BACKGROUND: Both houses of parliament overwhelmingly approved the draft in its second reading Feb. 20, and the law passed a third reading shortly after that. President Nursultan Nazarbaev had presented the first governmental version Sept. 2, 2002, and established a working group, and two political parties originally submitted drafts but eventually withdrew their drafts in support of the governmental draft. By most accounts, the law contains concessions to the opposition and is thus an improvement over the other. But some experts temper this opinion by saying that, despite these concessions, at best the law will change nothing in reality. At worst, they say, the law will further solidify governmental control over elections. Most assess the Constitutional court acts according to Nazarbaev’s will, so its ruling is hardly independent. Of seven members, Nazarbaev personally appointed three. The chairman of the lower house appointed two, and the chairman of the Senate—also appointed by the president—appointed the final two members. This composition makes an independent evaluation of the law’s constitutionality doubtful. There are in fact areas in the law contradicting the Constitution, particularly those regulating who can run for office. Opposition parties claim that because they have been forced to the sidelines, the law still contains many loopholes for election fraud. Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) candidate Pyotr Svoik stated at a February 18 news conference that “the system of falsification of elections remains fully in place”. Furthermore, there is no mechanism checking governmental oppression of opposition in the law. Nonetheless, the Kazakh authorized representative for human rights Bolat Baikadamov stated that the law represents a significant increase in electoral rights for citizens over the previous law.

IMPLICATIONS: Although the law has been finalized and signed into law, many open-ended questions remain, including the selection of regional election commissions and the potential for electronic voting. Other much-discussed elements of the law are candidate disqualifications for administrative offenses and the role of observers. The biggest unsolved problem is that of representation on regional election commissions. While the law appears even-handed by giving all political parties a spot on the commissions, it problematically limits the commissions to seven people. Kazakhstan has nine registered parties, and more are expected to register before the fall’s elections. Not all of the parties will have candidates in all regions, so in some regions the question is irrelevant. But, for instance, in Almaty, there are likely to be more than seven parties. A system for determining which seven parties can participate in the commission has not been decided. The discrepancy between the number of slots and the number of parties could enable Nazarbayev to exclude political foes from regional election commissions. On the other hand, the appointment of local election commission officials by the regional representative bodies, the mashlikhats, is an improvement on the old system, when regional representatives were hand-picked by the governors. Still, under the law, Nazarbaev will appoint the Central Election Commission’s seven members, and there is no stipulation on equal representation for all parties. This does not foster CEC independence, experts say, and even pro-presidential figures like the president’s daughter and head of the “Asar” political party Dariga Nazerbaeva has agreed. Another contentious issue was the perspective of electronic voting, which prompted a third reading of the law. Many consider the idea too technologically advanced for Kazakhstan, and insufficiently outlined in the law. The issue is touched on in Article 43, which now states that the CEC can make decisions on automatic informational (voting) systems. Those in favor of the voting systems claim they are less likely to be penetrated by corrupt-minded governors in the region than traditional voting methods. Nonetheless, lawmakers have given assurances that the computer program is not ready for use and will not be used in upcoming elections. Opponents of the system say that discussing the system and working any mechanism for it into the law is premature, considering there is no finalized system. Others say that governmental units are underestimating the cost of implementing the system to make it seem more plausible. Official cost estimates have hovered around 4.5 billion Tenge. One area of concession is the relaxed restrictions on candidacy. The law loosens a ban on candidates with “administrative offenses,” which could benefit opposition activists who have been found guilty of civil-law infractions. Still, candidates who have been convicted under criminal law cannot run for office, a rule that many say contradicts the constitution, which only denies candidacy to prisoners or mentally ill. One positive area of the law is the granting of greater rights to election observers. Experts say the new law, which allows journalists to be present at voting precincts and have access to election-related documents, meets international standards. Candidates can also nominate unlimited monitors to observe voting.

CONCLUSIONS: The law garnered many negative statements from various international organizations and from governing bodies like the U.S. government and the European parliament. Because the law was considered and passed by Parliament at the same time as the more controversial draft media law (also recently sent to the Constitutional Council), international organizations have claimed the reigning political elite is shoring up political power before this fall’s parliamentary elections and working to decrease competition. Aside from this, the case is a new example on a short list of Constitutional Council decisions on controversial laws. Experts say that ascertaining a precedent from past constitutional council decisions is also almost impossible. Since 1996, the council has made more than 120 resolutions, and rarely have they found a law to be unconstitutional. In high-profile cases, the experience is mixed. In April 2002, the council found the draft law on religious freedom to be contradictory to the constitution. Three months later, the council approved a contentious law on political parties. Experts say these laws drew equal international opposition, but the government acted to preserve its political interests in approving the law on political parties. Regardless of the improvements that the law seems to bring, conditions for political opposition in Kazakhstan remain extremely difficult. In 1999’s parliamentary elections, three of four seats won by the opposition went to the Communists, and the Communist Party is the only opposition group official recognized as a party. In 2002, a controversial law on political parties introduced a restriction barring registration for parties with fewer than 50,000 members.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Olivia Allison is an independent writer currently traveling Central Asia.