Wednesday, 17 October 2007

BAKIEV GEARS UP PRO-PRESIDENTIAL PARTY FOR COMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Published in Analytical Articles

By Nurshat Ababakirov (10/17/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Less than a week before the national referendum, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev appears vigilant to secure the successful passage of his draft constitution, to establish a favorable ground for his Ak-Zhol Party in the likely ensuing parliamentary elections, and, more importantly, to persuade the public that what he is up to is for the country’s sake. The president has good chances to create a monopoly over three branches of power starting already from 2009. This prospect leaves the opposition parties little time for deliberation but to straighten up their party lines and prepare for the elections.

Less than a week before the national referendum, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev appears vigilant to secure the successful passage of his draft constitution, to establish a favorable ground for his Ak-Zhol Party in the likely ensuing parliamentary elections, and, more importantly, to persuade the public that what he is up to is for the country’s sake. The president has good chances to create a monopoly over three branches of power starting already from 2009. This prospect leaves the opposition parties little time for deliberation but to straighten up their party lines and prepare for the elections.

BACKGROUND: In a speech on October 10 in Batken oblast, President Bakiev encouraged local governors to ensure a maximum turnout in the referendum set for October 21. He suggested building a centralized power structure, which would help the country free itself from the political instability that has prevailed over the last two years and prove effective against drastic economic hardships that have mounted in recent months. “Therefore, the executive branch should work from the bottom to the top as a single entity,” he asserted.

On October 15, the forum For Constitution, Reform, and Development voted for the creation of the Ak-Zhol party and chose Bakiev as its chief. Pro-presidential parties, government workers, and other civil activists created the forum a month ago after the Constitutional Court annulled the November and December constitutions. Then Bakiev, implying the parliament’s eventual dissolution, shared his plans about the creation of a “party of creativity, responsibility, and action,” which should unequivocally serve as a platform for his ideas and policies.

Observers promptly commented that he wants to follow the scenarios developed in Russia and Kazakhstan, with strong pro-presidential parties, but showed concern regarding the haste of his plans. Unlike prior experience, President Bakiev’s draft Electoral Code, which will be presented along the draft constitution in the referendum, allows recently created parties to run in elections.

As an unprecedented step in Kyrgyzstan, a country that harbors an abundance of dwarflike and leader-centered parties, the parliamentary elections will be based entirely on party lists. General speculations had it that the REBP party (Republican Party of Labor and Unity), created by the president’s brothers, Janysh Bakiev and Jusup Bakiev in 2005, could become the core of the future pro-presidential party. It has a stronger appeal in the south. It was thought that Moya Strana (My Country), led by Medet Sadyrkulov, the head of the presidential administration; Novyi Kyrgyzstan (New Kyrgyzstan), chaired by the newly appointed mayor of Bishkek Usen Sydykov; and other pro-presidential parties would round it up.

In general, the current constitutional draft embodies a strong presidential state and leaves a restricted and ambiguous role for the government led by a Prime Minister. On that account, Muratbek Imanaliev, the head of the Institute of Public Policy (IPP) and a former Foreign Minister, sarcastically asked why President Bakiev did not propose to break up the already weakened institution of the prime minister and assume its position with all the attributed responsibilities. Currently Bakiev has his third Prime Minister, Almaz Atambaev, who is likely not immune to the fate of his forerunners.

According to the constitutional draft, the president will be responsible for nominating and dismissing akims (local governors) and local judges. He will also be empowered to establish and fully control independent institutions, which may quite successfully carry out tasks usually assigned to the executive branch. He will select officials responsible for defense and security, and can dismiss any cabinet member without parliament’s consent.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite the continuous consolidation of power in Bakiev’s hands, some still perceive it as a way to transcend the lingered constitutional impasse by viewing it as ‘consensual constitution.’ But many experts and authors themselves acknowledge existing flaws in the draft constitution, quite able to generate further disputes, precipitating new changes of the constitution itself.

The tight schedule set for the referendum, notwithstanding the clear violation of norms regarding referenda, shows Bakiev’s efforts to take the advantage in a period when the opposition is still disunited as a result of the unsuccessful political rallies held last April. Moreover, ordinary people appear increasingly apathetic towards political matters, owing to seemingly excessive and equally futile political wrangling, partly reinforced by a crippling 30% inflation. Moreover, this short time is certainly insufficient for ordinary people to acquaint themselves with the provisions of the draft and come up with a conscious choice. Also owing to seasonal labor waves, up to 30-40 percent of eligible voters may currently be outside the country, which requires the establishment of voting precincts and effective registration abroad, which in the case of failure may well entice the government to resort to administrative leverages in some regions with a low turnout.

According to Omurbek Tekebaev, the leader of the Atameken Party, such haste is explained by the potential deterioration of socio-economic conditions in the wintertime, which could undermine president’s chances of securing widespread support for the allegedly authoritarian changes he is pushing through.

Following a proposal of pro-presidential parliamentarians, Bakiev’s last amendment to the draft sets a restrictive 0.5 per cent threshold to be passed in every province of the country and a five per cent nationwide threshold for parties. Supporters believe that it will make all parties operate on a national scale, thereby stifling clan-based elections and village-to-village skirmishes.

Yet, in practice and in the short run, a 0.5 per cent threshold in every province will drastically reduce the chances of some opposition parties to get into the parliament. For example, this measure, along with sideling small parties, is thought to be targeted at the Ar-Namys Party led by Felix Kulov, the president’s number one rival, who is better known in the north and likely infamous in the south for his attempts to mount rallies in April 2007 against the southerner Bakiev. Also, it will ensure no advancement for parties created by non-titular nations like the Uzbeks, who comprise 30 percent of the south’s population and 17 percent of the total, but who lack representation in many areas.

In general, about 5-7 parties are likely to run full-heartedly in the parliamentary elections. Several opposition parties such as Atameken, led by Tekebaev; Akshumkar, co-chaired by Baybolov, Sariev, and Beshimov; Arnamys, led by Kulov; the Social Democratic Party, led by current prime minister Atambaev, and Asaba, co-chaired by Beknazarov and Otunbaeva, have already started their pre-election campaigns at different stages. But some of the leaders have begun to call for unification into a single party, recognizing their present vulnerability in the face of the new-born strong pro-presidential party.

CONCLUSIONS: In a nutshell, the results of the referendum will likely be in Bakiev’s favor. But nobody seems able to provide a guarantee for the thoroughness of the draft constitution, and its immunity from future changes and amendments. Since the apparent monopolization of power is at stake, Bakiev can be expected not to eschew administrative involvement. Warnings are abound that Bakiev will meet the fate of Akaev. These could be in vain, if he proves be able to demonstrate some signs of economic development and political fairness. With the shuddered Kyrgyz economy and a strong power struggle, this could nevertheless prove difficult.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nurshat Ababakirov is a Bishkek-based freelance writer.
Read 2754 times

Visit also

silkroad

AFPC

isdp

turkeyanalyst

Staff Publications

Screen Shot 2023-05-08 at 10.32.15 AMSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, U.S. Policy in Central Asia through Central Asian Eyes, May 2023.


Analysis Svante E. Cornell, "Promise and Peril in the Caucasus," AFPC Insights, March 30, 2023.

Oped S. Frederick Starr, Putin's War In Ukraine and the Crimean War), 19fourtyfive, January 2, 2023

Oped S. Frederick Starr, Russia Needs Its Own Charles de Gaulle,  Foreign Policy, July 21, 2022.

2206-StarrSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, Rethinking Greater Central Asia: American and Western Stakes in the Region and How to Advance Them, June 2022 

Oped Svante E. Cornell & Albert Barro, With referendum, Kazakh President pushes for reforms, Euractiv, June 3, 2022.

Oped Svante E. Cornell Russia's Southern Neighbors Take a Stand, The Hill, May 6, 2022.

Silk Road Paper Johan Engvall, Between Bandits and Bureaucrats: 30 Years of Parliamentary Development in Kyrgyzstan, January 2022.  

Oped Svante E. Cornell, No, The War in Ukraine is not about NATO, The Hill, March 9, 2022.

Analysis Svante E. Cornell, Kazakhstan’s Crisis Calls for a Central Asia Policy Reboot, The National Interest, January 34, 2022.

StronguniquecoverBook S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, Strong and Unique: Three Decades of U.S.-Kazakhstan Partnership, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, December 2021.  

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr & Albert Barro, Political and Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan Under President Tokayev, November 2021.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

Newsletter

Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst

Newsletter