By Zabikhulla Saipov

The August 31–September 1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek offered a revealing snapshot of Afghanistan’s changing role in the region. The massive SCO gathering brought together the leaders of China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus. Its expanded SCO Plus meeting added Azerbaijan, Armenia, Egypt, Laos, Mongolia, Türkiye, Togo and Vietnam, alongside the UN and other organizations. U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor was in Bishkek meeting Central Asian leaders, while former U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad was engaging Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul. The juxtaposition is revealing: Afghanistan may have receded from Washington’s formal strategic agenda, but it has not receded from the calculations of the states surrounding it, or from every channel of U.S.–Afghan interaction.

BACKGROUND:

The precipitous U.S. departure from Afghanistan in 2021 altered the form of U.S. involvement, but it did not change the geography that had made Afghanistan central to Washington’s engagement with Central Asia. Afghanistan shares approximately 2,329 kilometers of common land and water borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, while all five Central Asian states remain exposed to security, economic, and connectivity issues pertaining to Afghanistan. After 2001, Afghanistan became a central organizing factor in Washington’s engagement with Central Asia, shaping security cooperation, military access, border assistance, counterterrorism policies and regional diplomacy. The withdrawal changed that equation, but not the underlying geography.

Since 2021, Uzbekistan has been particularly active in treating Afghanistan not only as a security concern but as a potential connecting link between Central and South Asia. The Termez Dialogue, launched in May 2025 as a permanent platform is perhaps the clearest example of this approach. Its second meeting in June 2026 moved toward practical mechanisms for political dialogue, connectivity, transport and logistics, climate adaptation, and cultural-humanitarian cooperation. Rather than treating Afghanistan solely as a security perimeter, Tashkent is attempting to embed the Afghan question within a broader architecture of regional connectivity. This institutionalization also began to acquire a specifically Central Asian format in August 2025, when Uzbekistan convened the first meeting of Central Asian special representatives on Afghanistan, which agreed to establish a regular Contact Group for coordinated regional dialogue on the Afghan issue.

Institutionalization, however, is moving in both directions. In April 2026, Afghanistan itself initiated the first Afghanistan–Central Asia Consultative Dialogue in Kabul, bringing together all five Central Asian states and proposing regular consultations, expert cooperation and a roadmap for cooperation in trade, transit, security and connectivity. The subsequent Afghanistan–Central Asia Think Tank Forum in June 2026 extended this process into the intellectual and policy sphere, explicitly seeking research-based proposals and locally generated regional narratives. Thus, Uzbekistan is building platforms through which Afghanistan can be incorporated into wider regional cooperation, while Kabul is simultaneously seeking to engage Central Asia on its own terms. Afghanistan remains an unavoidable geographic reality, but the institutional response to that reality is increasingly being shaped within the region itself.

IMPLICATIONS:

Central Asian ownership, however, should not be confused with Central Asian consensus. Uzbekistan emphasizes connectivity, trade and regional integration; Tajikistan remains particularly attentive to border security, inclusive government, and militant threats; Turkmenistan prioritizes energy, transit and neutrality; Kazakhstan approaches Afghanistan through economic and diplomatic engagement; and Kyrgyzstan, although less directly exposed geographically, participates in wider regional security discussions. These differences may explain why flexible regional mechanisms are emerging alongside existing multilateral institutions.

For Kabul, the emerging collaborative architecture may represent both an opportunity and a necessity. The April Consultative Dialogue was initiated by the Afghan side, but its timing is particularly significant given Afghanistan’s increasingly constrained external environment. Tensions and armed confrontation with Pakistan have disrupted one of Afghanistan’s principal trade and transit corridors, while the wider war involving Iran has created additional uncertainty around western routes and regional commerce. Against this backdrop, Kabul’s turn toward Central Asia may amount to more than diplomatic activism. It can be understood as an effort to widen Afghanistan’s room for maneuver by strengthening alternative northern connections to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the wider Eurasian market. In this sense, the Afghanistan–Central Asia dialogue may function as a form of strategic insurance at a moment when some of Afghanistan’s traditional routes and external options have become more vulnerable. Kabul is therefore increasingly seeking to participate in shaping the regional architecture around it. This does not automatically imply political convergence or recognition by Central Asian governments; rather, it reflects an attempt by Afghanistan’s de facto authorities to turn geography into diplomatic and economic leverage.

The Bishkek SCO summit illustrates the wider environment in which this process is unfolding. The sheer composition of the gathering demonstrated the breadth of the Eurasian strategic conversation in which Afghanistan is situated. Afghanistan remained outside the summit, yet its political future and security implications remained part of the agenda. The SCO’s call for an inclusive Afghan government showed that regional powers continue to attach political conditions to their vision of Afghan stability.

Uzbekistan used the same broader setting to advance institutional mechanisms of its own. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted Uzbekistan’s initiative to establish a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats in Tashkent under the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, indicating Tashkent’s interest in strengthening the region’s permanent capacity to address emerging security challenges. Together with the Termez Dialogue, the initiative illustrates a broader Uzbek strategy: institutionalizing regional cooperation rather than relying exclusively on ad hoc responses to individual crises.

Gor’s presence in Bishkek demonstrated that the U.S. remains engaged with Central Asia, but increasingly from outside the Afghan theater. His meetings with Central Asian leaders focused on strategic partnerships, economic and investment cooperation, transport, energy, critical minerals and the C5+1 framework. On September 5, Khalilzad met Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul to discuss Afghanistan–U.S. relations and opportunities for constructive engagement. Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry presented the meeting as part of discussions on bilateral relations, economic growth and self-reliance, while the U.S. State Department clarified that Khalilzad is no longer a government employee and was acting in a personal capacity. These engagements therefore should not be interpreted as evidence of a new official U.S. policy toward Kabul. Their significance lies elsewhere: the U.S.–Afghan relationship has not simply disappeared; rather, it now exists through channels considerably different from the military-centered relationship of the pre-2021 period.

The geometry of U.S. involvement is changing as Washington cultivates Central Asian partnerships without a military presence in Afghanistan, while Central Asian governments are simultaneously deepening practical engagement with Kabul through regional mechanisms. The U.S. does not necessarily need to sit at every table where Afghanistan is discussed. But understanding what those tables are producing may become increasingly important for a U.S. strategy that seeks to remain relevant in Central Asia.

The emerging regional architecture is not necessarily anti-American, nor does Central Asian engagement with Kabul imply recognition of the Taliban or alignment with China or Russia. Much of it is the practical consequence of geography, security concerns and economic necessity. The U.S. may therefore face a different Afghan question than it did before 2021. Previously, Afghanistan often shaped Washington’s requirements for Central Asia. Increasingly, Central Asian approaches to Afghanistan, and Afghanistan’s own efforts to engage Central Asia, may shape how the country connects to the wider region.

CONCLUSIONS:

The U.S. left Afghanistan, but Afghanistan did not leave Central Asia. What has emerged since 2021 is neither a simple regional takeover of the Afghan question nor a disappearance of U.S interest. Instead, Afghanistan is becoming embedded in a regional architecture being built from several directions: Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states are developing mechanisms for security and connectivity; Kabul is seeking to participate in that architecture on its own terms; and institutions such as the SCO are incorporating the Afghan question into a much broader Eurasian strategic conversation. Washington is still engaged with Central Asia, but increasingly without the Afghan theater as the organizing center of that engagement. At the same time, the U.S.–Afghan relationship has not simply disappeared. For U.S. policy, the challenge is therefore to recognize how the Afghan factor itself is changing. Afghanistan has not become less relevant to Central Asia; rather, Central Asia is increasingly determining what that relevance means.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Zabikhulla Saipov is an independent researcher on contemporary history and diplomacy of U.S. and wider Central Asia relations. He holds BSc honors degree from Uzbekistan State World Languages University, Tashkent; MIA degree from SIPA, Columbia University, New York, and PhD in political science from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent. 

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Tashkent and Islamabad have agreed to expand bilateral trade through routes traversing China, as Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions and the war in Iran have disrupted existing trade links. Pakistan’s conflict with Afghanistan has made the prospects for trans-Afghan corridors connecting Central Asia with Pakistan increasingly uncertain. Meanwhile, renewed U.S.-Iran fighting has made trans-Iranian routes an unreliable option for Pakistan’s trade with Central Asia. Pakistan and Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan are therefore promoting an overland route through China that bypasses Afghanistan. Besides providing Pakistan and Central Asia with a corridor avoiding both Afghanistan and Iran, this route creates opportunities to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), into Central Asia.

BACKGROUND:

Afghanistan has long represented the most viable transit route for trade between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). However, decades of conflict have prevented plans for a Trans-Afghan trade corridor connecting Central Asia with Pakistan from materialising. More recently, escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions over cross-border terrorism have further undermined prospects for developing these routes. Relations deteriorated sharply in October 2025 following border clashes, prompting Islamabad to suspend truck-borne trade through the main Torkham and Chaman crossings. In February 2026, Islamabad declared an open war against Afghanistan and launched airstrikes targeting alleged terrorist sanctuaries inside the country.

In April, Islamabad opened six overland transit routes for goods destined for Iran amid the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports. These routes allowed goods from third countries to transit Pakistan and enter Iran by road. The designated corridors connect Pakistani seaports with two Iranian border crossings, providing a viable route towards Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In April, Islamabad dispatched its first shipment of frozen meat to Tashkent via Iran.

Pakistan activated new routes through Iran for trade with the CARs, but renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities over the Strait of Hormuz have undermined their viability. The trans-China route has consequently emerged as the most viable and secure remaining option for trade between Pakistan and Central Asia. Both sides are therefore increasingly prioritizing the development of the trans-China trade corridor.

The trans-China option has long featured in discussions between Pakistani and Central Asian leaders due to security concerns in Afghanistan. In November 2025, Uzbekistan and Pakistan agreed to develop trade along two major land routes bypassing Afghanistan: the Pakistan-China-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan and Pakistan-China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan corridors. 

In April, Kyrgyzstan successfully tested an overland route to Pakistan via China, bypassing Afghanistan. A truck carrying Kyrgyz goods reached the Pakistani port of Karachi via China along the Karakoram Highway. Islamabad considers routes connecting Pakistan with Bishkek and Almaty more secure than the Trans-Afghan alternatives.

Several Central Asian leaders have visited Pakistan over the past ten months. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov visited Islamabad in December 2025, followed by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in February 2026. Their discussions with Pakistani leaders focused primarily on connectivity projects providing the CARs with access to Pakistan’s seaports at Karachi, Gwadar, and Bin Qasim.

Uzbekistan and Pakistan have agreed to amend their transit trade agreement to formally incorporate the China corridor. This would allow goods to transit through the Sost dry port and western China before reaching Central Asia. In July, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister was scheduled to visit Pakistan, but the visit was postponed at Tashkent’s request. During the visit, the two countries were expected to sign a protocol formally incorporating the China corridor into their transit trade agreement.

Currently, routes through China have become Pakistan’s preferred option for regional connectivity and the extension of CPEC.

IMPLICATIONS:

Deteriorating relations with the Taliban regime, recurring border clashes, and terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan have prompted a major shift in Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy, accelerating its turn towards routes through China. While the activation of the China corridor could undermine planned connectivity projects between Pakistan and the CARs, it may strengthen alternative regional initiatives. The future of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway, for instance, appears increasingly uncertain. Launched in 2021, the UAP railway aims to connect Central Asia with Pakistani seaports through Afghanistan.

Conversely, completion of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway could make Pakistan’s Gwadar port one of the shortest trade routes for Central Asia. The CKU railway is a strategic connectivity project linking Kashgar in China with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. From Kashgar, existing and planned transport links could connect the railway southwards with Gwadar through CPEC, providing Central Asia with access to the Arabian Sea.

Infrastructure development could further increase trade along the China corridor. Key projects include upgrading the Karachi–Peshawar ML-1 railway, expanding the Karakoram Highway, developing Gwadar Port as a warm-water outlet for the CARs, and expanding dry ports and logistics networks. Together, these projects could improve the efficiency and capacity of the China route.

Although Beijing, Islamabad, and Kabul have already agreed to extend CPEC to Afghanistan and Central Asia, the China corridor could accelerate its direct extension into Central Asia. CPEC connects China’s Xinjiang region with Pakistan’s Gwadar port in Balochistan through a network of highways, railways, and energy infrastructure.

The rerouting will provide Pakistan with an alternative route to Central Asia while maintaining Uzbekistan’s access to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi. Uzbekistan has emerged as Pakistan’s key economic partner in Central Asia. Although the China corridor bypasses instability in both Afghanistan and Iran, it is longer and more expensive than the Trans-Afghan route due to greater distances, higher handling costs, additional border procedures, and longer transit times. The China corridor could therefore serve as a strategic alternative in the short term, but is unlikely to fully replace the Afghan route commercially in the longer term. Improved infrastructure along the China route could enable Pakistan to connect with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan via the Khunjerab Pass.

CONCLUSIONS:

Geopolitics and security will ultimately determine the development of trade corridors between Pakistan and the CARs. The Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict has undermined prospects for the Trans-Afghan corridor, while the war in Iran has reduced the viability of the Trans-Iranian route. Under these conditions, the Trans-China corridor offers a comparatively secure and viable alternative for both Pakistan and the CARs. It could therefore serve as a strategic safeguard against regional instability stemming from conflicts in Afghanistan and Iran.

Pakistan’s importance as a trade outlet is widely recognized in Central Asia. The landlocked CARs seek access to Pakistani seaports through Afghanistan, Iran, or China to facilitate global trade. However, growing security concerns surrounding the Afghan and Iranian routes are likely to increase Central Asian interest in accessing Pakistani ports through the comparatively secure China corridor.

Pakistan, China, and the CARs could enhance the corridor by improving infrastructure, extending CPEC into Central Asia, and streamlining cargo clearance procedures at their borders. Such measures could address existing constraints and make the China route more cost-effective and commercially attractive.

AUTHORS BIO:

Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Erlan Benedis-Grab

On August 23, 2026, Kazakhstan elected its inaugural session of the state Kurultai, following its establishment under Kazakhstan's constitutional changes approved in the March 15 referendum. Adilet, the party into which the long-ruling Amanat (previously Nur Otan) merged, took 71.17 percent of the vote nationwide and 110 seats out of 145, a decisive supermajority. Kazakhstan's constitutional changes created the post of Vice President, a new People's Council, and the consolidation of the bicameral legislative branch into a unicameral parliament under a party list system. The overwhelming victory for the ruling party confirms what the constitutional changes made close to inevitable: an expanded presidential authority under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in which he can wield the system for a variety of purposes.

BACKGROUND:

The process of constitutional reform began as a suggestion for parliamentary reform. In his state of the nation address on September 8, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed abolishing the Senate and moving to a unicameral chamber elected entirely by party list. The process accelerated in early 2026. In January, Tokayev announced his intention to reform Kazakhstan’s constitution, establishing a Commission on Constitutional Reform chaired by Constitutional Court head Elvira Azimova, with Tokayev’s top deputy Erlan Karin as deputy chair. In February, Tokayev signed a decree, setting the referendum for March 15th. In March, voters approved the new constitution with an overwhelming majority of 87.15 percent. In July, the constitution took effect, terminating the bicameral parliament and triggering elections to the Kurultai on August 23.

Previously, Kazakhstan had a bicameral parliament consisting of the Mazhilis and Senate. The changes consolidated the two into a new unicameral parliament, called the Kurultai (meaning “assembly” or “gathering” of Turkic leaders). Additionally, the new parliament is elected entirely from a party list, replacing the previous mixed system of 70 percent  party list and 30 percent single-member constituencies.

A new quasi-legislative consultative body, the Halyk Kenesi (People’s Council), has been established, combining the earlier People’s Assembly of Kazakhstan and the National Kurultai. It is supposed to be a technocratic body designed to develop policy recommendations from the public. It is composed of 126 members, directly appointed by the president. It has the power to prepare legislation for the Kurultai and propose nationwide referendums, yet its functional role is likely to be limited. 

A vice presidency has also been created, with the vice president appointed by the president. This new position is first in the presidential line of succession, without necessarily making the vice president Tokayev’s successor.

The president will now nominate the Prime Minister, Supreme Court judges, and the Kurultai Speaker. Positions previously requiring Senate consent, including the heads of the Central Bank, the National Security Committee, and the Prosecutor General, now fall under presidential authority. These changes mark an institutional weakening of the parliament's authority.

The August 23 elections were the first contested by the Adilet (meaning justice) party, registered in June and led by Tokayev's former Chief of Staff, Aibek Dadebai. Following this, the ruling Amanat party, formerly Nur Otan, voted to merge itself into the Adilet party, making Adilet its successor as the ruling party of Kazakhstan.

With the apparatus of the Akorda clearly behind Adilet, it decisively captured 71.17 percent of the nationwide vote, taking roughly 110 of 145 seats. The OSCE commented that while the elections were orderly, they took place in an environment lacking political pluralism.

IMPLICATIONS:

Despite Tokayev’s promise of a “New Kazakhstan,” the constitutional changes affirm the dominance of Kazakhstan's super-presidential system. In this system, the president's formal powers so far exceed those of the legislature and the courts that no institution retains an effective check on him. The constitutional text now accommodates whatever Tokayev chooses to do with it, rather than constraining what he may do.

In his September 2025 address, Tokayev initially announced that reforms would take place in 2027. Instead, the whole rewriting process took around 6 months. Although Akorda framed it as a “broad nationwide discussion,” the constitutional text was likely engineered months or years before it was announced to the public. Given the rushed process, civil society in Kazakhstan, however limited, did not have enough time to mobilize significant opposition to the constitutional referendum. 

Tokayev is 73, raising the question of succession. The position of the vice presidency can be construed as a post for Tokayev to test his successor, or to withdraw from the presidency incrementally. 

However, even though Tokayev's presidential term ends in 2029, the Constitutional Court ruled that because the constitution was replaced outright rather than amended, terms served under the old charter do not count. Any election after the new text took effect counts as the first election. Kazakhstan’s single, non-renewable seven-year term remains untouched, but could carry Tokayev to 2036.

In appointing Erlan Karin as vice president, Tokayev chose someone whose political rise is tied to his own rule, rather than to the Nazarbayev-era patronage networks. Karin, a longtime presidential aide and former State Counselor, has been one of Tokayev’s most prominent political strategists. Yet the office could eventually offer Tokayev himself a post-presidential role. The obvious precedent is 2019, when Nazarbayev left the presidency but retained significant influence as Chairman of the Security Council. That way, Tokayev could wind down his leadership, passing the reins while securing his post-presidential position and retaining leverage.

Now, the elections to the Kurultai will be completely conducted through a closed party-list system, where the Adilet apparatus, and Akorda, handpicks their chosen candidates. Interestingly, this is a reversal of Tokayev’s own reforms submitted in 2022, mandating a 70/30 ratio for party-list vs single-seat constituencies. Its reversal signifies that Tokayev is past the early concessions of 2022, now rolling back the limited political reform of this period.

Neither system is entirely better or worse, but in Kazakhstan’s case this move clearly tightens presidential control over candidate selection. Candidates without the explicit support of the ruling Adilet party will be highly likely to be excluded from the new parliament.

Tokayev is also overhauling Kazakhstan's political machinery, merging Amanat with Adilet. Although Nur Otan was renamed Amanat in 2022, Tokayev wants a party that is unmistakably his own. Mazhilis MP Erlan Sariov put it succinctly, “Nazarbayev's fingerprints remain all over Amanat,” explaining why Tokayev would want a new party altogether. Yet there is no growth in pluralism, the party was molded from above rather than growing out of public demand. In truth, Tokayev gets a clean slate, a rebranded machine he can wield as he sees fit. 

Turnout was reported at 74.08 percent, twenty points above the 54.21 percent of 2023. However, the OSCE noted “significant differences between voter activity observed and the official turnout data”. The election was contested by several parties: the agrarian Auyl, the perennial opposition Ak Zhol, the “modern” Respublica, the communist remnants of the People’s Party, and the “real” opposition Nationwide Social Democratic Party, but Adilet captured the majority vote. The manufactured nature of these parties and their general unwillingness to oppose the government’s line could not seriously pose a challenge. 

CONCLUSIONS:

Akorda hopes to usher in a renewed Tokayev era with a new constitution, an updated parliament, and a decisive majority for the government, yet the core questions about Kazakhstan’s direction remain. Tokayev has reversed the chapter Kazakhstan opened during the turbulent year 2022 and the concessions then made by his government. The new constitution symbolizes that reversal; some changes are cosmetic, others engineer elite confidence in his rule. All of them empower him and the super-presidential system. Tokayev’s succession remains in question. The vice presidency can seat a successor, hold the chair for Tokayev himself, or stand by as he resets his own term, and the constitution now permits all three. Tokayev’s “New Kazakhstan” program may usher in increased modernization, efficiency and even transparency. It will not, however, undermine the dominance of the state. That approach may continue to bring prosperous autocratic development to Kazakhstan, but the public’s scorn over the lack of civic participation may build to a boiling point. 

AUTHORS BIO:

Erlan Benedis-Grab is a Junior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. He holds a dual B.A. in Economics and Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University Bloomington, and his research focuses on Central Asia, International Trade, and Energy Politics. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Nicola Ilario

South Ossetia's recent presidential transition, in which Alan Gagloev resigned in favor of Russian administrator Marat Kambolov, marks the latest step in a long-running process of Russo-Ossetian integration. The May 2026 "Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction," marks a significant step in South Ossetia's integration, signifying Moscow's broader strategy toward Georgia and the South Caucasus as well as its limitations.

BACKGROUND:

On June 23, Alan Gagloev resigned from his post as President of the small breakaway republic of South Ossetia, taking a new position as an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The move happened suddenly. Gagloev, in a televised address to the Ossetian people, claimed that after meeting Putin on June 22, he agreed to become an advisor to the Office of the Russian President. The next day he resigned. In his place, Prime Minister Marat Kambolov assumed the responsibilities of the presidency.

Kambolov is, notably, not a native to South Ossetia. A Russian national, Kambolov was sworn in as South Ossetia’s Prime Minister on June 17, 2026, but had until 2025 not been involved in the domestic affairs of the breakaway republic. Born in North Ossetia in 1965, he graduated from Moscow State Social University and the Russian Academy of Public Administration, going on to work in the Russian government. In May, he was tapped to be Gagloev’s advisor, and soon became Gagloev’s nominee for the premiership. Kambolov is expected to deepen Russo-Ossetian ties, implementing provisions of a bilateral treaty signed between Russia and Ossetia on May 9, 2026. Kambolov is expected to become the President of South Ossetia after snap elections planned September 18.

Kambolov’s ascension is part of a continuous effort of Ossetian aspirations for annexation into the Russian Federation. Indeed, since 1991 and with Russian backing, the Ossetians have maintained de facto independence from Georgia and alignment with Russia.

Generally, the South Ossetian separatist project is concerned with the unification of their people, whether it be within a sovereign state or under Russian rule. Indeed, the Ossetians are a transnational people, inhabiting Georgia, the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, as well as the Russian federal subject, the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania. As the vast majority of Ossetians reside in North Ossetia, it has been the wish of many in the south form a union with the north, to share a common state.

Ossetian demands for union with the north began in the early 90s, when the region broke from Tbilisi. In 1992, South Ossetia held a referendum that saw overwhelming support for independence by Ossetians and a 99.89 percent vote in favor for “reunion” with Russia.

Serious promotion of annexation did not begin until 2008, however, when Russia formally recognized the small de facto republic. After the election of Leonid Tibilov as South Ossetian president in 2012, it began making moves towards unionship. Tibilov stated after winning the 2012 elections that “We will certainly continue along the course towards Russia that has been chosen by our people – a course of further integration ... in all existing spheres, including the economy, as well as military, technical, and defense cooperation.” Other efforts towards union, such as the partial integration of the South Ossetian armed forces into the Russian army, also occurred during this period. In 2016, Ossetia signed the bilateral Treaty on Union Relations and Integration with the Russian Federation, strengthening ties between the two countries. Further plans for full annexation emerged at this time as well, with Tibilov suggesting closer union with Russia.

Plans for an annexation referendum did not pan out until 2022, where in March, South Ossetian president Bibilov announced a referendum following the 2022 presidential elections. Bibilov suggested it should take place the day after the presidential elections, thus constituting concrete executive action in contrast with earlier parliamentary debates on the organization of referendums. The referendum was delayed, however, by Gagloev who after winning the elections stated that the time was not right and signed a decree cancelling it.

Despite continued delays, Russo-Ossetian cooperation has continued with the culmination of talks leading to the signing of a bilateral treaty in 2026. On May 9, Vladimir Putin and Alan Gagloev signed a “Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction,” which the Russian Duma ratified on May 13. The document outlines provisions that would enable Russian citizens to hold office in South Ossetia and establish greater energy, transportation, telecommunication integration between the Russian Federation and the de facto republic. In effect, the agreement would bring de facto annexation. Gagloev, the former president of South Ossetia, called it, a “step towards the reunification of the Ossetian people,” further emphasizing that “South Ossetians perceive Russia as [their] great homeland.”

IMPLICATIONS:

The recent appointment of Marat Kambolov as Prime Minister and his ascension to the role of acting president is a continuation of the integration and unification of Russia and South Ossetia, a process that has been ongoing since the South Ossetian war in 1991. Kambolov is a demonstration that Moscow is now installing administrators rather than cultivating local elites.

The events in South Ossetia demonstrate Moscow’s continuing exercise of influence in the South Caucasus, which is otherwise waning against the backdrop of its economic, military and political overextension due to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russia has lost considerable influence in Armenia, as Prime Minister Pashinyan moves the country Westward and as President Aliyev of Azerbaijan continues to elevate Baku’s strategic autonomy.

This is evident as Gagloev noted that one of the reasons for the delay of the 2022 referendum was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As he stated, “I believe that the current authorities of the Russian Federation, represented by President Vladimir Putin, are still busy with other issues, I think with more serious ones.”

Setting aside Russia's insufficient political capital for outright de jure annexation, indirect rule is also part of Moscow’s strategy to manage Russo-Georgian relations. Since the Georgian Dream (GD) party’s rise to power in the early 2010s, Georgia began to employ a foreign policy that was multi-axis oriented, engaging in attempts at rapprochement with Russia. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the GD government refused to engage in the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow. GD likely believed that a swift Russian victory in 2022 was inevitable, and that maintaining friendly relations with Russia was Georgia’s most rational course of action. It is unclear whether there is a definitive grand strategy to GD’s foreign policy, yet the Georgian government clearly believes that cultivating better relations with Russia is in their interest.

This certainly incentivizes Moscow to maintain a friendlier attitude  Georgia, however, at the same time Moscow acknowledges the utility of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the relationship. By continually utilizing South Ossetia as a bargaining chip, Moscow can promise Georgia speculative future talks on the fate of South Ossetia, and in return Georgia retains a neutral, or even semi-positive attitude towards Moscow. Of course, Russia has no intention of giving away South Ossetia, yet this strategy continues to work as GD continues its attempts at a multi-axis oriented foreign policy.

CONCLUSIONS:

Georgia remains strategically important for Russia, which hopes to control a North-South Axis, from the North Caucasus through Georgia and Armenia, cutting through the Middle Corridor and further linking up with Iran. This competes with the ongoing establishment of a West-East Axis from Turkey, through Armenia/Georgia and Azerbaijan and further to the Caspian and Central Asia.

It is evident that Russia, at least under the current strategic policies of the Putin regime, will seek to retain its influence in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future. Moscow’s approach to integration in South Ossetia demonstrates its continued interest in the region, but also the limitations to its capacity for fulfilling them.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Nicola Ilario is an undergraduate at the University of Pennsylvania. He studies Economics and History, with a concentration in the history of diplomacy. Nicola interned at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute the Summer of 2026, assisting fellows in their research. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .