By Aleksandar Ivanović 

On October 10, 2025, the CIS heads of state summit was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The leaders established the “Commonwealth of Independent States Plus” (CIS+) format, further integrating external partners in CIS initiatives. Turkmenistan was chosen to chair next year’s summit in October. Multiple packages of documents were signed, targeting trade, crime, and most importantly, security. Security challenges from Afghanistan, including extremism and border conflicts, have continued since the Taliban takeover, and these recent agreements make up another component of Central Asia’s lengthy efforts to reduce the recurring concerns that can potentially spill over into their territories.

                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon hosts high-ranking representatives from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Belarus in Dushanbe for this year’s CIS Heads of State Summit, their annual tradition marks another year of important security partnerships.

The leaders signed multiple packages of documents, including the decision “on the Program of cooperation of the member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the field of countering terrorism and extremism for 2026-2028, strengthening border security at external borders for 2026-2030,” and military cooperation until 2030.

Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed Russia’s open support for the signed proposals, stating that “an important area of joint work among the CIS states is the fight against terrorism, extremism, corruption, and so on.” Russia has been a victim of terrorism in the past, most notably in March 2024 when a bomb detonated in a Moscow concert hall killed 144 and wounded more than 500. The attack was carried out by ISIS-recruited Tajiks from both sides of the Afghan border, demonstrating how Afghanistan-based extremism can strike major regional powers.

The summit occurs at a critical juncture where the regional balance of power undergoes an increasingly global shift. Russia and China have taken significant actions to cooperate with Afghanistan, where the now-Taliban run state poses a greater challenge to regional security. China has offered economic-based strategies, accelerating infrastructure investments like its copper mining project at Mes Aynak, which is possibly the world’s second-biggest copper deposit. Russia, taking a more political route, formally recognized the Taliban government in July 2025, becoming the first country to do so.

The recent moves from external powers have complicated Central Asia’s own efforts to manage threats relating to Afghanistan. However, its leaders were also eager to comment on how to address security while pursuing economic opportunities with the Taliban. In his remarks, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined his interest in developing economic partnerships in Afghanistan, mentioning “joint participation in the implementation of major investment and infrastructure,” and stating that “Uzbekistan is resolutely committed to ensuring long-term peace, stability, and sustainable development in Afghanistan.” Despite its relatively small border, Uzbekistan is in a constant battle with extremist activity and border conflicts coming from its unstable southern neighbor. As a result, Tashkent has approached the Taliban government with a more open-minded attitude compared to its Central Asian counterparts to support the Afghan economy and infrastructure, hoping to address poor economic indicators that instigate external threats including extremism.

IMPLICATIONS: The documents signed in Dushanbe mark another example of Central Asian resilience and solidarity in assuring regional security, and for dealing with Afghanistan in the future. Central Asian states have already grappled with these efforts since 2021 and have collectively reflected on Afghanistan on multiple occasions. In August in Tashkent, special representatives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan stressed the importance of fighting threats emanating in Afghanistan, highlighting extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, and cross-border crime.

Extremism stemming from Afghanistan has most significantly been propagated by ISIS-K, the Islamic State’s branch in the historic Khorasan region. It mostly consists of non-Pashtun minority ethnic groups living in the northern region of Afghanistan, including Uzbeks and Tajiks. A portion of their fighters also include extremists or government dissidents in Central Asia, who go to Afghanistan and join their cause. ISIS-K seeks to radicalize and recruit young men from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and spread propaganda through media to appeal to extremists and those dissatisfied with their governments. Major campaigns include criticizing governments for poor economic conditions in their respective countries, and the Taliban, a majority-Pashtun group and adversary that has undermined the presence of ethnic minorities like Uzbeks and Tajiks in Northern Afghanistan. President Rahmon has publicly acknowledged the issue, and has deemed ISIS-K a “plague,” and that “hell awaits” any Tajik that joins ISIS.

In addition to its media strategy, the group also actively works against the Taliban’s effort to build partnerships and expand security efforts in Central Asia. A notable example was when Uzbekistan, which holds the most cooperative relationship with the Taliban, was attacked in its border region by ISIS-K missiles in 2022, a strike aiming to undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy and security assurances to Central Asian governments.

Collective efforts with Afghanistan to combat extremism have not been substantial. With an already strengthened regional presence of ISIS-K, the Taliban’s internal power dynamics further complicate security assurances to Central Asia. The tension between Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in the southern city of Kandahar and the more accessible and pragmatic Sirajuddin Haqqani in Kabul creates uncertainty about whether commitments to suppress extremist groups will be honored consistently across Afghan territory.

Central Asian states have mostly conducted autonomous campaigns to limit the spread of extremist groups and their potential influence. In February 2024, the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan neutralized multiple extremist groups and detained 23 individuals, including adherents of destructive religious movements, in 8 regions of Kazakhstan for promoting terrorism. Tajik forces similarly followed three months later, raiding villages in its Eastern region to arrest 30 people for connections to their terrorist group Jamaat Ansarullah, Tajik extremist allies of the Taliban.

Tajikistan, the most vocal state, was the only Central Asian government to call out the Taliban and categorize it as purely a threat. Dushanbe refused to send a diplomatic mission after the Taliban seized political power and has demonstrated security concerns through conducting multiple military drills along the Afghan border, some in cooperation with the Uzbek military. In a June 2024 session of the CSTO Parliament Assembly in Almaty, Rustom Emomali, son of the Tajik president, declared Afghanistan a “breeding ground of terrorism.” The Taliban has repeatedly assured Central Asian governments that it will not allow its territory to serve as a platform for extremist groups to strike its neighbors. However, this assurance has lately been viewed more as a desperate plea for legitimacy rather than a valid promise, as hostile attacks by ISIS-K and the presence of other terrorist groups like Jamaat Ansarullah continue.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have pursued a dual-track approach, recognizing that economic engagement may prove more effective than isolation. Both countries expect to conduct US$ 3 billion worth of trade with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 2025, viewing the country as their most important underdeveloped economic opportunity. They also seek to revitalize the historic Great India Road trade corridor which runs through Afghanistan, and it remains their highest priority for reducing dependence on northern routes through Russia. However, this strategy requires delicate balancing – economic ties that could reduce the sources of extremism must not legitimize a regime that harbors terrorist groups.

CONCLUSIONS: The past four years have demonstrated that Central Asian states face a complex trilemma: they must counter immediate security threats from Afghanistan, pursue long-term economic integration through Afghan territory, and navigate the competing interests of Russia and China – both now deeply engaging with Kabul.

The CIS summit’s security packages represent one pillar of this strategy, but they can only succeed through continued economic and diplomatic initiatives. What defines this unique current moment in Afghanistan is the erosion of Western engagement following the near-complete cessation of U.S. humanitarian assistance under the Trump administration. This vacuum has allowed Russia and China to position themselves as Afghanistan’s primary external partners, potentially foreclosing Central Asian hopes for a more balanced regional order. The next couple of years will test whether Central Asian solidarity, as demonstrated in Dushanbe, can effectively manage Afghan challenges without becoming dependent on their northern and eastern neighbors. How these dynamics unfold will indeed remain an essential conversation in Turkmenistan next year.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Aleksandar Ivanović is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council
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By Eduard Abrahamyan

In recent months, Armenia and Russia have strengthened their relations. A series of high-level meetings shows not just a return to normal diplomacy but a purposeful reshaping of their alliance. Alongside President Putin’s renewed ties with Azerbaijani President Aliyev and the Kremlin’s broader adjustment of its regional strategy, the revived dialogue between Putin and Prime Minister Pashinyan forms part of a wider diplomatic renewal. This shift marks a clear easing of the tensions that strained their bilateral relations from September 2022 to mid-2024.



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BACKGROUND: The intensified Armenia–Russia bilateral reengagement commenced on October 8, 2024, with the Moscow meeting between Putin and Pashinyan, ostensibly ending a two-year estrangement stemming from Moscow’s inaction and the CSTO’s reluctance to deter or even explicitly identify Azerbaijan as the initiator of the September 2022 incursions into Armenian territory. Equally detrimental was the perception that Moscow had tacitly approved Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation in Karabakh.

The October 2024 meeting set both sides on a path toward a “new rhythm” in strategic relations, creating the basis for a renewed partnership aimed at resolving the “misunderstandings” that had emerged, as later described by Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Sergey Lavrov. The two leaders have since maintained regular contact through phone calls and in-person meetings throughout 2025. Yerevan also hosted several high-level Russian delegations, underscoring the breadth and institutional depth of the renewed dialogue. Diplomatic sources described this reset as a key turning point that effectively ended the period of tension, with both governments instructing their institutions to pursue a full realignment across all areas of strategic cooperation.

In January and May 2025, the foreign ministers made reciprocal visits, each reaffirming the start of a “new page” in the strategic partnership through “genuine and open discussions on accumulated issues.” This diplomatic thaw reached its peak in June 2025 with the visit of Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of Russia’s Federation Council, to Yerevan, aimed at strengthening parliamentary cooperation. Matviyenko’s visit not only supported Armenia’s evolving foreign policy direction but also highlighted the Kremlin’s engagement in Armenia’s domestic politics. Her meetings in Yerevan were widely seen as a sign of Moscow’s friendly neutrality, or even quiet support for the ruling Civil Contract party ahead of Armenia’s general elections planned for June 2026. After her meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan on 6 June, Matviyenko stated that “[Pashinyan] conveyed greetings to our president and emphasized that, despite insinuations, he and [Putin] have always maintained constructive, substantive relations without any issues,” sending a clear message to the “ill-wishers” that no divisions exist between the Armenian and Russian leadership.

The revival of high-level diplomacy has taken place alongside Pashinyan’s participation in international forums led or co-funded by Russia. In May 2025, he attended Moscow’s Victory Day parade, one of Putin’s most visible displays of state power and ideological authority. Pashinyan also traveled to Kazan to join the sixteenth BRICS Summit, which the Kremlin presented as proof that Western efforts to isolate Russia had failed. In July, Armenia’s Prime Minister took part in the International Conference on Nature and Environmental Protection in the Altai, supporting Putin’s broader vision of portraying Russia not as a marginal actor in the Turkic world but as the guardian of its historical and cultural origins amid the growth of the Organization of Turkic States. Later, Pashinyan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where Pakistan blocked Armenia’s application for full membership. Armenia would otherwise likely have joined one of the most rapidly consolidating non-Western frameworks, arguably challenging the West.

The recent strengthening of Armenia–Russia relations is closely linked to economic interdependence and the gradual improvement of Russia’s public image in Armenia. Economically, Russia has reaffirmed its role as Armenia’s main trading partner, with trade turnover reaching a record US$ 12.4 billion in 2024, more than twice the level recorded in 2022. According to investigative reports, this increase reflects the function of both Armenia and Azerbaijan as logistical intermediaries in Moscow’s sanction-evasion networks. Armenia’s re-export channels have supported the transfer of dual-use goods to, and embargoed gold from, Russia, while Azerbaijan has discreetly facilitated the re-export of Russian hydrocarbons. Together, these practices have formed a coordinated and mutually beneficial regional mechanism that reinforces the Kremlin’s economic resilience. In September 2025, during the World Atomic Week conference in Moscow, Pashinyan and Putin agreed that Rosatom would extend the operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant for another decade, ensuring continued supply of over 30 percent of Armenia’s electricity. Official statements also noted that the two leaders discussed the potential construction of a new reactor by Rosatom to address Armenia’s concerns about the ageing Soviet-era facility.

Russia’s public image in Armenia has begun to recover from its low point in 2022–2023. A July 2025 poll by the International Republican Institute shows a clear improvement in public attitudes: the share of respondents viewing Russia as the “greatest threat” fell to 27 percent (down from 40 percent the previous year), while 45 percent now regard Russia as Armenia’s most important political partner, an 18-point increase since 2024. This change in perception is driven less by traditional Russian information campaigns or local pro-Russian media than by a deliberate adjustment of Armenia’s state-controlled narrative, which now tends to present Russia in a “pragmatically” neutral light. The outcome is a gradual restoration of public ambivalence, a sentiment neither strongly pro- nor anti-Russian, that mirrors Yerevan’s cautious process of re-accommodation with Moscow.

IMPLICATIONS: The ongoing renegotiation of the Russia–Armenia alliance, alongside Putin’s renewed rapprochement with Azerbaijan as shown at the CIS Dushanbe summit in October, suggests that the recurring “crises” in Moscow’s relations with Yerevan and Baku are not genuine strategic breaks. Instead of marking major shifts, these episodes usually reflect short-term tactical frictions, temporary disagreements that each side manages or uses to achieve immediate political or diplomatic goals.

Such frictions are often exaggerated in Western discussions as signs of a major geopolitical shift, whether portrayed as Armenia’s “pro-Western pivot” or Azerbaijan’s alleged “anti-Russian turn.” In reality, the situation is more nuanced. Both Yerevan and Baku often highlight the appearance of tension with Moscow for strategic purposes, using the perceived distance from Russia to strengthen their negotiating position with Western partners.

For Armenia, this approach supports a dual narrative: expressing European ambitions to gain sympathy and investment while keeping practical ties with Russia for various reasons. Pashinyan’s shifting engagement with the CSTO reflects this duality—not an actual withdrawal, but an effort to push the bloc to act while maintaining reassurance toward Western partners. Likewise, the 2024 removal of Russian border guards from the Armenia–Iran border was largely symbolic, affecting only the Agarak–Nordooz checkpoint, while Russian software systems and personnel continued to operate.

Azerbaijan follows a similar strategy, occasionally dramatizing its disagreements with Moscow to project strategic independence while maintaining practical cooperation. As Aliyev stated during his meeting with Putin in Dushanbe, despite the December plane incident, the “relationship has successfully developed across many areas,” which Putin hoped would “continue in the spirit of our alliance.” Despite symbolic disputes, Baku and Moscow continue to collaborate in energy, transport, and security, including through the “3+3” regional platform and trilateral projects involving Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran. These selective displays do not mean that all tensions are artificial or coordinated. Real disagreements remain, such as over Moscow’s security obligations to Armenia or the oil contamination scandal involving Russian exports passing through Azerbaijani infrastructure to the EU, but Pashinyan and Aliyev rarely cross Moscow’s strategic boundaries. Thus, what appears as instability often serves to renegotiate hierarchies rather than to overturn them.

For Moscow, this managed ambiguity remains advantageous. By allowing limited dissent and some visible distance, Russia maintains its regional influence while appearing less intrusive, “being present by seeming absent.” This recently adopted strategy enables Putin to exercise influence without attracting too much Western attention. From Moscow’s viewpoint, even Western-backed initiatives such as the August 8 Armenia–Azerbaijan Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) infrastructure deal are not viewed as threatening. Instead, TRIPP is seen as fitting into Russia’s wider connectivity strategy, linking Russia and Turkey through Azerbaijan, similar to how the North–South corridor connects Russia and Iran. The Kremlin’s reasoning assumes that regional realities, codified by the November 9, 2020, trilateral agreement, will eventually force Washington either to cooperate with Moscow or to withdraw from the project.

For Yerevan, adopting a “region-first” policy means engaging with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, even while maintaining pro-Western rhetoric. The March 2025 parliamentary resolution to start EU membership talks serves mostly performative and domestic aims rather than indicating a real policy shift. The Pashinyan government continues to emphasize the advantages of the Eurasian Economic Union and has applied to join the SCO, showing how Western-oriented language coexists with lasting non-Western partnerships.

Moscow’s acceptance of this balancing comes from its belief that Pashinyan’s EU-focused gestures do not present a real threat. This explains the Kremlin’s restrained reaction to events such as the arrest of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who has fallen out of favor in Putin’s circles. Putin does not oppose either Pashinyan or Aliyev; rather, he views both as cooperative actors within Russia’s changing regional strategy. This approach is reflected in the Kremlin’s “warm neutrality,” expressed by Matviyenko toward Pashinyan before Armenia’s elections, and in Putin’s calculated revelation at the Dushanbe summit about Ramiz Mehtiyev’s planned coup against Aliyev. 

CONCLUSIONS: At this stage, Armenia–Russia relations highlight the growing gap between outward perception and internal reality in the region. To Western observers, Armenia’s pursuit of European integration and broader multilateral ties may seem like a gradual move away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. Yet beneath this surface lies a more complex and regionally rooted dynamic. It suggests that the Kremlin is rethinking its approach in the South Caucasus, developing a coordinated and flexible form of engagement with both Armenia and Azerbaijan that hides the full extent of Russian influence while strengthening the illusion that Russia is withdrawing. This adjustment gives all three actors subtle room to maneuver, allowing for a shared strategy of cooperative dominance and geopolitical maskirovka.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Eduard Abrahamyan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Analysis and author of Small States, Russia and the West: Polarity, Constellations and Heterogeneity in the Geopolitics of the Caucasus (Routledge, 2025).

By Emil Avdaliani

On October 9, the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan met in Dushanbe. Relations appear to be improving and despite the persisting distrust, Baku seeks to maintain a functional relationship with Moscow. At the same time, Baku has taken significant steps to strengthen ties with Washington, with U.S. companies pledging investments in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sector. Close relations with both Russia and the U.S. align with Baku’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy aimed at avoiding dependence on any single major power. Through this approach, Baku seeks to demonstrate that it enjoys increasing flexibility in its international maneuvering.



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BACKGROUND: Over the past two months, Azerbaijan’s relations with both Russia and the U.S. have undergone significant changes, reflecting Baku’s continued commitment to maintaining balance in its foreign policy.

On October 9, Vladimir Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. During the meeting, Putin addressed what he called the “most sensitive issue,” the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 jet, caused by a Russian air defense missile. He expressed his condolences and effectively issued an apology. Putin stated that the investigation into the crash had concluded and that the causes of the tragedy had been identified. He attributed the incident to three Ukrainian drones allegedly flying over Russian territory at the time and mentioned technical malfunctions in Russia’s air defense system, which launched two missiles that did not directly strike the plane but exploded about ten meters away.

Between the downing of the Azerbaijani airliner and the meeting in Dushanbe, relations grew even more strained following the arrest of members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg in June 2025. Russian security forces detained a group of Azerbaijani nationals in connection with murders committed in the early 2000s, resulting in the deaths of two suspects during the operation. In response, Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures, arresting eight Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime. The Russian House in Baku was subsequently closed, all Russia-related cultural events were cancelled, and Azerbaijani authorities detained both the director and the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan.

Amid the tensions and eventual reconciliation with Russia, Baku has also improved its relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated during the Biden administration. That period coincided with the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the mass displacement of Armenians, developments that created friction between Washington and Baku. However, with Trump’s return to the presidency, momentum began to build toward reversing this trend. The ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan drew renewed U.S. attention, with Washington showing a clear willingness to act as the main mediator in the process.

This development led to the peace summit in Washington, D.C., on August 8, where Yerevan and Baku reached a landmark agreement granting the U.S. a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of a transit corridor through Armenian territory. Named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), the corridor will connect Turkey with the Caspian Sea, bypassing the traditional route through Georgia. In addition, Azerbaijan secured U.S. President Donald Trump’s approval of an order lifting Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had prohibited U.S. military assistance to Azerbaijan since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. During the summit, Azerbaijan’s SOCAR signed a memorandum of understanding with ExxonMobil, and following the event, Washington and Baku agreed to hold regular meetings on military and economic cooperation.

IMPLICATIONS: For Azerbaijan, Putin’s remarks were seen as an apology, and Baku now appears ready to normalize relations with Moscow. Yet beneath this adjustment lies a deeper motive: Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is shaped by calculations of power balance. Although weakened by the war in Ukraine, Russia remains strong enough to exert pressure on Azerbaijan, and Baku has been cautious not to provoke Moscow’s anger. Positioned geographically between Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan remains vulnerable to possible Russian military or economic pressure, as well as to instability from the Middle East driven by Israeli and U.S. actions against the Islamic Republic.

This explains why, after a relatively extended period of tension with Moscow, Baku ultimately chose reconciliation. Moreover, this approach aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader pattern of behavior toward other powers. Since 2020, when Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, its relations with Iran have worsened. Tehran grew concerned about the shifting balance of power in the South Caucasus, marked by Azerbaijan’s rising confidence and Turkey’s expanding influence. Until late 2024, ties between Baku and Tehran went through several cycles of tension, yet both sides were careful to prevent any major military escalation. This period concluded with a clear rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Iran, marked by bilateral visits and the reopening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran.

The reconciliation with Moscow also reflects Baku’s ongoing focus on maintaining balanced relations with its neighbors, particularly major powers. Ties with Russia remain important, as shown by the expansion of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russia’s interior through Iran to the Indian Ocean. A key branch of this corridor passes through Azerbaijan, making it a vital route for Russia’s access to the Middle East. In addition, strong bilateral trade between Azerbaijan and Russia provides another incentive for both countries to avoid any serious deterioration in their relationship.

However, this reconciliation is neither complete nor entirely sincere. Azerbaijan will continue to follow its multi-vector foreign policy, which increasingly limits its dependence on Russia. The broader geopolitical context favors Baku. Engaged in a prolonged conflict that demands vast economic and military resources, Russia has been unable to maintain the dominant position in the South Caucasus that it held before 2022. The regional states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, quickly moved to take advantage of this new flexibility. Azerbaijan regained territories long controlled by Armenia, while Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh largely stood by. Since the fall of the Armenian enclave in September 2023, Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia have steadily worsened. In Baku, the need to rely on Moscow’s goodwill has greatly diminished, giving the country greater confidence in its foreign policy. As a result, Azerbaijan has expanded ties with Israel and Pakistan, improved relations with Iran, strengthened strategic cooperation with Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and, most notably, established a strategic partnership agreement with China.

To balance Russia, Azerbaijan needs not only Turkey, its traditional ally, and stable relations with Iran, but also strong ties with the U.S. Although Washington has at times encouraged dialogue with Moscow over the war in Ukraine, it has also demonstrated its ability to pursue an independent agenda in the South Caucasus, often at odds with Russia’s core interests. The TRIPP agreement is one example of this approach. It angered Moscow because the deal reduced Russian influence and encouraged both Azerbaijan and Armenia to follow Washington’s lead. For Baku, therefore, greater U.S. involvement in the region translates into reduced dependence on Moscow.

CONCLUSIONS: The current level of tension with Russia has eased, following a familiar pattern in Azerbaijan’s dealings with Moscow and other neighboring states. It also shows that Russia cannot afford to abandon Azerbaijan or enter a cycle of escalation with Baku. Moscow is unable to handle another major crisis along its borders and remains dependent on Azerbaijan for transit within the INSTC project. Looking ahead, a continued period of stable but cautious bilateral relations is likely, without major escalation, yet unlikely to develop into deeper cooperation. The relationship will remain based on pragmatic, transactional engagement, while over time the geopolitical gap between the two countries can be expected to grow increasingly evident.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Vali Kaleji 

On August 27, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the unprecedented statement that he recognizes the mass killings of Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks in the early 20th century Ottoman Empire as genocide. Armenia dismissed the gesture as insincere and opportunistic, given Israel’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan and Yerevan’s ongoing normalization talks with Ankara. Netanyahu’s recognition and its aftermath signify the contradictions of the new regional order emerging between the South Caucasus and the Levant.

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BACKGROUND: To maintain ties with Türkiye, Israel had long avoided officially recognizing the mass killings of Christians in the early 20th century Ottoman empire as genocide. When asked by Patrick Bet-David on his podcast why Israel does not recognize the Armenian genocide, Netanyahu said, “I think we have. I think the Knesset passed a resolution to that effect.” However, Israel’s parliament has not passed any such legislation into law. When asked why no Israeli prime minister has recognized the genocide, Netanyahu responded, “I just did. Here you go.”

Türkiye condemned and rejected Netanyahu’s statements. On August 29, it announced the complete suspension of all commercial and economic relations with Israel and the closure of its airspace to Israeli aircraft. This decision may be interpreted as a reaction to Israel’s renewed ground operations in Gaza as well as Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide. Türkiye’s responses to previous recognitions have consisted of diplomatic tensions, temporary cooling of bilateral relations, the summoning or recall of ambassadors, and critical rhetoric. To date, Türkiye has not severed relations with any of the 33 states recognizing the Armenian genocide.

Internationally, positions taken on the early 20th-century mass killings of Christians can be broadly divided into three categories. The first includes Türkiye and its close ally Azerbaijan, which deny that the events constituted genocide, characterizing them instead as unsystematic outcomes of the turmoil marking the final years of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The second category comprises Asian, Middle Eastern, and African states that neither deny the events nor officially recognize them as genocide. Seeking to preserve relations with Türkiye, these countries employ terms such as “massacre,” “mass murder,” “catastrophe,” “human tragedy,” and “inhumane actions.” 

The third category comprises the governments and parliaments of 33 states that have formally recognized the Armenian genocide. Following Netanyahu’s recent statement, Israel may now be considered the 34th country to join this group. 

IMPLICATIONS: Although no state has ever officially revoked its recognition of the Armenian genocide, the durability of Netanyahu’s stance as an element of Israel’s official policy toward Türkiye remains uncertain. The Knesset has not enacted any legislation formalizing such recognition. It is conceivable that a conclusion of the Gaza war, Netanyahu’s departure from office, changes in the political composition of the Israeli government and Knesset, or a normalization of Israeli–Turkish relations could prompt a reassessment of this position. In that case, Israel’s recognition may remain confined to Netanyahu’s statement amid bilateral tensions with Türkiye, rather than evolving into a permanent state policy.

Syria provides a clear example of how political instability and relations with Türkiye have influenced decisions to recognize the Armenian genocide. For decades, Syria refrained from official recognition, despite its strong ties with the Armenian diaspora and Armenia itself, in order to preserve relations with Türkiye. However, at the height of the Syrian civil war, Syria became the second Arab state, after Lebanon, to recognize the massacres of Armenians as genocide on February 13, 2020. After the fall of the Assad regime, this stance appears to have shifted significantly. The de facto government led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani now maintains close relations with Türkiye. Although it has not yet officially rescinded the earlier recognition, revisions to Syrian school history books, specifically the removal of references to Ottoman-era massacres and Syrian resistance to Ottoman rule, suggest an emerging reorientation in Syria’s approach under the new leadership.

Conversely, the Armenian government’s response to Netanyahu’s statement diverged from its usual reaction to other states’ recognition of the Armenian genocide. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan rejected the Israeli leader’s remarks, emphasizing that Armenia must decide whether it wishes such recognition to become “a geopolitical bargaining chip in the hands of those who have no connection to our reality or the interests of our people.” 

There are four key aspects to the Armenian government’s position. First, Yerevan perceives Netanyahu’s statement as lacking sincerity and genuine historical or moral solidarity with the victims of the genocide, particularly at a time when Israel faces intense international criticism over human rights violations over its war in Gaza. Second, Yerevan attributes this declaration primarily to Israel’s escalating dispute with Türkiye, which has deepened following Israel’s decision to impose a total blockade and occupation of Gaza. Consequently, from Yerevan’s perspective, Netanyahu’s remarks function primarily as an instrument of political pressure on Türkiye. 

Third, Israel maintains a close partnership with Azerbaijan, and Israeli military assistance played a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s victory during the Second Karabakh War in October–November 2020. This conflict resulted in Azerbaijan’s full capture of Nagorno-Karabakh and the mass displacement of Armenians to Armenia. The legacy of Armenia’s political and military defeats, facilitated in part by Israeli support, renders it difficult for the Armenian government to accept or welcome Netanyahu’s recognition. 

Fourth, Pashinyan’s government has actively pursued the normalization of relations with Türkiye in recent years. Following the recent agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump, the likelihood of restoring diplomatic relations and reopening the borders between Armenia and Türkiye has significantly increased.

From the perspective of many Armenians, particularly those within the Armenian diaspora who regard themselves as descendants of the survivors of the genocide, Pashinyan’s government is transgressing the “red lines” of Armenian historical claims by seeking normalization with Türkiye without meeting four key preconditions. These include: official recognition of the genocide by the Turkish government; a formal apology from Türkiye, as the Ottoman Empire’s successor state; compensation for the approximately 1.5 million victims; and the restitution of Armenian homes, lands, and churches, especially in eastern Türkiye. Türkiye has consistently rejected these conditions for the past century. 

CONCLUSIONS: Ultimately, Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide represents the latest manifestation of the contradictions shaping the emerging regional order spanning the South Caucasus and the Levant. This new configuration has arisen in the aftermath of the events of October 7 and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, developments that have diminished the influence of Iran, Russia, and while positioning Arab and Western states, along with Türkiye and, as key actors in post-Assad Syria. Armenia lost an international partner in the al-Assad regime, whereas Azerbaijan has sought to build a productive relationship with its successor. 

Baku has sought to establish a new coalition with Türkiye, Israel, and Syria, attempting to mediate between Ankara and Tel Aviv, as well as between Damascus and Tel Aviv. However, issues such as the Golan Heights, Israel’s support for Syria’s Druze minority, and its military interventions have rendered rapprochement between Israel and Syria particularly difficult. Furthermore, Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide and Türkiye’s subsequent decision to sever all trade and air connections with Israel have severely undermined mediation efforts between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, the divergent political aspirations of Syria’s Kurdish population, perceived as a shared challenge by both Türkiye and Syria’s new leadership, constitute another critical element in the intricate geopolitical landscape of the Levant in the post–October 7 and post-Assad era.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at    This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .