The nuclear disorders in East Asia contrast vividly with the nonproliferation progress in the neighboring region of Central Asia. Whereas North Korea’s nuclear testing is threatening to precipitate of a horizontal nuclear proliferation wave in surrounding countries, the Central Asian states are leading a campaign to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime by making their region a nonproliferation paradigm. Unfortunately, the Central Asians are not masters of their fate; great power politics continue to impinge on their ability to pursue their nonproliferation goals.

BACKGROUND: On May 19, the U.S. government announced the completion of one of the largest nuclear recovery operations in history involving a trilateral partnership between Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States. These parties, assisted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), repatriated almost 74 kilograms of highly enriched uranium “spent” nuclear fuel, sufficient to construct several nuclear weapons, from Kazakhstan to a secure facility in Russia.

The operation occurred within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which seeks to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites throughout the world. Thomas D’Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-independent agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, said that the operation “continues the outstanding cooperation between the NNSA and the Government of Kazakhstan and is an important step forward in our national and global security.” After noting that President Barack Obama has announced his intention to expand such global threat reduction programs, D’Agostino added that, “We look forward to building on this success with Kazakhstan through continued cooperation in future projects that meet the nonproliferation goals of our countries and the international community.”

On March, 21, 2009 the treaty on a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ), signed on September 8, 2006 in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, entered into force, following its ratification by Kazakhstan’s government. The treaty establishing the CANWFZ—which encompasses the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—obligates the signatories not to research, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise attempt to obtain a nuclear explosive device. The members also agree not to allow other parties to undertake such activities on their territories or assist them to do so elsewhere.

Kazakhstan is now becoming a lead player in global efforts to establish a “nuclear fuel bank” in which countries that do not develop their own fuel manufacturing capabilities can “borrow” uranium fuel for their power reactors from an international repository. In March, the Kazakh government privately told the Obama administration that it would consider hosting such a complex. Bulat Auezbaev, a senior scholar at Kazakhstan’s Institute for Strategic Studies, believes that Kazakhstan would obtain several distinct benefits from a multinational nuclear repository located on its territory—including strengthening the country’s nonproliferation reputation, securing millions of dollars in foreign investment, and helping to develop the country’s domestic nuclear infrastructure.

President Obama has endorsed creating at least one international nuclear fuel repository, as have the IAEA and many of other governments and nuclear arms control groups. They believe the structure would remove an incentive for countries to develop their own uranium enrichment capabilities and other technologies that could be used to manufacture atomic bombs. Supporters of creating an IAEA-supervised nuclear fuel bank hope that it might help resolve the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian leaders have defied calls by the international community to restrain their nuclear power program, but they insist that they do not seek nuclear weapons. Allowing Iranians to participate in the manufacture of nuclear fuel, but at an international facility that limits their access to sensitive technologies that might be useful for bomb-making, might help overcome these differences. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev made public his interest in possibly hosting such a bank during an April 6 joint press conference in Astana with visiting Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

IMPLICATIONS: Kazakhstan has certain attributes that could make it a good candidate for such a fuel bank. First, Kazakhstan is a major player in the international uranium market. The country has enormous stocks of natural uranium (approximately one-fifth of the world’s proven reserves), is set to become the largest national producer of uranium, and exports uranium to many countries. Kazatomprom, the national nuclear monopoly, announced last year that it intends to increase its presence in several international nuclear energy markets. The conglomerate wants to mine 15,000 tons of uranium by 2010—which would make it the world's largest producer of natural uranium—and 30,000 tons annually by 2018. It has also set the goal of supplying 12% of the global uranium conversion market, 6% of the market for enriched uranium, and 30% of the fuel fabrication market by 2015. In recent years, the company has negotiated several important joint ventures with firms from China, Japan, Russia, and other countries.

Second, many states are justifying their decision to develop indigenous nuclear enrichment capabilities on the grounds that they do not want to become vulnerable to foreign suppliers for nuclear fuel, citing especially the risk of politically motivated supply cut-offs. The Kazakh government’s longstanding “multi-vector” policy of trying to retain good relations with all countries means that foreign governments likely will feel comfortable depending on nuclear fuel provided from Kazakhstan. Kazakh officials have always supported the right of other countries to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Finally, since independence in 1991, the government of Kazakhstan has established a strong nonproliferation record. The new Kazakh government eliminated or transferred to Russia all the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan has joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which requires adherence to export guidelines designed to minimize proliferation risks. The Kazakh government has negotiated both a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA and accepted the agency’s more stringent Additional Protocol, which grants IAEA staff additional inspection and monitoring rights. Finally, it has worked with the IAEA and the U.S. government to strengthen the safety and security of its nuclear plants.

Yet, certain domestic and international concerns about Kazakhstan’s hosting a multinational nuclear fuel bank persist. Public opposition to nuclear activities remains high in Kazakhstan given the horrific legacy the country inherited from the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the Soviet government used the Semipalatinsk facility in eastern Kazakhstan to test hundreds of nuclear bombs, which polluted much of the surrounding environment and left thousands of people suffering adverse medical consequences. Timur Zhantikin, chairman of the Kazakh Atomic Energy Committee, said that ensuring ecological and environmental security would be the government’s principal concerns in deciding a location and construction program for a possible nuclear fuel bank. Even so, some domestic groups express unease that the government might keep the facility’s operations secret and conceal any risks and accidents.

Some foreign observers might worry about the close ties the Kazakh government enjoys with Russia and Iran, especially since Moscow and Tehran are seeking to develop a robust nuclear partnership. The recent scandal surrounding the arrest of the head of Kazatomprom, the national nuclear monopoly, and some of his associates has reinforced concerns that corruption might contribute to the diversion of sensitive nuclear materials to criminals or terrorists. Nuclear experts also doubt whether the Kazakh government can train a sufficient number of skilled operators to manage the rapid expansion of the national nuclear industry envisaged by current plans.

Problems also exist with the CANWFZ. Beijing and Moscow have pledged to support the zone, but France, Great Britain, and the United States have declined to sign the CANWFZ Protocol until the treaty signatories address certain objections. These Western governments are most concerned that the treaty text allows Russia to move nuclear weapons in or through the zone because it declares that the proposed NWFZ would not affect the rights and obligations that its members might have assumed under prior accords, which could include the Collective Security Treaty (CST). The CST could be read as placing the Central Asian countries under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella.

CONCLUSIONS: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan issued a very critical statement after the recent North Korean nuclear test. The Ministry “strongly condemns the practice of conducting of nuclear tests” and warned that North Korea’s action “will have a very negative effect on the process of global non-proliferation and is a threat to security, both regional and global.” It urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks on Korea’s denuclearization. The disputes over North Korea, Iran, or the CANWFZ continue, but the expectation is that the establishment of multinational nuclear fuel banks, perhaps including one on Kazakh territory with strong international support and safeguards, might avert new ones.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. He is the author, among other works, of Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008).