By Nargiza Umarova

The Islamic Republic of Iran is strengthening the Afghan dimension of its transport diplomacy, while also developing partnerships with Central Asian states. Several notable events have recently occurred in this area, and a collective analysis of these developments demonstrates Afghanistan’s active involvement in the expanding network of Eurasian overland routes. China is providing practical support for this within the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing’s strategy involves diversifying east-west logistics routes via Central Asia to minimize the growing risks of uncertainty in maritime shipping. Uzbekistan is expected to benefit particularly from this progress, as it prioritizes southern transit corridors and maintains pragmatic policies towards both Afghanistan and Iran.

BACKGROUND:

In June 2026, an Afghan delegation led by Deputy Minister for Railways, Mawlavi Mohammad Ishaq Sahibzada, visited Iran to discuss transport logistics infrastructure projects, including the construction of the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway. The parties discussed technical specifications, standards, financing mechanisms and the stages of project implementation. Prior to the meeting in Tehran, media reports had indicated that Afghan commercial banks were willing to invest in the new railway line connecting the provinces of Balkh and Herat, estimated to cost US$ 780 million. It was later revealed that Iranian companies would undertake the construction of the infrastructure facility in exchange for participating in the development of Afghanistan’s mineral resources.

The Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif transport line will serve as an extension of the cross-border trade route that originates in the Iranian city of Khaf, and will be a key component of the Afghan section of the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC), which is approximately 2,100 km long. The FNRC extends to Kashgar in China and utilizes a uniform 1,435 mm standard gauge, crossing the borders of two Central Asian states: Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In a global context, this will create a more competitive continental East-West Corridor, in which Afghanistan and its northern neighbors will play a pivotal connecting role. 

The strategic importance of the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway project is determined by its potential to connect Iran and Türkiye with the Central Asian republics and China via Afghanistan. It is worth noting that Ankara is a third party to the agreement on the joint construction of a railway to Mazar-i-Sharif, which was signed in Istanbul during the 36th regional meeting of the International Union of Railways in October 2025. 

In light of the Strait of Hormuz crisis triggered by the military standoff with the U.S., it has become critical necessity for Tehran to establish additional transport routes to China, one of its largest trading partners. Beijing is interested in both the Iranian market and the Islamic Republic’s extensive transit capabilities. On May 25, 2025, the first freight train departed from Xi’an, China, bound for the Iranian dry port of Aprin, marking the official launch of direct land transport between the two countries. The Xi’an-Aprin railway route passes through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, making use of the Uzen (Kazakhstan)-Bereket (Turkmenistan)-Gorgan (Iran) railway line. This line was opened in 2014 and forms part of the eastern route of the International North-South Transport Corridor.

Within the framework of the six-party meeting mechanism for heads of railway administrations, a China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Türkiye/EU railway corridor is being developed. This involves Uzbekistan in container transport along the southern branch of the East-West Corridor. This development forms part of the wider initiative to establish the China-Europe Railway Express Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative. The expansion of the network of freight routes connecting Chinese and Central Asian cities should also be viewed in this context. Since early 2026, several regular and test block trains have been launched from industrial and economic centers in China, such as Chongqing, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Hubei and Xining, bound for Central Asian countries, with the potential to extend into Iran and beyond.

IMPLICATIONS:

The practical progress being made on constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway line, alongside the already operational Khaf-Herat railway, reflects Iran’s desire to diversify its freight transport corridors, particularly in view of the ongoing risks of disruption to maritime shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran is therefore prioritizing the expansion of rail connections with Afghanistan and its Central Asian partners. Implementing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif infrastructure project is central to achieving this objective, as announced by the Iranian government in August 2026.

In light of the escalation of the Afghan-Pakistani conflict, the rail link between Iran and Afghanistan has given Kabul a significant opportunity to access the markets of the Persian Gulf states, Türkiye and the EU, offsetting the costs resulting from the temporary lack of access to the seaports of neighboring Pakistan. This has also boosted Iranian-Afghan trade, with an annual volume reaching US$ 3.6 billion. Similarly, bilateral freight traffic has sharply increased. From March 2025 to March 2026, over 640,000 tons of cargo were transported via the Khaf-Herat railway, compared to fewer than 15,000 tons during the previous period. Monthly volumes have already approached 130,000 tons, and projections indicate growth to 160,000 tons per month, or 1.5 million tons per year.

It is estimated that, once the Khaf-Herat railway line is fully operational, the annual volume of interstate freight traffic could increase to 3 million tons, and transit freight to 1.7 million tons. These figures are in line with Tehran’s ambitious plan to increase the volume of cargo transported by rail to 60 million tons per year. This goal will be achieved by developing North-South and East-West international transport corridors, which will require close cooperation with neighboring countries, including those in Central Asia. Tehran has already announced plans to increase rail freight traffic with Kazakhstan to 5 million tons per year, with Turkmenistan to 4 million tons, and with Uzbekistan to 2 million tons.

In order to speed up the transportation process and remove the physical barriers hindering the movement of cargo, Iran has reached agreements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan regarding the passage of its wagons, which should ensure their free movement throughout the CIS. However, these agreements have not yet been implemented.

CONCLUSIONS:

A review of Afghanistan’s foreign policy activities over the past few months reveals a noticeable synchronization of efforts between Kabul and Tehran in promoting the construction of a railway line to Mazar-i-Sharif. This project would establish an additional transport link to Central Asia via the Uzbek border. In this context, the visit of an Afghan technical delegation to Tashkent on July 22, 2026, is noteworthy. During negotiations with the Chairman of the Board of Uzbekistan Temir Yullari, a joint-stock company, the parties held detailed discussions on commencing engineering surveys to prepare a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan (Kabul) Railway Corridor, as well as the possible transfer of project documentation and a preliminary feasibility study for the construction of the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway to the Afghan side. The parties also addressed the modernization of infrastructure at Hairatan station, the construction of new warehouse complexes and an additional 1,650-meter access track at Naibabad station, which is located along the Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif route. In April 2026, Uzbek specialists had already laid 1,000 meters of access tracks on this section to simplify and accelerate cargo handling.

On July 27, an official meeting took place between Afghanistan’s Minister of Public Works, Mullah Mohammad Issa Sani, and Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister, Jamshid Khodjayev. According to Afghan sources, the Uzbek authorities expressed an interest in investing in the railway network between Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. However, this information has not been officially confirmed by Tashkent. 

If Uzbekistan is intent on contributing to the implementation of the new project, it could encourage the country to participate in developing the Five Nations Road. Although the original route was designed to bypass Uzbekistan, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway offers the potential to connect with the FNRC via a spur extending into Tajikistan through the Sughd section. This would enable the route to bypass the congested transport hub in Tashkent, shortening the journey to Afghanistan by several hundred kilometers. 

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Nargiza Umarova is a Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED), and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration, and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Zabikhulla Saipov

The August 31–September 1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek offered a revealing snapshot of Afghanistan’s changing role in the region. The massive SCO gathering brought together the leaders of China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus. Its expanded SCO Plus meeting added Azerbaijan, Armenia, Egypt, Laos, Mongolia, Türkiye, Togo and Vietnam, alongside the UN and other organizations. U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor was in Bishkek meeting Central Asian leaders, while former U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad was engaging Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul. The juxtaposition is revealing: Afghanistan may have receded from Washington’s formal strategic agenda, but it has not receded from the calculations of the states surrounding it, or from every channel of U.S.–Afghan interaction.

BACKGROUND:

The precipitous U.S. departure from Afghanistan in 2021 altered the form of U.S. involvement, but it did not change the geography that had made Afghanistan central to Washington’s engagement with Central Asia. Afghanistan shares approximately 2,329 kilometers of common land and water borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, while all five Central Asian states remain exposed to security, economic, and connectivity issues pertaining to Afghanistan. After 2001, Afghanistan became a central organizing factor in Washington’s engagement with Central Asia, shaping security cooperation, military access, border assistance, counterterrorism policies and regional diplomacy. The withdrawal changed that equation, but not the underlying geography.

Since 2021, Uzbekistan has been particularly active in treating Afghanistan not only as a security concern but as a potential connecting link between Central and South Asia. The Termez Dialogue, launched in May 2025 as a permanent platform is perhaps the clearest example of this approach. Its second meeting in June 2026 moved toward practical mechanisms for political dialogue, connectivity, transport and logistics, climate adaptation, and cultural-humanitarian cooperation. Rather than treating Afghanistan solely as a security perimeter, Tashkent is attempting to embed the Afghan question within a broader architecture of regional connectivity. This institutionalization also began to acquire a specifically Central Asian format in August 2025, when Uzbekistan convened the first meeting of Central Asian special representatives on Afghanistan, which agreed to establish a regular Contact Group for coordinated regional dialogue on the Afghan issue.

Institutionalization, however, is moving in both directions. In April 2026, Afghanistan itself initiated the first Afghanistan–Central Asia Consultative Dialogue in Kabul, bringing together all five Central Asian states and proposing regular consultations, expert cooperation and a roadmap for cooperation in trade, transit, security and connectivity. The subsequent Afghanistan–Central Asia Think Tank Forum in June 2026 extended this process into the intellectual and policy sphere, explicitly seeking research-based proposals and locally generated regional narratives. Thus, Uzbekistan is building platforms through which Afghanistan can be incorporated into wider regional cooperation, while Kabul is simultaneously seeking to engage Central Asia on its own terms. Afghanistan remains an unavoidable geographic reality, but the institutional response to that reality is increasingly being shaped within the region itself.

IMPLICATIONS:

Central Asian ownership, however, should not be confused with Central Asian consensus. Uzbekistan emphasizes connectivity, trade and regional integration; Tajikistan remains particularly attentive to border security, inclusive government, and militant threats; Turkmenistan prioritizes energy, transit and neutrality; Kazakhstan approaches Afghanistan through economic and diplomatic engagement; and Kyrgyzstan, although less directly exposed geographically, participates in wider regional security discussions. These differences may explain why flexible regional mechanisms are emerging alongside existing multilateral institutions.

For Kabul, the emerging collaborative architecture may represent both an opportunity and a necessity. The April Consultative Dialogue was initiated by the Afghan side, but its timing is particularly significant given Afghanistan’s increasingly constrained external environment. Tensions and armed confrontation with Pakistan have disrupted one of Afghanistan’s principal trade and transit corridors, while the wider war involving Iran has created additional uncertainty around western routes and regional commerce. Against this backdrop, Kabul’s turn toward Central Asia may amount to more than diplomatic activism. It can be understood as an effort to widen Afghanistan’s room for maneuver by strengthening alternative northern connections to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the wider Eurasian market. In this sense, the Afghanistan–Central Asia dialogue may function as a form of strategic insurance at a moment when some of Afghanistan’s traditional routes and external options have become more vulnerable. Kabul is therefore increasingly seeking to participate in shaping the regional architecture around it. This does not automatically imply political convergence or recognition by Central Asian governments; rather, it reflects an attempt by Afghanistan’s de facto authorities to turn geography into diplomatic and economic leverage.

The Bishkek SCO summit illustrates the wider environment in which this process is unfolding. The sheer composition of the gathering demonstrated the breadth of the Eurasian strategic conversation in which Afghanistan is situated. Afghanistan remained outside the summit, yet its political future and security implications remained part of the agenda. The SCO’s call for an inclusive Afghan government showed that regional powers continue to attach political conditions to their vision of Afghan stability.

Uzbekistan used the same broader setting to advance institutional mechanisms of its own. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted Uzbekistan’s initiative to establish a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats in Tashkent under the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, indicating Tashkent’s interest in strengthening the region’s permanent capacity to address emerging security challenges. Together with the Termez Dialogue, the initiative illustrates a broader Uzbek strategy: institutionalizing regional cooperation rather than relying exclusively on ad hoc responses to individual crises.

Gor’s presence in Bishkek demonstrated that the U.S. remains engaged with Central Asia, but increasingly from outside the Afghan theater. His meetings with Central Asian leaders focused on strategic partnerships, economic and investment cooperation, transport, energy, critical minerals and the C5+1 framework. On September 5, Khalilzad met Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul to discuss Afghanistan–U.S. relations and opportunities for constructive engagement. Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry presented the meeting as part of discussions on bilateral relations, economic growth and self-reliance, while the U.S. State Department clarified that Khalilzad is no longer a government employee and was acting in a personal capacity. These engagements therefore should not be interpreted as evidence of a new official U.S. policy toward Kabul. Their significance lies elsewhere: the U.S.–Afghan relationship has not simply disappeared; rather, it now exists through channels considerably different from the military-centered relationship of the pre-2021 period.

The geometry of U.S. involvement is changing as Washington cultivates Central Asian partnerships without a military presence in Afghanistan, while Central Asian governments are simultaneously deepening practical engagement with Kabul through regional mechanisms. The U.S. does not necessarily need to sit at every table where Afghanistan is discussed. But understanding what those tables are producing may become increasingly important for a U.S. strategy that seeks to remain relevant in Central Asia.

The emerging regional architecture is not necessarily anti-American, nor does Central Asian engagement with Kabul imply recognition of the Taliban or alignment with China or Russia. Much of it is the practical consequence of geography, security concerns and economic necessity. The U.S. may therefore face a different Afghan question than it did before 2021. Previously, Afghanistan often shaped Washington’s requirements for Central Asia. Increasingly, Central Asian approaches to Afghanistan, and Afghanistan’s own efforts to engage Central Asia, may shape how the country connects to the wider region.

CONCLUSIONS:

The U.S. left Afghanistan, but Afghanistan did not leave Central Asia. What has emerged since 2021 is neither a simple regional takeover of the Afghan question nor a disappearance of U.S interest. Instead, Afghanistan is becoming embedded in a regional architecture being built from several directions: Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states are developing mechanisms for security and connectivity; Kabul is seeking to participate in that architecture on its own terms; and institutions such as the SCO are incorporating the Afghan question into a much broader Eurasian strategic conversation. Washington is still engaged with Central Asia, but increasingly without the Afghan theater as the organizing center of that engagement. At the same time, the U.S.–Afghan relationship has not simply disappeared. For U.S. policy, the challenge is therefore to recognize how the Afghan factor itself is changing. Afghanistan has not become less relevant to Central Asia; rather, Central Asia is increasingly determining what that relevance means.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Zabikhulla Saipov is an independent researcher on contemporary history and diplomacy of U.S. and wider Central Asia relations. He holds BSc honors degree from Uzbekistan State World Languages University, Tashkent; MIA degree from SIPA, Columbia University, New York, and PhD in political science from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent. 

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Tashkent and Islamabad have agreed to expand bilateral trade through routes traversing China, as Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions and the war in Iran have disrupted existing trade links. Pakistan’s conflict with Afghanistan has made the prospects for trans-Afghan corridors connecting Central Asia with Pakistan increasingly uncertain. Meanwhile, renewed U.S.-Iran fighting has made trans-Iranian routes an unreliable option for Pakistan’s trade with Central Asia. Pakistan and Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan are therefore promoting an overland route through China that bypasses Afghanistan. Besides providing Pakistan and Central Asia with a corridor avoiding both Afghanistan and Iran, this route creates opportunities to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), into Central Asia.

BACKGROUND:

Afghanistan has long represented the most viable transit route for trade between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). However, decades of conflict have prevented plans for a Trans-Afghan trade corridor connecting Central Asia with Pakistan from materialising. More recently, escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions over cross-border terrorism have further undermined prospects for developing these routes. Relations deteriorated sharply in October 2025 following border clashes, prompting Islamabad to suspend truck-borne trade through the main Torkham and Chaman crossings. In February 2026, Islamabad declared an open war against Afghanistan and launched airstrikes targeting alleged terrorist sanctuaries inside the country.

In April, Islamabad opened six overland transit routes for goods destined for Iran amid the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports. These routes allowed goods from third countries to transit Pakistan and enter Iran by road. The designated corridors connect Pakistani seaports with two Iranian border crossings, providing a viable route towards Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In April, Islamabad dispatched its first shipment of frozen meat to Tashkent via Iran.

Pakistan activated new routes through Iran for trade with the CARs, but renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities over the Strait of Hormuz have undermined their viability. The trans-China route has consequently emerged as the most viable and secure remaining option for trade between Pakistan and Central Asia. Both sides are therefore increasingly prioritizing the development of the trans-China trade corridor.

The trans-China option has long featured in discussions between Pakistani and Central Asian leaders due to security concerns in Afghanistan. In November 2025, Uzbekistan and Pakistan agreed to develop trade along two major land routes bypassing Afghanistan: the Pakistan-China-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan and Pakistan-China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan corridors. 

In April, Kyrgyzstan successfully tested an overland route to Pakistan via China, bypassing Afghanistan. A truck carrying Kyrgyz goods reached the Pakistani port of Karachi via China along the Karakoram Highway. Islamabad considers routes connecting Pakistan with Bishkek and Almaty more secure than the Trans-Afghan alternatives.

Several Central Asian leaders have visited Pakistan over the past ten months. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov visited Islamabad in December 2025, followed by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in February 2026. Their discussions with Pakistani leaders focused primarily on connectivity projects providing the CARs with access to Pakistan’s seaports at Karachi, Gwadar, and Bin Qasim.

Uzbekistan and Pakistan have agreed to amend their transit trade agreement to formally incorporate the China corridor. This would allow goods to transit through the Sost dry port and western China before reaching Central Asia. In July, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister was scheduled to visit Pakistan, but the visit was postponed at Tashkent’s request. During the visit, the two countries were expected to sign a protocol formally incorporating the China corridor into their transit trade agreement.

Currently, routes through China have become Pakistan’s preferred option for regional connectivity and the extension of CPEC.

IMPLICATIONS:

Deteriorating relations with the Taliban regime, recurring border clashes, and terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan have prompted a major shift in Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy, accelerating its turn towards routes through China. While the activation of the China corridor could undermine planned connectivity projects between Pakistan and the CARs, it may strengthen alternative regional initiatives. The future of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway, for instance, appears increasingly uncertain. Launched in 2021, the UAP railway aims to connect Central Asia with Pakistani seaports through Afghanistan.

Conversely, completion of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway could make Pakistan’s Gwadar port one of the shortest trade routes for Central Asia. The CKU railway is a strategic connectivity project linking Kashgar in China with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. From Kashgar, existing and planned transport links could connect the railway southwards with Gwadar through CPEC, providing Central Asia with access to the Arabian Sea.

Infrastructure development could further increase trade along the China corridor. Key projects include upgrading the Karachi–Peshawar ML-1 railway, expanding the Karakoram Highway, developing Gwadar Port as a warm-water outlet for the CARs, and expanding dry ports and logistics networks. Together, these projects could improve the efficiency and capacity of the China route.

Although Beijing, Islamabad, and Kabul have already agreed to extend CPEC to Afghanistan and Central Asia, the China corridor could accelerate its direct extension into Central Asia. CPEC connects China’s Xinjiang region with Pakistan’s Gwadar port in Balochistan through a network of highways, railways, and energy infrastructure.

The rerouting will provide Pakistan with an alternative route to Central Asia while maintaining Uzbekistan’s access to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi. Uzbekistan has emerged as Pakistan’s key economic partner in Central Asia. Although the China corridor bypasses instability in both Afghanistan and Iran, it is longer and more expensive than the Trans-Afghan route due to greater distances, higher handling costs, additional border procedures, and longer transit times. The China corridor could therefore serve as a strategic alternative in the short term, but is unlikely to fully replace the Afghan route commercially in the longer term. Improved infrastructure along the China route could enable Pakistan to connect with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan via the Khunjerab Pass.

CONCLUSIONS:

Geopolitics and security will ultimately determine the development of trade corridors between Pakistan and the CARs. The Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict has undermined prospects for the Trans-Afghan corridor, while the war in Iran has reduced the viability of the Trans-Iranian route. Under these conditions, the Trans-China corridor offers a comparatively secure and viable alternative for both Pakistan and the CARs. It could therefore serve as a strategic safeguard against regional instability stemming from conflicts in Afghanistan and Iran.

Pakistan’s importance as a trade outlet is widely recognized in Central Asia. The landlocked CARs seek access to Pakistani seaports through Afghanistan, Iran, or China to facilitate global trade. However, growing security concerns surrounding the Afghan and Iranian routes are likely to increase Central Asian interest in accessing Pakistani ports through the comparatively secure China corridor.

Pakistan, China, and the CARs could enhance the corridor by improving infrastructure, extending CPEC into Central Asia, and streamlining cargo clearance procedures at their borders. Such measures could address existing constraints and make the China route more cost-effective and commercially attractive.

AUTHORS BIO:

Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Erlan Benedis-Grab

On August 23, 2026, Kazakhstan elected its inaugural session of the state Kurultai, following its establishment under Kazakhstan's constitutional changes approved in the March 15 referendum. Adilet, the party into which the long-ruling Amanat (previously Nur Otan) merged, took 71.17 percent of the vote nationwide and 110 seats out of 145, a decisive supermajority. Kazakhstan's constitutional changes created the post of Vice President, a new People's Council, and the consolidation of the bicameral legislative branch into a unicameral parliament under a party list system. The overwhelming victory for the ruling party confirms what the constitutional changes made close to inevitable: an expanded presidential authority under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in which he can wield the system for a variety of purposes.

BACKGROUND:

The process of constitutional reform began as a suggestion for parliamentary reform. In his state of the nation address on September 8, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed abolishing the Senate and moving to a unicameral chamber elected entirely by party list. The process accelerated in early 2026. In January, Tokayev announced his intention to reform Kazakhstan’s constitution, establishing a Commission on Constitutional Reform chaired by Constitutional Court head Elvira Azimova, with Tokayev’s top deputy Erlan Karin as deputy chair. In February, Tokayev signed a decree, setting the referendum for March 15th. In March, voters approved the new constitution with an overwhelming majority of 87.15 percent. In July, the constitution took effect, terminating the bicameral parliament and triggering elections to the Kurultai on August 23.

Previously, Kazakhstan had a bicameral parliament consisting of the Mazhilis and Senate. The changes consolidated the two into a new unicameral parliament, called the Kurultai (meaning “assembly” or “gathering” of Turkic leaders). Additionally, the new parliament is elected entirely from a party list, replacing the previous mixed system of 70 percent  party list and 30 percent single-member constituencies.

A new quasi-legislative consultative body, the Halyk Kenesi (People’s Council), has been established, combining the earlier People’s Assembly of Kazakhstan and the National Kurultai. It is supposed to be a technocratic body designed to develop policy recommendations from the public. It is composed of 126 members, directly appointed by the president. It has the power to prepare legislation for the Kurultai and propose nationwide referendums, yet its functional role is likely to be limited. 

A vice presidency has also been created, with the vice president appointed by the president. This new position is first in the presidential line of succession, without necessarily making the vice president Tokayev’s successor.

The president will now nominate the Prime Minister, Supreme Court judges, and the Kurultai Speaker. Positions previously requiring Senate consent, including the heads of the Central Bank, the National Security Committee, and the Prosecutor General, now fall under presidential authority. These changes mark an institutional weakening of the parliament's authority.

The August 23 elections were the first contested by the Adilet (meaning justice) party, registered in June and led by Tokayev's former Chief of Staff, Aibek Dadebai. Following this, the ruling Amanat party, formerly Nur Otan, voted to merge itself into the Adilet party, making Adilet its successor as the ruling party of Kazakhstan.

With the apparatus of the Akorda clearly behind Adilet, it decisively captured 71.17 percent of the nationwide vote, taking roughly 110 of 145 seats. The OSCE commented that while the elections were orderly, they took place in an environment lacking political pluralism.

IMPLICATIONS:

Despite Tokayev’s promise of a “New Kazakhstan,” the constitutional changes affirm the dominance of Kazakhstan's super-presidential system. In this system, the president's formal powers so far exceed those of the legislature and the courts that no institution retains an effective check on him. The constitutional text now accommodates whatever Tokayev chooses to do with it, rather than constraining what he may do.

In his September 2025 address, Tokayev initially announced that reforms would take place in 2027. Instead, the whole rewriting process took around 6 months. Although Akorda framed it as a “broad nationwide discussion,” the constitutional text was likely engineered months or years before it was announced to the public. Given the rushed process, civil society in Kazakhstan, however limited, did not have enough time to mobilize significant opposition to the constitutional referendum. 

Tokayev is 73, raising the question of succession. The position of the vice presidency can be construed as a post for Tokayev to test his successor, or to withdraw from the presidency incrementally. 

However, even though Tokayev's presidential term ends in 2029, the Constitutional Court ruled that because the constitution was replaced outright rather than amended, terms served under the old charter do not count. Any election after the new text took effect counts as the first election. Kazakhstan’s single, non-renewable seven-year term remains untouched, but could carry Tokayev to 2036.

In appointing Erlan Karin as vice president, Tokayev chose someone whose political rise is tied to his own rule, rather than to the Nazarbayev-era patronage networks. Karin, a longtime presidential aide and former State Counselor, has been one of Tokayev’s most prominent political strategists. Yet the office could eventually offer Tokayev himself a post-presidential role. The obvious precedent is 2019, when Nazarbayev left the presidency but retained significant influence as Chairman of the Security Council. That way, Tokayev could wind down his leadership, passing the reins while securing his post-presidential position and retaining leverage.

Now, the elections to the Kurultai will be completely conducted through a closed party-list system, where the Adilet apparatus, and Akorda, handpicks their chosen candidates. Interestingly, this is a reversal of Tokayev’s own reforms submitted in 2022, mandating a 70/30 ratio for party-list vs single-seat constituencies. Its reversal signifies that Tokayev is past the early concessions of 2022, now rolling back the limited political reform of this period.

Neither system is entirely better or worse, but in Kazakhstan’s case this move clearly tightens presidential control over candidate selection. Candidates without the explicit support of the ruling Adilet party will be highly likely to be excluded from the new parliament.

Tokayev is also overhauling Kazakhstan's political machinery, merging Amanat with Adilet. Although Nur Otan was renamed Amanat in 2022, Tokayev wants a party that is unmistakably his own. Mazhilis MP Erlan Sariov put it succinctly, “Nazarbayev's fingerprints remain all over Amanat,” explaining why Tokayev would want a new party altogether. Yet there is no growth in pluralism, the party was molded from above rather than growing out of public demand. In truth, Tokayev gets a clean slate, a rebranded machine he can wield as he sees fit. 

Turnout was reported at 74.08 percent, twenty points above the 54.21 percent of 2023. However, the OSCE noted “significant differences between voter activity observed and the official turnout data”. The election was contested by several parties: the agrarian Auyl, the perennial opposition Ak Zhol, the “modern” Respublica, the communist remnants of the People’s Party, and the “real” opposition Nationwide Social Democratic Party, but Adilet captured the majority vote. The manufactured nature of these parties and their general unwillingness to oppose the government’s line could not seriously pose a challenge. 

CONCLUSIONS:

Akorda hopes to usher in a renewed Tokayev era with a new constitution, an updated parliament, and a decisive majority for the government, yet the core questions about Kazakhstan’s direction remain. Tokayev has reversed the chapter Kazakhstan opened during the turbulent year 2022 and the concessions then made by his government. The new constitution symbolizes that reversal; some changes are cosmetic, others engineer elite confidence in his rule. All of them empower him and the super-presidential system. Tokayev’s succession remains in question. The vice presidency can seat a successor, hold the chair for Tokayev himself, or stand by as he resets his own term, and the constitution now permits all three. Tokayev’s “New Kazakhstan” program may usher in increased modernization, efficiency and even transparency. It will not, however, undermine the dominance of the state. That approach may continue to bring prosperous autocratic development to Kazakhstan, but the public’s scorn over the lack of civic participation may build to a boiling point. 

AUTHORS BIO:

Erlan Benedis-Grab is a Junior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. He holds a dual B.A. in Economics and Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University Bloomington, and his research focuses on Central Asia, International Trade, and Energy Politics. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .