BACKGROUND: While the Georgian opposition leads public protests against the rigged November 2 parliamentary elections, President Eduard Shevardnadze keeps ignoring calls for his resignation. Besieged in the capital city, Shevardnadze instead chose to seek the backing of regional strongman Aslan Abashidze, leader of the Adjara Autonomous Republic in southwestern Georgia. The call on Abashidze’s support is not an unprecedented development – in a significant move, Shevardnadze visited Abashidze in Batumi in November 2001 as he was challenged by street protesters who demanded the resignation of several members of his government. Following talks with the president on November 11 of this year, Abashidze was dispatched to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia to solidify regional support for Shevardnadze’s crumbling power and his waning control of the situation. Aslan Abashidze’s power in his own province is absolute, having suppressed the opposition in Adjara and forced dissenters into exile. The Abashidze-backed Revival Union was the chief competitor to the pro-presidential Citizens Union of Georgia in the two last parliamentary elections. Abashidze also managed to carve a considerable degree of independence from the central authorities for his province, especially in taxation and economic relations. While Abashidze wields considerable political power in his province and aspires for a nation-wide influence, his international profile has, so far, been limited. One reason is that Abashidze’s comfortable relations with the Russian administration and, especially, the Russian military did not fit well with Georgia’s overwhelmingly pro-Western foreign policy course. Presently, however, Shevardnadze is facing unprecedented public resistance, orchestrated by his former political trainees: Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze, who rally under pro-democratic banners. Although the opposition front remains fragmented, two opposition parties alone, the New National Movement led by Saakashvili and the Burjanadze Democrats, have managed to bring around 25-30,000 people on Tbilisi’s streets, launching permanent protests there as well as in other major cities. The protesters demand Shevardnadze’s resignation and new elections. Faced with this challenge, Shevardnadze is forced to seek allies.

IMPLICATIONS: Among Georgia’s political leaders, only Abashidze can offer sufficient muscle to make a difference in the ongoing power struggle, and only Abashidze can afford to openly side with the unpopular president. Due to obvious manipulation of the Adjaran election, Abashidze’s Revival Union is likely to be the single largest party in the new Parliament, second only to Shevardnadze’s own For New Georgia (FNG) bloc. Shevardnadze’s decision to seek Abashidze’s support has deepened the cleavages between Shevardnadze and the opposition in two major directions: firstly, the opposition interpreted the decision as a move towards authoritarianism at the expense of democratic development. Secondly, its indicates a pro-Russian tilt at the expense of a pro-Western orientation. Neither of these decisions is popular and they discredit the cornerstones of Shevardnadze’s tenure. The pitfall is that both national and international observers claim the elections in Adjara were even further from freedom and fairness than the grossly disorganized political process in the rest of Georgia. The voter turnout and Revival Union support figures both exceed 90%, which are believed to have been inflated at a major scale. Thus, Shevardnadze’s opting for political alliance with Abashidze undermines his pro-democracy credibility even further, giving birth to fears of an anti-democratic backlash if the alliance of two figureheads succeeds in weathering the current storm. Even more significant, however, is Abashidze’s new regional political role. He is widely rumored to have been the initiator of a sympathizing phone-call from President Vladimir Putin to the troubled Shevardnadze on the second day of the protests. Abashidze’s visit to Armenia coincided with the visit of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who later stated that the Russian military bases may engage into the crisis ‘if attacked.’ Thus, implicitly, the power of the Russian military bases in the Adjaran capital Batumi and Armenian-dominated Akhalkalaki was thrown behind Shevardnadze. It is also noteworthy that Abashidze emerged as a power-broker with Russian support. The level of his reception has been extremely high – at the level of the secretary of Putin’s presidential administration and the foreign minister. The details of the talks were not disclosed; however Russia is likely to be interested in the growing influence of the pro-Russian politician in Georgia’s legislature, which has traditionally been a nest of anti-Russian sentiment in Georgia. Analysts believe Abashidze may be headed for the position of the parliamentary chairman, who according to the Georgian constitution is to succeed the President if he resigns or is incapable of pursuing his duties. Should Shevardnadze decide to support his candidacy for the post of the Parliamentary Chairman, this move is likely to further alienate wide quarters of the Georgian elite, the opposition and wide public. Abashidze is rather disliked by the Georgian elite for his openly pro-Russian stance. His relations with the major opposition figures are particularly cold, especially after he accused Zhvania and Saakashvili of attempting his assassination in 1999. Abashidze’s rise to prominence may reinforce a trend of Shevardnadze’s policy of rapprochement with Russia at the expense of the pro-Western orientation and democracy. The willingness to find compromises with Russia was most recently manifested in the mid-2003 transfer of significant chunks of Georgia’s energy infrastructure to the Russian-controlled Unified Energy Systems and Gazprom. If the Revival Union attempts to further its pro-Russian agenda, it may face strong popular discontent orchestrated by the opposition. In the elections, none of the contesting political parties except Revival Union advocated for closer political and security ties with Russia. Thus, even by the preliminary election results, pro-Russian policy have no more than 18% of the popular support.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s crisis has already moved to threaten the foundations of the state’s institutions and policy. The stakes of the game for all participants are high, especially for the opposition, which in case it loses will be marginalized. The failure of the government to hold free and fair, well organized elections has far-reaching consequences as it demonstrates that the popular vote does not translate into a representative government. The parties which have popular support seem to be about to be excluded from political participation, while parties such as FNG and Revival, drawing almost exclusively on administrative potential of executive authorities, managed to manipulate the election results in their favor. Western powers are currently reluctant to express a clear position on the political crisis, as it could be interpreted as interfering with the election results. Yet they are not indifferent, as demonstrated by consultations with Shevardnadze by the U.S. Ambassador and an Assistant Secretary of State. Failure to react proactively to this crisis could nevertheless risk letting the situation escalate to open conflict.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Blanka Hancilova earned her doctoral degree from Charles University, and now serves with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.