Wednesday, 22 October 2003

AZERI POLITICS: A NEW REALITY AFTER ELECTIONS?

Published in Analytical Articles

By Fariz Ismailzade (10/22/2003 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: Incumbent President Heydar Aliyev stepped down 13 days prior to the race, thus ending his nearly 34 year long reign and paving the way for his son Ilham to succeed him. According to the final results from the Central Election Commission, Prime Minister Ilham Aliyev received 76.84 percent of the cast votes and his closest rival Isa Gambar of the Musavat party received 13.
BACKGROUND: Incumbent President Heydar Aliyev stepped down 13 days prior to the race, thus ending his nearly 34 year long reign and paving the way for his son Ilham to succeed him. According to the final results from the Central Election Commission, Prime Minister Ilham Aliyev received 76.84 percent of the cast votes and his closest rival Isa Gambar of the Musavat party received 13.97 percent of the votes. Six other candidates did not collect more that four percent of the votes. International Election Observation Missions deployed by the OSCE\'s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and the Council of Europe consisted of some 600 observers. They generally noted that the voting process was orderly and that a number of safeguards were implemented to prevent election fraud. These safeguards included the use of transparent ballot boxes, envelopes for ballots, publication of precinct results on the internet and the posting of the final protocols. Yet, the elections were still characterized as fraudulent, as a number of irregularities including ballot stuffing, observer restriction, and problems with the counting and tabulation of votes took place. Peter Eicher, Head of the ODIHR Observation Mission, noted that observers were “particularly troubled by the level of intimidation and unequal conditions for candidates during the campaign. Future progress towards democratic elections will depend first and foremost on the political will of the authorities.” The Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, in a dissenting statement, argued that the OSCE and COE statements were mild and downplayed the scope and significance of electoral fraud committed during the election. The IDEE highlighted the problems of biased media during the campaign period, ballot stuffing and observer intimidation on election day, and fraud in the counting, tabulation and protocol completion after the voting. While authorities refuted news reports of mass falsifications, the CEC cancelled the results of the voting in 694 polling stations. The opposition refused to recognize the legitimacy of the elections. The most radical members of the Musavat, Hope and Democratic parties (the latter led and financed by exiled former Speaker of Parliament Rasul Guliyev) clashed with the police and army during unauthorized rallies after the elections, in which close to 10,000 people participated, leading to scores of injured on both sides and at least two fatalities. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd, which raged on to break shop and car windows. A Journalist’s Rights group stated that nearly 80 journalists were beaten, harassed and detained during these clashes. Authorities arrested close to 400 opposition members both in Baku and throughout the country. Isa Gambar was put under house arrest and his deputies were detained. International organizations and the U.S. government called upon the Azeri government to restrain its punitive actions against the opposition parties. \"We are worried about tensions arising from the low level of mutual trust within society,\" said Giovanni Kessler, Head of the Observer Delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. \"We urge all parties to exercise restraint. This election shows an increased vitality of political life and serious efforts in Azerbaijan towards democracy and international standards.\"

IMPLICATIONS: This election opens a new era in Azerbaijan’s politics. Guillermo Martinez-Casan, Head of Delegation of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, said: “We hope this election could mark the beginning of a new era in Azerbaijan in which progress could be achieved through trust, confidence-building and co-operation of all democratic forces in the country.” Most domestic analysts predict that this election puts an end to the political careers of some opposition leaders and their parties. Etibar Mamedov of the National Independence party, a leader of the dissident anti-Soviet movement and first runner-up to the 1998 Presidential elections, finished fourth this time in a weak showing. Most of his supporters as well as regular members of Musavat, ADP and other parties have started either leaving their parties or creating fractions within them. Regional branches of the opposition parties are being either voluntarily or forcefully dissolved. Thus, the opposition is expected to be significantly re-shuffled and new leaders are likely to emerge. The popular independent TV channel ANS has already called on the opposition leaders to step down and hold internal elections within their parties. Another re-shuffle will take place within the ruling party, YAP. Although temporarily united prior to the elections, the competing factions of YAP are likely to re-start their rivalry over influence on Ilham Aliyev, who is thought to be less skilled than his father in balancing the interests of competing factions. Should Ilham choose one side over another, the fragmentation of the ruling elite will not be preventable. Finally, the extreme polarization of the Azerbaijani political scene has reached dangerous level and any further alienation of the opposition will lead to further instability and violence in the country. The opposition forces believe that they have no avenues for political participation, as all elections are rigged. Thus, it will be in Ilham Aliyev’s interest to open some avenues, such as the upcoming municipal elections in 2004 for the healthier segments of the Azerbaijani opposition to participate meaningfully. Most regular citizens have completely lost faith in the established opposition parties. Trust in opposition leaders was already low before the elections due to their inability to unite and field a single candidate. Their failure to prevent – and in some cases their active instigation of – violence on the streets of Baku has further damaged their standing.

CONCLUSIONS: The October 15 presidential elections ended Heydar Aliyev’s long-term dominance and opened up new opportunities for political development in the country. Despite fraudulent elections, Ilham Aliyev is generally accepted as a legitimate president both domestically and abroad. His popularity and name recognition is high and is likely to remain so, provided that the government continues to develop its oil resources and to improve the welfare of citizens. Ilham also needs to prove his leadership by initiating reforms sooner rather than later, and urgently and publicly addressing the concerns arisen in the post-election unrest. Time is needed for the opposition to settle down after the elections. Their number one task in the short term is to avoid mass arrest and complete disappearance. International assistance in this matter is urgently required. It is most likely that the current opposition leaders will have to resign or their parties will face the danger of a split. Most current leaders date from the Soviet era and seem to be unskilled for political competition under the current realities of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, it is a high time for the ruling party to start thinking of power-sharing with some opposition groups in order to avoid further violence or the salience of Islamic Radicalism. AUTHOR’S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance analyst on Caucasus politics and economics. He holds a master’s degree from Washington University in St. Louis and is a regular contributor for various international media outlets.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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