reflected in Clause 12 of the Russo-Iranian Treaty, which underscores both parties’ commitment to “strengthening peace and security in the Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East [to] prevent destabilizing interference by third parties” in these areas.

In this context, some experts suggest that Iran’s increased diplomatic involvement in regional affairs is likely. One potential avenue for such engagement is the "3+3" format, which includes Armenia, Iran, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Initially proposed by Ankara and Baku, the framework has since received active support from Moscow as a means to reduce the risk of Western powers gaining a foothold in the South Caucasus. Iran’s participation in this diplomatic initiative could further consolidate its regional influence while aligning with Russia’s broader strategic objectives.

CONCLUSIONS:  The expansion of Russo-Iranian ties is expected to have a notable impact on the South Caucasus and parts of the Caspian Sea region. Azerbaijan's geo-economic and geopolitical significance is likely to increase further, particularly if economic sanctions against Russia remain in place, compelling Moscow to deepen its reliance on alternative regional partners.

Russia, whose regional standing is in decline, might unexpectedly benefit from Iran’s strategic weakening. Given its growing security concerns, Tehran may become more inclined to collaborate with Moscow in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region to safeguard its strategic depth and border security.

From a broader strategic perspective, a greater Russian presence in the region should be viewed as a negative development. Given the region’s complexity and history of conflict, Russia’s potential increased involvement—if it materializes—poses a significant risk. Historically, Moscow’s regional policies have regularly contributed to greater instability rather than fostering long-term security, raising concerns about the potential destabilizing consequences of renewed Russian engagement in the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea region.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).