By Nargiza Umarova

During the first week of February, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan paid state visits to Pakistan. For Islamabad, these visits represented a new stage in relations with the Central Asian states, based on shared interests in trade, transport logistics, industrial production, and military affairs. Thus, the prospect of Pakistan becoming a key link in the emerging regional connectivity architecture is becoming increasingly realistic, which could accelerate the development of joint infrastructure projects with the active participation of Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND:

Due to its geographical isolation from the open seas, Central Asia is extremely interested in making effective use of Pakistan’s transit capabilities, particularly its maritime infrastructure, which has undergone extensive development in recent years thanks to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar are seen by regional countries as an alternative outlet to the Indian Ocean, complementing Iran’s southern ports. The fastest route to Pakistan is via neighboring Afghanistan, where large-scale infrastructure projects involving Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are underway. Despite continuing tensions on the Afghan–Pakistani border and the conflictual nature of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, these states are accelerating their strategic initiatives in Afghanistan. 

On January 27, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Pakistan announced that Astana was prepared to cover the full cost of constructing the western Trans-Afghan Railway, from Torghundi to Herat, Kandahar and Spin Boldak, with an extension to Chaman in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and on to the country’s seaports. The preliminary cost of the project is approximately US$ 7 billion, and the route’s length will be 687 kilometers. Construction is expected to be completed within three years.

This decision is clearly driven by Kazakhstan’s desire to strengthen its position in north-south transit transport, encompassing existing routes through Iran and emerging transport corridors crossing Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Astana expresses support for the creation of the Kabul Corridor along the Termez-Naibabad-Maidanshahr-Logar-Kharlachi route proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018. In July 2025, the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project entered a new stage of development when a trilateral intergovernmental framework agreement on the joint development of the project’s feasibility study was signed. On February 4, 2026, Uzbekistan ratified the agreement and agreed with Pakistan to begin field studies on the transport corridor.

The UAP project is paving the way for a new north-south trade route through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This route will provide the fastest land connection between Europe, Russia and South Asia, eliminating the need for sea crossings. Against this backdrop, Tashkent has proposed the creation of a multimodal corridor connecting Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is three times shorter than sea delivery routes. Following the launch of the Kabul Corridor, the 5,532-kilometer trade route to South Asia will be entirely rail-based. This will enable Kazakhstan to receive an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons per year — the same amount as Uzbekistan. The projected transit volumes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are estimated at 5 million tons per year, thanks to the attraction of Chinese cargo.

IMPLICATIONS:

Astana’s participation in transit traffic from Belarus to Pakistan was discussed during bilateral talks held during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Pakistan on February 4 , 2026. The parties also discussed the prospects for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) Railway Corridor.

Kazakhstan joined the initiative to construct a railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province, which represents an alternative to the Kabul Corridor, in 2024 at the invitation of the Turkmen side. In July 2025, Astana and Kabul signed a memorandum to implement the project. Kazakhstan has announced that it will allocate US$ 500 million towards the construction of a railway line to Herat and the necessary accompanying infrastructure, including a logistics hub in northern Afghanistan. The stake has now been raised to cover the entire budget for the Western Trans-Afghan Route.

Astana’s active interest in the TAP project may be linked to current dynamics regarding the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas transport corridor. Work began on laying the Afghan section of the 1,840-kilometer pipeline in December 2024. It is expected to reach Herat Province by the end of 2026.

Russia is paying close attention to TAPI, viewing it as an opportunity to diversify and stabilize its energy exports following the loss of the premium European market. In this context, Kazakhstan can expect to earn transit profits, providing additional expectations for the profitability of the railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak, as the two transport routes will clearly be synchronized.

On February 1, 2026, a meeting was held in Herat between Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, and Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister. They discussed the progress in constructing the TAPI gas pipeline, the power line between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Torghundi-Herat railway.

Both Ashgabat and Kabul are seeking to accelerate the TAPI project. At a recent meeting between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri, they noted the rapid pace of work on the Afghan section of the gas pipeline. It is reported that part of the route has already been prepared for pipe installation.

According to Afghan authorities, the Saudi Arabian company Delta International is interested in investing in the purchase of gas under the TAPI project, expanding Turkmenistan’s major gas fields and constructing and extending the gas pipeline from Guzara District of Herat Province to Spin Boldak District of Kandahar Province, and then on to the Indian border. The project would also involve building a large, modern gas hub at Pakistan’s Gwadar port.

CONCLUSIONS:

The dynamic development of relations with Afghanistan presents Central Asian states with the challenge of strengthening mutual coordination to ensure their infrastructure initiatives have complementary political and economic effects. To this end, it is advisable to hold regular consultations at the level of the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries in the region, to agree on a unified negotiating position when interacting with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to ensure the involvement of all five republics in interregional connectivity projects.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Nargiza Umarova is a Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Stephen Blank

While Central Asian cohesion and regional cooperation grow; the South Caucasus is fragmenting. This process increasingly affects the nature and scope of regional interactions with key international actors. Russian influence has declined precipitously in Armenia, which is turning to the West, and Azerbaijan, which is expanding its circle of partners. However, in Georgia the state increasingly resembles Russia in its autocratic and legal structure and thus its state practices.

BACKGROUND:

Writing in 2024, the Azeri scholar Gulshan Pashayeva observed that a defining feature of the Caucasus was its fragmentation. This fragmentation is deepening and in effect, relationships between the South Caucasus and key external actors have quickly grown and assumed new shapes in 2025. Georgia’s dependence on Russia has grown, whereas Russian influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan has visibly declined as these states are turning to Washington and Europe. 

Georgia is paying the supreme price of colonial status as it over time loses territory to Russia as both South Ossetia and Abkhazia virtually included in the Russian Federation. The Russian-driven borderization whereby Russian or pro-Russian forces either overtly or surreptitiously move border posts demarcating Russian-controlled from Georgian territories to expand Russia’s holdings occurs with impunity.

The mounting discord between the Georgian government and the EU also exemplifies Georgia’s regression. Georgia’s government, possibly at Moscow’s behest, is trampling upon processes necessary for Georgian admission into the EU and frustrating both Brussels’ conditions and the continuing support for EU membership among a majority of the Georgian population. 

Armenia’s government is implementing a program of democratic reform and ultimate membership in the EU while striving to make a conclusive peace with Azerbaijan and normalize ties to Turkey despite staunch resistance by domestic, diasporic elements, the Church and Russian influencers. None of these groups supports peace and many of them, including Russia, fear democratization as signaling a decisive political defeat at home as well as a threat to Russia. It is no surprise that the Church with Russian backing emerged as the leader of an attempted coup in 2025 to replicate Russia’s success in Georgia and reverse Yerevan’s turn to the West.

Azerbaijan’s case is even more striking. Beyond its military-diplomatic success in forging an alliance with Turkey and partnership with Israel to strengthen its military capability, it neutralized Russian support for Armenia while improving ties with key European states and the U.S. The Trump Administration has now built a permanent monument to its military-economic presence in the Caucasus, namely the Trump International Road for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This project brings Washington into the Caucasus as a permanent player and checks Iranian threats to Azerbaijan and links to Armenia, while giving Yerevan a tangible reward for its pro-Western and anti-Russian policies. Meanwhile, Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani airplane in 2024 and attacks on Azerbaijani residents in Russia have generated enormous resentment in Azerbaijan. 

IMPLICATIONS:

The Caucasus has become a battleground where the great powers and their favored local governments are not only on opposite sides, but where these powers’ rivalry also spills over into trade routes. The TRIPP has duly triggered Georgian apprehension since that project’s inauguration may well push aside Georgia as a preferred partner in the Middle Corridor project that ties together China, Central Asia, and ultimately Europe. But the significance of TRIPP far transcends its potential impact upon Georgia.

This project is only the latest manifestation of the declining Russian influence in the Caucasus and the parallel ensuing fragmentation of the region. While Moscow still holds many levers of influence and has no scruples about using them; they are fewer, less potent than before, and Russia faces a greater and more sustained foreign presence in the Caucasus than at any time since the disintegration of the USSR. Neither is this foreign influence strictly economic as in China’s case and as seen in its sponsorship of the Middle Corridor trade and transportation route through Azerbaijan that bypasses Russia. Türkiye’s alliance with Azerbaijan is of an explicitly military nature that provides an enduring supply of weapons, training, and presumably logistical and intelligence support for Azerbaijan. Türkiye also buttresses this support by providing the primary terminus for Azerbaijan’s increasing energy exports to Europe. Beyond these increasingly deep-rooted connections to Azerbaijan, through the Organization of Turkic States Türkiye now also has an institutional base for enduring outreach to Central Asia and the provision of all manner of military and economic ties to that region. 

Azerbaijan is also increasingly tied to the Middle East through its long-running defense and economic ties to Israel, their mutual collaboration against Iran and its membership in both the Abraham Accords and President Trump’s Board of Peace. Likewise, the EU and Azerbaijan have embarked upon a mutually rewarding series of ties independent of Russian influence and also primarily based on Azerbaijani energy exports in return for EU investment and political support.

Moreover, the advent of the TRIPP has launched what looks like a sustained U.S. presence in the Caucasus. This project is taking physical shape and Vice-President Vance’s visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan demonstrates that sustained interest. Under this project, “American companies could develop railways, roads, and pipelines linking Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave via a corridor through the south of Armenia’s Syunik Province.” Since Azerbaijan is now providing Armenia with energy, a formal peace treaty terminating the state of war over Nagorno-Karabakh under U.S. auspices seems likely. Beyond those signs of U.S. influence, President Trump has just stated that Vance’s tour will, “strengthen our strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, a beautiful Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with Armenia, Deals for our Great Semiconductor Makers, and the sale of Made in the U.S.A. Defense Equipment, such as body armor and boats, and more, to Azerbaijan.” If this lasting multi-domain U.S. presence materializes, it will represent a major blow to Russian ambitions but also codify the fragmentation of the Caucasus and exclude Georgia from the growing and long-term international competition in the region for a long time to come.

CONCLUSIONS:

Russia certainly still has cards to play. It has a long-term military base at Gyumri, Armenia, and well-established connections among the Armenian opposition that is both unreconciled to the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and to the Pashinyan government’s democratizing reforms and efforts to join the EU. Russia also has substantial economic connections to Georgia and what looks like a secure base of influence in Georgia’s government. 

Nevertheless, it is a declining power economically if not militarily and cannot stop the rising foreign presence in the Caucasus. Indeed, it depends on trade coming from Armenia and Central Assia to circumvent Western sanctions and access vital Western goods. Iran, whose back is to the wall due to combined U.S., Israeli, and European military-economic pressure, cannot bail it out. Nor will China, the primary sponsor of the Middle Corridor, rescue it in the Caucasus. Despite the Russo-Chinese “no-limits” partnership, Beijing has never lifted a finger to allow Russia to become a viable economic competitor across Eurasia or regarding inter-continental trade, transport, and connectivity issues.

Therefore, the fragmentation of the South Caucasus and the heightened presence of competing major international actors is likely to continue. Central Asian states, in contrast, forge ahead with mounting cohesion and collaboration. Indeed, those states, recognizing Azerbaijan’s critical geographic position and rising heft, have now included it in what used to be the 5+1 relationship with Washington, transforming it into a 6+1 formation. This development will also contribute to regional fragmentation. Azerbaijan is increasingly a power whose perspectives must embrace Washington, Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, not just the Caucasus.

The ethnopolitical rivalries that made the Caucasus a zone of conflict for a generation after 1991 may, however, be coming to an end as the new ties between Baku and Yerevan and greater foreign connections show. To the extent that Georgia can be helped to resolve its ethnic and other domestic cleavages that Russia continues to exploit, it may become possible for the South Caucasus to emulate the discernible regional cooperation now appearing in Central Asia.

That outcome would be to the benefit of the entire Caucasus as well as to its neighbors and interlocutors. While disappointing to Moscow, its regional clients and those “dead-enders” who wish to rekindle the fires of ethnic conflict, that way has been tried and founds wanting in the balance.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute (www.fpri.org.)

By Eldaniz Gusseinov & Sardor Allayarov, 

Following the conclusion of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia, three key trends are likely to shape the South Caucasus within broader global geoeconomic processes. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan may facilitate the emergence of the South Caucasus as a more integrated regional entity, rather than three distinct states occupying a shared geographic space. The region’s future can be understood through three interrelated dynamics: the expansion of overland infrastructure, intensified competition for markets, and increasing complexity in its geoeconomic architecture.

BACKGROUND:

An initialed peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was announced on August 8, 2025, under U.S. mediation, formally ended the protracted conflict and aimed to normalize bilateral relations. Despite sharing a common geographic space, the South Caucasus states differ markedly in their political, economic, and security orientations, which has historically constrained regional integration. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) while simultaneously expressing aspirations for EU membership. Georgia has maintained a broadly pro-Western orientation, though less pronounced than in the past, whereas Azerbaijan prioritizes integration within the Organization of Turkic States. At the same time, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have expressed interest in joining the SCO. Additionally, Azerbaijan has attained permanent status among the consultative meetings of the Central Asian heads of states. 

Similar processes can be observed in Central Asia, where the resolution of several border disputes enabled intensified cooperation through the integration of transport routes and energy hubs. Comparable developments may emerge in the South Caucasus, as border openings are likely to necessitate infrastructure expansion, followed by the harmonization of tariffs and customs procedures.

IMPLICATIONS:

At the initial stage, the institutionalization of meeting formats among South Caucasus leaders is likely to occur, both within a trilateral framework and through a 3+3 format involving other key regional actors. The Central Asia–South Caucasus format also appears promising, as the two regions are increasingly interconnected through the development of transport corridors.

The first trend is the growing demand for overland transport corridors driven by increased tensions between China and the U.S. Following significant progress in the normalization of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations, the South Caucasus, together with Central Asia, is likely to be perceived by Beijing as a relatively stable region for investment. In Central Asia, the development of overland routes is already well advanced. Kazakhstan, for example, has launched the second track of the 836-km Dostyk–Moyinty railway, increasing capacity fivefold to 60 pairs of trains per day. With a cost of nearly US$ 1 billion, it is the largest railway project undertaken since independence and a key enhancement of China–Europe transport connectivity. 

However, China’s westward transport expansion through Central Asia and the South Caucasus will also underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation. In this context, Beijing may seek deeper engagement within the SCO, potentially conflicting with Georgia’s and Armenia’s aspirations to strengthen cooperation with NATO and with Azerbaijan’s efforts to advance the military dimension of integration within the Organization of Turkic States.

Kazakhstan became the second country after Russia to utilize the opening of transit routes to Armenia via Azerbaijan. The new corridor (Kazakhstan/Russia–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Armenia) reduces logistics costs and enables regular deliveries, with Kazakhstan planning to transport up to 20,000 tons of grain per month.

In parallel, construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway is advancing rapidly. These dynamics are likely to extend to the South Caucasus as China and the EU seek to expand overland connectivity to facilitate trade and access stable markets. This process will further link Central Asia and the South Caucasus and will require enhanced coordination to improve connectivity among major economic centers, giving rise to a second trend: the increasing complexity of the region’s geoeconomic architecture.

Despite these developments, the South Caucasus continues to consist of three states sharing a common geographic space but pursuing distinct foreign policy orientations. A comparable situation previously existed in Central Asia and did not prevent regional consolidation, as multiple institutional platforms were leveraged to advance regional interests. Similarly, the EAEU can support trade with Russia, the SCO can provide additional security frameworks for transport corridors, and both the EU and China can serve as key financiers of transport infrastructure.

The third and most significant trend is that the opening of transport links in the South Caucasus will further liberalize the market and intensify competition. For Armenia, this is likely to result in more active competition between Russian and European food producers. Modeling-based studies suggest that Russia’s effective market share will decline as Armenia’s borders open, with Europe and Turkey gaining ground. The central challenge will be to maximize the benefits of this competition by creating conditions that allow actors who compete bilaterally to nonetheless engage in trade and pursue joint projects within the South Caucasus.

Armenia’s largest solar power plant, Masrik-1, with a capacity of 62 MW, was developed by FRV and commissioned in June 2025 in the Gegharkunik region, supplying clean energy to more than 21,000 households. The project was financed with support from international banks and an EU grant, while the main construction works were carried out by the Chinese state-owned corporation CMEC. This project represents one of the clearest regional examples of cooperation among competing powers and may serve as a model for other South Caucasus states.

CONCLUSIONS:

In sum, the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia constitutes a critical turning point for the South Caucasus, positioning the region as an increasingly important transit and connectivity hub linking Central Asia, Europe, and East Asia. The region’s future trajectory will be shaped by its capacity to manage a more complex geoeconomic architecture involving multiple external actors with overlapping interests. Divergent foreign policy orientations among regional states may create opportunities to leverage a wide range of institutional platforms and investment sources. Ultimately, the impact of the peace agreement will depend on whether the regional states can translate improved connectivity and heightened competition into cooperative economic projects. The long-term success of the regionalization process will therefore hinge on the ability of regional states to manage diversity in external partnerships by preventing geopolitical competition from obstructing economic cooperation. If effectively managed, the South Caucasus can move beyond a legacy of protracted conflict and emerge as a stable, competitive, and strategically significant component of broader Eurasian geoeconomic processes.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Eldaniz Gusseinov is a Head of Research and сo-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int. and a non-resident research fellow at Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of the Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul.

Sardor Allayarov is an International relations expert with a research focus on theories of international relations, international order, China, Eurasia, and foreign policy. He currently serves as a Research Assistant at Urgench State University in Uzbekistan.

By Emil Avdaliani

On December 19–20, 2025, the heads of state of the five Central Asian countries met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takachi in the C5+1 format. This marked the fifth such summit involving Central Asian leaders in 2025. Japan’s growing engagement with the region is driven primarily by interest in mineral extraction and processing, sectors that have attracted increasing competition from major Asian and Western powers. Tokyo’s evolving approach reflects broader global dynamics and heightened tensions over supply chains. Rather than seeking to exclude other external actors or assume a leading security role in Central Asia, Japan is pursuing a pragmatic strategy centered on economic cooperation. Through economically attractive initiatives, it aims gradually to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region.

BACKGROUND:

In December 2025, Tokyo hosted its first Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue, representing an upgraded version of a cooperation framework originally established in 2004. The region has thus evolved from a relatively peripheral area into a significant area in Japan’s foreign policy.

A series of agreements was concluded during the summit. Uzbekistan and Japan elevated their relationship to an expanded strategic partnership, prioritizing cooperation in green energy, the IT sector, deep industrial decarbonization, and the development of critical minerals, including uranium supplies. The two sides plan to implement projects worth over US$12 billion through a joint investment platform and the establishment of an economic zone in the Samarkand region.

Japan will also extend yen-denominated loans to Uzbekistan for the procurement of medical equipment and to improve small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to financial resources. In addition, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzioev proposed holding biennial summits at the head-of-state level and initiating the development of a Cooperation Strategy between Central Asia and Japan.

For Japan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stand out because of their geographic position, economic potential, and human resources. However, Tokyo is also deepening engagement with other regional actors. Turkmenistan, for example, concluded eight investment agreements with Japanese firms. In Tajikistan, Japan has expressed interest in developing logistics and transport infrastructure, as well as in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements.

Japan and the Central Asian states also established cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence and medicine. The parties proposed the creation of a Central Asia–Japan digital hub to promote collaboration in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, the Internet of Things, and digital technologies.

Following the summit, a multilateral business forum was convened at which several joint projects were announced. These included the construction of solar power plants in Uzbekistan by Sumitomo, Chubu Electric Power, and Shikoku Electric Power, supported by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI); the establishment of a medical center by Sojitz; and critical minerals mining projects involving the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC).

IMPLICATIONS:

For the Central Asian states, closer ties with Japan form part of a broader strategy to pursue a more multi-aligned foreign policy, extending beyond reliance not only on Russia and China but also on the EU and the U.S. Japan is regarded as a reliable and responsible source of investment, particularly in sectors such as green energy and infrastructure. With its considerable technological expertise and development experience, Tokyo is in a strong position in the competition for influence in Central Asia.

Japan nevertheless faces structural constraints as an investor that limit its geopolitical weight in Central Asia. Geography constitutes the primary obstacle: there are no direct overland or maritime routes linking Japan to the region. Central Asia’s landlocked position, combined with its considerable distance from Japan, will continue to impose significant constraints on bilateral relations. Consequently, Japan is unlikely to emerge as a major geopolitical actor in the heart of Eurasia. It will remain structurally disadvantaged especially vis-à-vis Russia and China, but also in comparison to the EU and the U.S. 

Second, Japan interest in security and military cooperation in the region is limited. Instead, it has primarily relied on soft power as its principal instrument of influence in Central Asia. For example, Tokyo has long supported Kazakhstan in assisting victims of Soviet-era nuclear testing by providing medical and technical aid, particularly to residents of the Abay region, where the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site is located. Other Central Asian states likewise receive substantial financial assistance from Japan. Notably, Tokyo offers various forms of partnership that are not formally conditioned on requirements related to democracy or human rights reforms.

Tokyo has demonstrated particular openness to cooperation in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). This focus reflects the heightened global attention Central Asia has received in recent years due to its resource base, which is critical for global supply chains. Japan seeks to diversify its mineral and REE imports away from China. This is not the first indication of Japanese interest in the region’s rare earth sector. In the 2010s, Tokyo participated, albeit briefly, in the Stepnogorsk project in Kazakhstan before withdrawing from the initiative. The December summit, however, signaled a renewed commitment to the mineral sector, underscored by a pledge to invest approximately US$ 19 billion over the next five years in developing supply chains in the region.

In this context, Kazakhstan introduced the Next-Generation SmartMining Plus initiative, aimed at digitalizing the mining industry. Discussions also addressed the first-ever shipment of gallium, a rare metal used in electronics and semiconductors, from Kazakhstan, a development of particular significance given China’s dominant position in global gallium production.

The intensifying competition for Central Asia’s REEs and other critical minerals forms part of a broader contest over the region’s resource base. The EU, Russia, China, the U.S., and other actors all perceive substantial untapped potential in Central Asia.

Although Japan is a relatively late entrant into this competition, its pledge to invest US$ 19 billion is notable, as no other external power has committed a comparable sum. The closest parallel is the EU’s plan to mobilize €12 billion under its Global Gateway initiative, which aims to enhance connectivity across Eurasia and strengthen the Union’s competitiveness vis-à-vis China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Tokyo is capitalizing on Central Asia’s preference for engaging a wide range of external partners. It has also identified sectors in which the region remains particularly vulnerable and receptive to external support. One such domain is the rapidly evolving landscape of Eurasian connectivity.

In the context of the war in Ukraine and the increasing efforts by the EU, India, China, and other actors to develop alternative overland trade routes, the so-called Middle Corridor, linking the Black Sea to China’s western region of Xinjiang, has gained strategic prominence. Japan’s support for strengthening east–west connectivity in Central Asia reflects an effort to reduce Russia’s historically entrenched influence over the region’s infrastructure and economic networks. This strategic logic underpins Tokyo’s commitment to further development of the Middle Corridor.

CONCLUSIONS:

Japan’s expanding engagement with Central Asia reflects both its own foreign policy recalibrations and the intensifying competition among Asian and Western powers for access to the region’s strategic resources. Rivalry among Asian actors in particular has grown more pronounced, with China, South Korea, India, and several ASEAN member states all seeking to deepen their ties with Central Asia.

Compared to Russia and China, however, Japan’s ambitions remain more cautious. Rather than pursuing dominance, Tokyo aims to position itself as a facilitator of existing regional dynamics. Support for the expansion of the Middle Corridor and for the extraction and processing of REEs and other critical minerals aligns with Japan’s objective of mitigating Moscow’s and Beijing’s potential monopolistic influence in these sectors.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.