By John DiPIrro

The Central Asia and Caucasus Institute’s proposed ‘American Strategy for Greater Central Asia’ (ASGCA) offers a timely recalibration of US engagement, centering on sovereignty, investment and regional interconnectivity. It challenges those of us steeped in democracy and governance work – that is, human rights, transparency, rule of law and institutional reform – to look beyond the normative ideals and confront the hard, often uncomfortable realities of power politics. It offers a serious and rare opportunity for the United States to redefine its role in a region that remains strategically vital and capitalize on a fleeting window of geopolitical advantage. Yet, without a robust policy of Russian containment, the strategy misses a key opportunity. To be effective, the US must help solidify a regional bulwark capable of resisting Russian military, economic and ideological coercion, while cultivating durable, mutually beneficial partnerships

BACKGROUND: For decades, U.S. engagement with Central Asia rested on flawed assumptions that development assistance, conditioned on commitments to democratic reform, would gradually yield stable, pro-Western partners. In reality, democratic reforms were largely performative and cosmetic, designed to appease U.S. interlocutors and secure continued funding. Russia and China, by contrast, offered a far more attractive alternative to Central Asian elites, including security guarantees, regime support, non-interference in internal affairs and tacit acceptance of corruption. These partnerships came with fewer conditions, demanding only loyalty.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. promise of prosperity through democratic transformation remained abstract and unconvincing in the face of authoritarian realpolitik. Even reformist leaders or color revolutions were quickly co-opted or violently displaced. In private, many regional elites sought a different offer: security, investment and recognition of sovereignty…without the "democracy business." Beijing and Moscow responded with infrastructure development and military cooperation, creating entrenched dependencies.

The Trump administration’s pivot toward transactional diplomacy that prioritizes economic and security partnerships over ideological demands has opened a window of opportunity to recalibrate U.S. engagement on terms regional governments find more palatable. Washington cannot and should not replicate the corrupt bargains offered by authoritarian powers, but it can offer something categorically superior: access to global markets, cutting-edge technologies, diversified security cooperation and entry into a predictable, rules-based order. This model, though imperfect, offers autonomy without the coercion, instability and dependency imposed by Moscow or Beijing. A pragmatic U.S. strategy grounded in sovereignty, prosperity and alignment could finally forge resilient and durable partnerships.

Meanwhile, Central Asia’s younger, urban, and globally connected populations are increasingly disillusioned with both domestic authoritarianism and foreign exploitation. Nationalist and pro-sovereignty sentiment has surged, particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its denial of Central Asian sovereignty and its mobilization of ethnic minorities into the Russian war effort have further fueled this backlash. Many citizens across the region have grown tired of being pawns in great-power rivalries.

It is within this context that the ASGCA represents a meaningful shift. By acknowledging regional priorities and accepting transactional diplomacy, it replaces Western idealism with strategic realism. ASGCA’s central innovation is its proposal to view these states not as isolated, vulnerable peripheries, but as a potential collective bloc, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan at its core, and Afghanistan, Mongolia and the South Caucasus anchoring each end. This corridor would align sovereign interests with US strategic goals and offer three critical advantages:

• Strategically, it would anchor a contiguous bloc that counters the Russia-China-Iran axis and dilutes their regional influence.
• Economically, it would unlock immense investment opportunities, from critical minerals and renewable energy, to trade corridors like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), bypassing Russian chokepoints and providing an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• In terms of security, it would foster regional self-sufficiency in counterterrorism, border control and internal stability, thereby reducing the need for US military presence. This feature aligns with both American and regional preferences.

Yet, ASGCA’s vision omits a crucial dimension. Without an explicit strategy for containing Russian influence, the project risks being strategically incoherent.

IMPLICATIONS:  While international law affirms Russia’s 1991 borders,[1] the Kremlin’s own doctrine tells another story. The Russkiy Mir (Russian World) ideology, a cornerstone of Moscow’s aggressive expansionism, asserts a transnational Russian civilization that overrides international borders whenever it is politically expedient. Russia’s borders, in its own eyes, end only where they are met with sufficient resistance. This has become painfully clear since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale war on Ukraine. The Kremlin’s disregard for sovereignty is not the exception: it is policy. This is why any peace settlement in Ukraine is likely to be tactical, not transformational. Moscow will use the opportunity to rearm and resume aggression when conditions are more favorable. As such, the West cannot afford another cycle of accommodation and illusion. A sustainable US strategy must empower regional actors to deter Russian pressure without direct American military deployment.

For this reason, any effort to unify and empower Greater Central Asia must explicitly incorporate Russian containment. By systematically investing in the region’s defense capabilities, economic integration and institutional resilience, the US can help Central Asia and the South Caucasus form a cohesive bloc capable of withstanding Russian pressure. These nations offer unique strategic value, including deep familiarity with Russian tactics, a pragmatic understanding of hard power and a growing desire to pursue independent paths. Unlike Western policymakers who often misread Moscow through a liberal, rational-actor lens, Central Asians and Caucasians harbor no such illusions, fully recognizing the necessity of strength and self-reliance.

Six reasons underscore this imperative.

First, without containment, sovereignty will remain fragile. Russian influence is not limited to tanks and troops. It manifests itself in cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, political subversion, cultural hegemony, economic blackmail and manipulation of ethnic minorities. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s rhetoric about “protecting Russians abroad” has stoked deep anxieties among political elites. In Armenia, Moscow’s failure to intervene during the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive exposed the hollowness of its security guarantees. If Greater Central Asia is to be more than a vision, it must be hardened against the hybrid Russian threats from the outset.

Second, containment is a precondition for regional integration. The Middle Corridor, a central component of ASGCA’s economic vision, cannot function without security. However, these corridors remain vulnerable to disruption without regional security guarantees. Russian influence over rail, road and energy infrastructure, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, makes any ambitious transit strategy susceptible to sabotage or political manipulation. A concerted effort to reduce Russian leverage is essential to ensuring the viability of east-west connectivity.

Third, Russia exploits regional divisions. Moscow excels at divide-and-rule tactics. It amplifies nationalist tensions, exacerbates border disputes and fuels distrust between neighbors. The longstanding water and border tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are fertile ground for Russian interference. A Greater Central Asia bloc must prioritize coordinated responses to hybrid threats, including joint intelligence sharing, cybersecurity collaboration and counter-disinformation mechanisms. Containment is not just a military goal. It is the precondition for durable regional unity. Geographically, this effort should concentrate along Russia’s southern flank, with the support of Turkey, India, Pakistan and the United States.

Fourth, U.S. credibility depends on strategic clarity and continuity. In Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the West’s failure to provide hard security guarantees has had devastating consequences. Central Asian states have taken note. U.S. commitments must be unambiguous and they must endure beyond election cycles. If Washington abandons this strategy after four years, it will validate Russian and Chinese narratives about American unreliability and drive regional partners back into the arms of Moscow and Beijing.

Fifth, containment can be achieved without escalation. A containment strategy does not require US troops on the ground. Instead, it must empower local states to serve as their own first line of defense, resilient enough to resist Russian coercion. This includes arms transfers, defense cooperation, cybersecurity partnerships, sanctions enforcement and media resilience. It also means supporting sovereign decision-making and reducing dependence on Russian economic systems. Containment, if done smartly, is a stabilizing force, not a destabilizing one.

Sixth, a containment strategy accelerates the end of the Ukraine war. Central Asia and the South Caucasus are critical nodes in Russia’s sanctions evasion networks. Enforcing export controls, cutting off trans-shipment of dual-use goods and closing legal loopholes in countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia and Georgia would severely disrupt Russia’s war economy, hasten its operational exhaustion and enable a faster, more favorable resolution to the conflict. Building a coalition of states committed to rejecting Russian revisionism not only weakens the Kremlin. It also creates the conditions for an eventual peace on Ukrainian terms.

By Davit Petrosyan

On 13 March 2025, Yerevan and Baku announced consensus on the peace agreement text, raising hopes of ending the decades-long conflict. The U.S. described it as a “historic peace treaty,” while the European Council encouraged both parties to proceed with signing. However, closer analysis suggests the document is more about formally closing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict than achieving sustainable peace. The failure to resolve key disputes—such as unblocking regional transit routes and border delimitation—combined with growing military imbalance in Baku’s favor and Armenia’s concession of important deterrent tools, suggests that Azerbaijan may launch new escalations when the broader geopolitical climate becomes more permissive. 

Photo source: ffikretow

BACKGROUND: The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to the late 1980s, when a war (1988-1994) broke out between ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region—an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Armenians—and Azerbaijani forces. With backing from the Republic of Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians gained control not only over Nagorno-Karabakh but also seven adjacent districts. A ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia on 5 May 1994 effectively froze the conflict. Although Nagorno-Karabakh achieved de facto independence, it remained unrecognized by any country, including Armenia. The OSCE Minsk Group—co-chaired by Russia, the U.S., and France—was established to facilitate a peaceful resolution.

After sixteen years of stalled negotiations, the conflict reignited on 27 September 2020, when Azerbaijan—backed by Turkey—launched a large-scale offensive, reclaiming the seven surrounding districts and about a third of Nagorno-Karabakh. Following several failed mediation attempts by Russia, France, and the U.S., Russia brokered a ceasefire on 9 November 2020. The agreement commissioned the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the region; the establishment of a joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center; and the transferred control of the Lachin corridor, previously under Armenian control and connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, to Russian peacekeeping forces. 

In the following period, Yerevan and Baku engaged in several rounds of peace talks, initially mediated by Moscow. Over time, however, the EU and the U.S. assumed more active roles. Early negotiations focused on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and later evolved into discussions about the rights and security of Armenians living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Negotiations also centered on border delimitation, humanitarian issues including the return of prisoners of war and detainees, the handover of landmine maps, and the search for missing persons. A particularly contentious issue was the unblocking of regional transit routes (connectivity), including the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which would connect Azerbaijan to its western exclave, Nakhichevan. 

Despite ongoing talks, Azerbaijan launched military incursions into Armenia’s internationally recognized territory between 2021 and 2022, occupying approximately 215 square kilometers. In response, Armenia invited the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor its border with Azerbaijan. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blockaded the Lachin corridor—with the tacit approval of Russian peacekeepers—and, following a ten-month blockade, launched an offensive that resulted in the forced displacement of 120,000 ethnic Armenians from the region. 

Since then, peace talks have continued, with Armenia seeking to avoid further escalation and Azerbaijan advancing new demands. On 13 March 2025, both parties announced a consensus on the text of the peace agreement. However, Azerbaijan added two conditions: the “amendment” of Armenia’s Constitution and the dissolution the OSCE Minsk Group. 

IMPLICATIONS: The agreement fails to resolve all disputes, leaving flashpoints that could trigger new escalations. One major issue is connectivity—the modalities for restoring road links, which is absent from the finalized text. Azerbaijan continues demanding unhindered access to its western exclave Nakhichevan, and has repeatedly threatened to open the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” by force. Conversely, Armenia views any extraterritorial corridor as a red line, signaling its resolve to respond proportionally. This marks a shift from earlier Azerbaijani incursions, when Armenian forces adopted a defensive posture, with Prime Minister Pashinyan declaring that Armenia would not retake occupied territories militarily. 

The diverging stances of regional powers on connectivity could either deter or ignite a future conflict. On February 14, 2025, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova blamed Armenia for “freezing” trilateral efforts to reopen routes. On March 26, 2025, Turkish President Erdoğan declared plans to build regional trade corridors centered on Zangezur. Conversely, on September 7, 2024, a senior Iranian official reaffirmed that the “Zangezur Corridor” was a red line for Iran. Joint Armenia-Iran military exercises in April 2025, amid increased Azerbaijani activity along the border, aimed to demonstrate Iran’s readiness to deter Azerbaijani attempts to take the route by force.

The agreement also leaves border delimitation unresolved, which has already led to military clashes, with Azerbaijan occupying 215 km² of Armenian territory. To date, only one portion of the border has been delimited. Key areas where Azerbaijani forces have advanced remain undelimited. Azerbaijan has shown no intention of withdrawing, raising doubts about the agreement’s ability to resolve tensions and establish lasting peace. Importantly, Russia can leverage disputes on this issue and connectivity to maintain its influence in the region. 

The EUMA’s removal from the Armenian–Azerbaijani border would significantly weaken Armenia’s security. Since EUMA’s deployment in mid-February 2023, not a single square meter of Armenian territory has been occupied. The mission has served as an effective external balancing tool, deterring Azerbaijani advances. Given that large portions of the border remain undelimited, EUMA’s withdrawal would eliminate a key stabilizing presence and increase the risk of new Azerbaijani aggression. 

Under the peace deal, Armenia agreed to withdraw international lawsuits against Azerbaijan, forfeiting another deterrent. Four applications to the European Court of Human Rights documented widespread Azerbaijani human rights violations during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, while Armenia's complaint to the International Court of Justice accused Azerbaijan of systematic racial discrimination. Dropping these cases not only erases the record of violations but also removes a major constraint on Azerbaijan’s future actions, freeing its hands for provocations. 

The peace agreement lacks enforcement mechanisms. No third party is designated to oversee compliance, further increasing the risk of escalation. It also fails to address the fate of at least 106 Armenian prisoners of war (POWs) and detainees, making the document resemble a “punitive” conclusion to the war rather than a genuine peace agreement. 

One of the primary motivations behind Azerbaijan’s additional conditions, “amending” Armenia’s Constitution and dissolving the Minsk Group, is to bury the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Constitution’s preamble cites the 1990 Declaration of Independence and references the joint statement of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan portrays this as evidence of Armenian territorial claims. The dissolution of the Minsk Group is intended to symbolize the closure of the conflict it was created to resolve.

Finally, the military balance continues to shift in Azerbaijan’s favor. While both countries allocate 4–5 percent of their GDP to defense, Azerbaijan’s spending was 3.5 times higher in 2020, 4.4 times higher in 2021, 3.8 times higher in 2022, and 2.7 times higher in 2023. Projections show that Azerbaijan’s defense budget was 2.7 times higher in 2024 and is expected to be 2.9 times higher in 2025. As the imbalance grows, Azerbaijan’s confidence in resorting to force to compel Armenia into new concessions is likely to increase.

CONCLUSION: The current peace agreement fails to resolve crucial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, depriving Armenia of important balancing and deterrent mechanisms. The two additional conditions put forward by Azerbaijan suggest that at this stage, Baku's aim is not to achieve a comprehensive peace, but to decisively close the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The failure to address the issue of Armenian POWs and detainees held in Baku, as well as the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, demonstrates that this agreement is not aimed at bringing sustainable peace to the South Caucasus but rather at formally confirming Azerbaijan's achievements so far. 

The weak peace agreement and the continually shifting military balance in Azerbaijan's favor enables Baku to retain the necessary levers to escalate the situation when the geopolitical environment appears more favorable. It reserves options to compel Armenia into new concessions, such as securing the route to Nakhichevan on its own terms and constraining Armenia's post-conflict recovery efforts. Finally, diverging positions over the reopening of regional transit routes and conflicting interests among regional powers could serve as additional triggers for renewed escalation, providing Russia with opportunities to maintain its influence in the region. 

AUTHOR BIO: Davit Petrosyan is a Fulbright Scholar pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Previously, he served as an Assistant to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia and as Chief Program Officer of Restart Civic-Youth Foundation.

By Tomáš Baranec

On March 1, 2025, the second round of the de facto presidential elections took place in Abkhazia. The incumbent de facto President, Badra Gunba, secured 55.66 percent of the vote, defeating opposition candidate Adgur Ardzinba, who received 42.25 percent. The 2025 elections were marked by two notable features. First, Russia directly intervened in the electoral process for the first time since the 2004 presidential elections, during which Moscow openly supported Raul Khajimba. Second, a political faction recently ousted through mass protests returned to power through electoral means. Both developments may have significant consequences for Abkhazia’s political trajectory.

Photo source: Andrey Danilov

BACKGROUND: The latter half of 2024 in Abkhazia was characterized by widespread public mobilization against the proposed so-called investment agreement with Russia. Critics expressed concern that the agreement would strip the region of its remaining de facto sovereignty and potentially threaten the precarious demographic majority held by ethnic Abkhazians. These tensions culminated in an assault on the presidential palace in Sukhumi and the subsequent resignation of de facto President Aslan Bzhania and de facto Prime Minister Alexander Ankvab on November 19.

Following the first round of the presidential elections held on February 15, 2025, two traditional political factions competed for power. Gunba represented the interests of the Ankvabist bloc (United Abkhazia), aligned with Alexander Ankvab and the ousted president Aslan Bzhania. Adgur Ardzinba of the Abkhazian National Movement led the opposing group—the Khajimbists. Initially, Ardzinba received support from Kan Kvarchia, chairman of the Aidgylara movement, and Leuan Mikaa, chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Abkhazia’s Sovereignty. However, both opposition figures ultimately refrained from actively participating in Ardzinba’s election campaign.

The catalyst for the early elections was the "unfinished revolution" of November 2024, during which President Bzhania and Prime Minister Ankvab were compelled to resign, leading to the abandonment of the highly unpopular investment agreement with Russia.

Gunba, as a representative of the recently ousted political faction, was initially expected to enter the early elections as a marginal contender. Despite the apparent achievements of the revolution, it remained incomplete. Prior to the elections, Ankvab’s faction continued to control all key ministries, administrative apparatuses, and the media landscape.

The Ankvab faction also secured a strategic advantage during the election campaign. Employing black PR tactics, they compelled Ardzinba’s campaign team to focus their efforts on countering numerous accusations and rumors. Consequently, the opposition leader had limited opportunity to engage with issues that were critical and sensitive for the Ankvab group, including cryptocurrency mining, the investment agreement, and the deterioration of the energy infrastructure.

The Ankvab faction structured its campaign around two principal narratives. In the first, Ardzinba was portrayed as anti-Russian, implying that only Gunba could guarantee the continuation of Russian support. In the second, Ardzinba was depicted as a proponent of Turkish interests, thereby suggesting that the opposition harbors hostility toward the Armenian community in Abkhazia.

By maintaining control even after the revolution, Ankvab’s supporters were able to utilize the local media’s propaganda apparatus and deploy the standard array of administrative resources in the lead-up to the elections.

However, the Kremlin’s overt intervention in support of Gunba introduced a new variable into an otherwise conventional electoral equation. In addition to supplying Abkhazia with so-called humanitarian gas at a reduced rate, senior Kremlin officials publicly aligned themselves with the candidate representing the Ankvab faction. Simultaneously, Russian media at all levels, along with coordinated bot networks on social media, intensified the black PR campaign against Ardzinba and the opposition with unprecedented intensity. Within this framework, the revocation of Russian citizenship from Mikaa and Kvarchia at the end of January functioned as a broader signal of warning to the entire Abkhazian populace.

IMPLICATIONS: The Ankvab faction secured electoral victory shortly before the plebiscite through the implementation of several active measures. At the last moment, it blocked the establishment of a polling station in Turkey, out of concerns that the diaspora electorate there might favor the opposition. Conversely, reports of significant, organized voter fraud surfaced at polling stations in Moscow and Cherkessk. Additionally, allegations emerged that Abkhaz authorities were distributing driver’s licenses in exchange for votes cast in favor of Gunba.

However, none of these measures alone guaranteed a seamless victory. The decisive factor was a targeted campaign directed at the Armenian minority, bolstered by substantial support from Russian media and the influential Armenian diaspora based in Sochi. For the first time, a majority of this demographic explicitly endorsed a single candidate—Gunba. Given that ethnic Armenians constitute approximately 17 percent of the population, according to local expert Said Gezerdava, their unified support proved pivotal in enabling the Ankvab faction to retain political control.

Despite achieving a lead of over 13 percent against the opposition candidate, the position of the Ankvab faction remains precarious, particularly considering probable expectations from Moscow. A victory by the Khajimba faction would have brought minimal change for Russia regarding Abkhazia, as one pro-Russian bloc would have merely supplanted another. The intensity with which the Kremlin committed to overtly supporting Gunba—even at the expense of discrediting the opposition and estranging segments of the local populace—indicates that it anticipates reciprocal concessions.

Moscow’s demands are well known. The Kremlin outlined them in the so-called protocol of August 19, calling on Sukhumi to lift restrictions preventing Russian citizens from purchasing real estate in Abkhazia and to adopt a commercial pricing model for electricity supply. An additional, longstanding demand includes the privatization of Abkhazia’s energy sector in favor of Russian enterprises.

In such a scenario, the outcome of the presidential election would merely represent a return to the political deadlock of summer 2024, which culminated in Bzhania’s downfall only a few months later. Given this reset, it is unreasonable to expect that identical measures, implemented under the same conditions, will yield a different result.

Therefore, if Russia and the de facto administration under Gunba aim to produce a different outcome, they will be compelled to fundamentally alter either the basic conditions or their approach.

Altering the terms in this context effectively entails changing public opinion within Abkhazian society regarding the agreements, which are widely perceived as posing a threat to the survival of the Abkhazian nation. A more conciliatory final version of the agreement, accompanied by a comprehensive and persuasive information campaign, could potentially lessen societal resistance. However, this would necessitate significant concessions from oligarchic groups in Russia closely affiliated with the Kremlin. A shift in approach would likely involve heightened repression, relying on coercion and intimidation to impose compliance amid sustained and widespread local opposition.

Events following Gunba’s electoral victory quickly revealed that the Kremlin is amenable to this scenario. On March 7, prominent Abkhazian journalist Inal Khashig was added to Russia’s list of foreign agents. That Khashig’s case was not an isolated incident, but indicative of a broader trend became evident two weeks later, when two other well-known journalists, Izida Chania and Nizifa Arshba, were similarly designated as foreign agents.

CONCLUSION: For Russia, the 2025 Abkhazian presidential election was less about preserving regional influence and more about securing the passage of a widely unpopular investment agreement. Two key factors support this interpretation: the unprecedented extent to which the Kremlin committed its support to Gunba, despite the fact that an Ardzinba victory posed no real threat to its position; and the revocation of citizenship from Kvarchia and Mikaa—not for their early endorsement of Ardzinba, but for their involvement in the events of November 2024.

Gunba’s victory, secured with Russian support, is likely to result in three key developments: increased direct control by Moscow over the region (with both Bzhania and Ankvab reportedly being gradually sidelined from power, according to Gezerdava); the advancement of Moscow’s interests through the use of repressive measures; and heightened tensions between ethnic Abkhazians and Armenians.

Drawing on the experience of recent years, it is reasonable to expect that local resistance to Russia’s unpopular demands will persist. However, the effectiveness of this resistance will largely depend on the extent to which the new repressive strategy impacts local elites, journalists, and activists. A key early indicator of future developments will be whether self-censorship emerges among local journalists following the designation of three of the most prominent media figures as foreign agents.

AUTHOR BIO: Tomáš Baranec is the Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Black Sea Studies as well as a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He worked as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague. 

By Emil Avdaliani

Although the Middle Corridor, connecting the EU and China via the Black Sea and Central Asia, has witnessed notable development in recent years, its swift expansion is constrained by both geographical barriers and the political complexities prevalent along the route. The Northern Corridor through Russia would be further consolidated should Russia achieve a favorable resolution to its war in Ukraine. While the Middle Corridor serves as a dependable link between Central Asia and the EU, it is likely to remain a complementary route to the northern Eurasian commercial highway.

Photo source: Tanvir Anjum Adib

BACKGROUND: The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, extending from the Black Sea to Central Asia and western China, has gained prominence since 2022 following the onset of the war in Ukraine. Although the route had existed in practice since the 1990s and was formally inaugurated in the early 2000s, its scope remained limited due to inadequate infrastructure, geopolitical instability in the South Caucasus, and, more significantly, the appeal of the Russian route, which had facilitated trade between China and the EU. Compounding these challenges is the corridor’s multimodal nature—comprising both land and sea segments—which, despite making it the shortest geographical path between China and the EU, has ultimately rendered its operation economically unviable.

Indeed, data from the period prior to 2022 highlights this unfavorable reality: merely 2–3 percent of overland containerized freight traversed the Middle Corridor. This dynamic shifted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the route became increasingly associated with geopolitical volatility, the unpredictability of Moscow, and the risk of financial loss for both the EU and China. In addition, the European Union’s imposition of extensive sanctions on Russia has further incentivized the pursuit of alternative transport corridors.

Overall, cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor increased in 2024 for railway operators in Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. For example, Azerbaijani authorities reported transporting over 18.5 million tons of goods in 2024, representing a 5.7 percent increase compared to 2023. In the case of Kazakhstan’s railways, the volume of freight carried via the corridor grew by 63 percent, reaching 4.1 million tons in 2024. Turkish and Georgian railway companies likewise experienced a rise in cargo throughput during the same year.

In late 2024, Kazakhstan unveiled plans to finance the construction of a new terminal at Azerbaijan’s Alat port. Concurrently, Astana is undertaking development efforts at the Aktau port, with authorities aiming to triple container throughput by the end of the decade. Additional recent developments similarly suggest a significant reorientation of strategic focus toward the corridor. Notably, in March, Azerbaijan hosted 24 companies for the General Assembly of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route International Association (TITR IA) Legal Entities Union. The objective of the assembly was to raise cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor to 96,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). 

IMPLICATIONS: Thus far, the outlook for the Middle Corridor has appeared favorable. Major powers are increasingly expressing interest in the corridor’s development. In early April, the inaugural Central Asia–EU Summit was convened in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The event was viewed as an effort to enhance the European Union’s presence in the region amid intensifying great power rivalry over Eurasian connectivity. The EU pledged a €12 billion assistance package, of which €3 billion will be allocated to the transport sector. Central Asia holds strategic significance for the EU, particularly considering the Middle Corridor’s advancement within the scope of Brussels’ Global Gateway initiative—a rival to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With improved transport infrastructure, cargo delivery times between Europe and Central Asia are projected to be halved, reaching approximately 15 days.

China is another major stakeholder, whose growing interest in the Middle Corridor is evident through both political engagement and investment initiatives. A Chinese firm is currently constructing a deep-sea port in Anaklia on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, a development that may prove instrumental in achieving the goal of capturing a 20 percent share of EU–China maritime trade by 2035. Previous efforts to build the port were hindered by domestic political disputes, but the present geopolitical environment differs, with China now actively supporting the project. Beijing has also sought to strengthen its political relationship with Georgia, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement in 2023. A similar agreement was concluded with Azerbaijan in 2024, with an upgraded version on April 23, 2025, in which China committed to enhancing the country’s Caspian Sea ports and advancing the long-delayed China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. These developments collectively signal the emergence of a near-continuous corridor stretching from China’s western frontier to the Black Sea.

However, given the evolving geopolitical dynamics surrounding Ukraine—particularly the ongoing negotiations between Russia and the U.S.—the Middle Corridor may face adverse consequences. Should Russia secure substantial gains in Ukraine, its strategic influence in the South Caucasus is likely to be enhanced. This could result in the consolidation of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan within Moscow’s sphere of influence, thereby empowering Russia to obstruct the functioning of a transit route that circumvents its territory from the south and facilitates access for rival powers into Central Asia. Potential measures at Russia’s disposal span from overt military actions to more subtle strategies, including embedding itself economically through infrastructure investments in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Moreover, despite the war in Ukraine entering its fourth consecutive year, this has not signaled the complete demise of the Russian route. Indeed, between 2022 and 2024, the northern corridor has continued to function as a major conduit between China and the EU. While the volume of freight transported along this route has fluctuated, it has nonetheless persisted as a vital commercial artery. Consequently, the Middle Corridor has continued to serve in a primarily complementary capacity.

This underscores the enduring viability of the northern route and should Russia–U.S. relations experience a substantial improvement; major enterprises may increasingly favor the well-established northern corridor. In contrast, the Middle Corridor continues to face constraints arising from both geographic challenges and the involvement of multiple stakeholders along its path. Infrastructure remains underdeveloped, and while intergovernmental cooperation is progressing, it still falls short of what is necessary. The true potential of the Middle Corridor is projected to reach up to 20 percent of overland containerized trade between China and the EU. However, this estimate is conditional upon several factors, including the successful completion of the Anaklia port and the expansion of the railway network across the South Caucasus.

CONCLUSION: Although the Middle Corridor has experienced considerable growth in recent years, its overall potential remains constrained. Geographic limitations, combined with persistent political complexities along the route, continue to impede rapid development. However, broader shifts in Eurasian geopolitics pose even greater challenges—should Russia succeed in concluding the war in Ukraine favorably and reconciling with the U.S., the corridor traversing Russian territory would be further solidified. This scenario does not imply that the Middle Corridor will cease to evolve. Rather, it is expected to continue expanding while remaining complementary to the northern Eurasian trade axis and functioning as a reliable conduit between Central Asia and the EU.

AUTHOR BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.