By Svante E. Cornell

In early August, Central Asian presidents met in Awaza in Turkmenistan along the sidelines of a UN conference, in preparation for their seventh formal consultative meeting that will take place later this fall. The process of institutionalizing regional cooperation is progressing apace, as Central Asian cooperation has expanded from informal summits of presidents to a more formalized structure that is also branching out into meetings at the ministerial level and between representatives of parliaments. For the process to bear fruit, however, the Central Asian presidents will need to take more concrete steps to set up formal regional structures of cooperation.

Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: When Central Asian Presidents met in Awaza, Turkmenistan on August 5 for a forum to prepare their more formal upcoming consultative meeting, it was difficult not to take a step back to not how different the situation is from only a decade ago. To begin with, until 2017 Central Asian leaders had met frequently in mechanisms involving other powers but rarely on their own. For years, they had built dialogue mechanisms with outside powers, Japan being the first to inaugurate a regional dialogue in 2004. The EU, United States and many others followed suit. But for close to a decade, Central Asian leaders did not have a regular format in which they met only as Central Asians, without foreign powers involved. Of course, this did not mean they had not met jointly for specific purposes, most notably the Treaty creating a Nuclear Free Zone for Central Asia, signed at Semey, Kazakhstan, in 2006. 

Furthermore, the location of the meeting in Turkmenistan speaks volumes. During previous iterations of Central Asian efforts to build regional cooperation, Turkmenistan typically remained aloof, citing its permanent neutrality. The fact that Turkmenistan is now an avid participant in these efforts is truly a major development.

The rebirth of Central Asian regional cooperation got kick-started in 2017, when Kazakhstan’s then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, responding to a suggestion by Uzbekistan’s new President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, convened a meeting of Central Asian Presidents. When this consultative meeting took place in 2018, it was the first time in almost a decade that Central Asian presidents had met without outsiders present. Since then, meetings between the presidents have taken place on a yearly basis.

The emphasis on presidential meetings is a reflection of the political realities of Central Asia. With political systems that are largely organized top-down, it is only natural that regional cooperation will be structured in a top-down manner, in the form of consultative meetings of the presidents. But for regional cooperation to be successful, it cannot only or even primarily be focused on presidential meetings. Quite to the contrary, regional cooperation will be successful when government agencies, trade councils, and civil society groups across the region cooperate in a structured manner with each other, through formal mechanisms or institutions. 

Such a vision was launched at the fourth meeting of Presidents in Cholpon-Ata in 2022, where presidents approved a broad range of initiatives covering mutual relations in more than two dozen spheres ranging from law, trade, sports, investment, visas and education to security. Similarly, the 2024 sixth consultative meeting led to the adoption of a roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2025-2027 and an action plan for industrial cooperation among Central Asian states for the same time period. 

IMPLICATIONS: More steps have been taken toward the building of institutions. Most importantly, the Presidents resolved at the 2023 Dushanbe Summit to establish a Council of National Coordinators of the presidential consultative meetings. Designed to “enhance the day-to-day effectiveness of interstate engagement and provide coherence to ongoing initiatives,” this body might in fact form the embryo of institutionalized Central Asian regional cooperation.

Further moves came at the 2024 summit in Astana, where the five presidents approved a strategic vision proposed by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev entitled “Central Asia 2040”, subtitled a "Concept for the Development of Regional Cooperation." This strategic vision builds on President Tokayev’s concept of “Central Asian Renaissance,” outlined in a policy article published ahead of the 2024 summit. In this article, the Kazakh leader outlined a vision of a more integrated region that also serves as an interlocutor on the world stage with great powers and international organizations. As he points out, this is already beginning to take place as a result of deeper Central Asian coordination in multilateral bodies like the United Nations, as well as in organizations like the SCO in which Central Asian states are represented.

The “Central Asia 2040” document spelled out a vision to deepen integration in concrete areas like trade, energy, transport, environment, digital connectivity, but also specifically included the task of strengthening a joint Central Asian cultural identity. Beyond that, it mentions for the first time, the institutionalization of meetings of heads of state into a formal regional structure. Accepting that the consultative meetings of Heads of State constitutes “the cornerstone of political coordination,” it declares that this format is being institutionalized as a “permanent regional structure” and declares that it is being broadened beyond the Heads of State. It explicitly expands the formats of cooperation to include “parliaments, ministries, civil society, businesses, and think tanks.” It should be noted that minister-level dialogues are already underway: ahead of the 2024 consultative summit, there was a meeting of Central Asian transport ministers, as well as a meeting of energy ministers.

The five states have already initiated a movement to develop parliamentary cooperation. A first Central Asia Inter-Parliamentary Forum was held in Turkestan, Kazakhstan, in February 2023, and was followed by a second convocation in Khiva, Uzbekistan, in September 2024. Key matters discussed included cooperation on oversight over high-level agreements and the harmonization of legislation across Central Asia, as well as the development of a legal framework for a common economic space, and for fostering cooperation in industry and transport. 

In addition to these formal steps, informal contacts among government officials across Central Asia have increased exponentially over the past decade. Far from being isolated from each other as in the past or interacting only through formal means, representatives of Central Asian government agencies are now comparing notes and learning from each other in ways that were not imaginable a decade ago.

The development of Central Asia-wide regional institutions is thus a work in process, but that process will likely take time. To some degree, major decisions taken at the yearly consultative meetings continue to be determined by the lowest common denominator. It is well known that there are diverging levels of enthusiasm for how deep regional cooperation should be, a question that has been marring Central Asian regionalism from the start. 

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan were long perceived as more skeptical to institutionalizing regional cooperation. But Turkmenistan’s hosting of the forum in Awaza shows its full participation in the process. And the recent progress in Kyrgyz-Tajik relations has also changed Dushanbe’s approach. When Kazakhstan’s suggestion for a friendship treaty among Central Asian states was raised at the 2022 Cholpon-Ata summit, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan refrained from signing. Tajikistan’s reticence could be attributed to its border conflict with Kyrgyzstan, which has since been resolved. Following the landmark Khujand Treaty of April 2025 that marked the resolution of the remaining border issues between the two countries as well as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan’s President in August late August signed the friendship treaty during a visit by Kazakhstan’s foreign minister Murat Nurtleu. It remains to be seen whether Turkmenistan will now also follow suit.

CONCLUSIONS: For Central Asian regional cooperation to be successful, it cannot long avoid speeding up the process of institutionalization. There is a limit to the momentum that can be achieved by pronouncements at the presidential level, even if those re followed up by ad hoc meetings at the ministerial level or between parliamentary representatives. Already, the implementation of the agreements reached at Consultative Summits is unclear. As the “low-hanging’ fruit of easily achieved steps is picked off, achieving tangible results without regional structures will be increasingly difficult. For regional cooperation to be felt at the societal level, and to become irreversible, structures of cooperation will be needed. That can ensure that presidential pronouncements are actually implemented at the national level. Furthermore, such regional structures can themselves identify and prioritize the main issues facing deeper regional cooperation in Central Asia. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

During Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s visit to China in April 2025, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Azerbaijan. For China, Azerbaijan represents a partner of considerable geostrategic importance, capable of functioning as a viable transit hub linking China, Central Asia, and Europe. Azerbaijan offers China access to the sole overland route to Europe that circumvents Russia. Furthermore, China’s pathway to the South Caucasus necessarily passes through Azerbaijan, positioning Baku as a pivotal actor in China’s Eurasian economic strategy. Conversely, Chinese investments have the potential to place Azerbaijan’s non-oil economy on a trajectory of diversification. A strategic partnership with Baku is thus poised to expand Beijing’s influence in the South Caucasus.

Credit: NAM

BACKGROUND: Historically, relations between China and Azerbaijan trace back to the ancient Silk Road, along which trade and cultural exchanges took place over 2,500 years ago. In December 1991, China recognized Azerbaijan’s independence, and diplomatic relations were formally established with the Caucasian state in April 1992. China inaugurated its embassy in Baku in 1992, while Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Beijing in 1993. Azerbaijan was among the first states to accede to China’s multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013. Designed to enhance global connectivity through investments in infrastructure, energy, and transportation, the BRI extends across more than 160 countries. In 2015, China and Azerbaijan concluded a memorandum of understanding on the joint development of the Silk Road Economic Belt.

In 2019, President Ilham Aliyev traveled to Beijing to attend the “Belt and Road” International Forum, during which the two states signed ten agreements to strengthen cooperation in industry, investment, trade, and other economic sectors. The BRI has functioned as a catalyst for the rapid expansion of China–Azerbaijan relations, which have evolved over the years from commercial, economic, transit, and logistics collaboration to cooperation in science, technology, and cultural exchange.

In 2024, the two nations, during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana, reached another milestone in bilateral relations by adopting the “Joint Declaration of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership.”

In April 2025, China–Azerbaijan relations were elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership, inaugurating a new chapter in bilateral ties. During talks with the visiting President Aliyev on April 23 in Beijing, President Xi emphasized that the two states should “continuously enhance political mutual trust, deepen practical cooperation, and strengthen international collaboration to open a new chapter of all-round cooperation.”

The timing and context of Azerbaijan’s decision to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with China were of considerable significance. In April, scarcely two weeks prior to the agreement with Beijing, President Aliyev warned that Azerbaijan might redirect its gas exports elsewhere should the EU fail to advance the expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor, a transit route currently functioning at near-capacity. Azerbaijan supplies gas to the EU via this corridor, and Baku wants the EU to support its enlargement, as exports fell to 2.84 bcm in the first quarter of 2025, compared with 3.2 bcm during the same period the previous year. While EU investment could enhance pipeline capacity to achieve the 20 bcm target by 2027, skepticism persists within the EU regarding Azerbaijan’s ability to sustain sufficient gas supplies.

IMPLICATIONS: Geographically, the South Caucasus is of interest to China as it offers a potential land route linking China with Europe. For this reason, Beijing last year formally joined the Middle Corridor, a trade route connecting Europe and China that bypasses Russia and serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia and to traditional maritime routes. Participation in the Middle Corridor is part of China’s broader strategy to diversify its trade routes.

For China, the present moment is opportune for expanding its presence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where Russia has been rapidly losing influence due to its war in Ukraine since February 2022. The ongoing transformation of the Eurasian geopolitical landscape has brought renewed attention to Azerbaijan’s role as a transit state between Europe and Asia. Within the rapidly evolving regional dynamics shaped by Russia’s war against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has gained centrality in China’s Eurasian economic strategy.

Situated at the intersection of China’s East–West and North–South transportation routes, Azerbaijan has figured prominently on Beijing’s agenda for advancing its economic and strategic objectives in the region. China regards Azerbaijan as a pivotal partner for extending its influence across Central Asia and the South Caucasus. As a key actor in the South Caucasus for the EU, Russia, and China alike, Azerbaijan plays an important role in the BRI by facilitating strategic connectivity projects. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway (BTKR), for instance, links the Trans-European and Trans-Asian railway systems. This project not only grants the five Central Asian republics and Afghanistan access to the EU but also expedites the movement of Chinese goods into European markets. Likewise, Azerbaijan provides China access to the Baku International Sea Trade Port within the BRI framework. Located on the historic Silk Road, the Port of Baku functions as a major transport and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia, and constitutes a vital component of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor.

Azerbaijan’s strategic connectivity initiatives possess the capacity to transform the Caucasian state into a major transport and logistics hub of the region. For this reason, China envisions a pivotal role for Azerbaijan in advancing the prospects of the BRI and ensuring the success of its Eurasian economic strategy.

At present, transport and logistics constitute the principal domains of China–Azerbaijan cooperation, though this partnership may expand to include military collaboration. Azerbaijan has already procured Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder Block-III fighter aircraft, a joint venture between the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation. Beijing could further augment Azerbaijan’s military capabilities as it consolidates its strategic presence in the South Caucasus in the capacity of Baku’s strategic partner.

The EU constitutes Azerbaijan’s principal export market and thus its leading trading partner. Baku’s intensifying relations with Beijing illustrate its efforts to lessen dependence on traditional routes and markets while diversifying foreign policy options. As this partnership deepens, Azerbaijan may permit Chinese state-owned enterprises to assume greater control over ports, railways, and other strategic infrastructure in the region, a development likely to raise concern in European capitals. Moreover, the competing interests of various geopolitical actors in the region could erode the degree of autonomy that Baku presently enjoys in shaping regional policies. Regional powers such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran may perceive a challenge to their strategic interests in the region arising from a deepening China–Azerbaijan strategic partnership.

CONCLUSIONS: By virtue of its position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Azerbaijan possesses significant potential to serve as a viable transit hub linking China, Central Asia, and Europe, particularly at a time when Beijing, engaged in a trade war with Washington, is actively seeking alternative routes for its exports.

Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with China is, however, likely to generate new foreign policy challenges for the Caucasian state. A further deepening of this partnership may constrain Azerbaijan’s capacity to sustain strategic balance in its foreign policy. The country’s integration with European energy markets and its relations with Western states could, at some point, come into conflict with China’s interests in the region.

At present, China is not in a position to shape the geopolitics of the South Caucasus given the presence of other key actors such as the EU, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the U.S. Beijing has, however, placed its bet on Azerbaijan, which it regards as a pivotal node in strategic connectivity initiatives such as the Middle Corridor. China further views a strengthened strategic partnership with Azerbaijan as essential to consolidating its position in the South Caucasus.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By David Bujiashvili and Tomáš Baranec

In a resolution on July 9, 2025, the European Parliament called for a review of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement (AA) and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), citing Georgia’s continued violations of the Agreement’s core principles. The resolution warned that persistent backsliding on democratic values could lead to the suspension of Georgia’s economic and trade benefits. Accordingly, the Parliament urged the European Commission and the Council to assess Georgia’s compliance with these standards and consider suspending the visa-free regime in case democratic norms are not respected.

BACKGROUND: The signing of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement in 2014, establishing a comprehensive framework for deeper political association and economic integration was a culmination of a systematic rapprochement between Tbilisi and Brussels. The AA encompasses cooperation in democratic governance, justice, human rights, energy, environmental policy and other sectoral areas. A key component of the agreement is the DCFTA granting Georgian goods duty-free access to the EU’s Single Market.

Building on the comprehensive framework of the AA/DCFTA, Georgian citizens also gained one of the most tangible benefits of EU integration: visa-free access to the Schengen Area in March 2017. This milestone held both symbolic and practical significance, allowing Georgian nationals to travel for up to 90 days without a visa. It was widely seen as a reward for the country’s reform efforts and remains one of the most tangible benefits delivered to the Georgian public as part of the European integration process.

The geopolitical landscape shifted again in 2022 with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompting the EU to reassess its enlargement policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. In this context, Georgia was granted EU candidate status in 2023 recognizing Georgia’s European aspirations and progress in the AA implementation.

However, shortly after gaining EU candidate status, internal challenges in Georgia, including political polarization and pressure on the judiciary, raised concerns about the country’s adherence to EU norms. This led to a major turning point on 28 November 2024, when Georgia’s ruling party declared that it would not place the issue of opening EU accession talks on the national agenda until the end of 2028.

In reaction to these developments, the EU has taken concrete steps, including suspending high-level political dialogue with Georgia. The European Council suspended visa facilitation privileges for holders of Georgian diplomatic and service passports as an initial step toward broader restrictions. Following the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on July 15, 2025, Georgia was given a deadline to implement 8 key recommendations by August 31. Failure to comply could lead to the suspension of the visa-free regime for all Georgian citizens and potentially a review or suspension of specific AA/DCFTA provisions. 

Meanwhile, several EU member states are keen to impose personal sanctions asset freezes and travel bans on Georgian officials but are constrained by the lack of unanimity among EU members. Past instances, such as Hungary and Slovakia blocking personal sanctions against Georgia illustrate the complexity of achieving full consent.

Alongside political developments, Georgia’s economic integration with the EU has delivered measurable results. Since the 2014 signing of the EU–Georgia AA/DCFTA, exports to the EU have grown about 17 percent, expanding beyond wine, mineral water, and hazelnuts to include kiwifruit, blueberries, berries, organic honey, essential oils, dried and processed fruits, and, since 2022, snails. Export activity is strongest in Kakheti (wine and agriculture), Imereti (food processing), and Adjara, which benefits from its Black Sea access facilitating trade. Shida Kartli, bordering Russia, remains less export-oriented due to geopolitical challenges and limited market access. 

Complementing trade growth, visa-free travel has expanded opportunities for tourism, business, education, and family ties, while significantly increasing remittances from EU countries. Since its introduction in 2017, over 500,000 Georgian citizens have benefited, making more than 1 million visits to Schengen Area countries. Starting at around US$ 414 million in 2017, EU-origin remittances more than tripled to approximately US$ 1.4 billion by 2024, reflecting a 238 percent increase. On the contrary, remittances from Russia started at approximately US$ 380 million in 2017 but grew only modestly to around US$ 420 million by 2024. Consequently, the EU now accounts for roughly 44 percent of Georgia’s total remittances, overshadowing Russia’s declining share.

IMPLICATIONS: The DCFTA plays a critical role in Georgia’s economic interests. Its suspension would have serious consequences, threatening jobs, competitiveness, and rural development. For years, it has provided Georgian producers, farmers, and entrepreneurs with tariff-free access to the EU market. Its suspension would damage the economy, erode public trust, and increase social vulnerability. 

In contrast to the gradual economic impact of the DCFTA, the suspension of visa-free travel would hit ordinary Georgians immediately, undermining free mobility. Thousands rely on it for tourism, personal matters, and medical access to EU clinics. Students, entrepreneurs, and families would face new bureaucratic obstacles. Restrictions would hinder Georgian entrepreneurs from attending EU exhibitions and forums, limiting partnerships and market growth, while reduced EU access could deepen reliance on Russia and China, both visa-free partners. 

This impact would be compounded by low-cost airlines, particularly WizzAir, which could reduce routes or raise fares. WizzAir, operating in both Georgia and Armenia, may even close its Georgian operations entirely and shift all flights to Armenia if the EU suspends visa-free travel for Georgians, especially given the prospect that Armenia could gain visa-free access in the coming years. Such a shift would make flights from and to Georgia more expensive and less accessible, further reducing European tourist arrivals. Meanwhile, flights from Russia have risen sharply in recent years, increasing the risk of greater reliance on Russian tourists if European arrivals decline due to fewer low-cost flights. 

The economic consequences would not be limited to tourism. Suspension of visa-free travel would also negatively affect household incomes derived from remittances, underscoring the EU’s crucial role in supporting Georgia’s economic development through these flows. Many Georgians working in the EU without proper permits—often in informal sectors such as caregiving or domestic work—would no longer be able to sustain these livelihoods. Currently, they avoid breaching the 90-day visa-free limit by rotating their stays among friends and relatives, a practice that complies with entry rules while significantly contributing to remittance inflows. This informal mobility has provided a vital boost to Georgia’s economy.

Beyond economic costs, the suspension would deal a profound emotional blow to pro-European Georgians, deepening frustration and a sense of isolation. It would be perceived not merely as a bureaucratic measure but as a symbolic break - a clear signal that the country’s European path is no longer guaranteed.

Domestically, the suspension would likely be attributed to the government’s democratic backsliding rather than external pressures. Attempts by authorities to deflect responsibility onto the opposition, civil society, or the EU are unlikely to convince the pro-European majority. This could heighten polarization and, with local elections on 4 October 2025, trigger protests and increase pressure on the ruling party.

From a legal and procedural perspective, suspending parts of the AA/DCFTA is highly complex, requiring unanimity among all 27 member states. Therefore, suspension of the AA/DCFTA is unlikely, while in contrast, suspending the visa-free regime requires only a qualified majority of 15 member states, making it a more feasible short-term option if Georgia fails to meet EU benchmarks.

Despite these considerations, the EU remains cautious about measures that could directly harm ordinary Georgian citizens, especially given the 86 percent public support for EU membership. However, internal divisions over targeted personal sanctions have increased the likelihood of collective measures, including suspending visa-free travel. While affecting ordinary Georgians, this step may be the EU’s only remaining leverage if the government continues undermining democratic norms and fails to implement the recommended reforms by the end of August.

CONCLUSION: In the absence of a unified position towards the Georgian government, the EU currently has only a limited set of sanctions, which primarily target the local population rather than key representatives of the ruling party and business circles close to it. The ability of these tools to change the Georgian government’s position is likely limited. Moreover, both the suspension of visa liberalization and the less likely suspension of parts of the AA/DCFTA may be double-edged in the medium term, as they could increase the dependence of the Georgian economy and business on Russia and China.  

Even if the current status quo with Georgia remains, while Ukraine and Moldova continue advancing towards EU membership, freezing Georgia’s accession process would create a damaging gap in EU enlargement policy. This could result in a ‘Turkey-style’ scenario, where candidate status is maintained in name but the accession perspective is practically frozen.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: David Bujiashvili is a Georgian diplomat and expert in European integration with over 26 years of experience in EU Affairs. He has held senior government positions, coordinated the implementation of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, visa liberalization, and EU assistance to Georgia, and served as Chief Coordinator of Georgia’s EU Accession Questionnaire (2021–2022), directly contributing to Georgia’s EU candidate status. He is also an Associate Professor at ALTE University of Georgia and author of the book Steps for Comprehending the European Union and 12 academic publications on EU Affairs.

Tomáš Baranec is the Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Black Sea Studies as well as a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He currently works as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

The U.S.-brokered peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, culminating in the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), have triggered a sharp strategic reaction from Iran. The 20-mile corridor through Zangezur grants Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhchivan under long-term U.S. management, reshaping regional connectivity and bypassing Iran. Tehran perceives the initiative as a U.S. encroachment on its northern frontier, eroding its leverage in the South Caucasus. The muted Russian response and Armenia’s growing openness to Western—and potentially Israeli—security ties deepen Iran’s unease, fueling fears of encirclement and diminishing its role as a key regional transit hub.

BACKGROUND: Brokered by the U.S., the latest Armenia–Azerbaijan peace talks have quietly but decisively reshaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus. At the heart of the deal is a newly designated transit Zangezur Corridor, officially named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which would grant Azerbaijan direct access to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenian territory. Moscow has responded with unusual silence, while Tehran has openly bristled at the emergence of a U.S.-designed transit network on its northern frontier.

Iran’s initial reaction to the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework has been visceral, with some prominent media organs terming it a “betrayal”. Tehran explicitly sees TRIPP as a U.S. footprint pressed onto its northern frontier. The plan envisions a 20-mile corridor through Armenia’s Syunik region, linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, with development rights leased to a U.S. consortium for up to 99 years. More than redrawing borders, the project reshapes the balance of power and places a sustained U.S. commercial and political presence in the narrow strip where Iran has long turned geography into strategic leverage.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran interprets the recent Azerbaijan–Armenia peace talks not only as a potential shift in the regional balance of power but also as part of a broader geopolitical environment increasingly hostile to its interests. Tehran worries that a settlement, especially one facilitated or backed by Western actors (including Turkey), could strengthen Azerbaijan’s position, deepen Baku’s security and economic ties with the West and Israel, and reduce Iran’s leverage in the South Caucasus. These concerns are amplified by the expanding footprint of the U.S. and Israel in Azerbaijan, from intelligence cooperation to defense technology transfers, which Tehran perceives as part of a containment strategy aimed at its northern flank. Against this backdrop, any peace process that sidelines Iran or solidifies the U.S. influence in the region risks, in Tehran’s view, to tighten the strategic noose around its borders.

Iran’s historical memory of regional threats plays a significant role in shaping its foreign policy reflexes. In addition to the growing perception of U.S. and Israeli threats following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further heightened Tehran’s sense of vulnerability. Iranian officials, suspecting that the Soviets might use the Baloch as a stepping stone toward making Iran their next target, began seeking countermeasures. After the Soviet collapse, the country continued to frame its foreign policy around an intensifying rhetoric of U.S. and Israeli danger and the cooperation of Azerbaijan with these powers. Today, Washington’s renewed bid to reassert influence in the region is likely to aggravate Iran’s geopolitical anxieties, with indirect repercussions visible in Iran–Azerbaijan relations.

Tehran’s messaging, while varied in tone, consistently reflects unease about the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, warned that the corridor would become a “graveyard” for its backers; a classic piece of deterrent rhetoric aimed at raising costs and sowing doubt. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry expressed conditional support for a peace deal in principle, while cautioning against “foreign interference” near Iran’s borders. President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran’s core demand had been met, yet voicing unease over U.S. corporate involvement.

Tehran is not worried about lines on a map. It is losing the bargaining power that those lines used to confer. A corridor under Armenian law deprives Iran of the sovereignty argument it used against an “extraterritorial” Zangezur model, outside Armenian jurisdiction. However, U.S. stewardship narrows Iran’s room to shape rules, customs, and security practices at the edge of its border. A U.S.-organized logistics spine running from Turkey via Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan (tightening connectivity between Turkey and Central Asia) offers a shorter, more secure east–west route that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

The Russian reaction intensifies Iran’s dilemma. Moscow’s muted response by accepting a U.S. role while cautioning against “foreign meddling” signals that Russia, overstretched and weakened in credibility after the 2020 Second Karabakh War, lacks the capacity or will to reshape the deal. For Tehran, this translates into fewer veto options by proxy and a thinner buffer against Turkish and U.S. coordination. It also incentivizes Yerevan to deepen ties with Western partners, which is not acceptable for Tehran.

Economically, the corridor undermines Iran’s claim to constitute an indispensable regional bridge. Tehran has long positioned itself as the key link between the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, with initiatives like the International North–South Transport Corridor and electricity and gas swaps with Armenia designed to cement that role. A functioning TRIPP route diverts attention and investment toward the “Middle Corridor,” lowering the premium shippers pay for transit through Iran and shrinking Tehran’s leverage to extract side deals on access, security assurances or energy flexibility. Iran’s alternative options remain limited, as seen in its cautious approach to the Gulf of Hormuz closure in June 2025.

Security risks run in both directions. For Tehran, a U.S.-supervised logistics corridor along its northern frontier would invite surveillance and restrict its gray-zone tactics. Yet overt interference such as through intimidation, sabotage, or proxy harassment would likely backfire. Such moves could strengthen U.S.–Turkish coordination (and even Azerbaijani-Israeli coordination), justify reinforced security around the route and push Armenia toward even closer alignment with Washington and Brussels. Iran’s own experience shows that coercion is most effective when opponents lack a unifying patron; TRIPP provides precisely that.

Still, Tehran has a few levers left. The first is regulatory: it can push for “no military use” clauses, real-time customs transparency and verified policing regimes that limit the route’s securitization. The second is connectivity hedging. The new route builds upon Iran’s already existing north–south connections with Armenia, including the Meghri–Julfa railway link, expanded electricity exchanges, and predictable gas swaps. Thus, the U.S.-managed corridor supports, rather than replaces, Iranian routes. The third is political triangulation. Iran maintains open channels with Ankara on trade and energy, where their interests sometimes overlap, while giving Yerevan price and reliability benefits that only a neighboring country can offer.

CONCLUSIONS:  Then, what is the balance sheet? In the short term, Iran faces a strategic setback in shaping the regional agenda. The U.S. has demonstrated its ability to achieve outcomes in the South Caucasus that Moscow could not, and the corridor effectively puts a purely Western hand on the flow of regional connectivity (the role of Turkey is also extremely important). In the medium term, Tehran can still limit the impact by quickly upgrading its own corridors, offering competitive transit pricing, and securing Indian and Gulf participation in north–south routes, turning competition into redundancy rather than outright replacement. Over the long term, the key question is whether Iran can tolerate a U.S. presence next door while extracting enough rules and linkages to avoid strategic encirclement.

An additional factor complicates this calculus: the possibility of an Israel–Armenia security partnership. While historically limited, such a relationship becomes more logical in a post-peace-deal environment where Yerevan seeks diversified defense ties beyond Russia and the West. This possibility is already being discussed in various circles. Israeli defense technology, already embedded in Azerbaijan, could find a foothold in Armenia in the form of counter-drone systems, border surveillance or intelligence sharing, especially if framed as balancing Ankara–Baku military cooperation. For Tehran, this would imply Israeli-linked security infrastructure on both its northwestern and northern flanks, eroding any remaining buffer zones and deepening the perception of encirclement. In such a scenario, even an economically beneficial TRIPP corridor would be overshadowed by the strategic risks it amplifies.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as an academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs. Additionally, he is a member of the Young Turkey–Young America fellowship program at the Atlantic Council and the Korean Society of Contemporary European Studies.