KARZAI AND NATO: A PARTING OF WAYS?
Rumors are rife that the Obama administration and its European allies have concluded that Afghan President Hamid Karzai lacks the will or ability to address Afghanistan’s critical problems—including corruption, narco-terrorism, and a debilitating insurgency that has prevented Karzai’s regime from exercising much political authority in the provinces. Sensing growing allied dissatisfaction, Karzai has been seeking to deepen his ties with Moscow. Russian policy makers have been reciprocating Karzai’s overtures while keeping open the option of exploiting NATO’s weak position in Afghanistan to bargain for allied concessions regarding Georgia and other matters.
BACKGROUND: NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave vent to NATO’s frustrations with the Afghan government in a scathing commentary published in The Washington Post on January 18. De Hoop Scheffer blasted the Karzai administration’s alleged corruption and mismanagement for fueling the Afghan insurgency: “The basic problem in Afghanistan is not too much Taliban; it's too little good governance,” he wrote. “Afghans need a government that deserves their loyalty and trust; when they have it, the oxygen will be sucked away from the insurgency.” Alluding to Karzai’s dependence on local warlords and regional drug kingpins, de Hoop Scheffer cautioned that NATO’s patience with the regime was reaching its limits: “we have paid enough, in blood and treasure, to demand that the Afghan government take more concrete and vigorous action to root out corruption and increase efficiency, even where that means difficult political choices.”
In a speech to the Afghan national parliament a few days later, Karzai responded by faulting NATO for waging the war against the Taliban poorly. He accused the allies of failing to address the rampant narcotics trafficking in the provinces and for employing tactics that have led to excessive civilian casualties. The President stated that he had submitted draft agreements to NATO and the United States that would allow the Afghan government to exert more control over foreign military activities in Afghanistan. Karzai also blamed Afghan corruption on the misadministration of the billions of dollars of international aid by foreign donors: “If we can stop this kind of corruption, God willing, our administration will soon become free from corruption.”
In the past, senior members of the Obama administration have been very critical of Karzai. Vice President Joseph Biden became infamous in Kabul last year after he abruptly ended a dinner in the presidential palace after he concluded that Karzai was concealing the extent of corruption within the Afghan government. In a written statement at her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described Afghanistan as a “narco-state” that was “plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption.” In his past writings, newly appointed Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke has lacerated the Afghan government for its “massive, officially sanctioned corruption” and its failure to stem the country’s drug trade.
In his February 8 address to the Munich Security Conference, Karzai insisted that Afghanistan had made much progress under his leadership, especially in the area of providing greater public services. He denied that his country had become a “failed” or “narco” state. Karzai also explicitly called for direct negotiations with those members of the Taliban unaffiliated with al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks that accept the current post-Taliban Afghan constitution. “And,” he added, “I would request the international community to back us in this—fully.”
IMPLICATIONS: Karzai’s statement might be seen as an overture to Obama and Holbrooke, the latter having made his reputation in the Balkans through such diplomatic initiatives. Yet, some of the American officials at Munich spoke of a “reality gap” between Karzai's glowing depiction and Afghanistan’s bleak reality. A recent survey of Afghan opinion shows growing dissatisfaction with their country’s situation. Karzai’s slipping popularity is encouraging influential challengers in the August 2009 presidential elections to hope they might gain tacit backing in Washington and Europe.
Sensing an opening, the Russian government has been directly wooing the Afghan leader by offering him military supplies and other assistance. Karzai has shown interest in developing relations with Moscow, especially since many NATO governments have begun citing his misrule for their difficulties in Afghanistan. According to Russian sources, Karzai had initiated the request for Russian military aid last year. At a ceremony in January 2009 at Afghanistan’s National Military Academy, Karzai boasted to the graduating cadets that, “I told America and the world to give us aircraft—otherwise we will get them from the other place!”
To enhance Moscow’s leverage in Kabul, Russian officials have vigorously shored up support among Central Asian governments. President Dmitry Medvedev has made repeated trips to the former Soviet republics in the region. During his January visit to Tashkent, Medvedev described Russian-Uzbek relations as a “strategic partnership and alliance,” adding that the two governments collaborate closely on Afghanistan since both consider that country’s fate to be of “exceptional importance.”
Russian officials have also sought to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, China, and four Central Asian countries (excluding only Turkmenistan), as an instrument of influence in Afghanistan. The SCO has established a working group on Afghanistan and has invited Karzai to attend its recent annual leadership summits. On January 14, SCO deputy foreign ministers met in Moscow and announced plans to convene a special conference in the first half of 2009 on Afghanistan. According to one source, the summit will occur in March and be open to the SCO observer members as well as other international organizations.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) also provides Moscow with a convenient tool of influence in Afghanistan’s neighborhood. This Russian-dominated military alliance includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The Russian government and the CSTO secretariat, which is led by Moscow, have advanced the principle that the member countries cannot join alternative military alliances or host new foreign bases without the approval of the other treaty parties. Insofar as the other CSTO states adhere to this principle, it gives Moscow considerable leverage over their security policies. The CSTO has launched several initiatives aimed at curbing the export of narco-terrorism from Afghanistan, but with questionable results.
On February 4, moreover, the CSTO announced that the alliance would establish a standing collective rapid reaction force, akin to that of NATO. The decision would transform the existing joint force, consisting of 3,000 pre-designated military personnel under national command, into a 10,000 member force under a single unified command such as existed in the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization or some collective NATO units. Russia’s clear military predominance within the CSTO would mean this restructuring would significantly tighten Moscow’s control over the armed forces of the other member governments. It would also give Russia a means to conduct collective military interventions in Eurasia, a capacity the SCO has not developed.
CONCLUSIONS: The recent events in Kyrgyzstan can be seen as another Russian effort to increase Moscow’s influence in Afghanistan. Russian and Kyrgyz officials deny the timing of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s February 3 declaration that he would close the U.S. Air base at Manas was related to his meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev a few hours beforehand. At the session, Medvedev confirmed the Kremlin’s intent to write off US$ 180 million in debt, lend Kyrgyzstan US$ 2 billion, give US$ 150 million in direct aid, and subsidize the construction of a multi-billion dollar hydropower plant in the impoverished Central Asian nation.
Yet, Moscow would gain considerable leverage in its relations with Washington if the United States could only bring supplies into Central Asia via Russian territory. At the same time that the Kyrgyz government was announcing its plan to close the American base at Manas, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that the Russian government would permit the shipment of U.S. non-lethal equipment across Russian territory to Afghanistan through Central Asia. Denied use of the Manas Air Base, the United States and other NATO countries would depend on Russian government goodwill to continue supporting their Afghan contingents. Moscow could readily suspend access should NATO prove too recalcitrant regarding a CSTO presence in Afghanistan, Russian military bases in Georgia, or other disputed issues.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Director for Project Management and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson institute.
