Wednesday, 16 February 2000

ARIANA AND INDIAN HIJACKINGS: THE TALIBAN CONNECTION

Published in Analytical Articles

By Julie Sirrs (2/16/2000 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: Although the two airline hijackings were similar in several respects, it is the differences between the two incidents that are more telling. Both planes made several stops before reaching their final destination and poor airport security, in Katmandu and Kabul, were largely to blame for allowing the hijackings to occur. But as to the differences between the two hijacking incidences, the most glaring was the Taliban’s response.

BACKGROUND: Although the two airline hijackings were similar in several respects, it is the differences between the two incidents that are more telling. Both planes made several stops before reaching their final destination and poor airport security, in Katmandu and Kabul, were largely to blame for allowing the hijackings to occur. But as to the differences between the two hijacking incidences, the most glaring was the Taliban’s response. With Indian Airlines, the Taliban held firm that it was the responsibility of the target country to resolve the crisis. Taliban spokesman Abdul Hai Mutmaen stated, "It would be better if Indian people came to get involved themselves in the process of negotiations." When their own Ariana Airlines plane was hijacked, however, the Taliban reversed this position. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar declared, "we never want to negotiate with hijackers." The disparity lies in the very different sympathies the Taliban had toward the two groups of hijackers.

Early on, the Taliban apparently realized that the motive of the Ariana hijackers was to gain asylum outside of Afghanistan and that this desperate act to escape Taliban-held Afghanistan would be embarrassing to the Taliban movement as soon as the hijackers true intentions became known. As a result, the Taliban told the media that the hijackers were seeking the release of former governor Ismail Khan, now held captive by the Taliban, a move that implicated the anti-Taliban opposition in the incident.

In contrast, during the Indian Airlines incident, the Taliban were more sympathetic to hijacker demands for the release of India-held Kashmiri militants, even though these hijackers killed a hostage early in the drama and were the more violent of the two groups. The Taliban have direct links with Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, the group which helps the Taliban procure fighters from abroad, and who United States officials believe is affiliated with the Indian airlines hijackers. Taliban sympathy was again evident in the aftermath of Indian Airlines incident when the hijackers, after successfully obtaining the release of three militants, supposedly disappeared while under Taliban escort. They likely are receiving safe haven in Taliban areas of Afghanistan with other international fugitives such as Osama bin Ladin and the Egyptian extremist Ayman Zawahri. In contrast, the Taliban's European representative has stated that the Ariana hijackers should face the death penalty under Islamic law.

IMPLICATIONS: These two airline highjackings highlight the ongoing regional instability in which the Taliban will remain entangled as long as they continue to play a role in fomenting such unrest. The Indian Airlines incident, for example, was a product of the unresolved Kashmir issue. The Taliban, with strong links to Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, also has a role in this conflict, not only using Harakat-ul-Mujahideen's help in recruitment, but also serving as a training ground for militants active in Indian-held Kashmir.

The most recent Ariana hijacking reveals the increasingly desperate situation inside Afghanistan, an existence so miserable that people will go to great lengths to escape from Taliban-controlled areas of that country. Though information is still emerging about the identity of the Ariana hijackers, several reports suggest that they are related to a family among the passengers from the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. If true, this would be significant because Mazar-e Sharif has been the site of some of the worst confirmed Taliban human rights abuses against the Afghan population to date. Shortly after the Taliban's summer 1998 takeover of that area, reports surfaced of atrocities committed by Taliban troops including murders, kidnappings, disappearances, and rapes. While non-Pushtun ethnic groups were the targets of these crimes, elsewhere, in areas such as Shomali and Taloqan, Pushtuns have also been the victims of Taliban abuse.

Whatever the identity of these hijackers ultimately turns out to be, almost any Afghan has a strong case to make for why their lives are in danger by remaining in Taliban areas of Afghanistan. Moreover, after two decades of war, extremely poor economic conditions also prevail throughout all of Afghanistan, though these are exacerbated in Taliban areas because of the militia's prohibition against jobs and education for most females. Not surprisingly, only about half of the plane's original 164 passengers are willing to return to Afghanistan. Even those willing to return most likely have good ties with the Taliban or fear for the safety of their family members left behind in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION: Hijackings such as these will likely continue in the future as long as the sources of political instability, whether in Kashmir or Afghanistan, remain unresolved. This is particularly true if the perpetrators of such acts of terror triumph, as did the hijackers of the Indian Airlines plane. Not only did they achieve their demands, but in all probability they themselves will escape justice. Inadequate airport security is also a contributing factor that needs to be addressed throughout the region.

The Taliban are particularly deserving of attention because they are the common link between both incidents. The issue of Ismail Khan, falsely claimed by the Taliban as the principal demand of the Ariana hijackers, is especially instructive. Ismail Khan is a conservative Sunni Islamist and a veteran mujahideen commander who fought against the Soviets. In 1995, Ismail Khan was overthrown by the Taliban while he was the governor of Herat province. Since taking over much of the rest of the country, the Taliban have been unable to match the prior level of services provided in Herat or anywhere else. The Taliban have alienated almost all potential aid donors in the international community by their miserable management of the non-narcotic sectors of the economy, gross human rights abuses, and links with foreign extremists. Such policies show that unless the Taliban make significant changes, their continued rule will only further fuel the region's tensions.

AUTHOR BIO: Julie Sirrs is currently a consultant based in the Washington, DC area. She was previously an analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency with responsibility for covering Afghanistan and Iran.

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