BACKGROUND: The authoritarian leader of the Autonomous republic of Ajaria, Aslan Abashidze, opposed the November 2003 ‘Revolution of Roses’ which brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Abashidze stepped up repression against his opponents in the autonomous region, and created obstacles to January 4 presidential elections. He was seen as courting Russia for support against Tbilisi following his several visits to Moscow, including consultations with the secessionist governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tensions reached a peak as President Mikheil Saakashvili was barred from entering Ajaria by armed militias and police on March 14, when campaigning for the March 28 general elections. Abashidze accused the president of masterminding a coup. In response, Saakashvili announced a partial blockade of Adjara, with Georgia’s marine forces re-routing ships bound for Ajaria’s capital, Batumi, to the port of Poti. Airspace and the border with Turkey were closed off. The bank accounts of Ajarian officials and companies associated with them were frozen. Saakashvili demanded a free political campaign during the run-up to the March 28 elections, the release of the arrested activists, and the re-establishment of central government control over Ajaria’s customs at the border with Turkey and in the port of Batumi. Abashidze, who departed to Moscow before the blockade entered into force, called for Russian “peacekeeping troops” to be stationed on Ajaria’s administrative border. Reports emerged of Ajarian authorities arming civilians and requesting assistance from Russia’s military base stationed in Batumi. De-escalation started after 6-hour talks between Abashdize and parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze on March 17, which opened the way for a meeting between Saakashvili and Abashdze. The two agreed that free campaigning would be allowed, the prosecutor-general would send a special team to investigate alleged cases of political repression, and the president would appoint representatives at customs points. As a result, sanctions on Ajaria were lifted.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s government has handled its first serious crisis. Similar situations in the early 1990s led to armed confrontation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which ended in the factual secession of those provinces. Although the Ajarian leadership has never called for secession from Georgia, a potentially dangerous armed standoff took place for five days on Ajaria’s administrative border. Georgia’s government showed flexibility and coherence, as well as an emerging distribution of responsibilities between the President and Prime Minister. An anti-crisis centre was established close to Adjara, in the town of Poti, led by the Prime Minister. Political decisions were taken by the cabinet in consultation with the President. After Saakashvili publicly announced the core policy, the Prime Minister led the government follow-up. The ministries of interior and security coordinated issues related to the blockade with the prosecutor-general, the ministry of finance and the central bank. No contradictory statements were made. The President has largely coordinated foreign policy by holding phone consultations with the U.S. Secretary of State and the Russian president. He dispatched his two closest aides to crucial capitals – his head of administration to Ankara, and the head of the national security council to Moscow. Thus the lines of communication with the key foreign stakeholders remained open during the crisis. Saakashvili did not shy from demonstrating muscle – maneuvers of elite motorized rifle battalions were kept as a deterrent, after speculations surfaced of the Russian military base providing Abashidze with tanks. At the same time, the Parliamentary speaker was employed as an envoy of good will, demonstrating the positive role of the legislature as well as the continued unity of the three leaders of the ‘Rose Revolution’. Concessions from Abashidze were reached quickly and, if implemented, represent a significant success for Tbilisi. The participation of Ajaria in the general elections of March 28 is crucial. Free campaigning is likely to bring the opposition into prominence and, subsequently, to Ajaria’s parliament, previously exclusively dominated by Abashidze’s Revival Union. If Saakashvili’s supporters gain a majority in the parliament, Abashidze would be pressured to obey parliament’s decisions. Presidential representatives on customs checkpoint and in the port of Batumi may not provide for Tbilisi’s direct control over operations there. However, through such presence, Saakashvili would receive credible information on smuggling and illegal flows that are thought to have helped Abashidze turn Ajaria into his own private fiefdom. A combination of these efforts may lead to Abashidze’s gradual removal from Ajaria’s leadership. This first success is of great international value, as it breaks with the sad tradition of rough and incompetent crisis management, shows coherence and positions Saakashvili as a credible partner. Importantly, Russia’s government was persuaded to play a positive role. Initially, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Tbilisi of escalating the crisis; however, Saakashvili chose to ignore these statements and drew on direct links with Putin. The Commander of the Russian troops in South Caucasus was sent to Batumi to personally ensure the neutrality of the Russian military base, whose commanders are known for their sympathies for Abashidze. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov also visited Abashidze, while the details of his mission remain confidential. As a result, Saakashvili thanked Putin for his “nuanced and tactful” role in resolving the crisis. Tensions with Abashidze are likely to persist, as the strengthening of the central control undermines the control Abashidze and his cronies wield on Ajaria’s political and economic life. Abashidze will likely attempt to erode current agreements, leading to bitter exchanges with Saakashvili in the future. Nevertheless, the past crisis undermined Abashidze’s portrayal of Saakashvili as a radical war-monger and gave Tbilisi leverage in future negotiations.

CONCLUSIONS: The Georgian government has shown improved competence and coordination, which is good news for Georgia and its neighbors. President Saakashvili has gone far to dismiss accusations of hot-headed radicalism, which prevailed before his election in January 2004. However, tensions with Ajaria are far from over, and the end result is what matters. The peaceful dismantling of Abashidze’s authoritarian system of governance is a formidable task, which goes to the core of the state-building task set as a priority by the Saakashvili government. Popular support allows Saakashvili to act with resolve, but would be withdrawn if the president is seen to cut under-the-table deals with Abashidze. Public opinion and the opposition will be watching whether the prosecution of Ajarian officials proceed, including the charges against its deputy Interior and Security ministers, who were accused of conspiring to murder the head of the local interior ministry department – an opposition sympathizer. Saakashvili is also expected to follow up on his demands of disbanding Ajaria’s security ministry, which is independent from Tbilisi – a point that was muted after the talks with Abashidze. Russia’s position during the crisis has led to cautious optimism that Saakashvili’s pragmatic and largely friendly course towards Moscow is bearing fruit, especially at the level of the two presidents.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Jaba Devdariani is an analyst of South Caucasus affairs and founder of the internet magazine Civil Georgia (www.civil.ge)