By Robert M. Cutler

In late December 2025, Armenia’s Central Election Commission pointed to June 7, 2026, as the likely date for parliamentary elections, implicitly tightening the timetable for any referendum linked to the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. With the text initialed but unsigned, Yerevan and Baku face steps towards ratification, slowly continuing border demarcation work, and interim arrangements. Russia, Turkey, and Iran are signaling their interests, but Armenia’s domestic politics will be decisive for the treaty’s signature and entry into force, and for the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

Credit: Shutterstock

BACKGROUND: Early in 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan moved the peace process beyond a notional document toward a text whose core provisions are settled. On March 13, 2025, the two foreign ministries publicly stated that they had concluded negotiations on the draft “Agreement on Peace and the Establishment of Interstate Relations.” At the same time, Azerbaijan framed its signature as contingent on changes to Armenia’s constitution. 

While the March 2025 step did not produce an immediate signature, it shifted the process from drafting to preconditions and sequencing. Whereas Baku treats language in the preamble to Armenia’s constitution as a territorial claim, Yerevan rejects that interpretation, pointing to the possibility of a constitutional referendum without setting a definite timeline. The draft also contains language that would bar deployment of third-country personnel along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. That provision bears directly on any monitoring presence near the frontier and, more broadly, on how the parties intend to manage security before demarcation is complete.

On August 8, 2025, the process advanced again in Washington. The parties initialed the text, and on August 11, Armenia published the full draft by mutual agreement. This U.S.-brokered step still stopped short of formal signature. The published text is explicit on several foundational points: it affirms mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis that former Soviet administrative borders become international borders; it renounces territorial claims; and it bars the use or threat of force as well as the use of each party’s territory by a third party for force against the other.

The draft also specifies the intended machinery for implementation. Diplomatic relations are to be established within a specified number of days after completion of ratification, although the published draft leaves that number blank. Border commissions are tasked to negotiate a separate delimitation and demarcation agreement. In the interim, the parties commit not to deploy third-party forces along the border and to adopt mutually agreed confidence-building measures pending demarcation. Additional “modalities” to be negotiated later include the detailed handling of missing persons and the working rules for the bilateral commission that is meant to oversee implementation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Armenia’s domestic political timetable has become a binding constraint on the pace and sequencing of decisions. On December 24, 2025, Armenpress reported that the chairman of the Central Election Commission said that June 7, 2026, was widely regarded as the likely election day, although a presidential decree had not yet been issued. That prospective date matters because Azerbaijan’s constitutional precondition points toward a referendum route in Armenia, while the treaty text itself anticipates domestic procedures and ratification steps before it can take effect. As of January 2026, the agreement’s core commitments are public and the text has been initialed, but signature and operational implementation still depend on how Yerevan and Baku sequence domestic legal assurances, border-related work, and interim security arrangements.

The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework stipulates that the route remains Armenian sovereign territory, while granting the U.S. exclusive development rights for 99 years. Washington would presumably pay Yerevan for the lease, with the land sub-leased to an Armenian-U.S. joint venture that would serve as the operator, holding a long-term mandate to construct and manage rail, road, pipelines, and fiber-optic infrastructure along the approximately 25 miles of Armenian territory linking Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. The U.S. might potentially deploy limited security personnel to ensure corridor security, but official texts remain vague on any on-the-ground presence. 

The peace text, as well as official Armenian statements, emphasize that the route is to be operated under Armenian law, with Yerevan retaining jurisdiction and administrative control. That emphasis, which is intended to foreclose putative concerns about extraterritorial claims by Azerbaijan, is necessary to placate and manage domestic and diaspora opinion. However, the framework agreement does not resolve key practical questions, including customs and border management details such as who stamps cargo, how fees are shared, and whether streamlined or special customs procedures will apply.

At this stage, the issue is less about drafting than durability. If the corridor arrangement proceeds under a 99-year U.S. development right, regional capitals will treat it as a strategic marker as well as a transport project. Moscow will judge it against its South Caucasus position; Tehran will weigh it against its red lines on transit and foreign presence; Ankara and Brussels will look for leverage on connectivity and standards. In Armenia, the sovereignty formula will be measured against day-to-day control at the route. Those pressures will shape prospects more than the text itself.

The attitudes of the three major regional players – Russia, Turkey, and Iran – are important conditioning factors, but none seems willing and able to block a peace deal definitively. For example, Moscow publicly welcomed the U.S.-brokered step but also warned that involvement by “non-regional players” should not create new divisions. Russia’s core attitude appears to be conditional acceptance of a peace text, paired with resistance to a long-duration U.S. operational footprint in a sensitive strip of Armenia. The warning language is less about the agreement’s existence than about who institutionalizes it and who physically manages it. A predictable Russian preference is that any corridor implementation be folded back into regionally branded formats. Indirect Russian-linked participation remains structurally available because a subsidiary of Russian Railways holds a concession to manage Armenia’s railway network.

Iran ostensibly welcomes the peace while warning against foreign “intervention” near its borders. Its attitude thus refuses to tolerate any outcome that looks like a change in the geopolitical configuration around Armenia’s southern border. Iranian commentary has linked the TRIPP specifically to concerns about a NATO-adjacent presence on the border. A senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader used escalatory deterrent rhetoric portraying the corridor concept as unacceptable and explicitly threatened to prevent “geopolitical changes.” Tehran’s interests are actually best served by a re-ignition of the conflict and the economic impoverishment of the Armenian population, both of which would decrease Yerevan’s autonomy and open for enhanced Iranian influence. Yet of course, it cannot say this out loud. Tehran’s lacks any actual capacity for vetoing the agreement but can exercise coercive signaling through military exercises, political warnings, and pressure through regional alignments.

Turkey strongly favors any route that de-isolates Nakhchivan, welcoming the corridor concept as a gain for strategic connectivity linking Europe to Asia via Turkey. However, despite its conditional welcome of a U.S.-anchored commercial structure, Ankara still wants the region’s political center of gravity to remain in the Ankara–Baku axis rather than shifting to Washington as the indispensable actor. A commercially functioning route will accelerate Turkey’s own normalization goals with Armenia, which are explicitly tied to an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty outcome. In late December 2025, Armenia and Turkey implemented a limited but concrete confidence step on visa procedures for certain official passport holders, effective January 1, 2026. Turkey will want a formula that works for Armenia, because a route that triggers prolonged Armenian internal instability would not be in Turkish interests.

CONCLUSIONS: To summarize, Russia would like to keep the process “regionalizable” and resist a precedent of long-term U.S. operating control, while Iran will treat optics as substance, especially regarding anything that looks like foreign security infrastructure adjacent to Iran’s border. Turkey’s attitude is broadly enabling, because the route advances Ankara’s connectivity vision and strengthens its ties with Azerbaijan. The evolution of domestic Armenian politics, however, is what will really determine the outcome: whether Pashinyan’s forces receive a majority of seats in the June parliamentary election, and whether a subsequent referendum will approve the necessary change in Armenia’s constitution.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a senior researcher at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

By Umair Jamal

Pakistan has upheld a policy of non-recognition of Israel since 1948, maintaining that diplomatic relations are contingent upon the establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital. However, in late 2025, Islamabad’s mediation in the Gaza ceasefire and its conditional readiness to contribute forces to a UN-mandated International Stabilization Force have elevated its diplomatic profile with the U.S. and Gulf partners. Washington, alongside Saudi and Emirati counterparts, appears intent on expanding the Abraham Accords following credible progress toward a two-state solution. Pakistani participation would constitute a historic shift and unlock new economic corridors extending into Central Asia, enhancing regional connectivity to global markets.

                                                          Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Pakistan’s official position on Israel remains firmly grounded in support for Palestinian self-determination, a stance that resonates strongly with domestic public opinion and has guided foreign policy since the country’s founding in 1947. Pakistani diplomatic passports explicitly prohibit travel to Israel, and public discourse frequently interprets the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through the lens of historical injustice, particularly the mass displacement of Palestinians in 1948.

Anti-Israel sentiment intensified across the Muslim world, including in Pakistan, following Israel’s large-scale military offensive in Gaza, which began in October 2023 in response to the Hamas attacks. The operation has thus far resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian casualties and extensive physical destruction across the territory.

A majority of Pakistanis regard recognition of Israel as untenable in the absence of a sovereign Palestinian state. At the governmental level, however, pragmatic considerations have increasingly shaped Islamabad’s approach amid intensifying economic pressures, including a foreign debt burden exceeding US$ 130 billion and continued dependence on international financial institutions.

In September 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took part in a multilateral summit convened by U.S. President Donald Trump, alongside leaders from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, to endorse a 20-point framework for a Gaza ceasefire. The initiative, which enabled hostage releases and expanded humanitarian access, marked a significant instance of Pakistan’s active mediation, coordinated through Doha and other Middle Eastern diplomatic channels.

Subsequently, in November 2025, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed Pakistan’s willingness to contribute troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803. He stressed, however, that the mission’s primary focus would be civilian protection and post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza rather than the disarmament of Palestinian groups. “Our job is peacekeeping, not peace enforcement,” Dar stated when questioned about the prospective deployment of Pakistani forces. This position aligns Pakistan with a coalition of eight Muslim-majority states cooperating with the U.S. to support efforts toward stabilizing Gaza.

These developments coincide with the strengthening of Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, formalized through a mutual defense pact signed in Riyadh on 17 September. The agreement commits both states to regard an attack on one as an attack on the other and encompasses broad provisions for military cooperation and joint deterrence. It underscores the two countries’ shared strategic interests amid heightened regional instability.

Saudi Arabia has signaled its openness to joining the Abraham Accords—a framework for the normalization of relations with Israel—conditional on credible progress toward a two-state solution. In recent remarks to President Trump, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that Riyadh is prepared to participate in the Accords but seeks to secure “a clear path toward a two-state solution.”

Similarly, U.S. officials, including envoys from the Trump administration, appear to have encouraged Pakistan’s inclusion in this framework as a way to extend normalization efforts beyond the Gulf region. Although Islamabad continues to emphasize that any movement in this direction would depend on firm guarantees of Palestinian statehood, reports of backchannel exchanges suggest that discussions on the issue are evolving.

These shifts carry significant implications for Central Asia. States such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are actively pursuing diversified connectivity options to reduce overreliance on Russian and Chinese infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s formal accession to the Abraham Accords in November 2025 illustrates this strategy, with the potential to strengthen its economic linkages with Israel and Western partners, particularly the U.S.

The prospective inclusion of Pakistan in the Accords could function as a pivotal connective link, but sustaining momentum would require careful management of domestic public opinion and sensitive regional dynamics.

IMPLICATIONS: If U.S. officials were to achieve their apparent objective of incorporating Pakistan into an expanded Abraham Accords framework, an outcome likely dependent on Saudi Arabia’s formal participation following progress toward a two-state solution, it would have significant ramifications for Central Asia’s economic landscape. The region’s republics, rich in hydrocarbons, uranium, and rare earth minerals yet constrained by geographic isolation, would benefit significantly from deeper integration into multimodal trade networks.

Foremost among these initiatives is the U.S.-backed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which incorporates Israeli routes and seeks to streamline freight transport from South Asia through Gulf ports to Europe. Designed to circumvent traditional chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the corridor could reduce transit times by up to 40 percent. Pakistan’s participation could extend IMEC’s eastern flank through its ports at Gwadar and Karachi, interfacing with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to provide Central Asian exporters, particularly those in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. with viable southern outlets.

Such diversification would mitigate the vulnerabilities inherent in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which, although operational, continues to face bottlenecks in Caspian Sea transit and persistent geopolitical frictions. In this context, enhanced Israeli technological inputs, such as advanced logistics software and desalination expertise, could improve the efficiency of these corridors, potentially generating annual trade gains amounting to billions of dollars for Central Asia by facilitating access to Mediterranean markets.

From a security standpoint, Pakistan’s prospective deployment of Islamic Security Forces (ISF) in Gaza, framed as a humanitarian stabilization mission, could serve as a model for multilateral engagement and potentially inspire analogous C5+1–style frameworks for managing Afghanistan’s borders. The Saudi–Pakistani defense pact concluded in September 2025 already signals deeper intelligence-sharing cooperation, which could extend northward to counter ISIS-K incursions threatening the frontiers of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s recent entry into the Abraham Accords, announced on 6 November during President Tokayev’s visit to the White House, further underscores this momentum.

Clear obstacles exist to the realization of this trajectory. Public opinion in Pakistan remains strongly opposed to normalization in the absence of Palestinian sovereignty, as demonstrated by sustained public protests and formal parliamentary resolutions. Consequently, any perceived capitulation to U.S. pressure could trigger political instability. Iranian concerns that IMEC represents an encirclement strategy, combined with its rivalry with Israel, could provoke proxy disruptions extending beyond Afghanistan into Central Asia. Moreover, China and Russia are likely to pursue countermeasures through their entrenched Belt and Road Initiative commitments, which already exceed US$ 25 billion in loans to Central Asian states. This could undermine regional cohesion and potentially exacerbate divisions, pitting Turkic-aligned states against Persian-influenced Tajikistan.

Yet a carefully calibrated strategy, linking reforms in Palestinian governance with the concurrent advancement of the IMEC corridor and an expanded role for Pakistan, could yield durable, region-wide dividends.

Israeli agricultural and water-management technologies, which have demonstrated effectiveness in arid environments, could contribute to the rehabilitation of the degraded Aral Sea basin and support the creation of tens of thousands of jobs across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Meanwhile, concrete U.S. incentives, such as the designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally Plus or the provision of security guarantees, could reinforce Islamabad’s willingness to resolve longstanding disputes with Afghanistan and India, facilitate full normalization with Israel, and finally enable the implementation of long-stalled connectivity projects, including the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway and the Trans-Afghan corridor.

The potential payoff could be transformative. Landlocked Central Asia would gain direct and competitive access to the warm-water ports of Gwadar, Karachi, and Mundra, unlocking billions of dollars in annual trade. This shift would also enable the region to diversify away from reliance on Russian and Chinese transit routes, thereby converting decades of geopolitical isolation into sustained economic prosperity.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan has conditioned recognition of Israel on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state for more than seven decades. That longstanding red line now appears to face its greatest pressure to date, as Islamabad’s effective mediation in Gaza and potential peacekeeping role have attracted praise from Washington and Riyadh. The U.S. is actively seeking to expand the Abraham Accords and aims to incorporate both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan once a credible two-state pathway is established. Should Pakistan ultimately accede, the economic payoff for Central Asia could be immediate, through faster IMEC and Trans-Caspian routes, expanded access to Gulf capital, and Israeli technology reaching the landlocked republics. Above all, this development could inaugurate a new era of integration adjacent to Central Asia that would benefit the region greatly.

Absent genuine Palestinian statehood, however, domestic opposition within Pakistan and regional resistance primarily from Iran could undermine these prospects. Ultimately, the outcome hinges on two factors: whether Pakistan can advance toward normalization with Israel without destabilizing its domestic political order, and whether the U.S. can deliver sufficient progress toward a credible and equitable two-state solution to provide Islamabad and other Muslim-majority states with the legitimacy required to take this step and unlock the region’s economic future.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Svante E. Cornell

In October 2025, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) convened a pivotal summit in Gabala, Azerbaijan, demonstrating its emergence as a significant geopolitical entity in the Eurasian landscape. During the summit, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized the OTS's evolution into a key geopolitical center, while Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev referred to it as an authoritative structure uniting Turkic populations. This marked a critical juncture in the organization’s development, solidifying its influence in a region that links the Mediterranean to Central Asia. 



                                                            Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The level of interest in Turkic cooperation has diverged over time and among the Turkic states. Some, like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, have consistently been enthusiastic participants. Türkiye, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, have seen fluctuations in their enthusiasm. It is mainly in the last 7 to 8 years that a consensus has developed on the importance of Turkic cooperation.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev in the late 2000s proposed the creation of a Council of Turkic-speaking States, which was formed in 2009. Twelve years later, it was turned into a formal inter-state organization, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

Up until recently, the intensification of cooperation among Turkic states was focused on non-security areas. Still, the OTS provided a platform where individual member states developed dialogue on security issues in both bilateral and trilateral formats. Thus, in parallel with the intensification of OTS activities, there has been a parallel rise in security, intelligence, and defense agreements among members of the organization.

Two types of formats can be seen in the growing security cooperation within the Turkic world. A first, not surprisingly, involves Türkiye’s bilateral security ties with other Turkic states. Importantly, however, a second format involves cooperation among those other states themselves, without Turkish participation.

The first type of format involves the growing Turkish engagement with Azerbaijan and the Turkic states of Central Asia. A key step was the formation of a defense treaty between Türkiye and Azerbaijan in the shape of the Shusha Declaration of June 2021, the same year OTS was created. The Shusha Declaration followed on the decisive role of Türkiye in supporting Azerbaijan in the 2020 Second Karabakh War. That, in turn, followed upon Türkiye’s active involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, where Ankara actively sided against Moscow-supported proxy forces; had a decisive impact on the outcome of the conflict; and managed to do so while maintaining a functional, if transactional, relationship with Moscow. There is no question that this was duly noted in Central Asian capitals and made a security and defense relationship with Türkiye increasingly attractive for the Turkic states of Central Asia.

In fact, Türkiye stands out among external powers in the region as it has shown a willingness and ability to engage across the spheres of security, intelligence, and defense (where Europe and the U.S. have generally been absent, with the notable exception of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program).  As Richard Outzen put it, all Turkic states of Central Asia are at one point or another in the process of developing “military education exchanges, training and exercises, a broader range of equipment and defense technologies, and, perhaps most importantly, development of common doctrine and operational approaches” with Türkiye.

While Azerbaijan has reached the level of near-complete integration with Türkiye, other states are at less advanced stages of the process. They may not desire the same level of military integration with Türkiye as Azerbaijan does, but all are intensifying exchanges with Ankara. Kazakhstan began to expand military ties with Türkiye in 2020 when it signed an agreement for joint defense and industrial projects. That was followed by a protocol for intelligence cooperation in 2022, as well as an enhanced strategic partnership. Kazakhstan purchased Turkish UAVs and now holds a license to produce them in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan also started its process of deepening military ties with Türkiye. In 2022, the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement on intelligence cooperation, as well as training and logistics. In November of that year, a further agreement included military education and defense industrial cooperation. As for Kyrgyzstan, it has purchased several types of Turkish UAVs, including TB-2 Bayraktar drones. Turkmenistan has also purchased Bayraktar drones. In late December 2023, Turkmenistan’s top leadership welcomed leaders of Türkiye’s largest defense industrial companies and publicly spoke of the potential role of these firms – and Türkiye – in helping Turkmenistan strengthen its defense capabilities.

As noted, not all security and defense cooperation involves Türkiye. On a bilateral level, security and defense cooperation has grown rapidly involving Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and most recently Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. These three states have all raised their respective sets of bilateral relations to the level of allied relations, including through the formation of “Supreme Interstate Councils” for inter-state coordination on a government level. In the defense sphere, cooperation has developed through military exchanges, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and the development of the defense industry.

Until recently, it was obvious that the development of Turkic Cooperation under the Organization of Turkic States served as a catalyst for the myriad of bilateral agreements in the security and military field. Yet formally, while OTS member states have discussed holding security consultations and developing a common stance on security issues ever since the Turkic Council’s Almaty Summit in 2011, defense and security cooperation remained outside the purview of the OTS. This has nevertheless begun to change as the OTS has more recently taken steps to expand into the security field. 

IMPLICATIONS: The OTS’s organizational move into the field of security and defense dates to the summit in Samarkand in 2022. The member states “went beyond consultations by adding a new dimension to their security cooperation ... they called for closer cooperation and military collaboration in the defense industry.”

Similarly, at the following summit in Astana in November 2023, the final communiqué called for “closer cooperation in the field of defense industry and military collaboration.” At the summit, a key advocate for the intensification of military cooperation was Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who stressed during his speech that “the main guarantor of security becomes defense potential” in the developing security situation and that he “believe[s] that cooperation between the member states in areas such as security, defense, and the defense industry should be further increased.”  Following his re-election in 2024, Aliyev subsequently declared that the OTS was the main vector in Azerbaijani foreign policy.

The eleventh summit in Kyrgyzstan in 2024 focused on the adoption of a “Charter for the Turkic World” which did not specifically go into matters relating to security and defense. Still, a seed was planted: the charter includes language that “the Turkic people will strive together to prevent any actions and threats aimed at undermining their unity, solidarity, and dignity.”  While far from a mutual defense clause, it is reminiscent of how the EU adopted a solidarity clause before moving to the mutual defense clause adopted with the EU’s Lisbon treaty. At this summit as well, Aliyev repeated his earlier call, saying, “Given the growing global threats, our cooperation in defense, security, and the defense industry is of tremendous importance.”

In July 2025, the first meeting of the heads of defense industries of the Turkic states was held in Istanbul, under the banner of the OTS. The meeting mainly served to take stock of existing bilateral cooperation programs and to plan for multilateral cooperation in the future. Azerbaijan has offered to host a second meeting in 2026.

The 2025 OTS Summit in Gabala, Azerbaijan, proved a turning point. The theme for the summit was “Regional Peace and Security,” indicating the organization’s more open embrace of security issues. The leading section of the summit’s declaration focused on security issues and particularly put forward the objective of signing a “Treaty on Strategic Partnership, Eternal Friendship, and Brotherhood of Turkic States.” While not included in the formal communiqué of the summit, Azerbaijan offered to host the first military exercises under the banner of the OTS.

CONCLUSION: It is clear that, in the past few years, the OTS has been rapidly expanding its purview into the security area, defense industrial cooperation, and military coordination.  It remains to be seen whether the OTS will transform into a formal alliance, as seems to be the intent of at least several of the member states. What is clear is that the OTS has turned into a vehicle for regional middle powers – specifically Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan – to work to fill the security vacuum that has plagued the heart of Eurasia over the past three decades. That vacuum has been the result of the weakness of internal security arrangements in the region, as well as the prevalence of security arrangements dominated by external actors, such as Russia’s CSTO. While Türkiye is prominent among the OTS member states due to its military capabilities and the size of its economy, it is clear that the Turkic “middle powers” have been at least as forceful as Türkiye in driving the rise of Turkic cooperation. 

Turkic cooperation is expanding and intensifying so rapidly that it can no longer be ignored. In many ways, the expansion of Turkic cooperation is directly in line with American and European policy objectives in Central Asia and the Caucasus. OTS activities are largely complementary to Western policies, while also filling voids that Western powers themselves have proven unwilling or unable to fill. For both the EU and the United States, the role of the OTS in maintaining a balanced international environment in Greater Central Asia has become significant enough that the factors limiting Western engagement with the OTS should not obscure the clear alignment of interests that is at play.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. 

By Emil Avdaliani

China is closely assessing the outcomes of the November 6 U.S.-Central Asia summit and its implications for the region. From Beijing’s perspective, the relatively active U.S. engagement with this landlocked region is noteworthy but does not constitute a major geopolitical challenge. In terms of actual influence on the ground, China remains in a significantly stronger position. It enjoys geographical proximity to Central Asia and has made substantially larger investments than the U.S. is either able or willing to undertake. These investments span multiple sectors, including education, green energy, physical infrastructure development, and the extraction and processing of natural resources.

                                                           Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: On November 6, Washington hosted a summit between the U.S. and the five Central Asian republics. The meeting was notable for several reasons. It marked the first time such a summit had been held at the White House and it followed President Trump’s recent bilateral meetings with the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Washington approached the summit with a pragmatic agenda. Its priorities were twofold: to secure long-term access to critical mineral resources and to strengthen the Middle Corridor as a reliable route to Central Asia that bypasses sanctioned Russian and Iranian territory.

Notably absent from the discussions were themes that had dominated earlier decades, such as the promotion of human rights, democratization, and the export of Western governance models. This marks a clear departure from the period when the C5+1 format was first introduced under President Obama in 2015. At that time, the initiative was largely designed to counter Russian and Chinese influence, rather than to promote trade and investment from the U.S.

President Trump’s regional policy is explicitly transactional. An agreement with Uzbekistan envisages approximately US$ 100 billion in investments flowing into U.S. industries over the coming years. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has joined the Abraham Accords and concluded around US$ 17 billion in commercial agreements with the U.S., including a US$ 1 billion joint mining venture.

Cooperation on rare earths has emerged as a particularly promising area. China currently accounts for nearly 70 percent of global rare-earth production and up to 90 percent of processing capacity, which has increased Washington’s interest in diversifying its supply chains. Central Asia holds significant mineral potential, and the basis for cooperation already exists. In 2024, the U.S. and Uzbekistan signed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals, marking the beginning of more extensive collaboration.

Historically, Central Asia has not occupied a central position in U.S. foreign policy. Limited trade ties and an excessive emphasis on democratization yielded few strategic benefits for Washington. What has changed is the broader geopolitical context. Russia’s war in Ukraine has redirected Moscow’s focus, prompting Central Asian governments to seek greater engagement with other major powers.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite the progress achieved by the U.S. in Central Asia, Washington is unlikely to marginalize China. Geography remains decisive. Any long-term American presence in Central Asia depends on secure access through the South Caucasus. The Armenia–Azerbaijan TRIPP agreement, developed under U.S. supervision, proposes a new transit corridor connecting the two states, but building the required infrastructure will take time. Even so, the Armenian route lacks direct sea access, making the existing Georgian segment of the Middle Corridor the more practical choice for large-scale trade. Ultimately, because China borders the region, logistics are simpler, and Beijing’s expanding military and security role is significant. These factors support China’s increasingly dominant position in regional trade and investment flows.

Assuming that the U.S. seeks to replace China would be a misguided analysis. Under Trump’s second term, Washington has adopted a more transactional approach, favoring a foreign policy largely devoid of human rights and democracy-promotion elements. The U.S. aims to capitalize on the willingness of Central Asian states to diversify their foreign relations, thereby enabling them to reduce their dependence on China, Russia, or other major powers.

Moreover, the U.S. is focused on a limited set of cooperative areas. Resource extraction and processing, as well as the development of east–west infrastructure that would enable exports from Central Asia, are central to Washington’s approach. By contrast, China invests across nearly all sectors of the economy. It actively pursues cooperation in education, security, and military affairs as well. Chinese companies are deeply embedded in almost every sector, ranging from renewable energy and transport to mineral extraction and processing. Uzbekistan alone has recently secured US$ 2.7 billion in Chinese investment in copper and silver projects, while U.S. processing capacity for critical minerals continues to lag far behind that of China. In September, further evidence of China’s enduring influence emerged when energy agreements worth around US$ 1.5 billion were signed during the Kazakh president’s visit to Beijing. In addition, approximately 70 commercial agreements totaling about US$ 15 billion were concluded.

It is therefore unsurprising that, following the Washington summit, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi conducted a tour of Central Asia on November 19-22 to discuss trade and infrastructure issues, underscoring Beijing’s strong position in the region. Bilateral commercial relations continue to expand. In the first ten months of 2025, trade between China and the Central Asian states increased markedly compared with the same period in 2024. In Kyrgyzstan’s case, trade rose from US$ 17.4 billion to US$ 23.6 billion, while trade between Kazakhstan and China increased from US$ 36.5 billion to US$ 39.8 billion. More modest growth was recorded in China’s trade with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Central Asian states also do not seek to expand their ties with the U.S. in ways that could create tensions with China. The summit in Washington did not include cooperation on military and security issues, which are particularly sensitive for Beijing. Central Asian governments are concerned that a strong shift toward the U.S. could increase their geopolitical vulnerability vis-à-vis China. A similar logic shapes Central Asia’s relations with Russia. It is therefore notable that, following the Washington summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited Moscow, describing the trip as “perhaps the main event of this year.” Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Kyrgyzstan to sign several major agreements and to reaffirm the strength of bilateral relations.

Yet China is building an extraordinarily influential geopolitical position in Central Asia due to the broad multilateral framework through which it has engaged the region. Beijing now regularly hosts summits at the level of heads of state with Central Asian countries, marking a clear elevation from earlier formats in which delegations were led by the Chinese foreign minister or other senior officials. In addition, Central Asian states are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and have joined several China-led initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), as well as the more recent Global Governance Initiative (GGI).

CONCLUSIONS: The U.S. has intensified its engagement with Central Asia by elevating the level of cooperation with the region. However, its influence remains limited when compared with the range of tools available to China. Geographic proximity, together with increasingly close cooperation between Chinese and Central Asian political elites, provides a strong foundation for bilateral relations. As a result, the summit in Washington is not a major concern for Beijing but is instead viewed as part of a broader and well-established pattern in which Central Asian states engage multiple global actors through summits and major agreements. Central Asian countries also show little inclination to abandon, or even significantly reduce, their close economic and political ties with China in favor of the U.S. Rather, they continue to pursue a policy of multi-alignment, which offers greater flexibility in foreign affairs and does not generate significant concerns in Beijing.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.