By John DiPIrro

The Central Asia and Caucasus Institute’s proposed ‘American Strategy for Greater Central Asia’ (ASGCA) offers a timely recalibration of US engagement, centering on sovereignty, investment and regional interconnectivity. It challenges those of us steeped in democracy and governance work – that is, human rights, transparency, rule of law and institutional reform – to look beyond the normative ideals and confront the hard, often uncomfortable realities of power politics. It offers a serious and rare opportunity for the United States to redefine its role in a region that remains strategically vital and capitalize on a fleeting window of geopolitical advantage. Yet, without a robust policy of Russian containment, the strategy misses a key opportunity. To be effective, the US must help solidify a regional bulwark capable of resisting Russian military, economic and ideological coercion, while cultivating durable, mutually beneficial partnerships

BACKGROUND: For decades, U.S. engagement with Central Asia rested on flawed assumptions that development assistance, conditioned on commitments to democratic reform, would gradually yield stable, pro-Western partners. In reality, democratic reforms were largely performative and cosmetic, designed to appease U.S. interlocutors and secure continued funding. Russia and China, by contrast, offered a far more attractive alternative to Central Asian elites, including security guarantees, regime support, non-interference in internal affairs and tacit acceptance of corruption. These partnerships came with fewer conditions, demanding only loyalty.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. promise of prosperity through democratic transformation remained abstract and unconvincing in the face of authoritarian realpolitik. Even reformist leaders or color revolutions were quickly co-opted or violently displaced. In private, many regional elites sought a different offer: security, investment and recognition of sovereignty…without the "democracy business." Beijing and Moscow responded with infrastructure development and military cooperation, creating entrenched dependencies.

The Trump administration’s pivot toward transactional diplomacy that prioritizes economic and security partnerships over ideological demands has opened a window of opportunity to recalibrate U.S. engagement on terms regional governments find more palatable. Washington cannot and should not replicate the corrupt bargains offered by authoritarian powers, but it can offer something categorically superior: access to global markets, cutting-edge technologies, diversified security cooperation and entry into a predictable, rules-based order. This model, though imperfect, offers autonomy without the coercion, instability and dependency imposed by Moscow or Beijing. A pragmatic U.S. strategy grounded in sovereignty, prosperity and alignment could finally forge resilient and durable partnerships.

Meanwhile, Central Asia’s younger, urban, and globally connected populations are increasingly disillusioned with both domestic authoritarianism and foreign exploitation. Nationalist and pro-sovereignty sentiment has surged, particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its denial of Central Asian sovereignty and its mobilization of ethnic minorities into the Russian war effort have further fueled this backlash. Many citizens across the region have grown tired of being pawns in great-power rivalries.

It is within this context that the ASGCA represents a meaningful shift. By acknowledging regional priorities and accepting transactional diplomacy, it replaces Western idealism with strategic realism. ASGCA’s central innovation is its proposal to view these states not as isolated, vulnerable peripheries, but as a potential collective bloc, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan at its core, and Afghanistan, Mongolia and the South Caucasus anchoring each end. This corridor would align sovereign interests with US strategic goals and offer three critical advantages:

• Strategically, it would anchor a contiguous bloc that counters the Russia-China-Iran axis and dilutes their regional influence.
• Economically, it would unlock immense investment opportunities, from critical minerals and renewable energy, to trade corridors like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), bypassing Russian chokepoints and providing an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• In terms of security, it would foster regional self-sufficiency in counterterrorism, border control and internal stability, thereby reducing the need for US military presence. This feature aligns with both American and regional preferences.

Yet, ASGCA’s vision omits a crucial dimension. Without an explicit strategy for containing Russian influence, the project risks being strategically incoherent.

IMPLICATIONS:  While international law affirms Russia’s 1991 borders,[1] the Kremlin’s own doctrine tells another story. The Russkiy Mir (Russian World) ideology, a cornerstone of Moscow’s aggressive expansionism, asserts a transnational Russian civilization that overrides international borders whenever it is politically expedient. Russia’s borders, in its own eyes, end only where they are met with sufficient resistance. This has become painfully clear since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale war on Ukraine. The Kremlin’s disregard for sovereignty is not the exception: it is policy. This is why any peace settlement in Ukraine is likely to be tactical, not transformational. Moscow will use the opportunity to rearm and resume aggression when conditions are more favorable. As such, the West cannot afford another cycle of accommodation and illusion. A sustainable US strategy must empower regional actors to deter Russian pressure without direct American military deployment.

For this reason, any effort to unify and empower Greater Central Asia must explicitly incorporate Russian containment. By systematically investing in the region’s defense capabilities, economic integration and institutional resilience, the US can help Central Asia and the South Caucasus form a cohesive bloc capable of withstanding Russian pressure. These nations offer unique strategic value, including deep familiarity with Russian tactics, a pragmatic understanding of hard power and a growing desire to pursue independent paths. Unlike Western policymakers who often misread Moscow through a liberal, rational-actor lens, Central Asians and Caucasians harbor no such illusions, fully recognizing the necessity of strength and self-reliance.

Six reasons underscore this imperative.

First, without containment, sovereignty will remain fragile. Russian influence is not limited to tanks and troops. It manifests itself in cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, political subversion, cultural hegemony, economic blackmail and manipulation of ethnic minorities. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s rhetoric about “protecting Russians abroad” has stoked deep anxieties among political elites. In Armenia, Moscow’s failure to intervene during the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive exposed the hollowness of its security guarantees. If Greater Central Asia is to be more than a vision, it must be hardened against the hybrid Russian threats from the outset.

Second, containment is a precondition for regional integration. The Middle Corridor, a central component of ASGCA’s economic vision, cannot function without security. However, these corridors remain vulnerable to disruption without regional security guarantees. Russian influence over rail, road and energy infrastructure, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, makes any ambitious transit strategy susceptible to sabotage or political manipulation. A concerted effort to reduce Russian leverage is essential to ensuring the viability of east-west connectivity.

Third, Russia exploits regional divisions. Moscow excels at divide-and-rule tactics. It amplifies nationalist tensions, exacerbates border disputes and fuels distrust between neighbors. The longstanding water and border tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are fertile ground for Russian interference. A Greater Central Asia bloc must prioritize coordinated responses to hybrid threats, including joint intelligence sharing, cybersecurity collaboration and counter-disinformation mechanisms. Containment is not just a military goal. It is the precondition for durable regional unity. Geographically, this effort should concentrate along Russia’s southern flank, with the support of Turkey, India, Pakistan and the United States.

Fourth, U.S. credibility depends on strategic clarity and continuity. In Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the West’s failure to provide hard security guarantees has had devastating consequences. Central Asian states have taken note. U.S. commitments must be unambiguous and they must endure beyond election cycles. If Washington abandons this strategy after four years, it will validate Russian and Chinese narratives about American unreliability and drive regional partners back into the arms of Moscow and Beijing.

Fifth, containment can be achieved without escalation. A containment strategy does not require US troops on the ground. Instead, it must empower local states to serve as their own first line of defense, resilient enough to resist Russian coercion. This includes arms transfers, defense cooperation, cybersecurity partnerships, sanctions enforcement and media resilience. It also means supporting sovereign decision-making and reducing dependence on Russian economic systems. Containment, if done smartly, is a stabilizing force, not a destabilizing one.

Sixth, a containment strategy accelerates the end of the Ukraine war. Central Asia and the South Caucasus are critical nodes in Russia’s sanctions evasion networks. Enforcing export controls, cutting off trans-shipment of dual-use goods and closing legal loopholes in countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia and Georgia would severely disrupt Russia’s war economy, hasten its operational exhaustion and enable a faster, more favorable resolution to the conflict. Building a coalition of states committed to rejecting Russian revisionism not only weakens the Kremlin. It also creates the conditions for an eventual peace on Ukrainian terms.