By Suren Sargsyan

On May 4-5, Yerevan hosted two significant events: the 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC) and the first Armenia–EU Summit. The gatherings brought together leaders from EU member states as well as representatives from Canada, the UK, and NATO. The Armenia–EU Summit concluded with a joint declaration and several cooperation agreements, prompting renewed debate over whether Armenia intends to pursue eventual membership in the EU. The question is particularly relevant given Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s ambiguous statements regarding Armenia’s strategic orientation. While the government has expanded cooperation with the EU across numerous sectors, it has simultaneously emphasized that Armenia does not intend to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Consequently, it remains unclear whether Yerevan seeks eventual EU membership or merely aims to deepen relations with the EU while avoiding a confrontation with Russia.

BACKGROUND:

Since Armenia’s 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” political observers, media outlets, and analysts have frequently argued that the country is gradually reorienting itself toward Europe. Many interpreted the rise of a reform-oriented government as a signal that Armenia would seek deeper integration with the EU and possibly pursue membership in the future. Such assessments often portrayed Armenia as distancing itself from Russia and adopting a more Western-oriented foreign policy.

In practice, however, Armenia has not taken concrete steps toward EU accession during the years following the revolution. Instead, the government has continued a long-standing policy of strengthening ties with the EU while maintaining relations with Russia. This approach is consistent with the policies pursued by previous Armenian administrations, which also sought to diversify the country’s external partnerships.

Armenia’s engagement with the EU predates the current government. Key milestones include the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1996, participation in the European Neighborhood Policy from 2004, involvement in the Eastern Partnership launched in 2009, and the signing of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. These initiatives demonstrate that successive Armenian governments have viewed closer cooperation with Europe as beneficial for political, economic, and institutional development.

At the same time, none of Armenia’s previous administrations formally declared EU membership as a strategic objective. The current government has likewise avoided making such a commitment. Instead, Armenian officials typically provide cautious and often ambiguous responses when asked about accession prospects. This ambiguity allows multiple interpretations and sustains public debate without requiring a definitive policy choice. Public opinion nevertheless remains broadly supportive of the prospect of EU membership in general, and visa liberalization in particular. According to surveys conducted by the International Republican Institute, 51 percent of Armenians would support EU membership if a referendum were held, while 32 percent would vote against. Such attitudes make the topic politically attractive, particularly during election periods. By avoiding a clear rejection of membership aspirations, the government can appeal simultaneously to pro-European constituencies and to voters who favor maintaining strong relations with Russia.

IMPLICATIONS:

The EPC Summit in Yerevan was significant not only because of its scale and high-level participation but also because it was held in a non-EU member state. If Armenia genuinely intended to pursue EU accession, this gathering would have provided an ideal opportunity to announce such ambitions and seek political support from European leaders. Virtually all relevant decision-makers were present, creating a favorable diplomatic environment for such a declaration. No such announcement was made, suggesting that EU membership is not currently a priority within Armenia’s foreign policy agenda. The absence of such a step indicates that Yerevan remains focused on deepening cooperation with the EU rather than initiating a formal accession process. This situation reveals a degree of tension between public sentiment and official policy. While support for European integration appears relatively strong among the Armenian population, the government has avoided translating these preferences into a concrete strategic objective. The primary reason appears to be geopolitical rather than domestic. The decision to pursue EU membership depends not only on Armenia’s political will but also on the willingness of the EU to accept new members. Enlargement remains a complex issue involving economic, political, institutional, and security considerations. Brussels evaluates candidate countries according to extensive criteria, including governance standards, economic performance, social development, and regional stability. Consequently, accession is a lengthy and demanding process even under favorable circumstances.

In Armenia’s case, additional geopolitical factors further complicate the issue. EU member states would inevitably consider Russia’s position when evaluating any Armenian application. Armenia remains a member of the EAEU and maintains extensive security ties with Russia. It also hosts Russia’s only military base in the South Caucasus. Given these realities, many European governments would be reluctant to support a process that could significantly increase tensions with Moscow.

Moreover, EU enlargement requires unanimous approval by all member states. Even countries with stronger institutional links to Europe have faced lengthy and uncertain accession processes. As a result, Armenian membership, even if formally pursued, would likely require many years or even decades to achieve. It would also necessitate extensive economic, political, and legal reforms that could generate significant domestic costs.

Comparisons with Georgia and Ukraine are often made in discussions of Armenia’s European aspirations. These cases provide useful reference points because both countries have actively pursued closer integration with the EU while facing strong Russian opposition. However, Armenia’s geopolitical circumstances differ in important ways.

Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, Armenia does not share a border with Russia. This reduces certain direct security risks associated with Russian pressure. At the same time, Armenia lacks a direct land or maritime connection to any EU member state. This geographical reality limits economic integration and creates logistical challenges.

Furthermore, the EU itself remains divided on the question of further enlargement. While some member states support enlargement, others remain cautious due to concerns about institutional capacity, financial costs, migration, and security implications. The prolonged and uncertain experiences of countries such as Ukraine and Georgia illustrate that membership aspirations do not necessarily translate into rapid progress.

Economic considerations also constrain Armenia’s options. Despite efforts to diversify its international partnerships, Russia remains Armenia’s principal economic partner. Russia accounts for a substantial share of Armenian exports, imports, investment flows, and labor migration. Any move toward EU accession would therefore have significant economic implications and could provoke responses from Moscow that Armenia would need to manage carefully.

Regional dynamics further complicate the issue. Armenia must also consider the interests of neighboring Iran. Although EU membership does not automatically imply NATO membership, Tehran could interpret such a move as part of a broader Western geopolitical alignment. Given the importance of Armenian-Iranian relations, Yerevan is unlikely to disregard Iranian concerns.

The position of the U.S. adds another layer of complexity. Although Washington generally supports European stability and cooperation, U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus has focused primarily on regional stability, economic connectivity, and broader geopolitical initiatives while Armenia’s potential EU accession hardly factor into U.S. strategic priorities. 

Among these constraints, Russia’s influence remains the most significant. Armenia’s security dependence, economic integration, and geographic realities create structural limitations that make a rapid strategic shift toward EU membership highly unlikely.

These factors also raise a broader question: if neither Armenia nor the EU is seriously pursuing accession, what was the primary purpose of the summit? Plausibly, the event was intended primarily as a demonstration of political support for Prime Minister Pashinyan and his government ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections. Hosting such a high-profile international gathering enhanced Armenia’s diplomatic visibility while reinforcing the government’s image as a credible partner for Europe.

CONCLUSIONS:

There is currently little to suggest that Armenia regards full EU membership as an immediate or realistic foreign policy objective. Although the government continues to expand cooperation with European institutions, it has avoided taking the political steps necessary to initiate a formal accession process. The absence of any membership declaration during the Armenia–EU Summit reinforces this assessment. At the same time, none of the principal external actors have strong incentives to support or concede to Armenian accession. Russia remains firmly opposed to such a development, while the EU lacks a clear consensus on further enlargement. Iran would likely view the prospect with concern, and the U.S. interest in the issue is limited. 

Discussions about EU membership in Armenia often serve domestic political purposes rather than reflecting an actionable policy agenda. The issue remains attractive to many voters and therefore continues to feature prominently in political discourse. Nevertheless, Armenia’s current strategy appears to focus on maximizing cooperation with the EU while preserving functional relations with Russia and other regional actors.

Accordingly, Armenia’s objective is best understood not as the pursuit of full EU membership but as the maintenance of deep political, economic, and institutional ties with the EU without fundamentally challenging the existing regional balance of power.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

By Sudha Ramachandran

Since the U.S. and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28 and especially after the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Central Asian Republics’ (CARs) trade via Iranian ports has been thrown into jeopardy. However, Pakistan and Iran have operationalized six roads linking the three major Pakistani ports of Gwadar, Karachi and Port Qasim with two Iranian border crossings at Gabd and Taftan. Will the new roads provide the CARs’ trade via the southern route with a lifeline?

 Photo by Davide Bonaldo, 2025

BACKGROUND:

On April 25, Pakistan’s Ministry of Commerce issued the “Transit of Goods through Territory of Pakistan Order 2026.” The order, which allows goods from third countries to pass through Pakistan before entering Iran, provides new routes connecting the three major Pakistani ports at Gwadar, Karachi and Port Qasim with two Iranian border crossings at Gabd and Taftan. The order took immediate effect and trucks have begun carrying cargo from the Pakistani ports, passing through the towns of Turbat, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Quetta and Dalbandin in Balochistan province, before entering Iran. Iran and Pakistan had, in 2008, agreed on this road transport connectivity framework. However, it was not until Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Islamabad on April 24-26, when he met with Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Pakistan Army chief General Asim Munir, that the decision to implement the order with immediate effect was taken. 

Recent developments in the region prompted Pakistan and Iran to operationalize the agreement. On February 28, the U.S. and Israel launched air and missile strikes on Iran, which in turn led to the Strait of Hormuz crisis. The U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has dealt a severe blow to trade via this vital waterway, prompting the Iran-Pakistan decision on the six land corridors. Ships laden with cargo and headed for Iran and beyond, which would have otherwise docked at the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, are now marking time at Pakistan’s ports, which lie outside the Strait of Hormuz. Over 3,000 containers headed for Iran had reportedly piled up at Karachi port in April, adding to the problems of this already congested port. Meanwhile, Gwadar saw an unprecedented surge in activity in recent months. Throughout 2025, Gwadar port processed just around 8,300 standard shipping containers. Over just a few weeks in April this year, the port handled 11,000 containers. With the operationalization of the April 25 order, cargo headed for Iran’s Chabahar and Bandar Abbas ports, which have been lying at Pakistani ports because of the Hormuz blockade, is now being offloaded and packed into trucks heading to the Iranian border crossings at Gabd and Taftan. The fast-moving developments in the region have implications not just for the Iran-Pakistan relationship but, importantly, for how the CARs will access the sea. 

IMPLICATIONS:

The six road routes linking Pakistani ports with the Iranian border will provide a shot in the arm to business at these ports, especially at Gwadar, which has been functioning below par. It will also unclog the already congested Karachi port. Importantly, it will boost Iran-Pakistan cooperation. The two neighbors share a volatile border of 909 kilometers, and have on occasion engaged in military hostilities, as in January 2024. However, economic cooperation, especially border trade, is vital not only for border communities and livelihoods but for their larger economies as well. Bilateral economic cooperation can now be expected to deepen and expand via the six new road routes. Iranian trade, which has taken a severe beating since the U.S.-Israel war and the U.S. blockade of Hormuz, will now receive a fresh lease of life. It will increase Iranian dependence on Pakistan, making the latter the dominant partner in the bilateral relationship.

As for Central Asia, the Iran war and consequent developments, while concerning, have opened new trade opportunities. Although the CARs are not dependent on West Asian oil and gas, as they are producers themselves, their trade routes to seaports have been hit hard. 

Being landlocked, the CARs have for decades focused their foreign policy on finding and developing routes to access seaports. They have developed several options, including the eastern route through China, the western route through Russia, the route to the Caspian Sea, and the southern route to Iranian and Pakistani ports. Given their wariness of dependence on both China and Russia, the CARs have generally preferred the southern route. Between Pakistani and Iranian ports, they have usually favored the latter as the Iranian ports provide Central Asian cargo with relatively predictable transit regimes, better rail and road connectivity, and clear commercial terms for exporters. In contrast, the CARs’ trade via Pakistani ports had to pass not only through unstable Afghanistan and militancy-vulnerable stretches in Pakistan, but also face poor connectivity infrastructure, unstable trade regimes and poorly managed ports in Pakistan. Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan over the past two years and especially since February 2026, when Pakistan launched military strikes on the country, dealt a further blow to the utility of trade routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Realizing these challenges, the rest of Central Asia has been looking to bypass Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, for example, is exploring the Karakoram route via China to avoid Afghanistan and reach Pakistani ports. Other Central Asian states are said to be keen to use this route as well.

The opening of six trade routes between Pakistani ports and the Iran border crossings has thrown new factors into the CARs’ calculations on sea trade, opening new options and lifelines. Instead of traversing the insecure and uncertain terrain of Pakistan and Afghanistan, their cargo, offloaded in Pakistani ports, can head to the Iranian border crossings, where they can then use the better road and rail connectivity in Iran to enter Central Asia. 

Of course, the opportunity that the new road routes have opened up for the CARs depends on whether Pakistan can quickly improve operations at its three major ports and ensure security along the roads for trucks carrying cargo to the Iranian border. The success of the six new road routes in drawing CARs trade and cargo will also depend on the condition of Iran’s roads and rail network. How badly damaged the Iranian overland infrastructure is by U.S. and Israeli strikes, and whether the CARs will be convinced of the security of the Iran route in the coming months will determine the success of the new connectivity option.

CONCLUSIONS:

The opening of six new road routes linking Pakistani ports of Gwadar, Karachi and Port Qasim with two Iranian border crossings is indeed a good plan. It could be a game changer not only for Gwadar port, which has been languishing for long without business, but also provide a lifeline to the damaged Iranian economy and Pakistan-Iran cooperation. Importantly, it will enable truckers from the rest of Central Asia to avoid Afghanistan while reaching Pakistani ports. However, the new route will attract Central Asian cargo only if Pakistan improves port management and security for trucks ferrying cargo along the new road routes. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr Sudha Ramachandran is an independent South Asian political and security analyst. She is also South Asia editor at The Diplomat. Her articles have appeared in publications like The Diplomat, Asia Times, China Brief and Terrorism Monitor.

By Vali Kaleji 

While the Armenian government appears to seek a short-term balance between the U.S. and Russia in the railway sector, its long-term objective is to end Russia’s monopoly and extensive influence over this critical infrastructure in Armenia. The realization of this objective, as well as reforms in the electricity and gas sectors, largely depends on the outcome of the decisive parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026. These elections will determine whether Armenia returns to its pre-2018 foreign policy orientation or continues its recent trajectory toward closer alignment with the West.

 Photo by Denis Belitsky, 2023

BACKGROUND:

On 13 February 2008, Armenia signed an agreement transferring full control of the state-owned Armenian Railways to South Caucasus Railway (Yuzhno-Kavkazskaya zheleznaya doroga, YuKZhD), a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways (RZhD). Subject to mutual agreement, the contract may be extended until 2048. The agreement followed a concession model, transferring operational, managerial, and investment responsibilities to the Russian side. Although ownership of the railway infrastructure formally remained with the Armenian government, operational control, investment decisions, tariff policy, and network development were effectively placed under Russian authority, constituting influence without formal ownership.

The 2008 railway agreement was effectively a continuation, and one of the consequences, of the 2002–2003 “debt-for-assets” agreement between Armenia and Russia, which settled Armenia’s US$ 96 million debt to Russia. The 30-year concession agreement is widely regarded as a major turning point in the development of Russia’s structural influence over Armenia’s economy and infrastructure in the post-Soviet period. Under the debt-for-assets arrangement, ownership or management of six major industrial and economic assets in Armenia, including electricity, gas, electronics, and defense-related sectors, was transferred to Russia, facilitating Russian dominance and influence in other sectors, including railways and telecommunications.

To reduce this monopoly and dependency, the Armenian government signed an agreement with Iran in 2009, one year after the 30-year concession agreement, to construct the “Marand–Norooz–Meghri–Yerevan” railway. Russia opposedthe project, and despite considerable efforts by Armenia, the railway was never realized, leaving Russia’s monopoly over Armenia’s railway network intact.

Plans to revive Soviet-era railway routes in the southern South Caucasus failed to materialize in the transformed regional environment following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. However, the peace agreement signed by Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan at the White House on August 8, 2025, marked a new phase in the construction and integration of road and railway routes in southern Armenia. Nevertheless, despite the completion of approximately 80 percent of the 110-kilometer Horadiz–Aghband railway line in southwestern Azerbaijan (around 140 kilometers including auxiliary routes), and Turkey’s initiation of a new 224-kilometer railway line from Kars to the Nakhichevan border, scheduled for completion before 2030, the rehabilitation and construction of the railway line in southern Armenia has yet to begin.

In these circumstances, during a press briefing on February 13, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that a country maintaining “friendly relations” with both Russia and Armenia could “purchase the concession management rights” of Armenia’s railways, which are currently under Russian management. He presented this as a potential solution to Armenia’s loss of “competitive advantage” by having international routes pass through the country. When asked which states could assume such a role, Pashinyan mentioned Kazakhstan, the UAE, and Qatar, while noting that the list was not exhaustive.

IMPLICATIONS:

Pashinyan’s recent statements may represent the latest step by the Armenian government to reduce the country’s dependence on Russia in the infrastructure sector. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian control and influence over Armenia’s railway network and railway management became particularly significant due to Armenia’s status as a landlocked country. After the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia’s railway routes with Azerbaijan (the eastern route) and Turkey (the western route) were closed. The disruption of railway connections between Armenia and Azerbaijan also severed Armenia’s rail link with Iran via the Julfa–Nakhichevan route. Consequently, over the past three decades, Armenia’s only active railway connection has been the northern route, a Soviet-era railway line running through Georgia to Russia and the Black Sea. Notably, despite the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia following the August 2008 war, this railway corridor, like the road route, has remained open and operational.

The absence of Armenia’s railway connectivity in three directions, eastward towards Azerbaijan, southward towards Iran, and westward towards Nakhichevan and Turkey, and the country’s dependence on the northern route through Georgia to Russia significantly strengthened the monopoly position and influence of the Russian-controlled South Caucasus Railway company. The Armenian government’s new approach therefore represents a step toward reducing Russia’s monopoly and influence over Armenia’s railway infrastructure, while also diversifying the country’s rail connections.

However, the most noteworthy aspect is Russia’s continued presence in these developments. Although Russia was excluded from the agreements reached during the Washington summit, it nevertheless expressed readiness to discuss possible participation in the Trump Route with Armenia. Mikhail Kalugin, Director of the Fourth CIS Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, argued that “there are ample grounds” for such involvement. Among other points, Kalugin referred to South Caucasus Railway, which “holds a concession to manage Armenia’s railway network.”

On the other hand, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan revealed that he had asked Russia to “urgently address” the full restoration of railway sections adjacent to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan and the Turkish border. The issue concerns three key railway sections: Yeraskh–Nakhichevan, Gyumri–Kars, and Ijevan–Gazakh. Pashinyan stated that he had raised the matter with Russia more than a month earlier.

However, the Armenian government appears to support Russian participation and investment only in railway sections located outside the so-called “Trump Route.” Addressing possible Russian involvement in the project, Nikol Pashinyan stated that the route is a bilateral initiative with the U.S., adding that “any third-party involvement can be discussed only bilaterally.” Pashinyan also responded to the South Caucasus Railway’s expressed readiness to transfer only the Meghri railway section, through which the Trump Route is expected to pass, from its administration to Armenia, arguing that the statement reflected a “misunderstanding.” “The [Meghri railway] section is not under Russian management for it to be handed over to Armenia. It is Armenia’s sovereign territory, and we have not delegated the management of that sovereign territory to anyone. There is no railway there to be managed by anyone,” Pashinyan stated.

In fact, as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk stated, the Russian Federation has decided to begin substantive negotiations on the restoration of two sections of Armenia’s railway network that would reconnect Armenian railways with the railway network of the Republic of Azerbaijan near the town of Yeraskh and with the railway network of the Republic of Turkey near the settlement of Akhuryan. The total length of the sections to be restored has been announced as 1.6 kilometers and 12.4 kilometers, respectively. All of these sections exclude southern Armenia, through which the Trump Route is expected to pass. Nevertheless, the reopening of these railway sections forms part of the Pashinyan government’s Crossroads of Peace project.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s exit from political and military dependence on Russia is unlikely without ending Russia’s monopoly over the country’s economic infrastructure. The Armenian government took an initial step in this direction by nationalizing the country’s electricity grid, and on July 9, 2025, Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed a law permitting the nationalization of the national electricity distribution company. However, this decision became politically contentious following the arrest of opposition leader Samvel Karapetyan, who had acquired full ownership of the Armenian Power Grid Company and the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant in 2017.

Armenia’s dependence on Russian-controlled economic infrastructure extends beyond railways and electricity. The exclusive supplier of natural gas in Armenia’s domestic market is Gazprom Armenia, a Russian-Armenian company established in December 1997, whose shares are wholly owned by Russia’s Gazprom. Consequently, Armenia’s efforts to end Russia’s monopoly and influence over its economic infrastructure face significant obstacles. The realization of this objective will largely depend on the outcome of the crucial parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026, which will determine whether Armenia returns to its pre-2018 foreign policy orientation or continues its recent trajectory toward closer alignment with the West.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Masom Jan Masomy and Eldaniz Gusseinov

Among external stakeholders, China bears the heaviest cost from the ongoing Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions along the Durand Line. The conflict erodes Beijing’s credibility as a regional mediator on the dispute-resolution front, even as its short-term containment record remains defensible. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to depend on Chinese economic engagement, and both are seeking to expand investment flows from Beijing. China has hosted at least seven formal rounds of the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, its primary platform for structured mediation between the two countries and has intervened repeatedly with emergency shuttle diplomacy during acute crises, most recently during the open military confrontation.

 Photo by Crystal51, 2015

BACKGROUND:

For a state positioning itself for a more influential role in the emerging global order, mediation has become a core instrument of strategic projection. This ambition found formal expression in Beijing’s May 2025 white paper, “China's National Security in the New Era.” Released by the State Council Information Office on May 12, the document represents the first dedicated national security policy statement since the founding of the People’s Republic. Its opening chapter frames China as a source of certainty and stability in a turbulent world, and the same self-positioning runs throughout the text. By tying political security to international order within a single "holistic" framework, with economic development as the connecting axis, Beijing presents its own internal stability and modernization as stabilizing forces for the broader international system. The Afghan-Pakistan file is currently the closest test of that framing on China’s periphery.

The results have been limited. China has not resolved the underlying disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and each failed mediation round makes the next one harder to frame as credible. Experts generally agree that Chinese mediation acts as a “band-aid” over structural wounds. The long-term drivers of hostility remain untouched: Islamabad’s demand that the Taliban crack down on TTP safe havens, and the historically unrecognized Durand Line that sits beneath nearly every bilateral grievance. Strategic distrust between Kabul and Islamabad has only hardened since 2021. On short-term crisis containment, however, Beijing’s record is defensible. It pulls both sides back from open war and keeps communication lines open, with the promise of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) used as an economic incentive to buy time, even when this does not produce durable agreements. For Beijing, short-term containment is “good enough” provided it prevents a regional collapse that threatens Chinese investments.

Pakistan’s declaration of “open war” on Afghanistan in late February 2026 produced significant civilian casualties across the country. On March 16, Pakistani airstrikes hit the Omid Addiction Treatment Hospital in Kabul. Afghan officials placed the death toll at approximately 400 patients, a figure that has not been independently corroborated. Human Rights Watch verified at least 143 killed and over 250 injured. Islamabad denied intentionally targeting the facility. By April 5, Taliban officials reported cumulative civilian casualties of 761 killed and 626 injured since late February, figures the United Nations has not fully verified. Prior to the hospital strike, UNAMA had documented 76 civilian deaths and 213 injuries from clashes beginning on February 26 and called for compliance with international humanitarian law.

The most recent mediation round, hosted by China in Urumqi, did not yield a permanent ceasefire between Kabul and Islamabad. It did, however, halt active kinetic conflict and keep further negotiation tracks open. Earlier mediation attempts by Qatar and Turkey, with parallel engagement from Saudi Arabia, sought to reduce escalation. Afghanistan and Pakistan have nonetheless experienced their most serious deterioration in relations since the Taliban seized power in 2021. Major trade routes at Torkham and Spin Boldak have remained closed since the October 2025 clashes, disrupting bilateral trade flows.

IMPLICATIONS:

Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan stem largely from Islamabad’s claim that the TTP operates from Afghan territory and conducts attacks inside Pakistan. Kabul’s immediate rejection of this claim has strained the bilateral relationship since August 2021. The unresolved dispute undermines Pakistan’s capacity to control its borderlands and opens space for non-state armed groups to regroup in remote border regions, a development that also concerns regional neighbors.

In this context, China’s mediation efforts stem from deeper structural stakes, linking border security and regional connectivity. For China, any instability or rise in militant mobility across the narrow Wakhan corridor or in the Pak-Afghan region raises long-term security questions. This issue is critical to China’s implementation of transportation projects across Eurasia. Discussions between China and Central Asian states also covered the potential integration of transport projects, including proposals to connect the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, currently under construction, with Uzbekistan’s proposed Trans-Afghan railway. Under this configuration, the combined route would originate in Kashgar and, via Afghanistan and the CPEC, terminate in Gwadar. The result is a ring of Chinese influence spanning Central and South Asia. China would be positioned to integrate high-tech production supply chains along this corridor.

In such a situation, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) may reorganize and reestablish itself across the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Its propaganda has consistently identified Chinese assets as legitimate targets. The early-2026 suicide bombing at a Chinese-run restaurant in a district of Kabul reinforced these security concerns. Separately, an armed assault using grenades dropped from drones killed five Chinese nationals and injured five others near the Afghan-Tajik border in December 2025. The pattern suggests that militant groups may be finding operational space along the porous Afghan-Tajik frontier from which to threaten Chinese interests across Central Asia.

Beijing is concerned that groups such as ETIM and ISKP may exploit periods of confrontation between Kabul and Islamabad. When Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions rise, militant activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan tends to increase, generating a volatile environment for Chinese personnel and CPEC-related projects.

To strengthen border security, China has established three new counties within a year. The He'an and Hekang counties sit near the disputed Ladakh border with India, and the newly formed Cenling county lies close to Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The administrative restructuring is designed to expand border surveillance and constrain the movement of anti-China Uyghur militants through Xinjiang's porous frontiers. Strategically, the move tightens governance over Kashgar in Xinjiang, the urban anchor for both the Wakhan corridor and the CPEC Karakorum Highway.

CONCLUSIONS:

While South Asia and the Middle East are experiencing heightened military confrontations that strain international peace, China addresses these crises through diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation. Its official statements emphasize de-escalation through restraint rather than coercion. Diplomatic brokering between Afghanistan and Pakistan offers potential strategic advantages for Beijing at both regional and global levels. The limits of this approach, however, are visible. Following the Urumqi negotiations, border skirmishes resumed, with Pakistani strikes hitting Kunar province on 27 April 2026.

By combining formal trilateral platforms with quieter shuttle diplomacy, China positions itself as central to regional crisis management and as a hedge against the regrouping of transnational terrorist networks. The Afghanistan-Pakistan case nonetheless demonstrates that economic incentives alone are insufficient to produce durable settlements between parties locked in active confrontation.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Masom Jan Masomy is an Assistant Professor and Deputy Director at the Regional Studies Centre of the Afghanistan Science Academy in Kabul. His work focuses on South and Central Asian affairs with a particular emphasis on Afghanistan and on the dynamics of great power politics across the wider Central and South Asian regions. His research interests span political and economic developments, security and migration, climate change, diplomacy, and regional connectivity. Email:  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . Eldaniz Gusseinov is Head of Research and co-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int., and a non-resident research fellow at the Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul. Email:  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .