By Charlotte Krausz

President Trump's recent imposition of 25 percent tariffs on India for importing Russian oil signals a potential expansion of secondary sanctions to other Russian energy customers. The policy shift threatens to extend punitive measures to post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus that remain heavily dependent on Russian energy infrastructure. While aimed at curtailing Russia's war revenues, such measures could paradoxically drive these strategically important regions closer to Moscow's orbit, undermining years of U.S. and EU engagement in the region.

Gazprom headquarters in St. Petersburg, Russia (Image Courtesy of Flickr)

BACKGROUND: In his statements, Trump has criticized countries that import oil and accused them of funding the “Russian war machine.” By stopping Russia’s revenues from its largely petrostate-based war economy, the U.S. seeks to thwart Russian advances in Ukraine and punish Putin. Yet imposing high tariffs on countries dependent on Russia for their energy supply, especially on post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, could have far worse ramifications for U.S. and EU aspirations in the region and drive former Soviet republics closer to Russia once more

A key example of this policy shift occurred in the first days of August 2025, when President Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff (later raised to 50 percent) on India for being a major buyer of Russian oil. Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of India, said that “the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable.” Given that India buys one-third of its crude oil from Russia, India is unlikely to change course, and the tariffs have badly damaged relations with India. The move is especially surprising given Trump’s past cordial relationship with Modi and the Biden administration's geopolitical courting of India. Biden even hosted Modi for a state dinner in June 2023.

In a recent opinion piece in The Washington Post, Andriy Yermak, Ukraine’s chief of the presidential office, praised the high tariffs on India. Yermak declared that it was a “great first step” but called for more pressure and for a “full economic blockade” of Russia. While Ukraine understandably wants everything possible to be done to end the war and bring peace, not all avenues will lead to the desired outcome. The decision for Europe to get off Russian oil following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was apparent and necessary. And though it led to an increase in energy costs and inflation, alternative energy sources were found, and Russia lost a vital stream of revenue. The expansion of these sanctions, this reasoning goes, will help the war effort and thwart Russia’s imperial ambitions.

But this strategy could be disastrous if poorly applied, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where countries are still dependent on Russia for energy needs. The energy landscape in Central Asia reflects decades of Soviet-era infrastructure and integration. Central Asian countries, except oil-rich Turkmenistan, remain highly reliant on Russian energy infrastructure and benefit from shared Soviet-era energy grids and the Eurasian Economic Union.

The South Caucasus presents a similar case. Georgia and Armenia, even more so, are largely dependent on Russian oil and have limited energy supply options. Georgia lacks domestic oil refineries and imports primarily from Russia and Azerbaijan, with Russian imports recently surpassing Azerbaijani supplies for the first time in eighteen years despite troubled bilateral relations. Armenia faces even greater constraints, with Gazprom maintaining a monopoly over natural gas imports and distribution. Natural gas made up 80 percent of Armenia’s energy imports in 2020. The rest comes from Iran in an electricity-for-natural trade deal. Armenia’s natural gas imports are delivered through the North-South Gas Pipeline via Georgia. Other regional pipelines bypass Armenia due to geopolitical conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the closure of European markets to Russian oil after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian energy companies redirected their focus towards Central Asia, leading to an increase in Russian energy imports into the region. Russia and Central Asian countries rely on the same Soviet-era-built energy grid and EAEU membership. Russian investment in Central Asia’s energy infrastructure has expanded since 2022, including nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and hydroelectric facilities elsewhere. Even Kyrgyzstan, despite being a renewable energy leader, plans to double its Russian oil imports by 2040.

Despite their energy dependence on Russia, both Armenia and Georgia have sought EU membership in the past. Both countries have undergone democratic revolutions, although their current political situations are tenuous. After Russia failed to defend Armenia from Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive, public opinion of Russia dramatically decreased, with two-thirds expressing a negative view and 40 percent viewing Russia as a threat. When the Georgian government withdrew from EU accession in November 2024, protests lasted for months demanding a reversal. Armenia and Georgia also share ties to Europe and the U.S. in terms of tourism, culture, and ethnic diasporas.

The U.S. imposing sanctions or high tariffs on countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus has the potential to undo decades of U.S. outreach to these regions. These could not separate their energy supplies from Russia without great harm to their own economies, nor would such a tradeoff be worth it to them. Antagonist trade policies would increase anti-American sentiment, inhibit future American investment, and thrust these post-Soviet states back into Moscow’s orbit.

Secondary sanctions on Russian oil importers are not assured to change the situation on the ground in Ukraine, which has been at a territorial standstill for months. Russia has proved more than capable of keeping its war machine growing and expanding under international sanctions. These approaches are less effective than simply supplying Ukraine directly with the weapons it needs to liberate territory and defend its skies.

Should the U.S. see strategic importance in weaning post-Soviet republics off Russian oil, it could encourage alternative energy routes and the use of renewable energy. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are already at the forefront in renewables like wind and hydroelectric power. A key alternative route could source energy from Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan has the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world. As Michael Doran from the Hudson Institute explains, “We just need a few kilometers of pipeline to be built in order to connect up Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan, which can then flow comfortably to Europe across Georgia … Turkmen Gas could end the dependence of Europe on Russian gas.” In addition, the U.S.-brokered peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan presents new energy options for Armenia. If Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey were to be opened, it could diversify its energy imports rather than remaining reliant on Russia.

CONCLUSIONS: Post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the Caucasus are caught between a revanchist Russia and growing ties with the West. Central Asia and the South Caucasus have much to offer the West, from energy deposits to critical minerals, emerging democracies, and tourism. A “full economic blockade” would not only be impossible to enforce but also detrimental to long-term U.S. interests.

The countries of the Central Asia and Caucasus regions are aware of the great power rivalries surrounding them. They understand their precarious situations and the importance of not antagonizing Russia. If the U.S. wants to have a presence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in the decades to come, it must respect the inherent multilateralism of these regions. As the war in Ukraine drags on, Washington must decide to what extent it sees importance in stopping the flow of Russian oil. It must weigh the value of cutting Russian oil revenues against future relations with post-Soviet countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Charlotte Krausz is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council, a Washington-based think tank. She is an undergraduate at the University of St. Andrews studying International Relations and Persian.

By Anna Vardanyan

The unprecedented anti-church campaign launched in Armenia at the end of May of this year, which is comparable only to the early Soviet years in terms of the severity of the measures, seems to cross all red lines. High-ranking clergy members are being arrested, the Prime Minister makes defamatory statements against the incumbent Catholicos and threatens to dethrone him, and law enforcement officers invade the country’s main church. What are the main drivers of these events, and what impact could they have on regional stability?

An Armenian Orthodox Church (Image Courtesy of GetArchive.net)

BACKGROUND: There are several reasons behind the current conflict between the Armenian government and the church. The current Armenian government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church have never been allies. Clashes with the church started from the very first days the revolutionary government came to power in 2018. The prime minister has regularly criticized the church hierarchy for its connections with the former authorities, which he calls a “criminal regime.” Looking back, it should be noted that, unlike with the current authorities, there were never issues with the Catholicos and the public during the three previous presidents’ rule. The incumbent Catholicos Karekin II was elected in 1999 during the administration of the first president, Levon Ter-Petrossyan, and has and still maintains very close relations with the latter. During the administrations of the second president, Robert Kocharyan, and the third president, Serzh Sargsyan, the Catholicos was treated respectfully, and there was  mutual understanding and support from the government to the church. There were even accusations that the Catholicos was obviously backing Kocharyan’s and, specifically, Sargsyan’s regimes and interfering in the political life of the state.

However, after the revolution in 2018, there were actions that appeared to be initiated by Pashinyan against the Catholicos, with a view to discrediting his reputation. In particular, from June to October 2018, protest rallies were held in which the participants demanded the resignation of Karekin II, whom they considered to be allied with the former authorities and accused of being involved in shady business deals.

Critics brought forward the narrative that Karekin II was “closed and shadowy,” he is believed to be too involved in business – a claim given greater weight by the discovery of a million-dollar Swiss bank account in his name. In 2015, an investigative report revealed that he had a million-dollar Swiss bank account, but the leaked files do not specify the exact role that Karekin II had in relation to the account, and the press spokesman of Catholicos said it was opened by his predecessor and used to help the Church.

The movement against the Catholicos, dubbed “New Armenia, New Patriarch,” has been holding rallies in downtown Yerevan, recording video appeals against Catholicos, and picketing his office in Echmiadzin, even pushing and grabbing him, as seen in an extraordinary video that shocked Armenians both for its aggression against the Catholicos and for the surprising vulnerability he displayed.

Nikol Pashinyan, during that period, stated that he was not going to intervene to reduce tensions against the Catholicos and emphasized the separation of church and state. However, as the movement failed to receive public support and was viewed rather poorly, Pashinyan’s targeting of the church ceased for a while.

After the defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, pressure on Pashinyan grew and Church leaders called for his resignation. The Catholicos urged Pashinyan to step down “to prevent further shocks, possible clashes, and tragic consequences to the public, to elect a new prime minister in consultation with political forces and to form an interim government of national accord.”

After this, the relationship between the Catholicos and Pashinyan deteriorated irretrievably. On the one hand, the Armenian Church remains the only state institution that maintains independence from Pashinyan and his team. Moreover, the religious structure more than once spoke out from nationalistic positions, becoming a stronghold of protest sentiments. Last spring, it was the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church who spoke out against the delimitation of the border with Azerbaijan in the Tavush region. Local archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan then became the leader of the resistance movement. First, he led a march from the line of contact to Yerevan and then held several large rallies in the Armenian capital. The movement was also supported by the central leadership of the Church. The Investigative Committee of Armenia unfolded allegations that Galstanian had begun preparations for the violent overthrow of the government in November 2024 with the members of his opposition-backed movement.

In a statement, the Committee alleged that the group had planned to assassinate unnamed “civilians,” take other violent actions, and paralyze the country’s security apparatus for that purpose. According to official information, Galstanyan was planning to “form 200 groups of militants, each with 25 people, in order to occupy parliament.”  He allegedly discussed this with Levon Kocharyan, the son of Armenia’s second president and a member of parliament. As a result of this, Galstanyan and 14 supporters were arrested on June 26.  

However, this process of repression was not limited only to Galstanyan's arrest. Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahyan, the leader of the Shirak Diocese, has also been arrested, charged with “usurpation of power and overthrow of the constitutional order.” Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian billionaire with Russian citizenship, who recently expressed his willingness to support the Armenian Apostolic Church, was also arrested. He is also accused of inciting a coup d'état. The Investigative Committee claims that these three individuals played a role in a terrorist act being prepared against the state.

The government's campaign against the church and recent arrests have been criticized by Armenian civil society. More than two dozen non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders are raising the alarm that the authorities are interfering with the autonomy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, as well as the principle of the independence of the judicial system.

IMPLICATIONS: The government-church conflict in Armenia should not be viewed solely as an internal political process within the country. It eventually has a broader scope, and in some sense fits into the realm of global processes taking place in the world, given the trends of separation of church and state and the “secularization” of spirituality in the world. According to the Constitution of Armenia, the church is separated from the state ( Article 7.1. ), nevertheless, since its formation, it has enjoyed state support and actively participated in the country's political processes: there are also known periods in Armenian history when, in the absence of a state, the church assumed the role of the state itself.

As for the role of the church in Armenia today, it has broad public influence, but no legal powers or duties. When it comes to bringing a clergyman into the legal arena, it leads to a tension of sentiments, because neither in terms of public perception nor in terms of law are there regulations aimed at clarifying the powers of the church and the government. Meanwhile, the Armenian Church enjoys a strong reputation both inside the country and in the Armenian diaspora. According to the results of the 2011 census in Armenia, about 97 percent of the country's population are followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Further aggravation of church-state relations could lead to civil conflict within the country and pose a threat to the re-election of the current authorities in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026, which, in turn, could abort the efforts of the current authorities to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The ruling party is approaching the election campaign in a difficult position. This spring, representatives of the ruling “Civil Contract” party lost two key positions in the mayoral elections in Gyumri and Parakar. Surveys indicate that the same result could be seen at the national level. According to a survey conducted by MPG/Gallup International Association in January of this year, the support for the pro-government “Civil Contract” is only 11 percent.  At the same time, the church enjoys considerable trust among the population. According to the Caucasus Barometer, a national household survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), which sampled 1,561 people aged 18 and over in Armenia between July and October 2024, about 79 percent of Armenian residents expressed trust in the Armenian Apostolic Church, making it the highest figure among public institutions.

It is likely that the church will support the opponents of the ruling party, thereby increasing their chances of victory. Perhaps the campaign to discredit the clergy was launched by the authorities in order to prevent such a scenario. Moreover, the authorities may want to provoke some protests now so that by the election date, they will have already fizzled out. However, the crisis that has arisen threatens a split. If Pashinyan succeeds in changing the Catholicos, then opposition-minded citizens of Armenia and parishes in the Diaspora may not recognize the first hierarch appointed after political interference.

This conflict between the government and the church in Armenia could lead to a dangerous point, when external forces could take advantage of this situation and try to implement some of their plans through the Church or interfere in the internal affairs of the country. All this can fit into Russia's plans, for example, which wants to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, and considers the Armenian church as a factor of influence in the region. It is worth mentioning that the brother of Karekin II is the Primate of the Russian Armenian Diocese, and Samvel Karapetyan has great financial resources, has created tens of thousands of jobs in Armenia, and Pashinyan and his team are wary that he could fund large demonstrations and achieve a change of power in Armenia backed by Russia. The opposition and the Armenian Apostolic Church, Armenian businessmen in Russia, and the Armenian community in Russia may unite around Karapetyan, which could lead to Pashinyan's resignation. It is no coincidence that Russian public figures affiliated with the Kremlin have issued severe condemnations of the Armenian authorities’ attacks on the church, including a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who described the attacks on the Armenian Apostolic Church as “deeply worrisome and unjustified.” Lavrov's statement was immediately followed by a harsh response from Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, urging him “not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Armenia.”

The Kremlin is keen on the dominance or victory of Echmiadzin in this conflict, on the basis not of Christian solidarity but geopolitical interests. The Kremlin seeks to destabilize the situation in Armenia and create a chaotic and uncontrollable situation. Even if the current weakened government remains in Armenia, its dependence on the Kremlin will only increase under such unstable conditions.

Ultimately, this conflict may weaken the position of Christianity in the South Caucasus. It is no coincidence that the Chairman of the Caucasus Muslims’ Board (CMB), Sheikh-ul-Islam Pashazade, encourages this conflict and regularly criticizes the Armenian Church, considering it a “threat to neighbors.”

CONCLUSIONS:  It is obvious that the reasons for the conflict between the government and the church are political. The current authorities and the Church elite have many controversies, including on issues of fundamental importance for Armenia. The authorities see the Catholicos and the bishops as yet another political opponent, against whom they are applying all available tools. Nevertheless, what is most disturbing is that the ruling party and the Prime Minister himself are fueling this rift by employing aggressive methods that threaten both democratic norms and religious freedom. Instead of stabilizing the situation, they often exacerbate tensions by using divisive rhetoric and targeting individuals, setting a dangerous precedent for political debate. This behavior threatens to deepen existing divisions within society at a crucial stage for Armenia's democratic development. Such escalations threaten to further split Armenian society, influence the results of the upcoming elections next year and negatively affect the peace negotiations with Azerbaijan-- something that in turn will affect the entire region. Pashinyan's course aims to form a “homogeneous political space,” but risks defeat in parliamentary elections and a premature resignation from power and politics. In this case, there is a significant risk that Armenia will revert to a Russian orientation, despite Russia’s gradual decline in  influence in the South Caucasus today.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Anna Vardanyan is an independent journalist-researcher based in Yerevan. For ten years she has worked as a Communications expert and Media advisor to the Vice-President of the Parliament of Armenia. She has been working as an accredited journalist at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia.

By Umair Jamal

The June 25 meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers in China illuminated how enduring tensions between Pakistan and India are hindering the bloc’s counterterrorism initiatives while compounding New Delhi’s diplomatic challenges within the organization. India’s refusal to endorse the meeting’s joint communiqué, following its unsuccessful attempt to include references to the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, demonstrated its waning influence in Eurasian multilateralism. Whereas Pakistan succeeded in presenting the unrest in Baluchistan as a matter of SCO concern, India was unable to garner support for its narrative on Kashmir. Concurrently, China’s advocacy for a more pronounced Iranian role in the SCO—evident in the forum’s condemnation of Israeli military actions, which India opposed—suggests a growing divide, potentially transforming the organization into a venue for great-power rivalry. This impasse accentuates India’s strategic dilemma: it must either align with the SCO’s emerging anti-Western consensus or risk marginalization within the China-dominated security framework of Central Asia.

The 2022 Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in Samarqand, Uzbekistan. Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

BACKGROUND: The SCO evolved from the 1996 Shanghai Five, initially established as a Sino-Russian initiative aimed at stabilizing Central Asia. However, its enlargement in 2017 to include both Pakistan and India introduced volatile bilateral dynamics into the organization. Traditionally, the SCO has concentrated on combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, yet the divergent stances of India and Pakistan have increasingly politicized these very concerns. Pakistan characterizes India’s actions in Kashmir as constituting state terrorism. Islamabad maintains its support for the region’s right to self-determination and remains committed to a negotiated resolution of the dispute. In contrast, India accuses Pakistan of facilitating cross-border militancy, resulting in an impasse that has repeatedly obstructed consensus within the SCO.

The April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, which resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, along with India’s subsequent missile strikes on Pakistan, significantly escalated bilateral tensions in the weeks leading up to the SCO meeting in China. India’s effort to raise the Kashmir issue during the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting proved unsuccessful, as references to the matter were excluded from the preliminary joint communiqué intended for endorsement by all member states. In contrast, Pakistan’s inclusion of references to unrest in Baluchistan in the draft appeared to align more closely with the organization’s stance against external interference, thereby garnering broader resonance within the bloc.

China’s discreet yet consistent support for Pakistan has altered the internal dynamics of the SCO in recent years. On multiple occasions, Beijing has permitted Islamabad to obstruct India’s terrorism-related narratives, while simultaneously advancing its own conception of the SCO as a counterweight to the U.S.-led international order. For example, India’s recent refusal to endorse the SCO’s condemnation of Israel’s attack on Iran further isolated New Delhi from the prevailing consensus within the group, highlighting its increasing divergence from the bloc’s anti-Western trajectory. This discord is structural in nature. India’s strategic alignments with the U.S. through frameworks such as the QUAD and I2U2 are at odds with the SCO’s objectives, whereas Pakistan’s China-backed diplomatic strategy aims to leverage the organization to constrain India’s influence. With Iran’s accession as a full member, the SCO is likely to intensify its anti-Israel and anti-American rhetoric, thereby compelling India to confront progressively more difficult diplomatic trade-offs.

IMPLICATIONS: The persistent tensions between India and Pakistan during SCO meetings are generating substantial obstacles for the organization while reshaping regional power dynamics. India increasingly finds itself in a strategic quandary. Remaining within the SCO necessitates engagement with both Pakistan and China on contentious issues such as Baluchistan and may compel tacit support for initiatives aligned with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conversely, a complete withdrawal from the forum would entail forfeiting strategic influence in Central Asia, thereby ceding greater regional influence to China and Russia.

Recent military confrontations between India and Pakistan underscore how their bilateral disputes are impeding the SCO’s capacity to foster effective security cooperation. Although the U.S. facilitated a ceasefire between the two countries following the latest clashes, the underlying issue persists: India aspires to leadership within the Global South, yet its strategic vision diverges from the SCO’s predominantly anti-Western orientation. India’s choice not to utilize the SCO platform to present its case against Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack reflects a diminishing confidence in the organization. Despite actively engaging Western capitals to highlight the issue of cross-border terrorism in the aftermath of its retaliatory strikes, India conspicuously refrained from advancing its position during the SCO summit.

This pattern of selective engagement suggests that New Delhi perceives the China-led forum as increasingly peripheral to its core security interests—a perception that stands in sharp contrast to its intensified diplomatic outreach to the U.S. and EU in recent weeks. India’s disengagement from the forum conveys a clear signal to states such as Pakistan and China: New Delhi prioritizes its Western alliances over participation in Eurasian multilateral mechanisms. By choosing not to raise the Pahalgam incident within the SCO framework, India implicitly acknowledged the organization’s limited utility in addressing its counterterrorism agenda. However, this strategy entails certain risks, as India’s terrorism-centric narrative, promoted primarily through its Western partnerships, has recently received limited international traction. Many states remain preoccupied with the potential nuclear implications of India-Pakistan tensions, while terrorism-related issues have garnered comparatively little global attention.

India’s marginalization within the SCO may inadvertently enhance Pakistan’s standing as the more engaged and consistent Eurasian partner, thereby exposing the limitations of New Delhi’s multi-alignment strategy. Pakistan has strategically leveraged the SCO platform to elevate its international profile, presenting itself as a cooperative actor aligned with the organization’s principles. 

Meanwhile, Islamabad actively seeks to obstruct Indian statements that conflict with its strategic interests, while simultaneously reinforcing its alliance with Beijing. By focusing on shared security concerns—such as terrorism—that resonate with Central Asian member states, Pakistan positions itself as a more constructive and cooperative actor within the SCO framework. In contrast, India’s persistent emphasis on Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism in Kashmir is perceived by other members as invoking a protracted bilateral conflict that necessitates substantive dialogue between the two parties. Within this context, the SCO is viewed as a potential facilitator, but only if both countries demonstrate a willingness to engage. While Pakistan has signaled openness to such mediation through the SCO, India has consistently rejected third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute.

China appears to be the primary beneficiary of the ongoing India-Pakistan rivalry within the SCO. It leverages these divisions to diminish India’s influence in Eurasian institutions, to assess the reliability of Russia—traditionally a neutral actor—and to advance its own financial mechanisms as alternatives to Western systems. In this context, Iran’s accession as a full member introduces additional complexities for India, compelling it to navigate between aligning with SCO positions and preserving its expanding strategic relations with Israel. Moreover, Iran’s inclusion is likely to enhance coordination between China and Pakistan on issues such as Afghanistan and regional energy initiatives, thereby increasing the risk of India’s marginalization within the organization.

India’s challenges within the SCO undermine its credibility as a self-proclaimed leader of the Global South. Its positions frequently diverge from those of the majority of member states, thereby casting doubt on its representative claims. The SCO’s counterterrorism cooperation has also been significantly impeded by the India-Pakistan impasse, which prevents joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and meaningful dialogue on bilateral tensions. This persistent dysfunction has historically provided greater operational latitude for militant groups and carries the risk of escalating into open conflict, as illustrated by the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack.

CONCLUSIONS: The SCO has arrived at a critical juncture, as the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to obstruct its operational efficacy. India’s marginalization at recent meetings underscores its difficulty in reconciling strategic partnerships with the U.S. and effective engagement within a China-led multilateral framework. Meanwhile, Pakistan—bolstered by Chinese support—has adeptly utilized the SCO as a platform to contest India’s stance on Kashmir and to portray itself as a constructive and responsible partner in counterterrorism efforts.

Looking ahead, three scenarios appear increasingly plausible. First, the existing stalemate may persist, with India continuing to obstruct references to Kashmir and Baluchistan while opposing proposals perceived as anti-Western. Second, Iran’s recent accession to the forum may consolidate an anti-U.S. and anti-Israel bloc within the SCO, further marginalizing India’s influence. Third, China may exploit these internal divisions to transform the SCO into a vehicle for advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, thereby diminishing India’s strategic role within the organization.

For the SCO to retain its relevance, it would need to play a constructive role in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan; however, China’s evident alignment with Pakistan renders this prospect improbable. The organization’s viability as a significant security platform now hinges on its capacity to transcend its current status as merely another stage for persistent India-Pakistan rivalry. With each successive meeting concluding without consensus, the prospects for such a transformation appear increasingly uncertain.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Sergey Sukhankin

Kazakhstan has finalized its decision regarding the bidder selected to construct its inaugural nuclear power plant (NPP). Contrary to earlier projections favoring a Chinese provider, the Russian state corporation Rosatom has assumed the leading role within the international consortium. However, this outcome is unlikely to marginalize Chinese interests: a Chinese firm is expected to lead the construction of a subsequent NPP, while Chinese companies are concurrently gaining prominence in other vital sectors of Kazakhstan’s (and Central Asia’s) economy, including renewable energy and water management. Western firms appear to be the principal losers, as their capacity to expand into the most lucrative and strategic segments of Kazakhstan’s economy is likely to diminish.

 The Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia. Image Courtesy of IAEA Imagebank  

BACKGROUND: In October 2024, following a national referendum in which over 71 percent of voters supported the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Kazakhstan, local authorities prouced a shortlist of prospective bidders. This included China’s CNNC, Russia’s Rosatom, South Korea’s KHNP, and France’s EDF. The selection process extended beyond economic rationale and was clearly shaped by geopolitical considerations: although Kazakhstani authorities initially intended to make a decision by the end of 2022, the deadline was repeatedly postponed. Despite widespread confidence among local experts that CNNC would prevail, and notable public support for the French and South Korean contenders, on June 14 it was officially announced that Russia’s Rosatom would lead the international consortium responsible for building the NPP.

However, appointing Rosatom to oversee Kazakhstan’s first NPP does not signify exclusive Russian dominance in the country’s emerging nuclear sector. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had previously stated that, to avert a foreseeable energy shortage, Kazakhstan would require not one but three NPPs. Furthermore, Minister of Energy Almasadam Sätqaliev publicly indicated that CNNC would likely head the consortium for the construction of another NPP. Tokayev later reaffirmed this during a meeting with Xi Jinping, assuring the Chinese leader that, given Kazakhstan’s need for 2–3 NPPs, CNNC is regarded as a reliable strategic partner with a secured role in the domestic market.

IMPLICATIONS: In many respects, Kazakhstan’s decision to appoint Rosatom as the head of the international consortium is readily explicable and can be attributed to two principal factors. First is the logic of “do-not-poke-the-bear” thinking. A combination of adverse developments and humiliations—the stalled “three-day war” in Ukraine, increasing economic and political isolation, and a series of setbacks in the Middle East—has rendered the Russian political elite particularly sensitive to any potential rejection of its bid by Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has once again declined to join BRICS, a move that visibly displeased Moscow. At this juncture, it is worth recalling that on May 29, Vladimir Putin met with Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev—an event that, according to some experts, may be interpreted as part of Russia’s exertion of political pressure on Kazakhstan’s current leadership in relation to the NPP project.

Despite Russia’s ongoing decline, Kazakhstan’s accommodation of Russia’s NPP-related interests is not unexpected: when cornered, the Russian regime is capable of undertaking retaliatory measures—such as provocations, subversion, or other forms of pressure—against the significantly smaller Kazakhstan. Conversely, experts have acknowledged that the selection of Rosatom may also possess an element of rationality. Analysts based in Kazakhstan emphasize Russia’s notable competitive advantages, which include cultural and linguistic proximity as well as logistical and technological compatibility. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s decision to finalize an agreement for the construction of a small NPP—an agreement that has since been upgraded in scope—may have further influenced Kazakhstan’s preference for Rosatom. Importantly, Rosatom is not subject to international sanctions, and the likelihood of its inclusion on such lists does not appear imminent.

That said, uncertainty remains regarding how Kazakhstan would respond should the corporation become subject to Western sanctions or if Russia’s macroeconomic conditions deteriorate further. Although Russia reportedly offers Kazakhstan favorable credit terms—details of which remain undisclosed—Kazakhstan-based experts highlight that Russia has previously failed to fulfill its commitments to finance energy infrastructure projects in three Kazakhstani cities. Moreover, citing the Belarusian case, anonymous Russian sources caution that partnering with Rosatom may ultimately impose a financial burden on Kazakhstan, despite the apparent economic appeal of the offer, and could also give rise to significant safety concerns over time.

Russia, however, will not be the sole dominant actor in Kazakhstan’s emerging nuclear energy sector. As previously noted, the local ruling elite regards China as a crucial component of the equation and, seemingly, as a counterbalancing force to Russia. For its part, Beijing will capitalize on several competitive advantages as it seeks to expand its influence within the country and its nuclear industry.

First, China is intensifying its cooperation with Kazakhstan in the field of water management, a domain of critical importance given the deteriorating conditions in the Caspian Sea. For example, during a recent meeting between Chinese and Kazakh water management experts, it was agreed that China Energy International Group would provide comprehensive training and expertise to its Kazakh counterparts. Additionally, it was disclosed at the meeting that the company is actively exploring the construction of a hydroelectric power facility in Kazakhstan and has expressed interest in participating in projects focused on the digitalization and automation of the country’s water management sector. Beyond current challenges with water supply, Kazakhstan’s ambitious plans to develop green hydrogen—which demands significant water resources—underscore water management as a strategic priority, and China is poised to expand its involvement in this area.

Second, China is rapidly enhancing its role in one of Kazakhstan’s most promising economic sectors—its uranium industry. Kazakhstan ranks first globally in uranium production and holds the second-largest uranium reserves after Australia, where production may decline due to growing public opposition. In light of ongoing geopolitical instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kazakhstan and Canada are likely to remain the two leading uranium producers, maintaining dominance in the global market. In this context, China could support Kazakhstan in addressing two major constraints limiting the full exploitation of its uranium resources: the absence of domestic enrichment capabilities and the continued reliance on Russia for uranium export logistics.

It is thus worth noting that Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group recently concluded an agreement with the Chinese firm SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, a subsidiary of the State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Under this arrangement, the Russian party transferred its shares in uranium production sites located in Northern Kazakhstan (Northern Khorasan) to its Chinese counterpart. Although experts remain divided on China’s rationale for acquiring stakes in what is viewed as a relatively depleted and marginal uranium site, many interpret this as a strategic move to further expand China’s presence in Kazakhstan. In any case, an increasing foothold in the country’s uranium sector could serve as a compelling argument in China’s favor in its pursuit of the NPP project.

Finally, Kazakhstan must recognize the potential consequences it may face in the near future if it fails to deepen its cooperation with China in nuclear and other forms of clean energy. Many experts contend that China’s rapid shift toward renewable energy signals a troubling trend for its hydrocarbon suppliers, including Kazakhstan. At present, renewable sources account for 80 percent of China’s energy and electricity demand, while fossil fuels still constitute approximately 62 percent of its overall energy consumption. However, the proportion of non-renewable energy in China’s energy mix is expected to decline further. This trajectory suggests that Kazakhstan should proactively explore alternative areas of economic cooperation—such as critical metals, renewable energy, and nuclear power—with its principal economic partner, especially in light of Beijing’s strategic direction and the intensifying competition from regional actors like Uzbekistan, where China is also expanding its presence.

CONCLUSIONS: Kazakhstan’s decision to appoint Rosatom de facto as the lead entity in constructing its first nuclear power plant (NPP) reflects a blend of economic, geopolitical, and symbolic considerations. The second NPP will most likely be built by China, which is simultaneously consolidating its position in Kazakhstan’s water management and renewable energy sectors—domains poised to drive economic growth across Central Asia for decades to come. For Russia, weakened and humiliated in Ukraine and the Middle East, the opportunity to construct Kazakhstan’s inaugural NPP represents a highly symbolic gesture, acknowledging its ongoing role in bilateral relations. Kazakhstan’s choice to prioritize a Sino-Russian consortium—though the long-term stability of this partnership remains uncertain—for shaping the country’s nuclear future effectively establishes a duopoly in this sector of the national economy. This development may be unwelcome news for Western actors, whose companies are unlikely to secure significant contracts in Kazakhstan’s most strategic economic sectors.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).