BACKGROUND: The most recent war in Chechnya, though launched as a counter-terrorism operation, has done little to reduce the threat of violence. Conversely, it has spurred increasingly violent attacks and widened the chaotic space in which radicals can recruit and operate. Beslan was the most brutal illustration of this while simultaneously provoking an exception to the rule of ongoing international neglect of Chechnya. No negotiations have taken place since 1997, and no Western government or international regulatory body has consistently and unequivocally pressed for a political resolution. With the conflict in its tenth year, the question is whether the United States will embrace an active position that moves the crisis closer to resolution or will continue to be cautious with Moscow on this and other issues in the Caucasus. Putin’s ambitions to keep the Soviet Republics firmly within Russia’s sphere of influence, and the tactics used to secure that position, have been eradicated by the recent elections fiasco in Ukraine. Putin’s actions in these and other elections call into question his honesty and sincerity in commitments made with the US, EU, and other international institutions such as the G8 on transparency, counter-terrorism intelligence sharing, energy security, and non-proliferation. In addition, the prolonged deployment of Russian Federal Forces in Chechnya, as in Tajikistan, has contributed to their corruption, seen in the selling of arms to radicals, hostage profiteering, and drug trafficking, and must lead one to question their effectiveness as a security and peacekeeping force not only in the Caucasus but also in joint international operations. Against the background of Ukraine and Georgia, the direction in Washington’e engagement has tended less toward direct involvement in conflict resolution, and more toward the broader theme of democracy promotion, which the Administration sees as a universal aspiration. Its foreign policy is dedicated to the promotion of democracy, as part of the total package of economic, governance, and civil society development with long term global and U.S. benefits including peaceful conflict resolution and threat pre-emption. This could be interpreted as a trend away from direct intervention in conflicts and instead toward investment in countries bordering on conflict areas. As the war in Iraq becomes more costly, there is necessarily an increased pre-occupation with the Middle East in the diplomatic sector and among NGOs. America will therefore have to devote the remainder of its resources not to costly crisis zones with desolate internal political landscapes, but to areas which have already manifested positive developmental trends. For example, there has been heavy investment in Georgia and Ukraine on the governmental and NGO fronts. However, other countries including Azerbaijan and Central Asian states have been ignored because of low expectations for the success of any efforts there. Similarly, there is little confidence in diplomatic or financial investment to Russia expressly devoted to ending the Chechen conflict. This approach of targeted democracy building, when applied to Eurasia and the Caucasus, also serves the purpose of chipping away at Russia’s dominance in the region. In effect, the promotion of democracy and political independence in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia diminishes Russia’s influence in the CIS without direct confrontation. This could gradually raise the regional role of Ukraine and Georgia. But this is unlikely to lead to any change n Chechnya. Even with increased support from the United States. Ukraine and Georgia are not likely to antagonize Putin over Chechnya, as Yushchenko and Saakashvili will have to work with Putin to maintain their relationships in the gas industry, not to mention their territorial security. The fact that Russia has killed the OSCE northern border patrol mission also indicates that Georgia is not in a position to play an larger role in the Caucasus, as some have suggested. Also underlying this is a reluctance on the part of the United States in taking on Russia directly, as well as a myopic view concerning security risks posed to the U.S. by the war in Chechnya. It is known that SS-21 SCARABs were launched from Mozdok (North Ossetia) in 1999. These short-range ballistic missiles are capable of carrying AA60 tactical nuclear warheads, which may also be in or near Mozdok. There is a credible fear that Shamil Basaev, or other radicalized Chechens, could take control of a ballistic missile site in an accessible region such as Tatischevo, near Rostov in southern Russia, partly through bribing members of the Russian Federal forces, as they did in practically all previous attacks. Vladimir Ustinov’s proposal before Duma to legalize the practice of counter-hostage taking has also raised the stakes in the Chechen conflict. The impact of a high-profile terrorist act involving such facilities would be tremendous. These weapons would not be used against the United States or Europe, but they could be used against Russia. Yet the effects would not be contained to Russia alone or even the immediate region. Such an event would be devastating in terms of human lives, medical and direct financial assistance, not to mention a sudden burgeoning of refugees from Chechnya and potentially Russia as well. Whatever pressures Georgia, Azerbaijan, and other states with Chechen refugee populations receive from Russia now would undoubtedly be magnified by such an event. If the past is any guidance, Russia would undoubtedly blame Georgia and possibly Azerbaijan, looking to the Pankisi Gorge and other pockets of refugees for terrorists. Its repression in the North Caucasus would increase, exacerbating the brewing unrest there. Moscow could conceivably blame Ukraine and Georgia for compromising regional security through defiance. The instability resulting from an enlarged open conflict area necessarily imperils U.S. energy security, economic interests, and the security of its presence in the Caucasus and neighboring Central Asia. This is a worst-case scenario, but every passing year unfortunately makes a worst-case scenario more likely. The resources, efforts and attention resulting from such an event would be much greater than the investment required now to help resolve or manage this still relatively contained conflict.

CONCLUSIONS: While Condoleezza Rice will most likely not push for intervention in Chechnya, she could toughen the Bush administration’s stance on its relationship with Russia and question the value of its relationship with Putin based on intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism. With Moscow’s dealings in Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Yukos affair and in light of Beslan, Washington is increasingly uncomfortable with its relationship with Moscow, and doubtful about Russia’s usefulness as a partner against terrorism. In seeking to redefine this relationship, there is an opportunity to re-evaluate the risks of a hands-off policy toward Chechnya ¯ to Russia, the Caucasus region, and therefore to the United States. Georgia and Ukraine potentially open a pathway, via the CIS, for broader international efforts in Chechnya, by virtue of being (for now) out from under the thumb of Moscow-backed authoritarians.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Erin Mark works with the Reagan-Fascell Fellows program at the International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy.