By Farkhod Tolipov

In mid-December 2025, several Russian state-controlled media outlets spread a rumor that Russia could apply for membership in the Central Asian Community. This statement followed Azerbaijan’s entry into the regional grouping in November at the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent. The rumor reminded of Russia’s accession to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization in 2004, which led to the merger of that body with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community. Once again, Russia seeks to join the Central Asian Community, potentially worsening geopolitical tensions in the region.

BACKGROUND: Twenty years ago, in 2004, Russia applied for membership in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). At that time, the presidents of two key states, Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev of and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, were unable to refuse Moscow. This external membership in CACO eventually led to the organization’s collapse. One year after Russia’s admission, CACO was merged with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES) on the grounds that the two organizations duplicated each other. Uzbekistan withdrew from EvrAzES in 2008. The structure itself existed until 2014, and in 2015, it was replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Only two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are now members of the EAEU. 

In 2019, the Russian side suddenly announced that Uzbekistan could become a member of the EAEU. Uzbekistan never confirmed either its desire or the possibility of such membership but decided in December 2020 to become an observer in the EAEU. Since then, Moscow has constantly and officially reminded Uzbekistan that the EAEU is waiting. Recently, the President of Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko even stated that “we are looking forward to Uzbekistan’s membership in the EAEU.” Notably, such statements come only from Russia or Belarus; other EAEU states are not focused on this, and Uzbekistan does not show a strong interest in joining the organization.

Against this backdrop, two geopolitical issues cause concern in Moscow. First, without Uzbekistan in the EAEU, Central Asia cannot be brought under full Russian control. Second, the EAEU remains a very small entity, consisting of only five former Soviet republics. This limited composition does not support Russia’s image as a great power but, on the contrary, highlights its difficulty in asserting such a status.

It has become a tradition that the informal summits of the EAEU and the CIS are held in Saint Petersburg on the same days. On 22–23 December 2025, both events took place in the city. Reports on the CIS/EAEU summits were quite modest and contained no serious statements, except positive remarks about increased trade within the CIS/EAEU during the year. These largely symbolic events took place against the background of the war in Ukraine, which has dealt a serious blow to Moscow’s international reputation. In this context, Russia is using different means to preserve its influence in Central Asia while losing control over other parts of the former Soviet space.

IMPLICATIONS: Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev did not attend the EAEU summit, citing his country’s non-membership in the organization. He also did not travel to Saint Petersburg for the CIS summit, referring to his busy schedule. However, in November Azerbaijan became a full participant in the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia (CMHS).

Although Baku’s accession to the CMHS is assessed differently across the region, this expansion of the “C5” format into a “C6” is likely viewed in Moscow as a new challenge to Russia’s position in the region of the “stans.” This may explain the appearance of rumors that Russia could apply for membership in the CMHS. At the same time, the increasingly pro-Russian policies of all Central Asian states, whether genuine or aimed at avoiding Moscow’s displeasure, raise concerns that history may repeat itself and that the Central Asian Community could again open its doors to Russia.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev delivered a speech at the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council that resembled a statement from a full member. He described EAEU countries as “our strategic and natural partners.” According to the president, Uzbekistan actively participates in all key Eurasian formats. He also stated that “we believe it is necessary to strengthen coordination between the institutions of the CIS and the EAEU.”

Mirziyoyev highlighted several issues, including the elimination of trade barriers and the creation of an Uzbekistan–EAEU coordination group on tariff and non-tariff barriers; the development of industrial cooperation and the launch of joint projects in machinery, energy, agriculture, and the chemical sector; the digitalization of trade and customs administration; participation in EAEU technological platforms, from biomedicine and new materials to robotics; and the creation of a unified tourism space that would combine products of the Union’s member states.

Overall, the narrow, trade- and business-centered rhetoric surrounding the EAEU does not indicate the emergence of a shared regional identity among its member states, which is both a key condition for and an outcome of meaningful integration. In contrast, a broader vision of Central Asia, based on a natural sense of common identity among its peoples, is far stronger than a solely economic grouping of states. Indeed, the November summit of Central Asian leaders in Tashkent produced notable signs of deeper regional integration. In particular, it was announced that the CMHS format could be transformed into a Community of Central Asia (CCA).

Despite this major trend in Central Asia, the pro-Russian, or seemingly pro-Russian, policies of regional leaders may have a reverse effect and lead to a repetition of history, including a renewed Russian application for membership in the CCA for purely geopolitical reasons. In a recent and telling statement, Russia’s ambassador to Uzbekistan claimed that “Uzbekistan assured the Russian Federation that the era of the Great Game has passed into oblivion.” The remark suggests the opposite: the Great Game may be entering a new phase in which it is not Uzbekistan or other Central Asian states that shape geopolitical rivalry, but Russia itself, which continues to view the region through the lens of great-power competition. Throughout its independence, Uzbekistan has sought to avoid geopolitical entanglements. Therefore, if assurances about the end of geopolitical games are needed, they should come from great powers themselves, rather than from Central Asian states.

Moscow may believe that Russia’s membership in CAC would signal the end of the Great Game, whereas in reality it would represent yet another expression of Russia’s enduring geopolitical modus vivendi.

CONCLUSIONS: Central Asia is entering a new round of the geopolitical Great Game, and this game is being driven primarily by Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, this outcome is hardly surprising. Moscow’s foreign policy and its broader international behavior are clearly dominated by geopolitical considerations.

At present, one can observe the emergence of two opposing geopolitical configurations, the “Eurasian Five” of the Eurasian community versus the “Central Asian Six” of the Central Asian Community. The paradox of this dual trend, however, is that two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are members of both EAEU and CAC.

In 2004, Russia’s accession to CACO distorted, weakened, and ultimately destroyed the organization and the broader process of integration among the five Central Asian states. As a result, regional integration was halted for a decade and revived only in 2017. Integration in Central Asia is a distinct phenomenon: from the outset, it has been shaped in part to avoid geopolitical entanglements. By its nature, Central Asian integration cannot include any major power, regardless of which one it is, because such inclusion would inevitably introduce a dimension of geopolitical competition into the integration process.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge Caravan”) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

By Robert M. Cutler

In late December 2025, Armenia’s Central Election Commission pointed to June 7, 2026, as the likely date for parliamentary elections, implicitly tightening the timetable for any referendum linked to the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. With the text initialed but unsigned, Yerevan and Baku face steps towards ratification, slowly continuing border demarcation work, and interim arrangements. Russia, Turkey, and Iran are signaling their interests, but Armenia’s domestic politics will be decisive for the treaty’s signature and entry into force, and for the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

Credit: Shutterstock

BACKGROUND: Early in 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan moved the peace process beyond a notional document toward a text whose core provisions are settled. On March 13, 2025, the two foreign ministries publicly stated that they had concluded negotiations on the draft “Agreement on Peace and the Establishment of Interstate Relations.” At the same time, Azerbaijan framed its signature as contingent on changes to Armenia’s constitution. 

While the March 2025 step did not produce an immediate signature, it shifted the process from drafting to preconditions and sequencing. Whereas Baku treats language in the preamble to Armenia’s constitution as a territorial claim, Yerevan rejects that interpretation, pointing to the possibility of a constitutional referendum without setting a definite timeline. The draft also contains language that would bar deployment of third-country personnel along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. That provision bears directly on any monitoring presence near the frontier and, more broadly, on how the parties intend to manage security before demarcation is complete.

On August 8, 2025, the process advanced again in Washington. The parties initialed the text, and on August 11, Armenia published the full draft by mutual agreement. This U.S.-brokered step still stopped short of formal signature. The published text is explicit on several foundational points: it affirms mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis that former Soviet administrative borders become international borders; it renounces territorial claims; and it bars the use or threat of force as well as the use of each party’s territory by a third party for force against the other.

The draft also specifies the intended machinery for implementation. Diplomatic relations are to be established within a specified number of days after completion of ratification, although the published draft leaves that number blank. Border commissions are tasked to negotiate a separate delimitation and demarcation agreement. In the interim, the parties commit not to deploy third-party forces along the border and to adopt mutually agreed confidence-building measures pending demarcation. Additional “modalities” to be negotiated later include the detailed handling of missing persons and the working rules for the bilateral commission that is meant to oversee implementation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Armenia’s domestic political timetable has become a binding constraint on the pace and sequencing of decisions. On December 24, 2025, Armenpress reported that the chairman of the Central Election Commission said that June 7, 2026, was widely regarded as the likely election day, although a presidential decree had not yet been issued. That prospective date matters because Azerbaijan’s constitutional precondition points toward a referendum route in Armenia, while the treaty text itself anticipates domestic procedures and ratification steps before it can take effect. As of January 2026, the agreement’s core commitments are public and the text has been initialed, but signature and operational implementation still depend on how Yerevan and Baku sequence domestic legal assurances, border-related work, and interim security arrangements.

The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework stipulates that the route remains Armenian sovereign territory, while granting the U.S. exclusive development rights for 99 years. Washington would presumably pay Yerevan for the lease, with the land sub-leased to an Armenian-U.S. joint venture that would serve as the operator, holding a long-term mandate to construct and manage rail, road, pipelines, and fiber-optic infrastructure along the approximately 25 miles of Armenian territory linking Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. The U.S. might potentially deploy limited security personnel to ensure corridor security, but official texts remain vague on any on-the-ground presence. 

The peace text, as well as official Armenian statements, emphasize that the route is to be operated under Armenian law, with Yerevan retaining jurisdiction and administrative control. That emphasis, which is intended to foreclose putative concerns about extraterritorial claims by Azerbaijan, is necessary to placate and manage domestic and diaspora opinion. However, the framework agreement does not resolve key practical questions, including customs and border management details such as who stamps cargo, how fees are shared, and whether streamlined or special customs procedures will apply.

At this stage, the issue is less about drafting than durability. If the corridor arrangement proceeds under a 99-year U.S. development right, regional capitals will treat it as a strategic marker as well as a transport project. Moscow will judge it against its South Caucasus position; Tehran will weigh it against its red lines on transit and foreign presence; Ankara and Brussels will look for leverage on connectivity and standards. In Armenia, the sovereignty formula will be measured against day-to-day control at the route. Those pressures will shape prospects more than the text itself.

The attitudes of the three major regional players – Russia, Turkey, and Iran – are important conditioning factors, but none seems willing and able to block a peace deal definitively. For example, Moscow publicly welcomed the U.S.-brokered step but also warned that involvement by “non-regional players” should not create new divisions. Russia’s core attitude appears to be conditional acceptance of a peace text, paired with resistance to a long-duration U.S. operational footprint in a sensitive strip of Armenia. The warning language is less about the agreement’s existence than about who institutionalizes it and who physically manages it. A predictable Russian preference is that any corridor implementation be folded back into regionally branded formats. Indirect Russian-linked participation remains structurally available because a subsidiary of Russian Railways holds a concession to manage Armenia’s railway network.

Iran ostensibly welcomes the peace while warning against foreign “intervention” near its borders. Its attitude thus refuses to tolerate any outcome that looks like a change in the geopolitical configuration around Armenia’s southern border. Iranian commentary has linked the TRIPP specifically to concerns about a NATO-adjacent presence on the border. A senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader used escalatory deterrent rhetoric portraying the corridor concept as unacceptable and explicitly threatened to prevent “geopolitical changes.” Tehran’s interests are actually best served by a re-ignition of the conflict and the economic impoverishment of the Armenian population, both of which would decrease Yerevan’s autonomy and open for enhanced Iranian influence. Yet of course, it cannot say this out loud. Tehran’s lacks any actual capacity for vetoing the agreement but can exercise coercive signaling through military exercises, political warnings, and pressure through regional alignments.

Turkey strongly favors any route that de-isolates Nakhchivan, welcoming the corridor concept as a gain for strategic connectivity linking Europe to Asia via Turkey. However, despite its conditional welcome of a U.S.-anchored commercial structure, Ankara still wants the region’s political center of gravity to remain in the Ankara–Baku axis rather than shifting to Washington as the indispensable actor. A commercially functioning route will accelerate Turkey’s own normalization goals with Armenia, which are explicitly tied to an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty outcome. In late December 2025, Armenia and Turkey implemented a limited but concrete confidence step on visa procedures for certain official passport holders, effective January 1, 2026. Turkey will want a formula that works for Armenia, because a route that triggers prolonged Armenian internal instability would not be in Turkish interests.

CONCLUSIONS: To summarize, Russia would like to keep the process “regionalizable” and resist a precedent of long-term U.S. operating control, while Iran will treat optics as substance, especially regarding anything that looks like foreign security infrastructure adjacent to Iran’s border. Turkey’s attitude is broadly enabling, because the route advances Ankara’s connectivity vision and strengthens its ties with Azerbaijan. The evolution of domestic Armenian politics, however, is what will really determine the outcome: whether Pashinyan’s forces receive a majority of seats in the June parliamentary election, and whether a subsequent referendum will approve the necessary change in Armenia’s constitution.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a senior researcher at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

By Svante E. Cornell

In October 2025, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) convened a pivotal summit in Gabala, Azerbaijan, demonstrating its emergence as a significant geopolitical entity in the Eurasian landscape. During the summit, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized the OTS's evolution into a key geopolitical center, while Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev referred to it as an authoritative structure uniting Turkic populations. This marked a critical juncture in the organization’s development, solidifying its influence in a region that links the Mediterranean to Central Asia. 



                                                            Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The level of interest in Turkic cooperation has diverged over time and among the Turkic states. Some, like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, have consistently been enthusiastic participants. Türkiye, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, have seen fluctuations in their enthusiasm. It is mainly in the last 7 to 8 years that a consensus has developed on the importance of Turkic cooperation.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev in the late 2000s proposed the creation of a Council of Turkic-speaking States, which was formed in 2009. Twelve years later, it was turned into a formal inter-state organization, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

Up until recently, the intensification of cooperation among Turkic states was focused on non-security areas. Still, the OTS provided a platform where individual member states developed dialogue on security issues in both bilateral and trilateral formats. Thus, in parallel with the intensification of OTS activities, there has been a parallel rise in security, intelligence, and defense agreements among members of the organization.

Two types of formats can be seen in the growing security cooperation within the Turkic world. A first, not surprisingly, involves Türkiye’s bilateral security ties with other Turkic states. Importantly, however, a second format involves cooperation among those other states themselves, without Turkish participation.

The first type of format involves the growing Turkish engagement with Azerbaijan and the Turkic states of Central Asia. A key step was the formation of a defense treaty between Türkiye and Azerbaijan in the shape of the Shusha Declaration of June 2021, the same year OTS was created. The Shusha Declaration followed on the decisive role of Türkiye in supporting Azerbaijan in the 2020 Second Karabakh War. That, in turn, followed upon Türkiye’s active involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, where Ankara actively sided against Moscow-supported proxy forces; had a decisive impact on the outcome of the conflict; and managed to do so while maintaining a functional, if transactional, relationship with Moscow. There is no question that this was duly noted in Central Asian capitals and made a security and defense relationship with Türkiye increasingly attractive for the Turkic states of Central Asia.

In fact, Türkiye stands out among external powers in the region as it has shown a willingness and ability to engage across the spheres of security, intelligence, and defense (where Europe and the U.S. have generally been absent, with the notable exception of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program).  As Richard Outzen put it, all Turkic states of Central Asia are at one point or another in the process of developing “military education exchanges, training and exercises, a broader range of equipment and defense technologies, and, perhaps most importantly, development of common doctrine and operational approaches” with Türkiye.

While Azerbaijan has reached the level of near-complete integration with Türkiye, other states are at less advanced stages of the process. They may not desire the same level of military integration with Türkiye as Azerbaijan does, but all are intensifying exchanges with Ankara. Kazakhstan began to expand military ties with Türkiye in 2020 when it signed an agreement for joint defense and industrial projects. That was followed by a protocol for intelligence cooperation in 2022, as well as an enhanced strategic partnership. Kazakhstan purchased Turkish UAVs and now holds a license to produce them in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan also started its process of deepening military ties with Türkiye. In 2022, the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement on intelligence cooperation, as well as training and logistics. In November of that year, a further agreement included military education and defense industrial cooperation. As for Kyrgyzstan, it has purchased several types of Turkish UAVs, including TB-2 Bayraktar drones. Turkmenistan has also purchased Bayraktar drones. In late December 2023, Turkmenistan’s top leadership welcomed leaders of Türkiye’s largest defense industrial companies and publicly spoke of the potential role of these firms – and Türkiye – in helping Turkmenistan strengthen its defense capabilities.

As noted, not all security and defense cooperation involves Türkiye. On a bilateral level, security and defense cooperation has grown rapidly involving Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and most recently Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. These three states have all raised their respective sets of bilateral relations to the level of allied relations, including through the formation of “Supreme Interstate Councils” for inter-state coordination on a government level. In the defense sphere, cooperation has developed through military exchanges, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and the development of the defense industry.

Until recently, it was obvious that the development of Turkic Cooperation under the Organization of Turkic States served as a catalyst for the myriad of bilateral agreements in the security and military field. Yet formally, while OTS member states have discussed holding security consultations and developing a common stance on security issues ever since the Turkic Council’s Almaty Summit in 2011, defense and security cooperation remained outside the purview of the OTS. This has nevertheless begun to change as the OTS has more recently taken steps to expand into the security field. 

IMPLICATIONS: The OTS’s organizational move into the field of security and defense dates to the summit in Samarkand in 2022. The member states “went beyond consultations by adding a new dimension to their security cooperation ... they called for closer cooperation and military collaboration in the defense industry.”

Similarly, at the following summit in Astana in November 2023, the final communiqué called for “closer cooperation in the field of defense industry and military collaboration.” At the summit, a key advocate for the intensification of military cooperation was Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who stressed during his speech that “the main guarantor of security becomes defense potential” in the developing security situation and that he “believe[s] that cooperation between the member states in areas such as security, defense, and the defense industry should be further increased.”  Following his re-election in 2024, Aliyev subsequently declared that the OTS was the main vector in Azerbaijani foreign policy.

The eleventh summit in Kyrgyzstan in 2024 focused on the adoption of a “Charter for the Turkic World” which did not specifically go into matters relating to security and defense. Still, a seed was planted: the charter includes language that “the Turkic people will strive together to prevent any actions and threats aimed at undermining their unity, solidarity, and dignity.”  While far from a mutual defense clause, it is reminiscent of how the EU adopted a solidarity clause before moving to the mutual defense clause adopted with the EU’s Lisbon treaty. At this summit as well, Aliyev repeated his earlier call, saying, “Given the growing global threats, our cooperation in defense, security, and the defense industry is of tremendous importance.”

In July 2025, the first meeting of the heads of defense industries of the Turkic states was held in Istanbul, under the banner of the OTS. The meeting mainly served to take stock of existing bilateral cooperation programs and to plan for multilateral cooperation in the future. Azerbaijan has offered to host a second meeting in 2026.

The 2025 OTS Summit in Gabala, Azerbaijan, proved a turning point. The theme for the summit was “Regional Peace and Security,” indicating the organization’s more open embrace of security issues. The leading section of the summit’s declaration focused on security issues and particularly put forward the objective of signing a “Treaty on Strategic Partnership, Eternal Friendship, and Brotherhood of Turkic States.” While not included in the formal communiqué of the summit, Azerbaijan offered to host the first military exercises under the banner of the OTS.

CONCLUSION: It is clear that, in the past few years, the OTS has been rapidly expanding its purview into the security area, defense industrial cooperation, and military coordination.  It remains to be seen whether the OTS will transform into a formal alliance, as seems to be the intent of at least several of the member states. What is clear is that the OTS has turned into a vehicle for regional middle powers – specifically Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan – to work to fill the security vacuum that has plagued the heart of Eurasia over the past three decades. That vacuum has been the result of the weakness of internal security arrangements in the region, as well as the prevalence of security arrangements dominated by external actors, such as Russia’s CSTO. While Türkiye is prominent among the OTS member states due to its military capabilities and the size of its economy, it is clear that the Turkic “middle powers” have been at least as forceful as Türkiye in driving the rise of Turkic cooperation. 

Turkic cooperation is expanding and intensifying so rapidly that it can no longer be ignored. In many ways, the expansion of Turkic cooperation is directly in line with American and European policy objectives in Central Asia and the Caucasus. OTS activities are largely complementary to Western policies, while also filling voids that Western powers themselves have proven unwilling or unable to fill. For both the EU and the United States, the role of the OTS in maintaining a balanced international environment in Greater Central Asia has become significant enough that the factors limiting Western engagement with the OTS should not obscure the clear alignment of interests that is at play.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. 

By Farkhod Tolipov

On November 14-15, 2025, the 7th Consultative Meeting of Heads of States (CMHS) of Central Asia took place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The meeting constituted a milestone in the 34 years of Central Asia integration since 1991. Long-awaited signs of institutionalization of this process emerged alongside the decision to grant Azerbaijan membership in this regional format. This was the hitherto most consequential CMHS, giving rise to potentially serious implications concerning the further evolution of Central Asian regionalism and its geopolitical implications. 



                                                       Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoev initiated the format of CMHS of Central Asia in 2017; and six meetings have been held since. This new format was introduced after almost 10 years of “frozen” integration from 2006 to 2016, during which the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, maintained mostly bilateral relations.

Regional integration, which had seen some progress between 1991 and 2005, was interrupted due to the merger of the regional structure Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES) after Russia joined CACO. Central Asian states could not restore their own regional structure until 2018 when the first Consultative Meeting was held in Astana, Kazakhstan. Five consecutive meetings took place in Tashkent, November 2019; in Avaza, Turkmenistan, August 2021; in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, July 2022; in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, September 2023; and in Astana, August 2024.

The CMHS has had a controversial dual effect. They consistently demonstrated seemingly resolute political will to strengthen and advance regional cooperation, while at the same time the participating presidents persistently refrained from rhetorical commitments to integration – perhaps out of concern that stronger integration could undermine their sovereignty. The regional cooperation/integration dilemma has thus constrained strategic choices and visions for the future.

In particular, this tendency was reflected during the 6th CMHS when the presidents adopted the Conception of Regional Cooperation “Central Asia-2040” which does not envisage integration at all. Yet the 7th Meeting included steps towards the establishment of institutions pertinent to a full-fledged regional organization. Although the presidents still avoid speaking in terms of real integration, they decided on four important issues: the creation of a permanent Secretariat; renaming the CMHS “Central Asian Community”; raising the status of National Coordinators of Consultative Meetings to Special Representatives of Heads of States; and adopting the Conception of Regional Security based on the Catalog of Risks.

However, the most controversial decision was the admission of Azerbaijan to the “C5” structure.

IMPLICATIONS: The first institutional forms of regional integration in Central Asia were set up in the 1990s. At that time, institutions such as the Council of Heads of States, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Councils were created, and attempts were even made to establish a Central Asian parliament. Central Asian leaders now make efforts to revitalize the initial integration process, albeit without articulating the very concept of “integration.”

The preceding six CMHS have yielded important experiences in terms of maintaining the impulse and rhetoric of regionalism as such. Moreover, the CMHS not only reintroduced the regional format of cooperation but also stipulated a geopolitical recalibration in and around Central Asia. One manifestation of this is the proliferation of so-called “C5+1” formats which reflected, among other things, the emerging regional order in Central Asia.

It was expected that Uzbekistan, as the initiator of CMHS and chair of the 7th Meeting in Tashkent, would push the pro-integration agenda forward. This intention appeared successful. Renaming the regional format the Central Asian Community (CAC) associates with the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) which functioned between 1994 and 2000. The successful operation of CAEC led the overall process of creating CACO. Hopefully, CAC can also promote stronger political unity among the states concerned. However, the new name must signify not only a positive disposition but also the real new political status of this community of five states. The “old” challenges remain in this “new” stage when it comes to their constantly repeated mantra about conducting common foreign policy concerning key international and regional issues.

A significant decision in this regard was taken regarding the Concept of regional security and stability as well as the Catalogue of security risks in Central Asia and measures to address them for 2026-2028. The idea of establishing a regional security architecture was articulated also in the previous CMHS. This is, indeed, a very crucial strategic task to be addressed urgently, requiring coordination of foreign policies. The content of the Catalogue clarifies what these risks are and how the regional security system will be created. Indeed, since Central Asian states have strategic partnership agreements and alliance relationships with each other, now is the time to test them by agreeing on the Catalogue to address regional security challenges.

Mirziyoev also proposed another, normative, idea: “based on our values and traditions of public diplomacy, we believe it would be appropriate to create a Council of Elders consisting of renowned public figures with extensive life experience. We believe this will contribute to generational continuity in our countries, as well as to strengthening regional solidarity and identity.” This message points to the importance of a common regional identity for the peoples of Central Asia. It was a call to engage citizens in regional integration and bring this process to the broader public. Indeed, broader involvement of civil society in regional integration has hitherto been lacking and this was a signal to the Central Asian public to contribute to making the region a real community.

In Tashkent, the five presidents were accompanied by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev. The summit adopted the decision to admit Azerbaijan into the Central Asian structure, which gave rise to a number of questions regarding the transformation of the five-lateral CMHS format into a six-lateral one and producing an equation with one unknown variable. Azerbaijan is a South Caucasian state, not a Central Asian one. How this seemingly bi-regional format will evolve in terms of future integration remains to be seen.

Uzbekistan’s former foreign minister Abdulaziz Komilov noted in an interview that Azerbaijan joining the CMHS as a member created a new geopolitical reality. The admission of Russia into CACO in 2004 was fatal for this organization and destroyed it. Azerbaijan, in contrast, is not an imperial state and does not have hegemonic ambitions. Azerbaijan’s membership in CMHS coincides with the transformation of this format into CAC.

Azerbaijan already has close relations to Central Asian states; together with Azerbaijan, four Central Asian states (excluding Tajikistan) are members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Azerbaijan is also a geopolitically experienced state and can in many respects pose a good example for Central Asians. At the same time, its membership in CMHS can profoundly impact the regional integration process. Whether Baku can play a special geopolitical role in Central Asia depends on its ability to contribute to what Central Asians have so far lacked in their regional and international actions – a single agency in the international system. The extent to which they will be able to achieve this together with Azerbaijan remains an open question.

The Tashkent summit also gave rise to another surge of criticism in Russian media and analytical circles. Especially Azerbaijan’s intensified participation in Central Asian regional affairs was described as a cause for concern and as concealing a pro-Western geopolitical design.

CONCLUSIONS: Previous CMHS have produced several positive statements and documents. The time has now come to address crucial practical questions regarding the new institutional structures agreed upon. Determining the actual content of the Catalog of Risks is an important issue. So is the status of the newly instituted high-ranking Special Representatives, and whether they will become more visible and engage with the broader public. Stronger visibility will undoubtedly motivate broader public engagement and thereby add more dynamism to the integration process. Another important issue is whether the Secretariat will be a transparent structure. It should avoid the risks of becoming overly bureaucratic and becoming preoccupied with the narrow interest in maintaining national sovereignty at all costs.

It also remains to be seen whether Azerbaijan’s membership is only eclectic – a mechanical expansion for the sake of showcasing regionalism; or a strategic enlargement based on a long-term and well calculated decision for the sake of confronting a new round of geopolitical challenges.

The Central Asian five-lateral format will experience a new round of geopolitical challenges related to great power rivalry in and around this region, especially in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine; the diversification of international transport and other connectivity in Central Asian states; and the rising profile of Central Asia in terms of its strategic autonomy in the international system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge Caravan”) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

By Anna Gevorgyan

The foreign and security architecture of Armenia has been largely shaped by the transformations of the role and capacity of regional actors after the 2020 Second Karabakh War. Russia’s continuing weakness due to its invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s growing role in the region, and Iran’s increasing vulnerability due to security challenges and economic crisis have been the key drivers shaping regional developments. At the global level, the US's growing interest in involvement in regional affairs has become another important feature in Armenia’s future.

Read Crossroads of Uncertainty