By Rafis Abazov

Uzbekistan is undergoing a strategic shift from reliance on traditional labor migration destinations toward a regulated, skills-based mobility model targeting high-income markets in Europe, East Asia, and North America. Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the establishment of a centralized Migration Agency institutionalizes vocational training, language certification, and bilateral labor agreements aligned with international standards. With over 2 million citizens working abroad and remittances reaching nearly US$ 14 billion annually, approximately one-fifth of GDP, migration remains central to economic stability. The reform aims to diversify risk, increase remittance quality, enhance human capital accumulation, and position Uzbekistan as a structured and reliable partner in global labor markets while strengthening domestic development through reintegration and entrepreneurship.

BACKGROUND:

Uzbekistan is entering a new phase in its migration policy. Long characterized by unregulated large-scale labor outflows to Russia and other post-Soviet destinations, the country is now deliberately repositioning itself as a regulated supplier of skilled labor to high-income markets in Europe, North America, Japan, and South Korea. Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, migration is no longer treated merely as a social safety valve but as a strategic economic instrument. The newly established Migration Agency signals an institutional shift toward managed mobility, vocational certification, and international labor standards—embedding migration policy within Uzbekistan’s broader economic modernization agenda. For over two decades, Uzbekistan has been one of Central Asia’s largest labor exporters. Economic restructuring, demographic pressure, and limited domestic job creation pushed millions of citizens to seek employment abroad. According to official data, almost two million Uzbek citizens (2023, official est.) were working abroad in 2023, the majority in Russia. Remittances have played a decisive role in the national economy: inflows reached approximately US$ 13.9 billion in 2023, accounting for nearly 18–20 percent of GDP. While these remittances have stabilized household incomes and supported domestic consumption, overdependence on a single labor destination exposed structural vulnerabilities. Currency fluctuations, geopolitical tensions, and regulatory shifts in host countries directly impacted migrants’ earnings and employment conditions.

Recognizing these risks, Tashkent has embarked on a policy recalibration. The government’s new migration strategy emphasizes diversification toward high-income economies where wage levels, labor protections, and skill requirements are higher. This pivot is not simply geographic; it is qualitative. It aims to transition from low-skilled, often informal labor migration toward regulated, skills-based, contract-driven mobility. The new Migration Agency coordinates with ministries of education, labor, and foreign affairs to align training curricula with employer demands in Europe, Japan, South Korea, and the Gulf states. Specialized programs now provide certification in healthcare assistance, construction trades, agricultural technologies, and industrial maintenance—sectors experiencing labor shortages in high-income economies. Language proficiency has become a central component of this strategy. Uzbek vocational centers now offer certified courses in German, Korean, Japanese, and English, increasing employability and reducing risks of exploitation. In parallel, bilateral labor agreements are being renegotiated to include stronger social protection clauses, insurance coverage, and mechanisms for dispute resolution. These agreements also aim to reduce irregular migration flows by expanding legal quotas and transparent recruitment procedures.

IMPLICATIONS:

Uzbekistan’s approach reflects a broader global shift toward managed migration frameworks. Rather than allowing informal recruitment networks to dominate the process, authorities are introducing structured pathways that protect workers and enhance the country’s reputation as a reliable labor partner. The economic rationale behind Uzbekistan’s migration pivot is multifaceted.

First, diversification reduces systemic risk. By expanding destination markets beyond Russia, Uzbekistan shields remittance flows from regional economic volatility. Even modest wage differentials matter: average earnings in South Korea or parts of the EU can exceed Russian wages by two to three times for comparable skills. Second, higher-income destinations generate larger remittance volumes per worker. If managed effectively, even a partial reallocation of labor flows toward high-income economies could significantly increase foreign currency inflows. With remittances already reaching nearly US$ 14 billion, incremental improvements in wage levels and contract stability could strengthen macroeconomic resilience. Third, the government views migration as a vehicle for human capital accumulation. Returning migrants often bring savings, technical skills, and entrepreneurial experience. Policy frameworks increasingly emphasize reintegration programs, small-business grants, and credit access to channel return migration into domestic economic development.

Uzbekistan’s recalibration also carries significant geopolitical implications. Diversifying migration destinations reduces overdependence on a single external partner and enhances foreign policy flexibility. By negotiating labor agreements with EU member states and East Asian economies, Tashkent strengthens diplomatic and economic ties beyond the post-Soviet space. Domestically, migration reform intersects with demographic realities. Uzbekistan’s population exceeds 36 million (up from 21 million in 1992), with a median age under 30. Each year, hundreds of thousands of young people enter the labor market. While domestic job creation remains a priority, international labor mobility offers a complementary pathway to absorb demographic pressure. By embedding migration within vocational education reform, authorities attempt to align external labor demand with internal skills development. This integration reduces the historical gap between education outputs and labor market requirements—both domestic and international.

Despite its strategic coherence, the migration pivot faces structural constraints.

An important challenge lies in balancing external labor exports with domestic industrialization goals. As Uzbekistan pursues manufacturing and services expansion, excessive outward migration of skilled workers could create internal shortages. Policymakers must calibrate mobility to avoid brain drain while still leveraging remittance benefits. Geopolitical uncertainties also remain. Immigration policies in high-income markets are subject to domestic political debates and regulatory fluctuations. Uzbekistan’s strategy depends on sustained openness in receiving countries. Finally, the success of reintegration programs will determine whether migration fosters long-term development. Without structured incentives for investment and entrepreneurship, returning migrants may struggle to translate overseas experience into domestic opportunity.

CONCLUSIONS:

Uzbekistan’s reforms may set a precedent for other Central Asian states grappling with similar migration dynamics. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also face outward unregulated labor mobility, albeit on different scales. If Tashkent successfully institutionalizes managed mobility while maintaining remittance stability, it could provide a replicable governance model for the region.

In this regard, migration policy intersects with regional economic cooperation frameworks. Skills harmonization, cross-border vocational partnerships, and data-sharing mechanisms could enhance Central Asia’s collective bargaining power in negotiations with destination countries.

With over 2 million citizens working abroad and remittances nearing US$ 14 billion annually, migration remains central to Uzbekistan’s economic stability. The new framework aims to maximize these benefits while reducing vulnerability and enhancing skill formation. Uzbekistan’s migration transformation represents more than a policy adjustment; it is a structural repositioning within the global labor economy. By institutionalizing managed mobility through the newly established Migration Agency, aligning vocational training with international standards, and diversifying destination markets toward high-income economies, Tashkent seeks to convert migration from a reactive necessity into a strategic asset.

If implemented effectively, this pivot could deepen Uzbekistan’s integration into regional and global economic networks—not merely as a labor exporter but as a regulated, skills-oriented partner. The long-term success of this strategy will depend on sustained institutional capacity, international cooperation, and the ability to translate institutionalized mobility programs into domestic development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), An Effective Project Manager (2025) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and facilitated the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries.

By Sudha Ramachandran

Afghanistan currently finds itself in an exceptionally precarious position. To the west, neighboring Iran has become an active war zone, while to the east, Pakistan has initiated what it describes as an “open war” against Afghanistan. After decades of conflict, Afghanistan’s capacity to manage the far-reaching consequences of the situation in Iran remains severely limited. The country’s already fragile economy is being further strained by rising global oil prices. At the same time, its access to maritime trade routes via Pakistan has been effectively closed for several months, while alternative trade corridors through Iran, the only viable substitute, are increasingly under threat. The likelihood of a substantial influx of refugees, including returning Afghan nationals, is expected to exacerbate an already critical humanitarian situation. Concurrently, the Taliban authorities are closely observing how the Iranian government responds to external pressures aimed at regime change.

BACKGROUND:

On the night of February 21-22, Pakistan launched “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq” against Afghanistan. Islamabad said that its missile and air strikes were targeting camps and hideouts of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province based on Afghan soil. Over the past month, Pakistan’s strikes have intensified and expanded in terms of the nature of targets and their geography. If initially Islamabad targeted border posts and alleged terrorist camps in Afghanistan’s border provinces, soon it was hitting Taliban military assets and ammunition depots as well as civilian targets, including a drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul.  

Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s western neighbor, Iran, came under devastating missile and air strikes launched by the U.S. and Israel on February 28. Since then, leadership compounds, military infrastructure, and economic and energy locations, including the country’s oil production and storage facilities have been destroyed. Top Iranian political and military leaders have been killed in the strikes as have hundreds of civilians. The war has spread beyond Iran. Tehran retaliated to the U.S.-Israel attacks by hitting Israeli targets as well as U.S. bases and oil infrastructure in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. South Asia was soon drawn into the war when the U.S. torpedoed an Iranian warship, IRIS Dena, 40 nautical miles off the Sri Lankan coast. On March 20, Iranian missiles reached deep into the Indian Ocean to target the U.S.-UK base in Diego Garcia. The war could draw in more countries, such as Pakistan. The destruction of production and refining infrastructure in the Gulf and Iran’s blocking of the Strait of Hormuz have led to fuel shortages and surging prices worldwide. What started as a war on Iran has set economies across continents ablaze. 

Among the countries that will be hit the hardest by the Iran war is Afghanistan. Several factors make it particularly vulnerable. It is Iran’s neighbor; the two countries share a 921 km-long border. Afghanistan is also a landlocked country, dependent on Iran and Pakistan for access to ports. Importantly, Afghanistan was ravaged by war for decades and internationally isolated since the Taliban captured power in August 2021. Its capacity to withstand the impact of the war in West Asia was limited to begin with. This capacity is being further weakened by Pakistan’s ongoing military strikes on Afghanistan.

IMPLICATIONS:

The Taliban regime strongly condemned the U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran, describing them as an “act of aggression.” Following the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it expressed its condolences to the Iranian government and people. Especially since the Taliban came to power in August 2021, relations between Iran and Afghanistan have grown, especially with regard to trade. Although there are several issues of conflict between the two, anti-Americanism serves as glue. The Taliban’s chief spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, has said in the past that if Tehran requests assistance in the event of a U.S. attack, Afghanistan is ready and willing to extend help.

So far, Afghanistan has not been hit by Iranian or U.S/Israeli drones or missiles. Indeed, it is western and south-western Iran that has borne the brunt of U.S. and Israeli strikes. Eastern Iran, which borders Afghanistan, has escaped being hit so far. It is therefore an attractive safe haven for those fleeing western Iranian cities and towns. These internally displaced people can be expected to cross into Afghanistan and Iran’s other eastern neighbors should the war intensify, prolong or spread to eastern Iran. Afghanistan is already grappling with the economic burden imposed by the mass deportation of an estimated 5.4 million Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan since October 2023. The new refugee flows from Iran will substantially intensify the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Persecution of Afghan refugees in Iran is set to increase as Iranians have often suspected that they are spying for Israel. Such perceptions are likely to intensify. They will be hounded by Iranian police and people, forcing them to join the exodus into Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s weak economy is poised to fray further amid fuel shortages and surging prices. Given its low capacity for manufacturing, Afghanistan has depended on Iran for consumer goods. Afghanistan’s landlocked status has made it dependent on Pakistan and Iran for access to the sea, however, as access to Pakistani ports has been shut off, Afghan dependence on Iranian markets and trade corridors to the sea have deepened. Although Iranian border posts remain open to Afghan goods, the trade corridor through Iran to the sea is insecure as it runs through the conflict zone. While it continues to function, it is vulnerable to missile strikes as the war in Iran intensifies. There is a risk that Chabahar port could be bombed. The closure of the Iranian trade corridor would bring the Afghan economy to its knees and shatter Afghan lives and livelihoods. Afghanistan will have to strengthen its trade and transit ties with other Central Asian states.

Notwithstanding its condemnation of the U.S and Israeli strikes on Iran, Pakistan has benefited somewhat from the war in Iran. As the international community is preoccupied with the West Asia crisis, it has ignored the Pakistani military strikes on Afghanistan. Pakistan has therefore escaped global opprobrium for the horrific suffering its strikes have caused to Afghan civilians. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime is watching how Pakistan is responding to the crisis in West Asia. Should the Saudis decide to join the war against Iran, Pakistan, which has a mutual defense pact with Riyadh, is obligated to join the Saudis. Drawn into the West Asian crisis, the Pakistani military would need to halt its ongoing “open war” against Afghanistan. A termination of ‘Operation Ghazab Lil Haq’ would be welcomed by Afghanistan.

Taliban leaders will also be watching Iran closely to see how pressure from outside in the form of military strikes and war impacts an authoritarian regime. Will decapitation and war trigger unrest and lead to regime change? Or will it strengthen national unity and see the population rally behind the regime against the foreign invader? In the event of regime change in Iran, its leaders could seek sanctuary in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONS:

The conflict involving Iran has arisen at a particularly challenging moment for Afghanistan, which is simultaneously facing missile and air strikes from Pakistan. As a landlocked state, Afghanistan is especially vulnerable to external disruptions; its economic difficulties are likely to intensify due to fuel shortages linked to the conflict in Iran and the resulting constraints on access to seaports. In addition to its geographic proximity to the West Asian conflict zone, Afghanistan’s already limited institutional and economic capacity is expected to come under severe strain. This pressure will be exacerbated by a further economic downturn and by the anticipated influx of refugees, including returning Afghan nationals, from Iran.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr Sudha Ramachandran is an independent South Asian political and security analyst. She is also South Asia editor at The Diplomat. Her articles have appeared in publications like The Diplomat, Asia Times, China Brief and Terrorism Monitor.

By Alpaslan Özerdem and Olesya Vartanyan

After more than three decades of closure, the Türkiye-Armenia border may soon reopen. A string of recent developments, including the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to Yerevan, agreements to simplify visa procedures, and moves toward direct land trade, suggest that normalization is shifting from cautious diplomacy toward practical implementation. If it does, it would mark one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. Yet reopening the border will require careful political management. Without it, renewed contact could generate friction rather than stability.

BACKGROUND:

The land border between Türkiye and Armenia has been closed since 1993. Ankara shut the crossing in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the first war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, the border has symbolized one of the most enduring geopolitical divides in the region. For communities on both sides, the closure produced long-term economic and social consequences. Armenia’s access to regional markets has remained constrained, while eastern Turkish border regions have also faced limited cross-border economic opportunities.

Regional dynamics began shifting after the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which altered the political balance in the South Caucasus and created new incentives for diplomatic engagement. In the aftermath of the war, Ankara and Yerevan appointed special envoys in 2021 to explore the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations and reopening the border.

Since then, negotiations have progressed slowly but steadily. Several confidence-building measures have been agreed and some already implemented. These include agreements allowing third-country citizens to cross the border, the resumption of direct flights between Istanbul and Yerevan, and discussions on facilitating trade and travel. In early 2026, the pace of normalization accelerated visibly. In March, Turkish Airlines launched regular scheduled flights on the Istanbul-Yerevan route. The two governments agreed to simplify visa procedures, and reports emerged that direct land trade between Türkiye and Armenia would begin as part of a broader US-led Caucasus peace push. Last December Bloomberg reported that Ankara was weighing a full reopening of the border within six months, while senior Turkish officials publicly expressed optimism, stating that they hoped “everything develops quickly.”

Physical preparations also indicate growing readiness. Armenia has renovated the Margara checkpoint on its side of the border, declaring the facility technically ready for operation. Türkiye has likewise upgraded infrastructure at the Alican crossing. These preparations suggest that the technical conditions for reopening could be met relatively quickly if political decisions align.

Still, reopening the border remains politically sensitive. For Türkiye, the process remains closely linked to the broader relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly negotiations over a comprehensive peace agreement following the collapse of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh authorities in 2023. Since last August, when the two countries signed several accords at the White House, Baku and Yerevan have taken a number of steps forward, including facilitating transit trade to Armenia through Azerbaijan and Armenia’s recent agreement with the United States on the TRIPP transit route, which will facilitate the operation of a transit route between Azerbaijan and its enclave of Nakhchivan in southern Armenia. These are promising steps, but a final peace agreement is still pending, which Türkiye must take into consideration.

Ankara has long coordinated its approach toward Armenia with Baku. Turkish policymakers have repeatedly emphasized that normalization should not undermine Azerbaijan’s strategic interests, and progress in Türkiye-Armenia relations has often moved in parallel with developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations. How close are the parties to a final agreement on the border? The string of practical steps in early 2026 suggests the process has crossed a threshold from symbolic confidence-building to operational preparation. Yet the absence of a finalized Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal means that Ankara retains a political brake on the timeline. A stall or deterioration in those talks could slow or freeze the border track; conversely, a breakthrough could accelerate it rapidly.

Domestic political considerations also matter. In Armenia, normalization with Türkiye remains controversial for segments of society deeply affected by historical grievances, and the issue will feature in the country’s upcoming June parliamentary elections. In Türkiye, policymakers must balance diplomatic engagement with Armenia against their longstanding strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

IMPLICATIONS:

If and when the border reopens, the effects will extend well beyond bilateral relations. Armenia has long depended on limited transit routes through Georgia and Iran to access external markets. Opening the Turkish border would provide an alternative corridor, linking Armenia more directly to European and Middle Eastern trade networks. It would also reinforce Türkiye’s role as a regional connector between the South Caucasus and broader Eurasian markets. In this context, reopening the border aligns with wider connectivity initiatives such as the Middle Corridor, which aims to strengthen east-west trade routes across the region.

Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has weakened since the start of the war in Ukraine and the collapse of its peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. As Moscow’s role recedes, regional actors are increasingly seeking alternative economic and diplomatic partnerships. In parallel, instability in the Middle East, including conflict involving Iran, has heightened uncertainty along key transit routes. For Armenia, which has relied on access through Iranian territory, reopening the Turkish border would reduce dependence on a single corridor and provide greater strategic flexibility.

On the other hand, the expansion of trade and transit routes associated with reopening the Türkiye-Armenia border could deepen regional interdependence and, in turn, support longer-term peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Durable reconciliation rarely rests on diplomatic agreements alone; it often emerges when economic cooperation and shared interests make renewed conflict increasingly costly. Expanded trade, transportation links, and cross-border mobility can help create these incentives by encouraging regional actors to view cooperation not as a concession but as mutual gain.

At the local level, decades of closure have left many towns near the frontier economically stagnant. Renewed cross-border access could stimulate transportation links, tourism, and commercial exchange. Armenian producers would gain easier access to Turkish markets, while Turkish businesses could expand trade with Armenia and potentially beyond. However, regions that have been economically isolated for decades may struggle to adjust quickly to new competitive pressures, and if cross-border trade develops unevenly, local communities could perceive the reopening as disruptive rather than beneficial.

The practical challenges of reopening should not be underestimated. Local authorities, customs agencies, border police, and regulatory bodies on both sides have never previously operated together. Communities along the frontier have lived in close geographical proximity but political separation for decades. In the Armenian village of Margara, residents have long lived within sight of the Turkish side of the river without direct contact. Renewed engagement may generate economic and cultural exchange, but it could also expose differences in administrative practices, expectations, and social attitudes that will require careful management on both sides.

CONCLUSIONS:

The reopening of the Türkiye-Armenia border represents more than a bilateral diplomatic milestone. It reflects a broader transformation in the political landscape of the South Caucasus. The rapid accumulation of practical steps in early 2026, from flights to visa agreements to land trade, indicates that the process has moved beyond the realm of aspirational diplomacy. Yet the outcome is not guaranteed. The process remains closely linked to developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, domestic political considerations in both countries, and evolving regional geopolitics. Whether Ankara ultimately opens the border before or after a finalized Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal will be a critical signal of how much Türkiye is willing to decouple the two tracks. Whether the border ultimately becomes a bridge between the two societies or simply another contested frontier will depend on how effectively these challenges are addressed not only in the coming months, but in the longer term.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Alpaslan Özerdem is Dean of the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. Olesya Vartanyan is a conflict analyst specializing in South Caucasus security and peace processes and a PhD student at George Mason University.

By Sergey Sukhankin

Armenia’s agreement with the U.S. on cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy may signify a major geopolitical shift in the South Caucasus. Specifically, the deal signals Yerevan’s effort to diversify its energy partnerships and reduce long-standing dependence on Russia, which has dominated Armenia’s nuclear sector since the Soviet era. Moscow`s response to the news has been very critical. Russian experts and policymakers warned about technological risks and questioned the feasibility of U.S.-supplied Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Russian officials and state media frame the initiative as both a security concern and a geopolitical challenge, emphasizing Rosatom’s experience and warning that Armenia could become a testing ground for unproven technologies.

BACKGROUND:

Armenia’s nuclear sector has historically been closely linked to Russia. Armenia’s Nuclear Power Plant at Metsamor, built during the Soviet period, supplies up to 31 percent of the country’s electricity. The plant’s second unit continues operating after modernization programs that extended its lifetime (until 2036) and upgraded its capacity. Due to particularities of the nuclear-producing energy sector, Armenia’s dependence on Russia is complex and multidimensional extending to maintenance of infrastructure, scientific cooperation and other aspects, deepening the dependency on Russian involvement in the country’s energy system. Metsamor’s aging reactors and the country’s growing electricity needs have forced Armenian authorities to consider constructing a replacement facility. Thus, the government began evaluating options for new nuclear capacity examining potential cooperation with multiple countries including Russia, the U.S., China, and South Korea. Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized that the government would select the partner offering the most competitive combination of price and technology. 

The turning point came in February 2026, when the U.S. and Armenia finalized a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement establishes the legal framework for exporting nuclear technology to Armenia and opens for U.S. companies to participate in building a new nuclear facility. Furthermore, during a visit to Yerevan (9–10 February), U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance announced that Washington could invest up to US$ 9 billion in Armenia’s nuclear energy sector, which includes long-term fuel and maintenance contracts. 

Small modular reactors are central to Armenia’s new strategy – this was clearly voiced by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in October 2024, when he mentioned that the Armenian government aims to build a small modular reactor as the next nuclear facility. The main competitive advantages of these facilities is that they are viewed as more flexible and potentially cheaper to deploy in smaller energy markets. Armenia’s government believes that over the years the technology could provide a suitable replacement for the Metsamor facility while maintaining the country’s energy security. 

Predictably, the initiative has triggered a strong and quite negative reaction in Moscow: Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom currently plays the key role in Armenia’s nuclear sector and has long been interested in building new reactors in the country. Therefore, the possibility that Armenia might select an American reactor technology threatens Russia’s economic interests and influence in a region traditionally considered part of Moscow’s geopolitical sphere. Russian media outlets have framed the agreement as a major strategic shift in Armenia`s foreign economic policy, and rather unfriendly toward Russia. Commentators in Russian publications argue that Pashinyan’s decision could weaken Russia’s position in the South Caucasus while strengthening US influence in Armenia’s energy infrastructure, establishing a long-term strategic foothold. Clearly, the debate therefore extends beyond energy policy and touches on the broader geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West.

IMPLICATIONS:

In Russian argumentation, Armenia’s nuclear agreement with the US carries multiple strategic implications where two factors tower above others. First, the deal is described as threatening both Russia’s dominance in Armenia’s energy sector and its global position as a leading actor in nuclear technologies. Rosatom has invested significant resources in maintaining the Metsamor plant and extending its operational life. Russia, primarily through Rosatom and state-backed financing, has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the modernization of Armenia’s nuclear plant, including a US$ 270 million loan, a US$ 30 million grant, and additional upgrade contracts. Russian officials have also repeatedly highlighted Russia`s global leadership in nuclear construction and its extensive experience in operating reactors abroad. In this context, losing the Armenian market to U.S. competitors would represent both an economic loss and a symbolic blow to Russia’s international nuclear industry. 

Second, Russian officials have emphasized safety concerns related to the proposed SMR project. Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, warned that Armenia’s location in a seismically active region makes nuclear construction particularly sensitive. According to Shoigu, Soviet engineers designed Metsamor’s foundation to withstand the devastating 1988 earthquake, demonstrating the reliability of Russian technology. He argued that the introduction of unfamiliar reactor designs could introduce new safety risks that regional governments would have to consider. 

Shoigu also questioned the technological maturity of U.S. SMR designs. He pointed out that the U.S. has yet to complete a fully operational SMR project domestically, suggesting that the technology remains largely untested in practice. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova warned that Armenia could effectively become a testing ground for experimental U.S. nuclear technologies if it proceeds with the project, and that the scale of the proposed US$ 9 billion agreement raises questions about financial risks and long-term feasibility. Safety concerns resonate strongly across the post-Soviet space due to the legacy of major nuclear accidents, most notably the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The memory of such incidents continues to shape public perceptions of nuclear energy from Belarus to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, arguments emphasizing nuclear safety, which Russian officials frequently invoke in discussions about Armenia’s potential adoption of small modular reactors, are not merely rhetorical but can find receptive audiences in societies where historical experience has made the risks associated with nuclear technology particularly salient.

Despite these tensions, Armenian officials insist that the decision regarding a new nuclear plant has not yet been finalized and that Yerevan continues to review proposals from multiple partners, including Russia. Armenian authorities have even requested additional technical briefings from Moscow regarding Russian modular reactor technologies, indicating that competition for the project remains open. 

Another factor that could affect a potential U.S.-Armenia nuclear deal is Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary election on June 7. Some Western experts believe that the U.S.-Armenia nuclear agreement would likely be weakened or delayed if Pashinyan is defeated in the elections, however not automatically disbanded. (Pro)Russian experts suggest that an opposition win could sharply change Armenia’s foreign-policy course, improving ties with Moscow. 

The Armenian side clearly understands that the final decision, should it not comply with Russia`s expectations, would have broader geopolitical implications for the country. This has an even more pronounced meaning given that over the past several years political relations between Russia and Armenia have deteriorated as Armenia has sought to diversify its foreign policy and strengthen ties with Western partners. For Russia, the potential loss of influence in Armenia’s nuclear sector represents much more than a commercial setback – it could manifest a broader erosion of Moscow’s role in the South Caucasus at a time when Western countries are expanding their presence in the region and Russia’s influence and posture are eroding.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. marks a potentially transformative moment in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. While the project remains at an early stage and Armenia continues to evaluate competing proposals, the possibility that U.S. companies could build the country’s next nuclear reactor has already triggered strong negative reactions in Moscow. Russian officials have criticized the proposal on technical, economic, security and geopolitical grounds, emphasizing safety concerns and highlighting Rosatom’s experience in nuclear construction. At the same time, Russian media portray the initiative as part of a broader Western strategy to expand influence in Armenia and weaken Russia’s traditional role in the region, in strategic proximity of southern Russia. For Armenia, the nuclear agreement represents an effort to diversify strategic partnerships and strengthen energy independence. Yet the decision also clearly carries risks, including exacerbated political friction with Russia. Ultimately, the competition over Armenia’s nuclear future illustrates the intensifying geopolitical rivalry shaping the South Caucasus. The outcome of this contest will influence not only Armenia’s energy security but also the balance of power in a region where infrastructure, economics, and geopolitics remain deeply intertwined.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).