By: Yunis Gurbanov

The Eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State (CMHS) of Central Asia was held on October 8, 2026, in Awaza, Turkmenistan. It was the first meeting at which Azerbaijan was represented as a full-fledged member of the format. More significantly, the Awaza meeting can be regarded as an effort to provide content to the expanded format since the parties adopted a Joint Statement and decided on the regulatory documents of the Consultative Meeting, designating the format Chair in 2027 to Azerbaijan. The inclusion of Azerbaijan will not transform the Consultative Meeting into a supra-state structure or an integration association. The forum remains built on the principle of consensus and consciously maintains its flexibility. The inclusion of Azerbaijan has nevertheless shifted the geographical focus and agenda of the meeting. The Caspian Sea will connect the countries, not separate them, placing Trans-Caspian transportation and energy cooperation as well as other issues of cooperation and ecology on the agenda.

BACKGROUND:

CMHS is the outcome of developments in intra-regional relations due to the changing political environment in Uzbekistan from 2016 onwards. Instead of forming one more intergovernmental organization on the basis of a binding treaty, the five Central Asian countries created a leadership-oriented consultation and coordination mechanism. During the Awaza summit, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev explicitly stated his opposition to “cumbersome structures” and advocated for a flexible format of cooperation of sovereign states based on respect and pragmatism.

The importance of Azerbaijan’s involvement increased gradually. Baku was asked to participate in previous gatherings as a guest since its cooperation with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan was developing politically, economically and in transport. Azerbaijan was acknowledged by all Central Asian presidents as one of the full-fledged members of the group in November 2025. The informal consultative meeting in Cholpon-Ata in July 2026 and the adoption of the Cholpon-Ata Declaration helped establish the first CMHS involving the six presidents in Awaza.
The CMHS on October 8 did more than just confirm the format’s enlargement. According to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, the trade volume between Azerbaijan and Central Asia increased by 50 percent in the past year, and more than 400 enterprises with capital from Central Asian countries operate in Azerbaijan. Baku also established joint investment funds with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and cooperation in transport, energy transit, information technologies and renewable energy is growing.

Azerbaijan’s involvement in the C6 format is most significant in the transport area. The Middle Corridor passes through Azerbaijan and connects Central Asia with Georgia, Türkiye, and Europe. It has become increasingly relevant for the Central Asian states seeking access to Western markets through the Caspian Sea. According to Aliyev, the volume of cargo transported via the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10 percent in 2025 and by nearly 20 percent in the first eight months of 2026.

IMPLICATIONS:

The inclusion of Azerbaijan expands the CMHS format while avoiding any attempts to change its geographic identity and creating a new regional concept in which connectivity becomes the main element.

Another implication is the shift from trade to production. The most significant idea put forward at the Awaza summit was Mirziyoyev’s proposed new economic objective of “six economies – one product,” implying that companies in different countries that partake in the cooperation will be involved in the same value chain instead of trading. Uzbekistan also proposed to organize the “Central Asia-Azerbaijan” business forum in Khiva during 2027.

This will perfectly suit Azerbaijan’s appeal to the participating states to “invest together, produce together, and enter foreign markets together,” providing for more industrial zones, factories, logistics centers and investment projects along the corridor.

The meeting also addressed institutional development. The leaders adopted regulatory documents for the CMHS, while Uzbekistan proposed developing a dedicated legal framework. However, Mirziyoyev emphasized that implementation mattered more than the number of documents adopted. Greater institutionalization could improve coordination, but excessive formalization risks undermining the mechanism’s flexibility.

Transport coordination is likely to remain the most practical area of cooperation. Uzbekistan proposed establishing a Council for Infrastructure Development to coordinate transport projects and integrate national infrastructure into a broader regional framework. This initiative aligns with the development of the Baku International Sea Trade Port.

Cooperation also extends to energy resources. Oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is transported through Azerbaijan’s transport network, while the three countries are developing a green energy corridor to supply Western markets. These initiatives highlight the Middle Corridor’s potential for energy cooperation and digital connectivity, including the installation of fibre-optic cables beneath the Caspian Sea.

Environmental challenges are equally significant. Azerbaijan has raised concerns about declining water levels in the Caspian Sea, which could influence coastal infrastructure and increase the costs and reduce the efficiency of maritime transport.

Finally, Azerbaijan’s participation brings about a convergence of interests with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), an important instrument of Baku’s foreign policy. Four of the six C6 countries are OTS members, while Turkmenistan holds observer status. Tajikistan, with its distinct linguistic and cultural identity, participates in other regional cooperation frameworks. The OTS has also gained importance in Azerbaijan’s security policy. At the October 2025 Gabala summit, President Ilham Aliyev proposed joint military exercises and subsequently emphasized defense and security cooperation in September 2026. Rather than competing with the OTS, however, the C6 format offers a broader platform for regional cooperation.

However, the expanded format faces geopolitical constraints, reflecting the six states’ differing relations with Russia, China, Türkiye, the EU, and the U.S. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remain members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also belong to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Turkmenistan maintains its policy of permanent neutrality, while Tajikistan pursues distinct foreign policy and security priorities.

CONCLUSIONS:

Azerbaijan’s full inclusion in the Consultative Meeting represents not merely a symbolic expansion but a structural extension of Central Asian regional cooperation. The Awaza meeting on October 8 demonstrated that the expanded format could facilitate more practical cooperation on production chains, infrastructure, investment, energy corridors, digitalization, and environmental challenges.

However, the significance of the C6 format should not be overstated. It is neither a formal organization nor an alliance, and its participants retain their sovereignty and distinct foreign policy orientations. Its potential instead lies in providing a platform for political coordination among six states connected by the Caspian Sea and increasingly integrated through transport, energy, and investment corridors, enabling them to align their interests.

Azerbaijan’s first chairmanship in 2027 will provide an important test of the format’s potential. If Baku succeeds in translating the initiatives proposed at the Awaza meeting into concrete projects, the transition from C5 to C6 could mark a significant step towards broader regional cooperation across the Trans-Caspian region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr. Yunis Gurbanov is a Senior Adviser at the AIR Center in Baku and Lecturer at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of Azerbaijan. His research focuses on Eurasian geopolitics, regional security, connectivity, and political and economic cooperation across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the broader post-Soviet region.

By: Irakli Laitadze

On September 30, 2026, Marat Kambolov was inaugurated in Tskhinvali as South Ossetia’s new de facto “president”, following the “presidential election” of September 18. Representatives of Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and breakaway Abkhazia attended the ceremony. Georgia and the EU rejected the vote as illegitimate and without legal effect. The transition illustrates South Ossetia’s deepening political, security and economic integration with Russia. The election’s significance lies in the consolidation of an established trajectory. Kambolov’s career in Russian state institutions and rapid emergence within the de facto administration reflect the territory’s dependence on Moscow for political support, security and economic viability. For Georgia, this dependence poses a continuing challenge to sovereignty and national security. Regionally, South Ossetia remains a strategic foothold where Russian military power, unresolved territorial disputes, limited international oversight and vulnerabilities associated with informal cross-border activity intersect. 

BACKGROUND:

South Ossetia’s current status stems from the conflicts accompanying the Soviet Union’s dissolution and, particularly, the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war. Following that war, Moscow recognized South Ossetia as independent and established a permanent military presence. Georgia and the overwhelming majority of states continue to regard it as Georgian territory.

The political transition preceding the vote was revealing. Alan Gagloev, de facto “president” since 2022, resigned in June 2026 and subsequently became an adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kambolov, whose professional career was closely associated with Russian institutions, rapidly emerged as his successor. According to the announced results, Kambolov won 84.95 percent of the vote on turnout of 82.65 percent. Moscow welcomed his victory, while Kambolov emphasized strategic partnership with Russia and the welfare of South Ossetia’s population.

The transition coincided with further institutional integration. On May 9, 2026, Putin and Gagloev signed a Treaty on Deepening Allied Cooperation in Moscow. Building on the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the 2015 Treaty on Alliance and Integration, the agreement envisaged closer cooperation across multiple policy areas. The EU has criticized Russia’s incorporation of South Ossetia into its political, military, economic and judicial structures. 

South Ossetia also has a history of informal trade beyond conventional customs controls. Until its closure in 2004, the Ergneti market near Tskhinvali facilitated substantial trade among Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia, including smuggling of cigarettes, fuel and other goods. Reports also described trafficking in weapons and drugs and significant losses to Georgian state revenues. This history does not establish that contemporary South Ossetia is a centrally organized criminal hub. It does, however, illustrate the governance vulnerabilities associated with weak customs, judicial and law-enforcement arrangements.

IMPLICATIONS:

The election reinforces Russia’s influence over South Ossetia’s political institutions. Kambolov’s professional connections exemplify the close ties linking senior figures in the de facto administration to Russian institutions. Moscow can thus exercise decisive influence over defense, security and external relations without formally annexing the territory. South Ossetia retains nominal governmental institutions, providing Russia with many advantages of territorial control while avoiding the political consequences of formal incorporation.

For Georgia, the immediate implications are military and infrastructural. Russian forces retain a permanent foothold close to Georgia’s central regions and principal east–west transport arteries. The Roki Tunnel and Transcaucasian Highway connect South Ossetia with Russia, providing an important logistical route across the Caucasus. Kambolov has proposed additional tunnels and transport connections. If implemented, these projects could facilitate the movement of personnel, equipment and goods and deepen South Ossetia’s dependence on Russia.

South Ossetia’s location amplifies these risks. Georgia’s principal east–west highway (S1) and railway are integral to regional transport networks. At their closest points, the highway passes approximately 450–500 meters from the administrative boundary line (ABL), while the railway is within 1.3 kilometers. Russian Federal Security Service border guards and South Ossetian personnel operate along the boundary, and a serious security incident or deliberate disruption could interrupt Georgian passenger and freight movement and affect regional supply chains. 

Borderization remains another instrument of pressure. Since 2008, fences, barbed wire and other barriers have progressively hardened the ABL. These measures restrict movement and access to agricultural land, disrupt established routes and expose residents to detention, sometimes near poorly marked sections of the boundary. Georgian citizens continue to face unlawful detention by Russian and South Ossetian security personnel. Those responsible for the killing of Georgian citizen Tamaz Ginturi near the occupation line have not been brought to justice. Such incidents sustain insecurity without requiring another major military offensive.

The Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), co-facilitated by the European Union Monitoring Mission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, brings together Georgian, Russian and de facto South Ossetian representatives near the boundary. It provides a channel for dialogue and de-escalation but is neither a judicial institution nor a law-enforcement mechanism. Its limited mandate, together with restricted international access, constrains oversight and leaves important security and governance problems unresolved.

The regional implications are also significant. South Ossetia gives Moscow a military and political position within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders as the South Caucasus transport landscape evolves. The U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), alongside the Middle Corridor, could strengthen regional connections that bypass Russia. Nevertheless, Moscow’s presence in South Ossetia provides leverage over Georgia and potentially affects regional connectivity. That leverage is not unlimited: Turkey’s influence in Azerbaijan, U.S. engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the EU’s involvement in Armenia constrain Russia’s capacity to shape developments across the wider region.

Deepening institutional dependence also complicates conflict resolution. As Moscow and Tskhinvali become more closely integrated, the de facto authorities have less scope to negotiate independently. Russian influence has long been decisive in practice; successive treaties increasingly formalize that dependence. Russia’s direct political and military involvement thus remains central to the conflict’s dynamics and prospects for settlement.

The territory’s political future has domestic consequences for Georgia. Elections and proposals for referendums on independence or unification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation take place outside Georgia’s constitutional jurisdiction. They expose Tbilisi’s limited capacity to exercise authority over internationally recognized Georgian territory and intensify political pressure over the unresolved conflict. Any eventual incorporation into Russia would represent a further escalation, deepen Georgia’s strategic vulnerability and raise wider regional political and economic risks. For now, the election chiefly underscores the durability of a Russian-backed order that restricts Georgian sovereignty and perpetuates geopolitical fragmentation in the South Caucasus.

CONCLUSIONS:

The September 2026 “presidential election” in South Ossetia represents a further consolidation of Russia’s political and security influence over the territory rather than a change in its political direction. The growing institutional integration between Tskhinvali and Moscow reinforces South Ossetia’s dependence on Russia and further limits the prospects for conflict resolution.

For Georgia, these developments perpetuate significant security challenges. Russia’s military presence, continued borderization and expanding transport links with South Ossetia strengthen Moscow’s position without requiring formal annexation. The proximity of Georgia’s main east–west transport infrastructure to the administrative boundary line also creates vulnerabilities with potential consequences for regional connectivity.

The election further highlights the limitations of Georgia’s ability to influence developments in South Ossetia. The continued operation of institutions outside Tbilisi’s control, together with recurring proposals for unification with Russia, challenges Georgia’s territorial integrity and increases domestic political pressure. Any formal incorporation of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation would further undermine Georgia’s sovereignty and increase regional security risks.

Ultimately, the election reinforces an established political and security arrangement that consolidates Russian control, constrains Georgia’s sovereignty and perpetuates the unresolved conflict.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Irakli Laitadze is an Assistant Professor at Ilia State University (Tbilisi, Georgia) and Senior Fellow of the think-tank EU Awareness Centre (Brussels). He was previously a career diplomat, serving as a senior Counsellor in the Mission of Georgia to the EU and Director of the EU Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. After his diplomatic service, he was the CFO in GMT Hospitality and CEO of Publishing House Artanuji. He holds degrees from Tbilisi State University, the Diplomatic School of Madrid (Diploma), and Cambridge University (MBA), and a Ph.D. (Magna cum laude) from Tbilisi Free University. 

By: Stephen Blank 

Much has been written about the decline of Russian influence in Central Asia and the rising self-assertion of local governments. Most of this commentary focuses on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two richest and strongest states in Central Asia. However, the decline of Russia’s capacity for dominating Central Asia and local governments’ greater freedom of action has become equally visible to states like Tajikistan that are often overlooked. Dushanbe cannot and has not gone as far as Astana and Tashkent and frequently acts out of necessity as much as choice.  Nevertheless, the signs of its growing capacity and of Russia’s parallel decline are mounting. 

BACKGROUND:

Even though Tajikistan imported 91 percent of its petroleum products from Russia in the first half of 2026, it began importing Iranian oil in August because it cannot rely exclusively on continuing Russian supplies. Ukraine’s attacks on Russian refineries have forced Moscow to impose export restrictions that have rebounded on Central Asian countries like Tajikistan. Thus, while most of its energy imports originate in Russia, Tajikistan has had to risk falling afoul of U.S. sanctions on Iran to sustain its economy and other Central Asian states have also had to follow suit for the same reason.

This is far from the only example of Russia’s decline. Hitherto, Russia has been virtually the sole source of Central Asian militaries’ armaments. Now, due to the pressures imposed by the demands emanating from the war in Ukraine, foreign sanctions on components, and the lackluster performance of Russian weapons, that is no longer the case for all the Central Asian states. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have acquired India’s Akash air-defense system. Tajikistan has also purchased China’s HQ-17AE air defense systems, whereas Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also operate Chinese systems. 

These purchases of diverse and heterogeneous systems from multiple suppliers generate challenges of management and integration into a functioning whole. Nonetheless, they send an unmistakable message that Russia can no longer play an exclusive role as the sole regional security manager. In many cases, Russia will not be able to maintain supply chains or provide repairs to aging equipment, thus its ability to provide for Tajikistan’s security is obviously declining. 

This does not imply that Tajikistan can or will go as far as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have gone in diversifying their foreign policy options to enhance their actual sovereignty and independence. For example, Tajikistan, in an apparent effort to placate Russia, has begun the procedure for withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has indicted President Vladimir Putin for war crimes in the war against Ukraine. Indeed, when Putin visited Dushanbe in 2025, Tajikistan refused to arrest him. This led the ICC to find Tajikistan in breach of its obligations, leaving it no choice but to initiate the withdrawal.  In a contest between the ICC and Russia, Tajikistan obviously chose Russia.

IMPLICATIONS:

Nevertheless, Tajikistan has shown and will continue to show that it is responsive to international developments beyond Russia. Tajikistan’s Humo Bank warned its Russian clients that unless they visited one of its offices in Tajikistan and submitted to a biometric identification by September 30, their cards would be blocked starting on October 1.  Although Humo Bank cited the need to protect its clients from fraud; apparently the real reason was Western pressure operating through Visa Direct to threaten sanctions unless Humo Bank stopped allowing certain clients to use it to circumvent sanctions.  

Although Humo Bank operates in Tajikistan under license from the government; it is owned by the Japanese Investment holding firm, Gojo & Co, and is therefore vulnerable to Western pressure. However, what is interesting in this case is that Tajikistan acceded to that pressure targeting its Russian customers. 

Moreover, in this context Humo Bank was not the only bank that yielded to Western pressure. For example, Revolut Bank stopped accepting top-ups from credit cards issued in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for EU residents, claiming that payment systems had classified those countries as high-risk. Tajikistan took advantage of foreign pressure to limit Russian influence in its banking system. And it did so despite the fact that its economy depends to a great degree on remittances from Tajik migrant workers in Russia and the ensuing unimpeded flow of capital through Russian banks.

None of this suggests that Tajikistan can or will emulate the actions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in making extensive deals with Washington, Brussels, the Gulf states, and others. Tajikistan does not have these capabilities, nor will it attain them anytime soon. Its ability to play China off against Russia, and to balance other external actors against Moscow and Beijing, is much lower than that of Astana and Tashkent. 

Yet the decline of Russia’s capability in the economic as well as the military sector is both creating more space for independent action on Tajikistan’s part and the necessity for it to defend its own interests. Moreover, Russia’s decline has led other foreign actors, including Western banking and financial interests as well as Chinese and Indian defense exporters, to fill the ensuing vacuum created by Russia’s increasing incapacity.  

In cases where the costs to Tajikistan from striking at Russian interests outweigh the benefits it might gain, as in the example of the ICC, Dushanbe has refused to antagonize Moscow. This pattern is likely to continue for some time to come, especially since the situation in and around Afghanistan, which is a vital security interest of Tajikistan that it cannot manage by itself, becomes more precarious. However, as Tajikistan continues to work more cooperatively with other Central Asian and foreign governments, its ability to stand up for itself will grow.

CONCLUSIONS:

Increasingly the trends towards regional self-assertion and involvement with partners beyond Russia and China are becoming more prominent in Central Asia’s politics. The fact that this is occurring not only with regard to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but also in Tajikistan’s case suggests that these trends are putting down lasting roots.  Therefore, despite the imbalance of capabilities between Moscow and Dushanbe, we should expect to see more examples Central Asian including Tajik self-assertion. Yet we should also, based on the mounting constraints upon Russia, see more examples of its growing incapacity to enforce unilateral dominance over local governments.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.