By David Bujiashvili and Tomáš Baranec

In a resolution on July 9, 2025, the European Parliament called for a review of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement (AA) and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), citing Georgia’s continued violations of the Agreement’s core principles. The resolution warned that persistent backsliding on democratic values could lead to the suspension of Georgia’s economic and trade benefits. Accordingly, the Parliament urged the European Commission and the Council to assess Georgia’s compliance with these standards and consider suspending the visa-free regime in case democratic norms are not respected.

BACKGROUND: The signing of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement in 2014, establishing a comprehensive framework for deeper political association and economic integration was a culmination of a systematic rapprochement between Tbilisi and Brussels. The AA encompasses cooperation in democratic governance, justice, human rights, energy, environmental policy and other sectoral areas. A key component of the agreement is the DCFTA granting Georgian goods duty-free access to the EU’s Single Market.

Building on the comprehensive framework of the AA/DCFTA, Georgian citizens also gained one of the most tangible benefits of EU integration: visa-free access to the Schengen Area in March 2017. This milestone held both symbolic and practical significance, allowing Georgian nationals to travel for up to 90 days without a visa. It was widely seen as a reward for the country’s reform efforts and remains one of the most tangible benefits delivered to the Georgian public as part of the European integration process.

The geopolitical landscape shifted again in 2022 with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompting the EU to reassess its enlargement policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. In this context, Georgia was granted EU candidate status in 2023 recognizing Georgia’s European aspirations and progress in the AA implementation.

However, shortly after gaining EU candidate status, internal challenges in Georgia, including political polarization and pressure on the judiciary, raised concerns about the country’s adherence to EU norms. This led to a major turning point on 28 November 2024, when Georgia’s ruling party declared that it would not place the issue of opening EU accession talks on the national agenda until the end of 2028.

In reaction to these developments, the EU has taken concrete steps, including suspending high-level political dialogue with Georgia. The European Council suspended visa facilitation privileges for holders of Georgian diplomatic and service passports as an initial step toward broader restrictions. Following the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on July 15, 2025, Georgia was given a deadline to implement 8 key recommendations by August 31. Failure to comply could lead to the suspension of the visa-free regime for all Georgian citizens and potentially a review or suspension of specific AA/DCFTA provisions. 

Meanwhile, several EU member states are keen to impose personal sanctions asset freezes and travel bans on Georgian officials but are constrained by the lack of unanimity among EU members. Past instances, such as Hungary and Slovakia blocking personal sanctions against Georgia illustrate the complexity of achieving full consent.

Alongside political developments, Georgia’s economic integration with the EU has delivered measurable results. Since the 2014 signing of the EU–Georgia AA/DCFTA, exports to the EU have grown about 17 percent, expanding beyond wine, mineral water, and hazelnuts to include kiwifruit, blueberries, berries, organic honey, essential oils, dried and processed fruits, and, since 2022, snails. Export activity is strongest in Kakheti (wine and agriculture), Imereti (food processing), and Adjara, which benefits from its Black Sea access facilitating trade. Shida Kartli, bordering Russia, remains less export-oriented due to geopolitical challenges and limited market access. 

Complementing trade growth, visa-free travel has expanded opportunities for tourism, business, education, and family ties, while significantly increasing remittances from EU countries. Since its introduction in 2017, over 500,000 Georgian citizens have benefited, making more than 1 million visits to Schengen Area countries. Starting at around US$ 414 million in 2017, EU-origin remittances more than tripled to approximately US$ 1.4 billion by 2024, reflecting a 238 percent increase. On the contrary, remittances from Russia started at approximately US$ 380 million in 2017 but grew only modestly to around US$ 420 million by 2024. Consequently, the EU now accounts for roughly 44 percent of Georgia’s total remittances, overshadowing Russia’s declining share.

IMPLICATIONS: The DCFTA plays a critical role in Georgia’s economic interests. Its suspension would have serious consequences, threatening jobs, competitiveness, and rural development. For years, it has provided Georgian producers, farmers, and entrepreneurs with tariff-free access to the EU market. Its suspension would damage the economy, erode public trust, and increase social vulnerability. 

In contrast to the gradual economic impact of the DCFTA, the suspension of visa-free travel would hit ordinary Georgians immediately, undermining free mobility. Thousands rely on it for tourism, personal matters, and medical access to EU clinics. Students, entrepreneurs, and families would face new bureaucratic obstacles. Restrictions would hinder Georgian entrepreneurs from attending EU exhibitions and forums, limiting partnerships and market growth, while reduced EU access could deepen reliance on Russia and China, both visa-free partners. 

This impact would be compounded by low-cost airlines, particularly WizzAir, which could reduce routes or raise fares. WizzAir, operating in both Georgia and Armenia, may even close its Georgian operations entirely and shift all flights to Armenia if the EU suspends visa-free travel for Georgians, especially given the prospect that Armenia could gain visa-free access in the coming years. Such a shift would make flights from and to Georgia more expensive and less accessible, further reducing European tourist arrivals. Meanwhile, flights from Russia have risen sharply in recent years, increasing the risk of greater reliance on Russian tourists if European arrivals decline due to fewer low-cost flights. 

The economic consequences would not be limited to tourism. Suspension of visa-free travel would also negatively affect household incomes derived from remittances, underscoring the EU’s crucial role in supporting Georgia’s economic development through these flows. Many Georgians working in the EU without proper permits—often in informal sectors such as caregiving or domestic work—would no longer be able to sustain these livelihoods. Currently, they avoid breaching the 90-day visa-free limit by rotating their stays among friends and relatives, a practice that complies with entry rules while significantly contributing to remittance inflows. This informal mobility has provided a vital boost to Georgia’s economy.

Beyond economic costs, the suspension would deal a profound emotional blow to pro-European Georgians, deepening frustration and a sense of isolation. It would be perceived not merely as a bureaucratic measure but as a symbolic break - a clear signal that the country’s European path is no longer guaranteed.

Domestically, the suspension would likely be attributed to the government’s democratic backsliding rather than external pressures. Attempts by authorities to deflect responsibility onto the opposition, civil society, or the EU are unlikely to convince the pro-European majority. This could heighten polarization and, with local elections on 4 October 2025, trigger protests and increase pressure on the ruling party.

From a legal and procedural perspective, suspending parts of the AA/DCFTA is highly complex, requiring unanimity among all 27 member states. Therefore, suspension of the AA/DCFTA is unlikely, while in contrast, suspending the visa-free regime requires only a qualified majority of 15 member states, making it a more feasible short-term option if Georgia fails to meet EU benchmarks.

Despite these considerations, the EU remains cautious about measures that could directly harm ordinary Georgian citizens, especially given the 86 percent public support for EU membership. However, internal divisions over targeted personal sanctions have increased the likelihood of collective measures, including suspending visa-free travel. While affecting ordinary Georgians, this step may be the EU’s only remaining leverage if the government continues undermining democratic norms and fails to implement the recommended reforms by the end of August.

CONCLUSION: In the absence of a unified position towards the Georgian government, the EU currently has only a limited set of sanctions, which primarily target the local population rather than key representatives of the ruling party and business circles close to it. The ability of these tools to change the Georgian government’s position is likely limited. Moreover, both the suspension of visa liberalization and the less likely suspension of parts of the AA/DCFTA may be double-edged in the medium term, as they could increase the dependence of the Georgian economy and business on Russia and China.  

Even if the current status quo with Georgia remains, while Ukraine and Moldova continue advancing towards EU membership, freezing Georgia’s accession process would create a damaging gap in EU enlargement policy. This could result in a ‘Turkey-style’ scenario, where candidate status is maintained in name but the accession perspective is practically frozen.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: David Bujiashvili is a Georgian diplomat and expert in European integration with over 26 years of experience in EU Affairs. He has held senior government positions, coordinated the implementation of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, visa liberalization, and EU assistance to Georgia, and served as Chief Coordinator of Georgia’s EU Accession Questionnaire (2021–2022), directly contributing to Georgia’s EU candidate status. He is also an Associate Professor at ALTE University of Georgia and author of the book Steps for Comprehending the European Union and 12 academic publications on EU Affairs.

Tomáš Baranec is the Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Black Sea Studies as well as a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He currently works as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

The U.S.-brokered peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, culminating in the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), have triggered a sharp strategic reaction from Iran. The 20-mile corridor through Zangezur grants Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhchivan under long-term U.S. management, reshaping regional connectivity and bypassing Iran. Tehran perceives the initiative as a U.S. encroachment on its northern frontier, eroding its leverage in the South Caucasus. The muted Russian response and Armenia’s growing openness to Western—and potentially Israeli—security ties deepen Iran’s unease, fueling fears of encirclement and diminishing its role as a key regional transit hub.

BACKGROUND: Brokered by the U.S., the latest Armenia–Azerbaijan peace talks have quietly but decisively reshaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus. At the heart of the deal is a newly designated transit Zangezur Corridor, officially named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which would grant Azerbaijan direct access to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenian territory. Moscow has responded with unusual silence, while Tehran has openly bristled at the emergence of a U.S.-designed transit network on its northern frontier.

Iran’s initial reaction to the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework has been visceral, with some prominent media organs terming it a “betrayal”. Tehran explicitly sees TRIPP as a U.S. footprint pressed onto its northern frontier. The plan envisions a 20-mile corridor through Armenia’s Syunik region, linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, with development rights leased to a U.S. consortium for up to 99 years. More than redrawing borders, the project reshapes the balance of power and places a sustained U.S. commercial and political presence in the narrow strip where Iran has long turned geography into strategic leverage.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran interprets the recent Azerbaijan–Armenia peace talks not only as a potential shift in the regional balance of power but also as part of a broader geopolitical environment increasingly hostile to its interests. Tehran worries that a settlement, especially one facilitated or backed by Western actors (including Turkey), could strengthen Azerbaijan’s position, deepen Baku’s security and economic ties with the West and Israel, and reduce Iran’s leverage in the South Caucasus. These concerns are amplified by the expanding footprint of the U.S. and Israel in Azerbaijan, from intelligence cooperation to defense technology transfers, which Tehran perceives as part of a containment strategy aimed at its northern flank. Against this backdrop, any peace process that sidelines Iran or solidifies the U.S. influence in the region risks, in Tehran’s view, to tighten the strategic noose around its borders.

Iran’s historical memory of regional threats plays a significant role in shaping its foreign policy reflexes. In addition to the growing perception of U.S. and Israeli threats following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further heightened Tehran’s sense of vulnerability. Iranian officials, suspecting that the Soviets might use the Baloch as a stepping stone toward making Iran their next target, began seeking countermeasures. After the Soviet collapse, the country continued to frame its foreign policy around an intensifying rhetoric of U.S. and Israeli danger and the cooperation of Azerbaijan with these powers. Today, Washington’s renewed bid to reassert influence in the region is likely to aggravate Iran’s geopolitical anxieties, with indirect repercussions visible in Iran–Azerbaijan relations.

Tehran’s messaging, while varied in tone, consistently reflects unease about the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, warned that the corridor would become a “graveyard” for its backers; a classic piece of deterrent rhetoric aimed at raising costs and sowing doubt. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry expressed conditional support for a peace deal in principle, while cautioning against “foreign interference” near Iran’s borders. President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran’s core demand had been met, yet voicing unease over U.S. corporate involvement.

Tehran is not worried about lines on a map. It is losing the bargaining power that those lines used to confer. A corridor under Armenian law deprives Iran of the sovereignty argument it used against an “extraterritorial” Zangezur model, outside Armenian jurisdiction. However, U.S. stewardship narrows Iran’s room to shape rules, customs, and security practices at the edge of its border. A U.S.-organized logistics spine running from Turkey via Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan (tightening connectivity between Turkey and Central Asia) offers a shorter, more secure east–west route that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

The Russian reaction intensifies Iran’s dilemma. Moscow’s muted response by accepting a U.S. role while cautioning against “foreign meddling” signals that Russia, overstretched and weakened in credibility after the 2020 Second Karabakh War, lacks the capacity or will to reshape the deal. For Tehran, this translates into fewer veto options by proxy and a thinner buffer against Turkish and U.S. coordination. It also incentivizes Yerevan to deepen ties with Western partners, which is not acceptable for Tehran.

Economically, the corridor undermines Iran’s claim to constitute an indispensable regional bridge. Tehran has long positioned itself as the key link between the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, with initiatives like the International North–South Transport Corridor and electricity and gas swaps with Armenia designed to cement that role. A functioning TRIPP route diverts attention and investment toward the “Middle Corridor,” lowering the premium shippers pay for transit through Iran and shrinking Tehran’s leverage to extract side deals on access, security assurances or energy flexibility. Iran’s alternative options remain limited, as seen in its cautious approach to the Gulf of Hormuz closure in June 2025.

Security risks run in both directions. For Tehran, a U.S.-supervised logistics corridor along its northern frontier would invite surveillance and restrict its gray-zone tactics. Yet overt interference such as through intimidation, sabotage, or proxy harassment would likely backfire. Such moves could strengthen U.S.–Turkish coordination (and even Azerbaijani-Israeli coordination), justify reinforced security around the route and push Armenia toward even closer alignment with Washington and Brussels. Iran’s own experience shows that coercion is most effective when opponents lack a unifying patron; TRIPP provides precisely that.

Still, Tehran has a few levers left. The first is regulatory: it can push for “no military use” clauses, real-time customs transparency and verified policing regimes that limit the route’s securitization. The second is connectivity hedging. The new route builds upon Iran’s already existing north–south connections with Armenia, including the Meghri–Julfa railway link, expanded electricity exchanges, and predictable gas swaps. Thus, the U.S.-managed corridor supports, rather than replaces, Iranian routes. The third is political triangulation. Iran maintains open channels with Ankara on trade and energy, where their interests sometimes overlap, while giving Yerevan price and reliability benefits that only a neighboring country can offer.

CONCLUSIONS:  Then, what is the balance sheet? In the short term, Iran faces a strategic setback in shaping the regional agenda. The U.S. has demonstrated its ability to achieve outcomes in the South Caucasus that Moscow could not, and the corridor effectively puts a purely Western hand on the flow of regional connectivity (the role of Turkey is also extremely important). In the medium term, Tehran can still limit the impact by quickly upgrading its own corridors, offering competitive transit pricing, and securing Indian and Gulf participation in north–south routes, turning competition into redundancy rather than outright replacement. Over the long term, the key question is whether Iran can tolerate a U.S. presence next door while extracting enough rules and linkages to avoid strategic encirclement.

An additional factor complicates this calculus: the possibility of an Israel–Armenia security partnership. While historically limited, such a relationship becomes more logical in a post-peace-deal environment where Yerevan seeks diversified defense ties beyond Russia and the West. This possibility is already being discussed in various circles. Israeli defense technology, already embedded in Azerbaijan, could find a foothold in Armenia in the form of counter-drone systems, border surveillance or intelligence sharing, especially if framed as balancing Ankara–Baku military cooperation. For Tehran, this would imply Israeli-linked security infrastructure on both its northwestern and northern flanks, eroding any remaining buffer zones and deepening the perception of encirclement. In such a scenario, even an economically beneficial TRIPP corridor would be overshadowed by the strategic risks it amplifies.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as an academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs. Additionally, he is a member of the Young Turkey–Young America fellowship program at the Atlantic Council and the Korean Society of Contemporary European Studies.

By Umair Jamal

On July 3, 2025, Russia became the first major state to formally recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. This decision, framed as a strategic partnership aimed at countering the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), seeks to employ Taliban authority to stabilize Afghanistan and curb regional terrorism. Yet, the move entails legitimizing a regime with longstanding and ongoing associations with jihadist networks, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and other extremist actors. These linkages, encompassing ideological affinities, logistical cooperation, and territorial safe havens, generate concern regarding the exacerbation of extremism, the destabilization of neighboring states such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, and the complication of global counterterrorism strategies.

                                                                 City of Kabul (Image Courtesy of Pexel)

BACKGROUND: Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government on 3 July 2025 represents a significant reorientation in its Afghan policy. This decision is underpinned by Moscow’s security imperatives and broader geopolitical calculations.

After the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Taliban rapidly reasserted control over Afghanistan, creating a power vacuum that has permitted diverse extremist organizations to expand within ungoverned spaces. Russia’s engagement is shaped by the Taliban’s asserted opposition to the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a shared adversary responsible for the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, which claimed more than 140 lives. This incident highlighted ISIS-K’s transnational capabilities, leading Russia to regard the Taliban as a prospective partner in constraining its influence.

In April 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court annulled the Taliban’s terrorist designation, maintained since 2003, thereby facilitating formal recognition and reflecting a pragmatic effort to stabilize Afghanistan and safeguard Russian interests in Central Asia. The Taliban’s governance, however, remains highly contested owing to their strict enforcement of Islamic law and enduring connections with extremist organizations. The movement appears to have openly violated the 2020 Doha Agreement commitment undertaken with the international community to prevent Afghan territory from serving as a base for terrorism.

During their 1996–2001 rule, the Taliban provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda, a relationship that endures through both operational and ideological linkages, as documented in recent UN assessments. The Haqqani Network, a semi-autonomous Taliban faction under Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, remains pivotal in orchestrating attacks and sheltering terrorists. In addition to al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban sustain ties with organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which targets China’s Xinjiang region. Since 2021, at least 21 extremist groups have exploited Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training, recruitment, and logistical operations, according to the UN’s 15th Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report.

ISIS-K, which emerged in 2015 with an estimated 4,000–6,000 combatants, persists in conducting attacks across Iran, Pakistan, and Europe, reinforcing Russia’s calculated yet precarious reliance on the Taliban to confront this threat while potentially disregarding their wider patronage of jihadist networks.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban carries substantial implications for regional stability and global counterterrorism. On the one hand, it may enhance collaboration against militant organizations such as ISIS-K, which pose threats to both Russia and Central Asian states. The Taliban have undertaken operations that reduce ISIS-K’s local activity, though the group’s international reach endures, as demonstrated by the 2024 Moscow attack. On the other hand, such engagement entails risks, as legitimizing the Taliban may strengthen a regime that continues to shelter, protect, and support multiple extremist factions.

A recent United Nations assessment warns that al-Qaeda and its affiliated jihadist groups now control facilities in 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and are increasingly assisting anti-Pakistani militants, such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in conducting cross-border attacks. Another UN report indicates that the TTP has established new training camps in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika (Barmal) Provinces and is expanding recruitment within its ranks, including from the Afghan Taliban. The UN further notes that the Taliban continues to provide the TTP with logistical, operational, and financial support, with leader Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly receiving a “monthly payment” of approximately 43,000 USD. Evidence also suggests that TTP cadres sustain tactical-level ties with ISIL-K in Afghanistan while offering training and assistance to militant networks in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. Moreover, the de facto authorities in Kabul have deployed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) combatants within law enforcement and military units to provide domestic security, particularly in northern Afghanistan.

In recent months, foreign terrorist combatants of Central Asian origin with affiliations to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have relocated from the Syrian Arab Republic to northern Afghanistan. These fighters have been characterized as “scouts,” serving as a vanguard to establish conditions for the subsequent arrival of their families and additional militants into Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Uyghur militant organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), continues to operate within Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, ETIM enjoys “unprecedented levels of freedom” under Taliban governance. In some instances, the Taliban have relocated ETIM militants from Badakhshan, near China’s border, to other regions under pressure from Beijing. This relocation appears to constitute partial restraint rather than elimination, enabling the group and its ideology to persist in Afghanistan. The Taliban have further refused to extradite senior figures such as TIP leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, who remains in Kabul directing the group’s global activities, including those of its Syrian contingents. Turkistani reportedly mediates internal Taliban disputes and represents al-Qaeda in the Taliban’s Shura Majlis, particularly on military affairs. This situation directly contradicts Taliban denials of hosting foreign fighters and demonstrates high-level endorsement and protection.

Another pressing concern is that the Taliban are deploying and mobilizing foreign militant organizations such as Jamaat Ansarullah, which undermines Tajikistan’s stability, and the IMU, to combat ISIS-K in Afghanistan. This operational integration is troubling, as it demonstrates the incorporation of such groups into military roles. A recent UN assessment highlights “closer ETIM/TIP collaboration with the Taliban in Afghanistan,” encompassing alliances with TIP’s Syrian affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The report further noted that “Regional Member States reported that, in December 2024, a three-person delegation, including one representative from ETIM/TIP, traveled from Damascus to Kabul and engaged the de facto authorities on the eastward movement of foreign terrorist fighters.” Such partnerships and dialogues indicate that the Taliban regard groups like ETIM and IMU as allies rather than adversaries, despite their destabilizing implications for Central Asia and Russian interests.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government constitutes a high-risk gamble that may ultimately backfire by strengthening a regime deeply enmeshed with jihadist networks. United Nations reports substantiate the Taliban’s continued support for organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, TTP, and ETIM, which exploit Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training and cross-border operations, thereby undermining stability across Central and South Asia.

By legitimizing the Taliban, Russia may unintentionally reinforce a wider terrorist ecosystem, thereby weakening international counterterrorism norms and complicating collaboration with Western and regional partners. The Taliban’s accommodation of at least 21 extremist organizations, documented since 2021, heightens the risk of Afghanistan reemerging as a central hub of global terrorism.

To balance its security interests while mitigating associated risks, Russia should pursue a cautious and multifaceted strategy. First, it should employ platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to coordinate with China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on intelligence exchange and border security to limit extremist spillover. Second, Moscow should make its support for the Taliban conditional upon verifiable commitments to sever links with groups such as TTP and ETIM, reinforced through targeted sanctions to ensure compliance. Third, Russia ought to engage both Pakistan and India in addressing cross-border threats posed by TTP and Kashmir-oriented organizations like LeT and JeM, fostering regional dialogue to avert escalation. Finally, it should strengthen its domestic counterterrorism capacity by investing in real-time surveillance of Afghan-based groups and reducing reliance on Taliban assurances.

By combining pragmatic engagement with rigorous oversight, Russia can advance its objective of constraining ISIS-K while avoiding the amplification of a broader jihadist threat and ensuring that Afghanistan does not further destabilize the region.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Stephen Blank

In Washington on August 8, 2025, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed what amounts to a framework for a peace treaty. The agreement ratified both sides’ support for creating the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) in the area formally known as the Zangezur corridor, in Armenia’s Syunik province, and entrusts management of the corridor to a U.S. private company on a 99-year lease. It is also likely that U.S. security personnel will supervise the corridor’s planned intermodal rail and highway transportation. As a result, Azerbaijan will have direct overland contact with its Nakhchivan province while a direct land route will be established from the Caspian Sea straight through to Turkey, allowing a substantial growth of Central Asian trade with Europe. The agreement represents the first and considerable sign of a tangible U.S. presence in the Caucasus and comes at the expense of Russian and Iranian interests.

U.S. President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian President Nikolas Pashinyan sign the new Azerbaijan-Armenia peace accord in the White House (Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

BACKGROUND: After many years of unclear U.S. policies towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Trump Administration has made a major move to upgrade U.S. presence in the Caucasus and provide a decisive impetus towards the conclusion of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as a strong impetus for the so-called Middle Corridor between Asia and Europe. 

The Zangezur corridor has been a bone of contention in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks to terminate the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, since the corridor passes through Armenia. This “sliver” of territory has been at the heart of disputes dating back to the Soviet conquest of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1920-21, when the Soviet leadership deliberately separated Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan to prevent its proximity to Kemalist Türkiye. Armenia’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993-94 led to widespread ethnic cleansing and thousands of Azeri refugees as well as a strong Azeri irredentist movement that has now triumphed over Armenia and led Pashinyan’s government to sue for peace.

Domestic nationalist opposition in Armenia has vigorously protested Azerbaijan’s demand for the corridor, which would connect it to both Nakhichevan and Türkiye with potentially huge economics payoffs for both states. The issue has generated an impasse in the bilateral negotiations, often directly conducted by Presidents Pashinyan and Aliyev. The domestic pressure in Armenia and from the Armenian diaspora to refuse concessions to Azerbaijan has triggered a serious domestic crisis leading Pashinyan to arrest high-ranking members of the church on the grounds that they were plotting a coup. There is some evidence of Russian support for the coup plotters. Pashinyan’s reform agenda is anathema to Armenian reactionaries and nationalists are resisting what they call a surrender to Azerbaijan. Moscow evidently has its own interests in backing these disaffected elites to reverse Pashinyan’s reforms to prevent their emulation elsewhere. Moreover, strife between Yerevan and Baku benefits Moscow, allowing it to play the states off against each other and regain its influence in Armenia. Indeed, it has reinforced its military presence in Armenia despite the war in Ukraine.

IMPLICATIONS: In this context, Trump’s offer could present a way out of the current impasse. Washington will pay Armenia for a 99-year lease of the corridor, which would formally respect Armenia’s sovereignty but give the U.S. operating control over the area and allow it to place forces there to maintain the corridor and provide security. Armenia has previously hinted that it might be open to a proposal that preserves its sovereignty but allows for third party management of the corridor. The U.S. proposal allows Baku and Yerevan to sidestep the vexed question of sovereignty over the corridor until passions have subsided. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, gets de facto ability to link with Nakhchivan and to operationalize the routes traversing this territory. A working and well-maintained overland trade route to Türkiye, Europe, and the Levant constitutes a giant step towards consummating the Middle Corridor from China to Europe, allowing Azerbaijan to benefit as a key middleman on this route. At the same time, Armenia needs peace to deal with its domestic opposition, institute Pashinyan’s democratic agenda, and terminate the state of war so that Armenia can restore relations with Türkiye and profit from the expansion of international trade corridors into the Caucasus. The agreement also incentivizes both sides to move quickly towards a peace treaty where they and neighboring states, including in Central Asia, stand to gain economically and politically.

Trump’s proposal also works to stabilize the Caucasus by minimizing Russian opportunities for interference. For over a century, Russia has endeavored to manipulate the tensions between Armenians and Azeris to enhance its imperial reach and standing in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s victories of 2020 and 2023, plus the pressure of the war in Ukraine have forced Russia to retreat in the Caucasus and elsewhere. The agreement will likely strengthen Pashinyan’s government at home against his pro-Russian and Russian-backed enemies. Moreover, Trump’s proposal, by creating a basis for completing the Middle Corridor, undermines Russia’s increasing efforts to create an International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC) from India to Iran, Central Asia and Russia. Despite much recent Russian diplomatic effort, this proposed route is nowhere near as complete as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which relies on the Middle Corridor that bypasses Russia.

Türkiye stands to make major gains through this proposal and clearly supported it as part of its improving ties with Washington. While Russia sought to exploit Armeno-Azeri tensions; Türkiye’s massive aid to Azerbaijan’s military and alliance agreement with it gave it a lasting presence in the Caucasus. Washington seems to be at peace with this outcome, and the proposal could only have come about with Turkish support behind the scenes. This U.S.-proposed solution therefore enhances Türkiye’s reach and power projection through the Caucasus, which is increasingly important to Ankara given its rising multi-dimensional profile in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. 

Beyond the serious implications for local actors, the proposal entails equally meaningful consequences for actors beyond the Caucasus. Iran, for example, is a major loser and has already declared its opposition. After its defeat by Israel and the U.S. it has no choice but to make a rapprochement of some sort with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, Iran’s connection to Armenia will be seriously impaired and it will no longer be able to resupply Armenia with weapons or incite resistance against Baku over Zangezur. Furthermore, the real possibility of completing the Middle Corridor with U.S. help would imply a lasting U.S. presence on Iran’s northern border. This will seriously complicate Iran’s ability to rebuild either its network of terrorist proxies or its nuclear program.

Conversely, China gains from this proposal. If it materializes, it will give a major impetus to the realization of China’s BRI and the accompanying Middle Corridor. It also buttresses China’s growing economic position in the Caucasus most prominently embodied in its development of the Anaklia port in Georgia. China has invested considerable economic and political capital in the combination of major land and maritime trade and transport routes. If implemented, the proposal will represent another instance whereby China has gained influence and position in Eurasia at Russia’s expense.

The proposal also permits the EU an opportunity to expand its presence in Armenia and the Caucasus. A democratizing Armenia, freed of the Nagorno-Karabakh incubus, is already seeking EU membership. The EU also buys large amounts of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas and the prospect of real peace in the Caucasus can only redound to its benefit. The EU also stands to gain from the completion of the Middle Corridor, which provides it with a secure land route for trade to and from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China.

CONCLUSONS: Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposal constitutes the first major U.S. initiative in the Caucasus and Central Asia since the Clinton Administration helped develop the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to connect Transcaucasian oil to European markets. While consonant with the Administration’s overall perspective of using large-scale economic projects and/or trade opportunities as instruments to facilitate peaceful solutions to long-lasting wars, the proposal also marks the first sign that Washington realizes the importance and opportunity presented by the independence of South Caucasian states. If this project is implemented, awareness will likely grow that the Caucasus and Central Asia offer Washington many genuine and plentiful opportunities for increasing its economic and political influence.

This project may also reflect a growing U.S. awareness that the Caucasus and Central Asia are areas of strategic significance that both want a consistent engagement with Washington and offer new and exciting vistas regarding energy, rare earths, trade, investment, large-scale environmental cooperation, and security cooperation. That awareness has hitherto been missing in U.S. policy. Indeed, Trump’s policies regarding these regions has been quite inconsistent given Trump’s imposition of tariffs – exactly the wrong move – on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors. Policymakers need to understand the necessity and benefits of long-lasting partnerships for all parties since this project, if it comes to pass, creates opportunities for peace, cooperation among many international actors, enhanced trade, and greater independence for the South Caucasian states. These outcomes are not only in the interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia; they could also become the basis for very different development in the Caucasus than has been the case in the past.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.