Robert M. Cutler

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s April 2025 state visit to China, culminating in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marks a significant elevation in bilateral relations. The agreement is more than a symbolic gesture: it reflects a strategic convergence across infrastructure, energy, and digital development. It also signals a re-balancing of power in the South Caucasus in response to Western inertia. As China consolidates its position, the question is no longer whether the West leads but whether it has already surrendered the initiative.

BACKGROUND: The Second Karabakh War of 2020 abruptly exposed the obsolescence of entrenched diplomatic frameworks in the South Caucasus, most notably the OSCE Minsk Group. The November 2020 Trilateral Statement that ended the fighting, brokered under Russia’s aegis, signified an incipient restructuring of regional dynamics. Russia positioned itself as the nominal guarantor of stability, installing a contingent of so-called peacekeepers on Azerbaijani territory. Yet this maneuver, driven by residual influence and opportunistic calculus, underscored Moscow’s determination to preserve a semblance of relevance amid shifting fault lines.

While Russia acted following long-established and well-defined interests, the U.S. and the EU hesitated. The initiatives introduced by Western actors, preoccupied with internal crises and other entanglements, lacked coherence, confidence, and strategic vision. The mediation efforts were fragmented and the summits were ad hoc. As a result, the promising diplomatic overtures failed to generate substantive traction. The reactive nature of Western engagement post-2020 contrasts starkly with the proactive moves of regional and other stakeholders having more immediate stakes in the evolving South Caucasus order.

Turkey’s deepening military partnership with Azerbaijan, formalized through the Shusha Declaration of 2021, epitomized pragmatic alignment. Kazakhstan, seizing the moment, accelerated its integration into the emergent Middle Corridor, bolstering East-West logistics networks through the Caspian basin. Concurrently, Gulf states capitalized on Azerbaijan’s post-war stabilization by channeling substantial investments into renewable energy infrastructure, particularly solar and wind projects in the liberated territories. These tangible gestures did not just reflect geoeconomic calculations but represented a recognition of the region’s latent economic potential.

In this context, China modified its traditionally cautious posture in the South Caucasus. Historically deferential to Russia’s informal sphere of influence, Beijing began to reassess the region’s strategic significance following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The resulting destabilization of Eurasian corridors, compounded by Western sanctions and the geopolitical weaponization of supply chains, propelled the South Caucasus from peripheral concern to a central axis in China’s connectivity strategy. This shift was not reflexive or opportunistic. Rather, it reflected China’s measured strategic assessment of the structural transformations in the architecture of Eurasian trade.

By 2022, the foundations for a deepening Sino-Azerbaijani partnership had been firmly established. The signing of a joint declaration on strategic partnership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in July 2024 signaled a decisive commitment to broaden bilateral economic ties. The two countries’ trade in 2024 was over 20 percent above its 2023 level, reaching nearly US$ 3.74 billion. Chinese enterprises expanded into sectors previously peripheral to their Eurasian ambitions: telecommunications, green energy, and transport logistics. President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Beijing in April 2025 did not initiate this trend but rather consolidated it. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) agreement was the logical culmination of sustained and deliberate moves that anchored Azerbaijan’s strategic realignment toward the East.

IMPLICATIONS: The realignment is not mere economic opportunism. Rather, it signals a deeper geopolitical evolution driven by the inadequacy of Western engagement and the region’s preparedness to respond to actors willing to match rhetoric with decisive action. The failure of Western policy is not just about inattentiveness, but also about an inability to grasp the interplay between regional agency, emerging connectivity frameworks, and the geopolitical vacuum created by Russia’s shifting posture. In this unfolding dynamic, Azerbaijan has moved beyond waiting for Western recognition or support. It has instead begun to assert its own role within a rapidly realigning Eurasian order.

For China, Azerbaijan serves as a gateway not only to Europe through the Middle Corridor but also toward the Middle East, reinforcing China’s broader trade architecture and strategic depth in the region. The CSP is not a symbolic gesture. Its scope is broad and consequential, encompassing coordinated industrial development, infrastructure harmonization, technology transfer, and streamlined customs protocols. These measures are underpinned by capital investments and long-term industrial partnerships. 

For Azerbaijan, the CSP consolidates a deliberate move to attenuate traditional dependencies on Western and Russian interlocutors. It embodies Azerbaijan’s long-articulated aspirations for economic diversification, substantiated now by tangible capital flows and operational partnerships. The CSP’s provisions span petrochemicals, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and renewables. Agreements on aerospace and intellectual property signal a strategic depth, eschewing transactional engagement in favor of embedded, systemic collaboration. 

The transport dimension alone is reshaping regional dynamics. The Middle Corridor, stretching from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian basin, and into the South Caucasus and Europe, has demonstrated rapid growth. While still smaller in scale than northern routes traversing Russia, its year-on-year expansion has been notable. A trilateral joint venture among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia’s rail operators is actively synchronizing digital customs tracking and reducing delivery times to enhance competitiveness.

The Port of Alat, central to Azerbaijan’s maritime logistics, has already undergone substantial upgrades. Cross-border road transport agreements and operational protocols with China, concluded in 2024 and 2025, are streamlining east–west trade flows. China’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan as a "central transit node" underscores the strategic weight of this integration.

The significance of the CSP extends beyond ports and pipelines. Digital infrastructure has emerged as a foundational pillar. Huawei and ZTE, longstanding presences in the region, have solidified their positions through new agreements establishing joint research centers, expanding data infrastructure, and modernizing e-government frameworks. These initiatives are embedding Chinese technological standards into the South Caucasus and positioning Baku as a nascent digital hub.

Energy collaboration has similarly accelerated. China’s Universal Energy is backing the Gobustan solar project, with further discussions ongoing over potential wind energy developments along the Caspian coast. These initiatives are paralleled by an expansion of Chinese soft power, from Confucius Institutes to cultural exchanges and educational programs.

Azerbaijan has not “abandoned” the West. The reality is starker: the West has failed to keep pace with Azerbaijan’s evolving strategic calculus. President Aliyev’s visit to Beijing and the CSP with China are less an embrace of Beijing than a commentary on the chronic insufficiencies of Western engagement. For years, Baku signaled openness to deeper commercial ties, infrastructure investments, and a balanced diplomatic posture. What it often received were half-measures, symbolic gestures, and ideological critiques. 

The waning of Western diplomatic leverage in the South Caucasus is not a sudden anomaly. It is the cumulative outcome of incremental miscalculations, fragmentary approaches, and the persistent failure to integrate regional realities into a coherent strategic vision. The 2020 Second Karabakh War marked a decisive inflection point. Azerbaijan’s reintegration of its formerly occupied territories exposed the impotence of frameworks long regarded as the bedrock of resolution efforts. The abrupt reassertion of Azerbaijani territorial sovereignty in 2020, and its completion in 2023, underscored the extent to which Western actors had become disconnected from the region’s evolving dynamics.

Europe’s Global Gateway initiative, though nominally prioritizing the Middle Corridor, remains hesitant and underfunded. The U.S., preoccupied with broader geopolitical contests, has failed to sustain a coherent South Caucasus policy. When attention does surface, it is often filtered through domestic advocacy agendas misaligned with both regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. Thus, under the influence of domestic lobbies, two of the Biden administration’s last acts were to decline to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which bans direct assistance to the Azerbaijani government, and to sign a bilateral strategic partnership charter with the Armenian government.

CONCLUSIONS: The South Caucasus has shifted from constituting a peripheral zone to a strategic nexus. Capital and influence from East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are converging upon the region. Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf states have become active participants in this evolving matrix. Azerbaijan, far from merely serving as a bridge, has assumed the role of architect and builder of new routes. Aliyev’s visit to Beijing is emblematic of this shift. Baku no longer waits for external recognition; it engineers its own relevance. 

The West must recognize this not as a defection, but as an adaptation to opportunity over nostalgia. The coming months will be decisive. If the West wishes to remain a meaningful player, it must replace rhetorical overtures with substantive commitments: joint infrastructure ventures, credible support for energy transition, and diplomatic engagement rooted in regional realities rather than encumbered by historical preoccupations.

Azerbaijan’s choice is not between China and the West, but between agency and irrelevance. It has already chosen. The question now is whether the West retains both the capacity—and the will—to respond.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

Azerbaijan's acquisition of at least 50 JF-17 Block III fighter jets from Pakistan, to be equipped with Turkish-manufactured missiles, aims to enhance the aerial combat capabilities of the Azerbaijani Air Force. Jointly developed by China and Pakistan, the JF-17 Block III fighters will gain increased lethality through the integration of avionics from Türkiye’s advanced defense industry. This agreement has further consolidated the multi-dimensional defense collaboration between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, commonly referred to as "three brothers." Pakistan and Azerbaijan are also actively participating in Türkiye’s Kaan fifth-generation fighter aircraft program. The procurement of Türkiye’s fifth-generation jets, among the most advanced globally, is expected to be transformative for both Baku and Islamabad.

BACKGROUND:  Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan are collectively referred to as the "three brothers" since Türkiye was the first state, and Pakistan the second, to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. Both Türkiye and Pakistan provided military support to Baku during the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020. The states convened in Islamabad in January 2021 for a trilateral meeting, during which they agreed to expand cooperation in political, strategic, trade, economic, peace, and security, while reaffirming mutual support on issues of shared concern.

Initiated and launched by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 2010, the Kaan fifth-generation fighter program represents Türkiye’s indigenous jet fighter initiative. Following Türkiye’s exclusion from the U.S. F-35 fifth-generation fighter program in 2019, the Kaan remains Türkiye’s sole alternative and is intended to replace the country's aging fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The first prototype was tested in 2023; however, the development process is expected to span at least a decade. 

While Azerbaijan is providing financial assistance to Türkiye’s Kaan program, hundreds of Pakistani officials and engineers are actively engaged in the project. In 2023, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed an agreement during the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2023) in Istanbul to advance the development of the Kaan fighter program. As part of its contribution, Azerbaijan is expected to offer financial investment and industrial collaboration in support of the initiative.

In 2024, Azerbaijan’s Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov stated that his country was leveraging the defense capabilities of Türkiye, its primary partner in military cooperation. In January 2025, Türkiye and Pakistan finalized plans to establish and operate a joint facility for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jet, agreeing to collaborate on the development and manufacturing of the aircraft.

In February 2025, defense industry authorities from Azerbaijan and Türkiye, during a meeting held at the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX-2025) in Abu Dhabi, discussed the successful military-technical cooperation between the two nations and pledged to further strengthen defense industry ties by exploring prospects for joint projects.

The JF-17 Thunder Block III, a fourth-generation fighter jet, has been developed through a joint venture between Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation. Compared to earlier versions of JF-17, the Block III features superior maneuverability, enhanced combat capabilities, and improved stealth characteristics. In February 2024, Azerbaijan signed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement with Pakistan for the procurement of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal also included pilot training and armaments for the fighter jets. On 25 September 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced, “The JF-17 jets have already been integrated into the arsenal of Azerbaijan’s air force.”

IMPLICATIONS: Arming the JF-17 “Thunder” Block III fighter jets acquired by Baku with Türkiye’s Gökdoğan Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) and Bozdoğan Within-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (WVRAAM) will significantly enhance the aerial firepower of Azerbaijan's Air Force. It also underscores the progress of Türkiye’s defense industry. Türkiye is emerging as a major global arms exporter, after the leading five exporters—the U.S., France, Russia, China, and Germany.

With its advanced combat capabilities, the JF-17 aircraft surpasses the region’s Russian-made jets, including the MiG-29 and SU-25. Russia has been Azerbaijan’s primary arms supplier for decades, however, the JF-17 will replace Azerbaijan’s existing and aging fleet of Russian-manufactured MiG-29 fighters. The JF-17 are expected to enhance Azerbaijan’s airpower amid escalating regional security challenges. Equipped with improved avionics and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the Block III variant is adaptable to diverse combat scenarios. 

According to the Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSB), Türkiye’s defense and aerospace exports in 2024 totaled US$ 7.2 billion. Three Turkish defense firms are included in the ‘Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies’ list, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Jointly developed by Pakistan and China, the JF-17 fighter jet deal with Azerbaijan also creates opportunities for China to secure additional defense agreements with Azerbaijan and other countries in the region. Between 2019 and 2023, China accounted for 5.8 percent of global arms exports. During this period, China supplied arms to nearly 40 countries across Asia and Africa, ranking as the fourth largest exporter of conventional weapons after the U.S., France, and Russia.

By selling the JF-17 Thunder to Azerbaijan, Pakistan has effectively supported China in boosting demand and expanding its market for arms and military equipment in a region traditionally dominated by Russia. The JF-17 agreement with Azerbaijan is likely to facilitate the entry of Chinese weaponry and enhance China’s influence in the region.

Islamabad, Ankara, and Baku have integrated their tactical and strategic practice with the use of Turkish drone systems. In the Kaan project, Türkiye is experimenting with a ‘loyal wingman’ drone, to gather data in a range of different terrains and against a range of technologies.

The development of the Kaan fighter will significantly reduce Türkiye’s reliance on foreign aircraft. As a fifth-generation fighter program, Kaan demands extensive expertise, substantial financial resources, and international collaboration. Azerbaijan’s financial investment and Pakistan’s manufacturing expertise will not only support Türkiye’s Kaan project but also further reinforce the trilateral defense cooperation for long-term initiatives.

The joint factory established by Islamabad and Ankara for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jets will further consolidate the defense partnership between Pakistan and Türkiye. Pakistan’s role is expected to enable Türkiye to produce the Kaan jet at a reduced cost. Cost-effective joint production of the Kaan is expected to expand Türkiye’s defense exports, while also bolstering Pakistan’s aerial defense capabilities.

Yet the involvement of Pakistan—China’s longstanding strategic ally and “all-weather” friend—in the Kaan project may pose challenges in sourcing components from Western suppliers due to security concerns. China’s suspected indirect involvement in the Kaan program via Pakistan is viewed as a potential risk to the project. Although China has no official role in Türkiye’s Kaan initiative, critics suspect an indirect influence through Pakistan’s participation. A primary factor behind the rising demand for Chinese defense equipment is its competitive pricing, attributed to low-cost production. The anticipated cost-effective production of the Kaan fighters has further fueled suspicions regarding China’s indirect involvement in the project.

Pakistan’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan carries significant geopolitical implications. In the aftermath of the six-week Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, Armenia—Azerbaijan’s primary adversary—has become the largest importer of weapons from India, Pakistan’s principal regional rival.

CONCLUSION: The JF-17 and Kaan fighter jet agreements is a clear statement that Pakistan and Türkiye will continue to bolster Azerbaijan’s military capabilities, with trilateral defense cooperation expected to deepen further. If successful, the Kaan project will lay the groundwork for expanded trilateral collaboration among Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan in launching additional large-scale defense initiatives. It will also create opportunities for future bilateral or trilateral joint ventures in the defense industry among the three nations.

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva

On March 31, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in the Tajik city of Khujand to officially announce that all territorial disputes between their countries had been resolved. While future tensions cannot be ruled out, the region’s leaders now seem to believe that cooperation brings more benefits than conflict. For the Ferghana Valley, that shared outlook may be the strongest hope for lasting peace. 

BACKGROUND:  On March 13, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed a landmark treaty in Bishkek that definitively demarcates the entire 1,000-kilometer border between the two countries. The signing ended decades of intermittent clashes and unresolved territorial disputes rooted in the Soviet-era administrative boundaries. The agreement has been heralded as a major achievement in Central Asia’s regional integration efforts. Yet, the circumstances under which the deal was brokered—notably the lack of transparency, absence of public debate, and suppression of dissent—raise important questions about governance, public trust, and the future of cross-border relations.

The border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has long been a source of friction, shaped by convoluted Soviet-era administrative divisions that ignored ethnic, geographic, and cultural realities. When both countries gained independence in 1991, these internal lines hardened into contested international borders. Enclaves, disputed villages, and overlapping claims turned the border zone—particularly Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region—into a hotbed of tension.As scholars have noted, Soviet planners in the 1920s and 1930s deliberately drew borders in ways that divided ethnic groups in order to weaken potential nationalist movements, creating enduring fault lines.

Violent clashes over land, roads, and water access occurred frequently, notably in 2014, 2021, and 2022. The 2022 conflict, which left more than 100 people dead and forced over 100,000 Kyrgyz citizens to flee their homes, was the deadliest to date. Civilian infrastructure, including schools and homes, was destroyed, exacerbating mistrust and trauma. Yet this tragedy also marked a turning point, prompting both governments to prioritize renewed negotiations. Talks resumed in late 2022 and intensified through 2023 and 2024, culminating in the March 2025 agreement.

Years of border-related violence left deep scars on both Kyrgyz and Tajik communities. Skirmishes often began with disputes over water access or road usage but escalated quickly due to the presence of military and paramilitary forces in civilian areas. Armed confrontations resulted in civilian casualties, displacement, and destruction of property. The 2021 and 2022 conflicts in particular revealed how unresolved borders and competing nationalist narratives can turn small incidents into full-scale battles.

These events created a humanitarian crisis, especially on the Kyrgyz side. Thousands were displaced multiple times, while cross-border trade and local economies ground to a halt. Despite multiple ceasefires and ad hoc agreements, durable peace remained elusive until the new treaty.

IMPLICATIONS: The treaty signed in Bishkek demarcates the full 972-kilometer boundary and resolves all outstanding territorial claims. While the full text of the agreement remains undisclosed, officials have confirmed that contentious zones like the Tajik exclave of Vorukh and surrounding Kyrgyz villages like Dostuk were key components of the deal. Reports suggest that land swaps and security guarantees played central roles in achieving consensus. Ceremonial gestures — including the reopening of checkpoints and reciprocal presidential visits — symbolized a new era of cooperation. Both governments framed the agreement as a diplomatic triumph. 

The March 2025 agreement is notable not just for what it achieves, but how it came to be. After over three decades of deadlock, the treaty represents the first time that both governments have fully delineated and mutually accepted their shared border. While the specifics of the final map have not been made public, officials claim that all 972 kilometers have been agreed upon, including previously disputed enclaves and water-sharing arrangements.

Unlike past negotiations, which were often derailed by public outrage and nationalist pressures, the latest talks were conducted in near-total secrecy. Kyrgyz President Japarov pursued a top-down approach, sidelining parliamentary debate and civil society in favor of closed-door diplomacy with Dushanbe. Critics argue that this strategy undermined democratic oversight. At least two prominent Kyrgyz activists — including opposition figure Ravshan Jeenbekov — were detained for criticizing the deal and calling for public input on territorial concessions.

Despite these concerns, the breakthrough likely stemmed from a convergence of political incentives. For Japarov, resolving the border conflict bolsters his image as a strong and pragmatic leader, particularly after facing domestic backlash over economic stagnation and governance issues. For Rahmon, the agreement strengthens Tajikistan’s security and eases pressure on a regime that has faced increasing scrutiny over human rights abuses and political repression.

Moreover, international pressure and quiet diplomacy may have played a role. Both Russia and China—key players in the region—have interests in stabilizing Central Asia’s volatile borderlands. Beijing in particular has invested heavily in cross-border infrastructure and trade routes under its Belt and Road Initiative, and further conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan risked disrupting its regional ambitions. Despite both countries being CSTO members, Russia has kept its distance from the Kyrgyz-Tajik conflict. After invading Ukraine, Moscow lost interest in regional mediation. In October 2022, President Putin admitted Russia had “no intention of playing a mediating role,” offering only Soviet-era maps to aid negotiations. The Kremlin’s reluctance stems from earlier setbacks. A 2020 offer to mediate was met with a protest from Tajikistan, and Moscow’s failure to resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict made it cautious about another potential diplomatic failure in its perceived sphere of influence. Russia’s limited role has highlighted Uzbekistan’s emergence as a key regional mediator. Since 2018, President Mirziyoyev has led efforts to revive regional dialogue through Central Asian summits without outside powers like Russia or China. By 2025, Tashkent had helped reopen communication between Rahmon and Japarov — who until recently would not even shake hands. Uzbekistan’s active diplomacy was especially visible in early 2025, when the prime ministers of all three countries met to discuss border issues.

The Kyrgyz-Tajik border accord could set a precedent for resolving similar disputes in Central Asia. Yet, the long-term success of the Kyrgyz-Tajik deal remains uncertain. Much depends on how the treaty is implemented on the ground. Villagers affected by the redrawn boundaries have voiced concerns about losing access to farmland, water sources, and ancestral homes. Without robust compensation mechanisms or inclusive dialogue, displaced or dissatisfied communities may become flashpoints for renewed tensions.

In Kyrgyzstan, the lack of transparency has already fueled public distrust. Some residents of Batken—the region most impacted by the deal—have protested what they see as the government’s unilateral ceding of territory without adequate consultation. Japarov’s administration has struggled to control the narrative, resorting to arrests and censorship to stifle dissent. If local grievances are ignored, the agreement could backfire, becoming a source of instability rather than peace.

Regionally, the agreement may also shift the balance of power. Tajikistan, a historically more authoritarian state, appears to have secured favorable terms in some contested areas, raising concerns in Kyrgyzstan about unequal negotiations.

Nonetheless, the border agreement represents a significant, if imperfect, step forward. It removes a major source of armed conflict, potentially allowing both governments to redirect resources toward economic development and infrastructure. It also provides a foundation for cross-border cooperation on water management, trade, and regional security, if both sides are willing to engage beyond security optics.

By John DiPIrro

The Central Asia and Caucasus Institute’s proposed ‘American Strategy for Greater Central Asia’ (ASGCA) offers a timely recalibration of US engagement, centering on sovereignty, investment and regional interconnectivity. It challenges those of us steeped in democracy and governance work – that is, human rights, transparency, rule of law and institutional reform – to look beyond the normative ideals and confront the hard, often uncomfortable realities of power politics. It offers a serious and rare opportunity for the United States to redefine its role in a region that remains strategically vital and capitalize on a fleeting window of geopolitical advantage. Yet, without a robust policy of Russian containment, the strategy misses a key opportunity. To be effective, the US must help solidify a regional bulwark capable of resisting Russian military, economic and ideological coercion, while cultivating durable, mutually beneficial partnerships

BACKGROUND: For decades, U.S. engagement with Central Asia rested on flawed assumptions that development assistance, conditioned on commitments to democratic reform, would gradually yield stable, pro-Western partners. In reality, democratic reforms were largely performative and cosmetic, designed to appease U.S. interlocutors and secure continued funding. Russia and China, by contrast, offered a far more attractive alternative to Central Asian elites, including security guarantees, regime support, non-interference in internal affairs and tacit acceptance of corruption. These partnerships came with fewer conditions, demanding only loyalty.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. promise of prosperity through democratic transformation remained abstract and unconvincing in the face of authoritarian realpolitik. Even reformist leaders or color revolutions were quickly co-opted or violently displaced. In private, many regional elites sought a different offer: security, investment and recognition of sovereignty…without the "democracy business." Beijing and Moscow responded with infrastructure development and military cooperation, creating entrenched dependencies.

The Trump administration’s pivot toward transactional diplomacy that prioritizes economic and security partnerships over ideological demands has opened a window of opportunity to recalibrate U.S. engagement on terms regional governments find more palatable. Washington cannot and should not replicate the corrupt bargains offered by authoritarian powers, but it can offer something categorically superior: access to global markets, cutting-edge technologies, diversified security cooperation and entry into a predictable, rules-based order. This model, though imperfect, offers autonomy without the coercion, instability and dependency imposed by Moscow or Beijing. A pragmatic U.S. strategy grounded in sovereignty, prosperity and alignment could finally forge resilient and durable partnerships.

Meanwhile, Central Asia’s younger, urban, and globally connected populations are increasingly disillusioned with both domestic authoritarianism and foreign exploitation. Nationalist and pro-sovereignty sentiment has surged, particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its denial of Central Asian sovereignty and its mobilization of ethnic minorities into the Russian war effort have further fueled this backlash. Many citizens across the region have grown tired of being pawns in great-power rivalries.

It is within this context that the ASGCA represents a meaningful shift. By acknowledging regional priorities and accepting transactional diplomacy, it replaces Western idealism with strategic realism. ASGCA’s central innovation is its proposal to view these states not as isolated, vulnerable peripheries, but as a potential collective bloc, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan at its core, and Afghanistan, Mongolia and the South Caucasus anchoring each end. This corridor would align sovereign interests with US strategic goals and offer three critical advantages:

• Strategically, it would anchor a contiguous bloc that counters the Russia-China-Iran axis and dilutes their regional influence.
• Economically, it would unlock immense investment opportunities, from critical minerals and renewable energy, to trade corridors like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), bypassing Russian chokepoints and providing an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• In terms of security, it would foster regional self-sufficiency in counterterrorism, border control and internal stability, thereby reducing the need for US military presence. This feature aligns with both American and regional preferences.

Yet, ASGCA’s vision omits a crucial dimension. Without an explicit strategy for containing Russian influence, the project risks being strategically incoherent.

IMPLICATIONS:  While international law affirms Russia’s 1991 borders,[1] the Kremlin’s own doctrine tells another story. The Russkiy Mir (Russian World) ideology, a cornerstone of Moscow’s aggressive expansionism, asserts a transnational Russian civilization that overrides international borders whenever it is politically expedient. Russia’s borders, in its own eyes, end only where they are met with sufficient resistance. This has become painfully clear since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale war on Ukraine. The Kremlin’s disregard for sovereignty is not the exception: it is policy. This is why any peace settlement in Ukraine is likely to be tactical, not transformational. Moscow will use the opportunity to rearm and resume aggression when conditions are more favorable. As such, the West cannot afford another cycle of accommodation and illusion. A sustainable US strategy must empower regional actors to deter Russian pressure without direct American military deployment.

For this reason, any effort to unify and empower Greater Central Asia must explicitly incorporate Russian containment. By systematically investing in the region’s defense capabilities, economic integration and institutional resilience, the US can help Central Asia and the South Caucasus form a cohesive bloc capable of withstanding Russian pressure. These nations offer unique strategic value, including deep familiarity with Russian tactics, a pragmatic understanding of hard power and a growing desire to pursue independent paths. Unlike Western policymakers who often misread Moscow through a liberal, rational-actor lens, Central Asians and Caucasians harbor no such illusions, fully recognizing the necessity of strength and self-reliance.

Six reasons underscore this imperative.

First, without containment, sovereignty will remain fragile. Russian influence is not limited to tanks and troops. It manifests itself in cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, political subversion, cultural hegemony, economic blackmail and manipulation of ethnic minorities. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s rhetoric about “protecting Russians abroad” has stoked deep anxieties among political elites. In Armenia, Moscow’s failure to intervene during the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive exposed the hollowness of its security guarantees. If Greater Central Asia is to be more than a vision, it must be hardened against the hybrid Russian threats from the outset.

Second, containment is a precondition for regional integration. The Middle Corridor, a central component of ASGCA’s economic vision, cannot function without security. However, these corridors remain vulnerable to disruption without regional security guarantees. Russian influence over rail, road and energy infrastructure, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, makes any ambitious transit strategy susceptible to sabotage or political manipulation. A concerted effort to reduce Russian leverage is essential to ensuring the viability of east-west connectivity.

Third, Russia exploits regional divisions. Moscow excels at divide-and-rule tactics. It amplifies nationalist tensions, exacerbates border disputes and fuels distrust between neighbors. The longstanding water and border tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are fertile ground for Russian interference. A Greater Central Asia bloc must prioritize coordinated responses to hybrid threats, including joint intelligence sharing, cybersecurity collaboration and counter-disinformation mechanisms. Containment is not just a military goal. It is the precondition for durable regional unity. Geographically, this effort should concentrate along Russia’s southern flank, with the support of Turkey, India, Pakistan and the United States.

Fourth, U.S. credibility depends on strategic clarity and continuity. In Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the West’s failure to provide hard security guarantees has had devastating consequences. Central Asian states have taken note. U.S. commitments must be unambiguous and they must endure beyond election cycles. If Washington abandons this strategy after four years, it will validate Russian and Chinese narratives about American unreliability and drive regional partners back into the arms of Moscow and Beijing.

Fifth, containment can be achieved without escalation. A containment strategy does not require US troops on the ground. Instead, it must empower local states to serve as their own first line of defense, resilient enough to resist Russian coercion. This includes arms transfers, defense cooperation, cybersecurity partnerships, sanctions enforcement and media resilience. It also means supporting sovereign decision-making and reducing dependence on Russian economic systems. Containment, if done smartly, is a stabilizing force, not a destabilizing one.

Sixth, a containment strategy accelerates the end of the Ukraine war. Central Asia and the South Caucasus are critical nodes in Russia’s sanctions evasion networks. Enforcing export controls, cutting off trans-shipment of dual-use goods and closing legal loopholes in countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia and Georgia would severely disrupt Russia’s war economy, hasten its operational exhaustion and enable a faster, more favorable resolution to the conflict. Building a coalition of states committed to rejecting Russian revisionism not only weakens the Kremlin. It also creates the conditions for an eventual peace on Ukrainian terms.