GEORGIA WAR RUIN WEST’S IMAGE IN AZERBAIJAN
The recent developments in Georgia had many negative consequences for the countries of the region and regional powers that have vested interests there. The West, with its slow, weak and at times inadequate response to the Russian aggression, broke many hearts in the region. People and politicians were grossly disappointed with the passive military support for Georgia both from Washington and Brussels. Although full-scale military activities are over, the West’s failure to actively back Georgia, as opposed to how it is thought to have acted during Reagan’s times, will have severe consequences for its economic and security ties to Azerbaijan. Political reforms in the country, and perhaps also in Georgia, are likely to suffer. Everyone now is asking one question: is it worth to risk relations with Moscow for the sake of such uncertain support from the West?
BACKGROUND: The military conflict between Georgia and Russia in early August created uncertainties and fears in the region. The pace, scope and aggressiveness of the Russian attack on Georgia raised eyebrows even in most republics of the former Soviet Union friendly to the Kremlin. For a moment, it seemed like the Soviet Union was back. Russian military units attacked not only Georgia’s military forces, but also civilians, residential buildings, airports, seaports, transport and communication infrastructure. They did it violently and brutally and at times, even crossing basic ethical lines and international law.
In addition to the usual rhetoric on acting like a security guarantor in the Caucasus, Russia also seemed to deliberately target the “East-West” energy corridor, so patiently, diligently and successfully built by the West in 1990s. For several days, the transport of Caspian oil and gas through Georgian ports, railways and pipelines was stopped. The airspace was in danger. Cross-border transit between Azerbaijan and Georgia became a nightmare.
Many pundits claim that Russia was and is punishing Georgia for its democratic, pro-Western and independent regime. Authoritarian Russia cannot tolerate an island of democracy next to its borders. It cannot digest the pro-NATO mood and spirit in Georgian public and political circles. It wanted to crush the West’s main ally in the region.
All of this was done in front of a confused, fragmented and for the most part silent West. Even back in April, when NATO at its Bucharest summit was debating whether to grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan, the first signs of complete lack of unity on the issue was shown. Germany and France objected to closer ties with Georgia, while the U.S. and Eastern European states supported it. Then, when Russia, using this lack of unity, attacked Georgia, the West again showed itself from the most passive, weakest and least knowledgeable angle.
For the first several days of the conflict, the West failed to provide any military support to Georgia. It did not even try to pressure Russia with anything but statements, or to force it to stop its bombings of the Georgian civilians. Most Western organizations were continuously debating the issue. The White House kept issuing soft messages to the Kremlin; and the European countries, with the exception of the Baltic States, Sweden and Poland, did not dare to risk their relations with Moscow. Only by the seventh day of the conflict, President Bush used tough rhetoric, but then again only offered humanitarian assistance. The Pentagon was downgraded to the level of a provider of relief services. EU countries did not show any adequate knowledge of the situation in the region, and fell short in addressing the Russian excuses about international law and ethnic minorities.
IMPLICATIONS: This weak and unprofessional response by the West will have severe negative consequences for the region, both in terms of its own image and in terms of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Azerbaijan.
First and foremost, Georgia and Azerbaijan have been pursing Euro-Atlantic integration since the collapse of the Soviet Union exactly for the purpose of increasing their safety and obtaining security guarantees. Both nations suffered greatly from Russian imperialist policies in region. The traumas of the last years of the Soviet Union forced Tbilisi and Baku to seek closer ties with the West. Politicians and the public alike, in both capitals, hoped that the West would stand up for these critical countries if Russian decided to attack them. The West inspired such thinking, emboldening Baku and Tbilisi to dare to build pipelines that broke the Russian energy monopoly in the region. They established GUAM, which acted as an anti-Moscow club, and developed individual action plans with NATO.
In some instances, such as the case of Iranian military posturing against Azerbaijan in the summer of 2001, Turkey (as a NATO member and U.S. ally) indeed did step up and supported its Caucasian ally. But in the current conflict, neither Turkey, nor the EU or the U.S. managed to back Georgia. They failed to abide by their own implicit promises.
After such developments, it will now be extremely hard for Azerbaijan to continue to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration, upset Russia and seek NATO membership. Instead, it is likely that Azerbaijan will further try to soften its approach and maintain relations with Moscow. This, in turn, will have both political and economic implications, such as the potential purchase of Azerbaijani gas by Russia.
Second, Azerbaijanis have for several years been accusing the West of applying double standards. This was particularly true in the public perception of the war in Iraq, the West’s closure of the eyes to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia, and the issue of democracy in the country. The situation in Georgia, when the West says one thing and does another, will further harden this perception. This, in turn, will embolden those in Azerbaijan who say that America has no business telling Azerbaijan how to democratize, because America itself lost its image of a morally just country.
Finally, the East-West corridor, on which Azerbaijan and Georgia put all their bets, now seems to be fully vulnerable to Russian attacks. Politicians in Baku will have to think twice before coming up with new ideas on how to use the Georgian territory for the transit of Caspian oil and gas. This comes at an especially bad moment, because Azerbaijan was just intensifying talks with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan about the transit of Central Asian energy resources through Azerbaijan via proposed Trans-Caspian pipelines. It is obvious that Moscow wanted to put the Trans-Caspian pipeline idea at risk, and the West did not move a finger to help save this pipeline project for which it is the main beneficiary. By doing so, the West jeopardized its own energy security and the vision of such ambitious pipeline projects as Nabucco and Odessa-Brody.
CONCLUSIONS: It is likely that Azerbaijan will draw lessons from the conflict in Georgia and further curb its pro-Western integration, unless serious western policies emerge out of this crisis. Nobody in Baku wants to ruin relations with Moscow and seek new conflicts on its territory, especially during a year when Presidential elections are to be held. Further setbacks are expected on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, as most Azerbaijanis now believe that it will be impossible to solve the conflict as long as Russia maintains its influence in the region. The example of South Ossetia proved the point.
Unless the West develops a very clear vision on what it wants to do in the South Caucasus region, and unless this vision is transformed into practical and useful programs, and unless the West steps up its military support for the countries of the region, Azerbaijan is likely to harbor deep mistrust for the West, and doubt the benefits of its risky pro-Western orientation.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a Baku-based freelance writer.
