By Nargiza Umarova

Azerbaijan is strengthening its political and economic ties with the Taliban government by playing an active role in creating and developing promising transport routes to South Asia. At the forefront is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, launched in 2018 through a joint initiative of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Turkmenistan, similar to the ancient route of the Great Silk Road. The possibility of extending the corridor to South Asia is being considered, which would have geo-economic and geopolitical implications for Uzbekistan.

                                                                       Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The US$2 billion Lapis Lazuli Agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan on 15 November 2017. The route runs from the Afghan cities of Aqina in Faryab Province and Torghundi in Herat Province, through the Caspian Sea ports of Turkmenbashi and Baku, and the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti or Batumi, to Istanbul or Kars in Turkey, with further access to the European transport system.

The first test shipment along the Lapis Lazuli logistics chain was carried out in 2018. In January 2021, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan signed a trilateral roadmap to develop this route. However, implementation of the document was suspended due to the Taliban's seizure of power in Kabul in August 2021.

Against the backdrop of pragmatic interactions between Central Asian states — particularly Uzbekistan — and the current Afghan leadership, Azerbaijan is also seeking to strengthen its position in Afghanistan as a partner in trade, the economy, transport, and logistics.

Baku’s main priority is the Middle Corridor project, a vital logistics link between China and Europe. The Lapis Lazuli Corridor essentially extends the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan. This enables Kabul to take part in trans-Caspian shipping and to redirect some of its export cargo bound for the European market from Pakistan or Iran, to the South Caucasus and Turkey.

In 2024, Afghanistan’s total trade with the EU was approximately US$ 42 million, which is 15.9 percent higher than the previous year’s figure. Experts predict that this growth trend will continue. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is attempting to accelerate these processes by adopting a proactive approach to its relations with the Taliban.

On July 2, 2025, on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, met with Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov. They emphasized Baku’s readiness to increase export and import volumes with Afghanistan. The Afghan delegation visited the Baku International Seaport, where they discussed expanding the geography of freight transport along the South Asia-Caucasus-Europe route and integrating Afghanistan into the Middle Corridor.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have made significant efforts to develop the infrastructure of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. Azerbaijan has invested approximately US$ 1 billion in two vital elements of the project: the Alat Port in Baku and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan constructed the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Aqina railway in 2016, and connected the Afghan cities of Aqina and Andkhoy by rail in 2021. The Caspian port of Turkmenbashi is also being modernized to increase its capacity. In order to generate economic returns on their investments and reap the long-term benefits of transport service exports, it is crucial for Baku, Ashgabat and other stakeholders along the route to maximize its utilization. This justifies the idea of extending the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to Pakistan and India, which would run contrary to Uzbekistan’s interests.

IMPLICATIONS: It is assumed that the transport corridor from Europe to India via the South Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan will become an alternative to Tashkent’s strategic plan for connecting Eastern Europe with the Indian subcontinent. This plan involves linking the Trans-Afghan Railway (Kabul Corridor) with the Northern Railway Corridor through Russia. To this end, Uzbekistan has initiated the formation of the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Ocean ports transit route, which is set to launch in multimodal format soon.

The main benchmark for calculating the Kabul Corridor’s economic efficiency and feasibility is India’s growing potential for trade with Central Asian countries, the EU, China and Russia.

In the 2024 fiscal year, India’s trade turnover with the EU exceeded US$ 137 billion, with China US$ 118 billion, with Russia US$ 70 billion, and with Central Asian countries US$ 1.7 billion. The majority of Indian goods are delivered to promising markets by sea, which incurs high financial and time costs. The integration of India and Pakistan's transport space into the Eurasian road network is expected to stimulate land transportation along the South Asia-Europe axis. This shift holds great potential for the Kabul Corridor, with a projected annual cargo volume of up to 22 million tons, most of which will be in transit. 

However, the extension of the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan and the development of further access to Pakistan and India will redistribute the flow of cargo from South Asian countries to Europe in favor of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, who are connected by the Caspian Sea. In turn, this risks diminishing Uzbekistan’s exclusive role as a trans-Eurasian transport link. 

In theory, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to Pakistan by constructing a railway line from Torghundi station on the Afghan-Turkmen border to Naibabad station, which marks the beginning of the Afghan section of the Kabul Corridor. Although this would exclude Uzbekistan from the India-EU supply chain, it would enable the Kabul Corridor to attract additional cargo from the South Caucasus and Turkmenistan. However, this advantage would not offset Uzbekistan’s loss of transit flows from the larger economic centers of Eurasia.

Connecting the Lapis Lazuli and Kabul corridors would motivate constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway, which would breathe new life into the long-standing Five Nations Railway Corridor project, running through China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The Five Nations Route bypasses Uzbekistan, significantly reducing the distance between East and West. This will probably diminish the importance of the Southern Railway Corridor, which runs through Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which is intended to be an important component of this route.

At the same time, constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway could undermine the Lapis Lazuli Corridor’s competitive advantage by increasing Iranian transit. Iran already has rail access to northern Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat route, which is used to deliver Afghan cargo to Europe. Extending the Khaf-Herat railway to Naibabad station near Mazar-i-Sharif and connecting it to the Kabul Corridor would enable Iran to divert potential cargo traffic from India and Pakistan to Turkey and Europe via itself, thereby depriving Central Asian and South Caucasian countries of transit benefits. Consequently, there is a possibility that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to South Asia, bypassing Kabul and instead passing through Kandahar. This would stimulate the development of the western Trans-Afghan Railway along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak route. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan promote the project as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor. 

Russia should be considered a potential stakeholder in the extension of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor along any of the trans-Afghan routes. Moscow has already announced plans to connect with Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea, utilising Turkmenistan’s port and rail infrastructure, which would integrate Russia into the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. This would establish a connection between India and Russia, and potentially Europe, through Turkmenistan and the Caspian port of Turkmenbashi, rather than through Uzbekistan.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s best option for maintaining and enhancing its competitive advantages in trans-Eurasian and trans-Afghan transport is to accelerate construction of the Kabul Corridor, involving all Central Asian states financially to the maximum extent possible. Kazakhstan’s practical support for developing the Kabul Corridor is important, as connecting it to the Northern Railway Route to Europe will enable Astana to receive an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons per year. This will preempt any potential competition from Astana and Ashgabat in developing trans-Afghan transport connections. 

It would be worth proposing to Baku the joint promotion of a new multimodal corridor from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the EU. This would stimulate the development of the Middle Corridor by increasing transport from South Asia and Afghanistan to Europe via the Caspian Sea.

Moreover, an alternative should be developed to the Five Nations Route, instead envisaging a connection between China, Afghanistan and Iran through Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. This would ensure the profitability of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway project for Tashkent.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

 

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The Caspian Sea is increasingly emerging as a focal point of geopolitical competition. The joint military exercises conducted by Russia and Iran in July, following similar drills by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the northern Caspian a month earlier, underscore the region’s rapid transformation into a nexus of strategic rivalries and evolving security alignments. Among the littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are assuming particularly prominent roles in shaping the strategic landscape. Their efforts are supported by Turkey, which is facilitating the naval expansion of these three Turkic nations. Russia’s ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine has significantly weakened Moscow’s capacity to assert dominance over the Caspian Sea and to effectively utilize it as part of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Russia to Iran and India.


                                                            Credit: Wikimedia Commons


BACKGROUND:
The Caspian Sea was widely regarded as a “Russian lake” during the Soviet era, as Iran, possessing only a short Caspian coastline, showed little interest in utilizing it for power projection. For decades, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla maintained dominance over the waters of the inland sea. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Moscow sought to preserve the existing balance of power in the Caspian. In 2018, Russia secured an agreement among the five Caspian littoral states on territorial delimitation, excluding the military presence of non-littoral actors in the sea.

The region experienced a significant geopolitical shift in 2020 after Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey provided military assistance to Azerbaijan during the conflict. Following the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, the Caspian littoral states expanded their navies. Turkey continues to support Azerbaijan’s requirements for modern weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister, Zakir Hasanov, affirmed that Ankara was Baku’s principal partner in military cooperation.

Over the past five years, Turkey has facilitated the naval expansion of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. These countries, along with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are members of the Turkey-backed “Pan-Turkic Union.” Through this framework, Turkey has assumed a leading role in diminishing Russia’s influence over the military development of these states.

In 2023, Turkey’s Asfar and YDA Group, together with Kazakhstan’s Uralsk Plant “Zenit” JSC, concluded an agreement for the construction of offshore platforms in the Caspian Sea. The agreement included the production of various naval vessels, including main surface combat ships, to fulfill the operational requirements of the Kazakh Navy. Likewise, the deepening relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan signify a broader shift in energy geopolitics and highlight their shared strategic interests. The Bayraktar TB2, Turkey’s first domestically produced unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), is deployed within Turkmenistan’s armed forces. In February, the two countries signed a gas supply agreement that offers Turkmenistan a new export channel while consolidating Turkey’s position as a regional energy hub.

In 2024, the joint military exercises Birleistik (Unity) 2024 were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast, marking the first such drills held without Russian participation. The armed forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly participated in the exercise.

In April, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan announced plans to conduct the joint military exercises Caspian Breeze – 2025 in the northern part of the Caspian Sea near Russia’s coastline. The exercises commenced in June at Aktau, Kazakhstan, with the objective of strengthening the protection of maritime economic infrastructure, naval bases, and shipping routes. A month later, Russia and Iran initiated their own joint naval exercises, CASAREX 2025, under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” These drills were designed to enhance maritime security and promote deeper naval cooperation between the two states.

The two joint military exercises within the span of a single month demonstrate a changing regional balance of power. The Caspian littoral states have expanded their naval capabilities in recent years, thereby challenging Russia’s long-standing hegemony in the Caspian region.

IMPLICATIONS: The navies of the three Turkic littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, have experienced substantial growth and deepened cooperation in recent years. Through a series of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and supported by Turkey, these states have enhanced their strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. These developments have not only strengthened the collective influence and military capacity of the Turkic states but have also posed a significant challenge to Russia’s longstanding naval dominance in the Caspian.

Security cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states in the absence of Russian participation signifies a major geopolitical realignment in the Caspian region. For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have agreed to employ their joint naval forces to protect pipelines on the seabed and vessels operating on the surface. The regional geopolitical competition is likely to intensify following Iran’s decision to resume drilling operations in the Caspian after a 30-year hiatus. This development could generate tensions with the three Turkic littoral states, which are already deeply engaged in offshore oil and gas extraction within the Caspian Sea.

Turkey plays a pivotal role in the ongoing militarization of the Caspian Sea. It initially strengthened Azerbaijan’s defense capabilities, subsequently supported Turkmenistan, and is now actively engaged in enhancing Kazakhstan’s naval power. According to Yuri Lyamin, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), “Kazakhstan is following the ongoing, multi-year process of strengthening the navies of Caspian states. The reasons and necessity of this can be debated, but it is a long-standing trend driven by prestige and the desire to keep up with its neighbors. Over the past decade and a half, Turkmenistan has built a very strong navy in the Caspian, including with Turkey’s assistance. It was to a Turkish design that Turkmenistan’s largest ship, and one of the largest warships in the Caspian, the corvette Deniz Khan, was commissioned and constructed in 2021. A considerable number of missile, missile-artillery, and other boats for the Turkmen border guards were also built based on Turkish designs.” The growing number of actors in the region is complicating Moscow’s ability to utilize the area for strategic connectivity projects. One of these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a Russia-led project designed to connect Russian ports with Iran, the Gulf region, and the Indian Ocean. The INSTC agreement was initially signed in 2000 by Russia, Iran, and India, was later joined by Azerbaijan and several Central Asian states. Meanwhile, Iran is actively seeking alternative trade routes to the EU, including via Armenia.

Conversely, Azerbaijan’s Port of Baku serves as a critical hub within the east–west Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, which links China to the EU via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby bypassing Russia. The Middle Corridor endows Baku’s with an important role for both Europe and Central Asia by providing a viable alternative to Russian transit routes, facilitating efficient east–west connectivity across the Caspian and through the South Caucasus.

Similarly, Turkey promotes the integration of Turkmenistan in the Middle Corridor, which would advance Turkey’s long-standing ambition to position itself as a strategic logistical bridge linking Asia and Europe.

The 2018 agreement grants the Caspian states the right to construct gas pipelines across the seabed. Ankara aims to channel Caspian gas to its territory via Azerbaijan, and onward to the EU, elevating Turkey’s role as a pivotal energy hub. However, this directly contradicts Russian interests and the potential exists for heightened tensions or even confrontation between the Turkey-backed Turkic states and the Russia-Iran alliance over control of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The geopolitical competition between the three Turkey-backed Turkic littoral states and the Russia–Iran alliance could intensify as both sides continue to expand their economic and military presence in the Caspian region. The increase in military exercises conducted over the past two years underscores the emergence of new security alignments within the Caspian basin.

Turkey has taken on a leading role in advancing the naval capabilities of the three Turkic littoral states, a position that was traditionally held by Russia. As Turkey’s involvement in the region deepens, Moscow’s ability to shape the military development of these countries will likely be further marginalized. Russia, meanwhile, continues to bear significant geopolitical costs for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the onset of the conflict, Moscow’s influence across Central Asia and other regions, including the Caspian, has steadily declined and other powers such as China and Turkey have begun to fill the resulting vacuum.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

 

By Emil Avdaliani

The EU’s deepening engagement with Tajikistan through the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (ECPA) aligns with Brussels’ broader economic and political outreach toward Central Asia. This strategy represents another phase in the Union’s increasingly active policy toward the region. The EU’s interest is driven by the Central Asia’s significance amid intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China over control of supply chains critical for battery and electric vehicle production. A further factor strengthening EU–Central Asia relations is the regional states’ pursuit of multi-alignment. Wary of dependence on either Russia or China, the Central Asian governments seek partnerships with other major powers.

 

                                                                     Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: On July 18, the European Union and Tajikistan initialed the EPCA. This accord will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that has been in place since 2010, establishing a legal framework to advance reforms in Tajikistan. The EPCA corresponds closely with the EU’s strategic priorities in Central Asia, which call for a more reinvigorated approach to the strategically significant region. It also seeks to establish a basis for future relations, reflecting emerging economic and political conditions on the ground. Brussels and Dushanbe foresee cooperation in trade as well as in human rights, sustainable development, education, energy, and related areas.

Similarly, in July the two parties discussed the present state of cooperation and prospects for launching new joint projects in mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and the food industry. Additional areas include the mining sector, with particular focus on the extraction and processing of critical raw materials. Officials from Tajikistan and the EU also considered Dushanbe’s potential participation in the EU Global Gateway initiative, designed to promote sustainable infrastructure and reinforce strategic linkages across Eurasia.

The EPCA builds upon already established cooperation across multiple sectors. For example, during the past five years, 500 Tajik students have studied in Europe through EU funding. The Union has financed projects in the healthcare sector and promotes digital transformation, including initiatives to expand digital access via satellite technology. The EU also contributes to the development and modernization of green energy production in Tajikistan. With European support, the Nurek, Sebzor, and Kayrakkum hydroelectric power station projects are under implementation, and Brussels is assisting the establishment of infrastructure to transmit electricity to South Asia through the CASA-1000 transmission line.

IMPLICATIONS: The EPCA was concluded after several years of bilateral negotiations, a timeframe regarded as relatively brief for agreements of this nature. The EU remains committed to serving as a partner in Tajikistan’s future development and seeks to broaden cooperation across a range of key sectors, from education to investments in critical infrastructure.

Tajikistan is particularly interested in attracting additional European investments and technologies for the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station and the modernization of the Nurek facility. Moreover, Dushanbe seeks to advance the implementation of a “green” economy, a topic addressed in discussions between President Emomali Rahmon and the President of the Council of the European Union, António Costa. Tajikistan has articulated ambitious plans to transform the country into a significant producer of green energy. In June, the leadership announced that by 2037 the country would generate electricity exclusively from renewable sources. Although perhaps unrealistic, these plans underscore Dushanbe’s rising aspirations.

The EU’s intensified engagement with Tajikistan corresponds to Brussels’ broader involvement in Central Asia. The summit convened by the EU with the five Central Asian states in Samarkand earlier this year represented a significant development in bilateral relations. Under the Global Gateway program, the EU announced a €12 billion investment package for Central Asian countries, including €3 billion for transport, €2.5 billion for critical minerals, and allocations for other sectors. Initiated in 2023, the EU–Central Asia summits have become central to bilateral ties, reflecting the region’s increasing significance for Brussels following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion altered Eurasian connectivity, elevating the importance of Central Asian routes for both China and the EU. As part of the Middle Corridor, Central Asia is integrated into the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, designed to advance sustainable and interconnected infrastructure projects worldwide.

Tajikistan places particular value on connectivity opportunities arising from the EU’s engagement with Central Asia. Historically, the country has remained peripheral to major transit routes, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan assuming more central roles in linking China with global markets. Recently, however, Dushanbe has sought to capitalize on evolving Eurasian connectivity. Central Asia’s interaction with Afghanistan constitutes one potential avenue, but given Tajikistan’s cautious stance toward Afghanistan, the country is instead considering transit routes through Iran. Relations between Tehran and Dushanbe have improved in recent months, and Tajikistan is now actively pursuing the use of Iranian ports to gain access to India and the Gulf region.

Another transregional project pursued by Tajikistan is the Middle Corridor. In June, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced that Dushanbe is actively cooperating with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and other partners on agreements providing mutual discounts on rail transportation to facilitate trade flows. This activism is not confined to Tajikistan but reflects a broader trend observable in the conduct of other regional states, including even the most closed one, Turkmenistan.

For the EU, Tajikistan holds particular importance in light of Brussels’ growing focus on securing rare earth resources, which are vital for multiple industries where competition with China has intensified. Estimates suggest that the country possesses approximately 800 mineral deposits containing critical materials demanded in global technological production. In late 2024, Tajikistan announced the discovery of 15 new major deposits of rare earths. In July of this year, authorities further reported the identification of rare earth metals—niobium and tantalum—in the Rasht Valley. Tajikistan also possesses considerable hydropower potential, with its 13,000 glaciers accounting for 68 percent of Central Asia’s water resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The EU’s engagement with Central Asia, and Tajikistan in particular, demonstrates that the Union has adopted an increasingly geopolitical orientation toward the region. To compete effectively with China, Russia, the U.S., and other powers, Brussels must shift its focus from rhetorical emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion to more tangible measures, including investment in critical sectors of cooperation with Central Asian states. The EU is regarded as a reliable partner owing to its adherence to high environmental standards in investment and the long-term benefits derived from them. While Central Asian states anticipate deeper EU involvement, they also acknowledge the constraints of bilateral cooperation. Geographic remoteness and underdeveloped infrastructure remain significant obstacles. Furthermore, the EU allocates fewer financial resources to the region than Russia, and particularly China, while its bureaucracy, unlike China’s, is less adaptable to the needs of individual Central Asian states.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

 

By Stephen Blank

It would currently be very much in the U.S. interest to reinvigorate relations with Georgia. Despite Georgia’s growing submission to Russian policy, its mounting anti-democratic repression, and pervasive corruption, opportunities exist that can justify a U.S. policy initiative towards the country. Specifically, Trump can emulate his achievement of inserting U.S. influence over trade routes like the Zangezur corridor to resuscitate the U.S. effort to develop Georgia’s Anaklia port complex on the Black Sea. Success would establish a lasting U.S. presence and provide a counterbalance to Sino-Russian influence. An enduring U.S. trade presence and even management of the primary land and sea corridors linking the Caucasus to both Central Asia and Europe could facilitate a far-reaching strategic transformation throughout these regions.

american-and-georgian-flags-fly-side-by-side-during-7f460c

 

Image Credit: PICRYL

BACKGROUND: The U.S. is moving quickly to build on President Trump’s intervention in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its resolution. A U.S. delegation recently travelled to Armenia to begin the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which Washington, Baku, and Yerevan agreed to in August. The delegation has just announced an initial investment of US$145 million to begin building this road, thus confirming Washington’s presence in the Caucasus. Beyond this intervention, the administration is strengthening ties with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and may even be planning a trip there. 

In Georgia, an enduring U.S. presence at Anaklia would have repercussions beyond its possible impact on Georgia’s domestic politics. Due to Ukraine’s success in driving the Black Sea Fleet out of the battle theater, Russia is building a strategic naval hub at Ochamchire in Abkhazia, which will clearly be an enduring threat to Georgia. Likewise, China’s large investments throughout the Black Sea region aim to obtain lasting economic-political influence over the entire littoral. Both these processes will clearly aim to exclude Western influence from Georgia and beyond. A U.S. presence in Anaklia would provide a check on both powers’ ambitions and preserve an option for all the states of the Caucasus and the Black Sea littoral in general. Even if the Trump Administration has no interest in or incentive to influence Georgian democratization, it does seek to expand U.S. economic presence in both the Caucasus and Central Asia to check China and Russia. Since Central Asia’s economic-political growth depends on its ability to trade in an unhampered way with the West through secure economic corridors leading to Europe, a U.S. presence in Anaklia, together with TRIPP and an enhanced U.S. position in Central Asia, likewise augments the economic-political independence of Central Asian states.

Several years ago, Georgia rejected plans that were already in place for a Western firm to build the port at Anaklia and awarded the contract to the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). Yet despite that decision and the fact that the China Railway Tunnel Group is building a highway that would connect Western Georgia to Russia, and Chinese workers are constructing an East-West highway across Georgia, no port has been built. A report by Civic Idea, an independent Georgian think tank, points out that China’s interest in this deep-water port coincides with its presence at the port of Poti, which is part of the larger Free Industrial Zone. In both these cases, the report cited strong evidence of Georgian corruption at China’s expense, leading to delays in construction at Anaklia, even as the Western presence has been excluded.

IMPLICATIONS: Therefore, an opportunity exists for a U.S. initiative to recapture the contract for building a port at Anaklia. While this would require a strong negotiating team, it is nevertheless conceivable and desirable not only for the West but for other Central Asian and South Caucasus states. At present, the idea of the Middle Corridor seems to be the most likely vehicle for connecting China, Central Asia, and the Caucasus with Europe. TRIPP provides a major impetus to land-based trade for this intercontinental project. However, a passage through Anaklia not only benefits Georgia by connecting it to the Middle Corridor; it also offers a maritime route for shippers in both Europe and Asia that would increase trade and connectivity. The opportunity of sending bulk cargoes through the Black Sea would permit traders to reach more markets than those accessible exclusively by land-based trade and transport flows. Cargoes requiring maritime transport could originate in China or Central Asia, or in Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia (once peace is achieved in the current Russian war against Ukraine), and be shipped at reduced cost to any other member of the corridor. This would stimulate economic exchanges and reduce shipping costs, facilitating mutual cooperation on safeguarding either or both extensions of this corridor, thereby improving regional cooperation and security among the members.

Central Asian states, which are all seeking to utilize the Caspian Sea for expanded international trade to Europe, would profit greatly from a reliable, secure maritime passage westward. Uzbekistan, which is doubly landlocked, has called for a global pact guaranteeing transit and the creation of an international logistics forum for landlocked states. It is negotiating with its neighbors to buy ships and operate ferries on the Caspian Sea to buy and sell goods and overcome existing bottlenecks. To the extent that it can move cargoes to and from its neighbors on the Caspian Sea, the opening of a secure and reliable route from the Caspian ports of Azerbaijan to the Black Sea and thence to Europe or to reverse that process would constitute an enormous stimulus to its economy and those of its neighbors. Similarly, a reliably functioning port in Anaklia that is not beholden to Russo-Chinese or Georgian corruption would enhance Georgia’s economy, along with those of Armenia and Azerbaijan. TRIPP will undoubtedly stimulate Central Asian economic integration with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and a reliable maritime trade route through Anaklia will also similarly redound to Georgia’s benefit.

A secure U.S. position in Anaklia and its accompanying infrastructure also has potentially profound strategic implications. It would prevent both China and Russia from monopolizing Black Sea trade and geopolitics. Even if this port ultimately services large-scale Chinese trade going to Europe or from there to China, a U.S. presence would limit the amount of influence that China can wield in Georgia and beyond its borders. It would contribute to ensuring a stable series of long-term protocols that will benefit Georgia, along with other South Caucasus states and Central Asian traders. The economic benefits of a well-managed port complex would provide positive political incentives for Georgia, while the established presence of U.S. interests would act to deter Russia’s threat of military action and make it harder for Russia to operate militarily in the Black Sea. 

Persuading the Trump Administration to make an offer to Georgia that it cannot refuse regarding Anaklia is admittedly a hard sell, especially when the Black Sea is a war zone and Georgian Dream is seeking to neutralize the domestic opposition with Moscow’s support. Nevertheless, inaction increases the costs to Washington and its allies, especially after putting down a marker in the Caucasus by investing in TRIPP. If Anaklia and the maritime arm of intercontinental trade and connectivity through the Caucasus are dominated by U.S. adversaries, they will use that opportunity to undermine TRIPP and negate its benefits. That outcome will surely undermine the Administration’s continuing investment in regional peace and could catalyze a return to warfare. Moreover, inaction also permits China and Russia to throttle the Administration’s now rising interest in Central Asia, as expressed in rumors of a presidential visit. It would also dash the hopes of Central Asian states for a more vigorous relationship of mutual benefit with Washington and Europe. 

CONCLUSIONS: The Chinese and Russian rivalries with the U.S. are global. They are not confined to Taiwan, Ukraine, or even Europe. Moscow and Beijing are contesting U.S. power, influence, and values globally, not least in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Therefore, it is arguably in the interest of Washington and those states that wish to partner with it to enhance their partnerships when opportunities present themselves, even if economic and political risk is involved. A Western initiative linking Washington with interested European and Eurasian states regarding Anaklia is therefore probably less risky than has been imagined. The benefits of offering to develop Anaklia as a major port center managed according to international standards outweigh these risks in the new regional environment, thus meriting serious consideration. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

 

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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