By Ambassador David Dondua

Georgia’s democratic backslide has shocked observers at home and abroad. Once a “beacon of democracy” and a frontrunner of European integration, the country has lost its standing within the European democratic family in a remarkably short time. While this shift may appear sudden, it reflects deeper vulnerabilities—lessons that matter not only for Georgia but also for other small states navigating similar geopolitical crossroads.

BACKGROUND:

The rapid erosion of Georgia’s democratic and pro-Western trajectory cannot be explained by a single decision, policy, or political figure. Rather, it is the result of a complex combination of factors. At the most general level, it reflects the success of a long-term Russian hybrid and cognitive operation against Georgian society, an operation that ultimately proved much more effective than the 2008 military invasion.

As a result of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russia occupied only 20 per cent of Georgia’s territory. In the decade that followed, however, Moscow achieved something far more consequential. Through sustained political influence, economic leverage, disinformation, and elite capture, it gradually penetrated Georgia’s state institutions. Government, parliament, the presidential administration, courts, security services, police, armed forces, and the foreign service all became vulnerable to influence. Most importantly, Russia succeeded in distracting the country from its European integration trajectory and sowing mistrust toward democratic reforms and Western aspirations. Strategically, this amounted to the cognitive occupation of the entire state.

Blaming this reversal solely on Russian hybrid attacks, the pro-Russian stance of the ruling Georgian Dream government, or the role of the de facto ruler, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, would be too simple. The reality is more complex. Among the many political, social, and institutional factors that shaped Georgia’s vulnerability, one has remained largely unrecognized, rarely discussed, and almost entirely absent from public debate.

In the late 1980s, as the collapse of the Soviet Union became inevitable, Georgian society engaged in intense debates about the future of the independent state. Constitutional arrangements, models of governance, economic systems, currency, and even sporting affiliations were openly discussed. One issue, however, was never truly debated: the foreign policy orientation of independent Georgia.

On this question, there appeared to be complete consensus. Becoming part of the West was treated as self-evident—almost sacred. It was widely perceived as the fulfilment of centuries-long aspirations to align Georgia with Europe. No alternatives were discussed, not because they were examined and rejected, but because few dared to articulate them. In a diverse, multi-ethnic society that had lived under Russian rule for more than two centuries, it is unlikely that such alternatives were entirely absent. Yet for the next three decades, this unchallenged consensus shaped both Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy.

IMPLICATIONS: 

From today’s perspective, this unquestioned consensus appears to have been a missed opportunity for deeper and informed societal consolidation. This observation should not be misunderstood as questioning Georgia’s European choice. The author firmly believes that the European path was and remains the right choice for Georgia. Yet accepting this choice without deep public reasoning, open discussion, or even heated debate left society ill-prepared to fully understand and defend it.

Georgian society is often characterized by emotional radicalism, reinforced by a lack of democratic traditions. This leaves limited space for critical reflection. As a result, key aspects of EU and NATO integration were rarely discussed in a fact-based and accessible way. Public support, therefore, remained largely emotional rather than knowledge-based.

This gap became visible whenever misinformation spread. Claims that EU regulations would ban or severely restrict traditional agricultural products, force the uprooting of vineyards—widely perceived as an attack on Georgia’s cultural heritage—or exclude most of local goods from European markets due to strict quality standards repeatedly triggered public outrage. Such narratives exposed how shallow public understanding often was, despite consistently high levels of declared support for European integration.

Insufficient effort was made to explain to citizens that compromise is inherent in joining any international organisation. Government officials and even NGOs promoting the EU and NATO integration often avoided discussing trade-offs and long-term costs. Citizens were rarely told that today’s difficulties are frequently the price of tomorrow’s benefits—choices that can only be made consciously by an informed society.

Following the adoption of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), the state should have launched a large-scale educational effort to demonstrate how this instrument could be applied in practice, particularly for small entrepreneurs and rural communities. While some initiatives were undertaken, largely with donor support, they were insufficient. For many citizens, European integration remained an abstract promise rather than a lived experience.

A fundamental contradiction of Georgia’s post-independence politics is that all Georgian governments over the past three and a half decades have claimed to be pro-Western and have promised the population a European democratic future, including NATO membership. Even the current ruling party, Georgian Dream, publicly declared the same until recently. Yet in practice, the actions of all those governments, without exception, have often fallen short of democratic standards, at times even sharply contradicting them. 

Against this backdrop, today, the ruling party has deliberately cast Europe as a convenient scapegoat for almost all of the country’s past and current difficulties, whether stemming from poor governance, institutional weaknesses, corruption, reform costs, or external developments beyond Georgia’s control. Georgian Dream has transformed ordinary challenges into a political weapon to erode public trust in democratic reforms and derail the country’s European path.

As noted above, in every election, including the watershed 2012 vote, virtually all political actors pledged a European future to voters; even marginal candidates openly backed or courted by the Kremlin used pro-Western rhetoric. Unlike in Ukraine, Moldova, or Armenia, where societies were exposed to competing geopolitical visions and, over time, could observe different policy orientations, compare outcomes, and distinguish between credible and non-credible strategic paths, Georgian voters were never offered a genuine choice. They were offered reassurance that the European path was uncontested and secure. This monopoly of a single geopolitical orientation meant that alternatives were neither seriously articulated nor openly debated. Paradoxically, the absence of pluralism later became a vulnerability: because the European choice was never collectively debated and consciously affirmed, it failed to generate a strong sense of public ownership.

Today, pro-Russian actors exploit this gap by asking: “Who decided that Georgia must choose Europe?” The ruling Georgian Dream has increasingly reinforced this narrative by claiming that the European course was imposed on Georgia by some phantom foreign forces. 

At the same time, fully replacing Europe with Russia remains politically tricky in the short term, given prevailing public attitudes. Instead, the government has sought to cultivate the idea of “state neutrality” as an ostensibly safer alternative to Western integration, one that promises stability while allowing Georgians to preserve their traditions, identity, and way of life without external pressure. Packaged in this way, neutrality appears as a return to normalcy and sovereignty. Such a narrative can gain traction precisely because the European path was never thoroughly debated, internalised, and embraced on the basis of knowledge.

In reality, however, neutrality functions as a transitional narrative rather than a genuine option. Given Georgia’s geography, security environment and economic dependencies, let alone historical experience, neutrality is simply not workable. In practice, abandoning Western integration is the fastest route to renewed subordination to Russia and the gradual erosion of Georgian statehood.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s democratic and geopolitical setback is not the result of abandoning Europe overnight. It is the consequence of failing to cultivate deep understanding, ownership, and resilience around the European choice over three decades. Strategic orientations cannot survive on consensus alone; they require constant explanation, public debate, and civic education.

For years, Georgia proudly cited overwhelming public support for European integration. Yet emotional endorsement without understanding is fragile. A society that genuinely comprehends how Western institutions function and what integration realistically entails is far more resilient to manipulation. In retrospect, 50 or even 40 per cent of firm, knowledge-based support would have been more durable than 80 per cent of symbolic approval. This underscores that the key to Georgia’s recovery lies not in numbers alone but in cultivating genuine understanding and ownership among citizens.

This moment, however, is not irreversible. What was insufficiently addressed in the past can still be corrected. Periods of crisis often force societies to replace inherited assumptions with conscious choices. Continued engagement by Georgia’s Western partners is therefore essential—not less, but more focused on education, communication, and societal resilience.

Europe has not disappeared from Georgia’s collective identity. If reinforced through knowledge rather than slogans, it can still serve as the foundation for democratic recovery and a sustainable return to the European path.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ambassador David Dondua is a diplomat and political analyst. He serves as Chairman of the EU Awareness Centre, a Brussels-based think tank focused on European integration, democratic resilience, and countering hybrid threats in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

China is reshaping Central Asia’s nuclear energy sector, challenging Russia’s long-standing dominance in the region. In September 2025, Uzbekistan explored a contingency agreement with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), amid concerns that the contract signed in June with Russia’s state-owned nuclear monopoly, Rosatom, for the construction of nuclear power units might face delays. While Rosatom leads the consortium responsible for building Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, CNNC has emerged as the principal alternative competitor. Under current plans, CNNC would assume a leading role in the construction of Kazakhstan’s second and third nuclear power plants.

BACKGROUND: Nuclear energy has been a central instrument through which Russia has sustained its presence in Central Asia. Experts argue that nuclear power projects tend to create long-term dependencies for host states, particularly when nuclear energy constitutes a significant share of national electricity generation. Such projects also entail security risks, including the potential for sabotage. A 2023 study on Russian nuclear energy diplomacy published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs notes that “Central Asia has a special place in Russian nuclear energy diplomacy because of the post-Soviet heritage, meaning that Rosatom’s operations in the region are easier and smoother than elsewhere.”

Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 intensified Russia’s diplomatic isolation, undermining its dominance in Central Asia’s nuclear energy sector. As a sanctioned and increasingly isolated Russia gradually loses its influence in the region’s nuclear landscape, Beijing is capitalizing on the opportunity to secure new clients for its nuclear reactor technology.

During a visit to Uzbekistan in 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement with Tashkent for the construction of a 2.4-gigawatt nuclear power plant, valued at approximately US$ 11 billion. However, the project failed to progress as planned and was revised in 2024, when the two sides concluded a new agreement for a facility comprising six small reactors, each with a capacity of 55 megawatts (MW).

In June 2024, Russia concluded an agreement with Uzatom to carry out a feasibility study on constructing a nuclear power plant comprising two to four VVER-1000 reactors in Uzbekistan. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan held discussions with Rosatom on a small nuclear power plant with a capacity of 110 MW. However, the talks failed to progress after Bishkek lost interest.

In June 2025, Kazakhstan announced the selection of Rosatom to lead the construction of the country’s first nuclear power plant. In a separate statement, however, Astana also confirmed that CNNC would head the development of the country’s second nuclear facility. In August 2025, Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar further stated that CNNC would also lead the construction of the country’s third nuclear power plant. In September 2025, Uzbekistan’s nuclear agency, Uzatom, unveiled an upgrade plan for its two small nuclear reactors (RITM-200N), scheduled for completion by 2030, and for two large nuclear units (VVER-1000) by the mid-2030s. By pursuing a multi-vector diplomatic strategy, Uzbekistan has signed nuclear energy agreements with both Russia and China.

China’s nuclear energy cooperation in Central Asia is expanding rapidly. In September 2025, Beijing–Tashkent nuclear cooperation featured prominently in a meeting between Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Shen Yanfeng, Chairman of CNNC, held on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China. Following the Mirziyoyev–Yanfeng meeting, new mining agreements valued at US$ 5 billion, including a uranium mining deal, were announced.

IMPLICATIONS: Energy-constrained Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have looked to Rosatom, the world’s leading constructor and exporter of nuclear reactors. International sanctions imposed on Russia over its war in Ukraine have cast uncertainty over Rosatom’s future. As a result, Russia’s clients in Central Asia are increasingly turning to China as an alternative partner for nuclear energy cooperation. It was against this backdrop that Tashkent, in September 2025, discussed a contingency agreement with China for the construction of nuclear power plants, supplementing a deal signed with Rosatom in June 2025. While Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant is being built by Russia, China is set to lead the construction of the country’s second and third nuclear facilities.

China’s growing involvement in the nuclear energy sector is significantly eroding Russia’s long-standing dominance in the region. CNNC has emerged as a strong competitor to Russia’s Rosatom in nuclear projects in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as both Central Asian states expand their nuclear energy programs.

CNNC is posing strong competition to Russia’s Rosatom on cost considerations in nuclear energy projects. For Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, CNNC sought to attract Kazakh authorities by proposing the construction of two nuclear units with a combined capacity of 2.4 gigawatts at a cost of US$ 5.47 billion, a significantly lower bid. The comparatively lower cost of Chinese nuclear reactors gives China a competitive advantage over Russia in Central Asia, where affordability is a critical factor in ensuring the financial sustainability of host countries.

China’s policy of sharing nuclear technology and granting host countries full control over the nuclear fuel cycle emphasizes energy independence in states developing nuclear power projects. This approach is particularly attractive to Central Asian countries and gives China a competitive advantage over Russia. In Kazakhstan, for example, this policy aligns with Astana’s long-term objective of reducing dependence on external powers in the nuclear energy sector, and CNNC has offered technology transfer along with full control of the fuel cycle. By contrast, Russia follows a model that retains control over fuel supply and requires the repatriation of spent fuel for the duration of a plant’s operation in non-nuclear states.

Faster delivery timelines are another factor that make China more attractive to Central Asian countries than Russia in nuclear energy projects. Chinese companies typically complete nuclear power projects in seven years or less, whereas Rosatom generally requires between six and nine years to construct nuclear reactors.

Despite China’s competitive advantages in cost and delivery speed, Chinese nuclear projects involve technical and environmental risks. China does not provide Central Asian states with a long-term, reliable solution for radioactive waste management. Consequently, in the absence of advanced and transparent safety protocols, safety concerns remain a major obstacle to China’s nuclear ambitions in the region.

In September 2025, Almassadam Satkaliyev, Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency, emphasized the importance of ensuring safe operations at nuclear facilities. He stated that Kazakhstan would continue to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and nuclear fuel production to electricity generation at nuclear power plants, while strictly adhering to the country’s international obligations regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

CONCLUSIONS: Despite international sanctions imposed in response to the war in Ukraine, Russia is making concerted efforts to maintain its influence over nuclear energy projects in Central Asia. However, sanctions have increasingly eroded Russia’s primary source of leverage, nuclear cooperation, allowing China to challenge Moscow’s long-standing dominance in the region’s nuclear energy sector.

China’s nuclear power initiatives are poised to solidify its long-term strategic influence in Central Asia. These projects necessitate decades of engagement through fuel supply chains, technology transfer, and sustained operational oversight.

China is reshaping Central Asia's nuclear landscape by leveraging cost competitiveness, technology transfer, and expedited project timelines to erode Russia's traditional dominance in energy cooperation. However, despite these advantages, concerns persist regarding China’s comparatively lax safety standards.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation. Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Suren Sargsyan

On November 17, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Alison Hooker visited Yerevan and Baku to promote the U.S. president’s vision of regional peace and security. During the visit, she discussed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project with the leadership of both countries. On November 18, Jonathan Asconas, Senior Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, visited Georgia to discuss the country’s possible participation in TRIPP. Beyond the economic implications of the route, these steps indicate an evolving regional U.S. approach toward the South Caucasus.

Credit: Diego Delso

BACKGROUND: The announcement regarding the construction of TRIPP and an increased U.S. activity in the South Caucasus has received significant political and analytical attention. However, five months after the announcement, it remains unclear what the timeline for implementation will be and which company will handle its operations. 

The announcement of the TRIPP project and the increase in U.S. activity in the South Caucasus have attracted significant political and analytical attention. However, five months after the announcement, it remains unclear what the implementation timeline will be and which company will be responsible for operating the project.

The central question is whether the U.S. is seeking a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, a goal it has historically avoided, or whether its involvement remains primarily economic and business-oriented. Washington’s previous approaches towards the South Caucasus have fallen short of both a coherent strategy or ambitions to establish a lasting strategic presence in the region. In light of developments over recent months, it is therefore important to assess how U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus is evolving under the revitalized approach of the Trump administration.

TRIPP is primarily a business project, but it also has the potential to develop into a strategic asset by giving Washington a new presence in a region traditionally viewed as Russia’s sphere of influence. While it would first create a commercial foothold, the route could acquire broader strategic importance by connecting Asia and Europe while bypassing both Russia and Iran. The inclusion of pipelines, oil and gas corridors, and railway links would also allow Central Asian energy resources to reach Europe through the Caspian Sea, fully circumventing Russian territory.

On December 17, 2025, the Armenia–U.S. Bilateral Working Group, established to support the outcomes of the August 8, 2025, Peace Summit, held its inaugural meeting. 

IMPLICATIONS: To establish lasting influence in the South Caucasus, a global power must exert leverage over at least two of the region’s three states. At present, no external actor meets this condition, unlike Russia, which for years maintained decisive influence by using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to exert control over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict-based dependence shaped their political priorities, foreign policy orientations, and economic choices, while also preventing the development of effective regional cooperation mechanisms.

Russia deliberately relied on the continuation of conflict as a tool of influence, a well-established method of maintaining strategic presence. When conflicts end, however, influence weakens and a vacuum emerges, which is often filled by another power. By contrast, the U.S. is seeking influence through the promotion of peace, economic development, and mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, presenting itself as an arbiter seeking to maintain long-term engagement in the region. The possible inclusion of Georgia in discussions on TRIPP further increases the strategic importance of this approach.

While Moscow relied on managed instability, Washington is investing in regional consolidation based on shared economic interests. This approach inevitably conflicts with the interests of states that oppose both TRIPP and the expansion of U.S. influence. Given the deep historical, institutional, and economic links between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, through organizations such as the EAEU, CSTO, CIS, and the Organization of Turkic States, any change in the balance of influence in one region will directly affect the other.

Within this broader framework, the Trump administration has sought to extend the Abraham Accords beyond their original Middle Eastern context. By including economically important, Muslim-majority but secular states such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, both of which already have strong relations with Israel, the aim is not normalization, but the institutionalization of cooperation. This approach represents another U.S.-led multilateral mechanism designed to promote regional prosperity while expanding long-term strategic influence.

Judging from recent practical developments, it becomes clear that current U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus is growing more complex and nuanced. On November 30, 2024, the U.S. suspended its strategic partnership agreement with Georgia, a document it had been the first among South Caucasus states to sign in 2009. Shortly thereafter, in the final days of the Biden administration, the U.S. signed a strategic partnership agreement with Armenia on January 14, 2025. On November 8, 2025, the Trump administration signed a memorandum with Azerbaijan to establish a working group tasked with preparing a strategic partnership agreement. At the same time, President Trump waived Section 907, enabling expanded cooperation between Azerbaijan and the U.S. across a range of areas. 

These steps suggest that the Trump administration is prioritizing a regional approach toward the South Caucasus. In addition, the U.S. provided Armenia with US$ 145 million in assistance as part of the first tranche of funding for the TRIPP project and related agreements reached on August 8. This support is intended to finance investments in trade, infrastructure, critical mineral supply chains, and border security.

As for Georgia, despite tensions in bilateral relations, the country continues to play an important role in U.S. regional policy. Georgia has sought to align itself with Washington’s agenda of promoting peace in the South Caucasus, while also discussing possible participation in the TRIPP project and its implementation. This approach appears to correspond with U.S. expectations, as Washington moves toward deeper engagement with Georgia within this framework.

Current U.S. policy extends beyond the bilateral level and has regional ambitions, seeking to strengthen cooperation with South Caucasus states individually while emphasizing shared regional priorities. 

CONCLUSIONS: Despite the apparent principled agreement of all parties on the route, its timeline for implementation and the duration of the process remain unclear. If realized, the route would give the U.S. a unique opportunity to establish a presence in the South Caucasus, and this commercial presence could evolve into a strategically significant one, especially if the route’s scale and capacity become significant enough for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the U.S. companies responsible for its operation and security. Whether the U.S. can counter the long-standing influence of Russia and Iran in the region, both of which may view the project as undermining their interests, will depend on the consistency of the Trump administration’s policy, its sustained commitment, and the broader competition among global actors in the South Caucasus.

According to Armenian authorities, Yerevan and Washington plan to establish a consortium that would act as the main company responsible for constructing and operating the railway. The consortium could also build, manage, and operate pipelines, power transmission lines, and other related infrastructure. In addition to road transport, rail capacity is crucial to sustain the transport of Chinese goods along this route in order to ensure its economic viability and maximize cargo volumes.

From this perspective, overall U.S.–China relations are also critical. As a result, the U.S. faces the compound challenge of promoting peace and stability in the region and limit potential spoilers, while simultaneously improving relations with China and resolving outstanding tariff issues, tasks that pose a particularly difficult test for the Trump administration.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.