By Nargiza Umarova
The fourth session of the India–Central Asia Dialogue at the level of foreign ministers convened in New Delhi on 6 June 2025. The concluding communiqué underscored the significance of Iran’s Chabahar Port in advancing trade connectivity between the Central Asian republics and India, and beyond.
The Indo-Iranian Chabahar initiative competes with the port of Gwadar, a pivotal component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which envisages the integration of Central Asia through the development of a trans-Afghan railway. Concurrently, Russia is pursuing its distinct agenda by engaging with the Taliban to extend the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) into Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the Central Asian republics face the risk of becoming entangled in a cycle of great power competition, thereby endangering their own national interests.
BACKGROUND: Since 2020, Uzbekistan has engaged in dialogue with India and Iran regarding the joint utilization of the deep-water port of Chabahar, which provides direct access to the Indian Ocean. Situated in southeastern Iran, the port constitutes a critical component of Tashkent’s strategy to develop southern transit corridors and diversify freight transportation routes. Chabahar functions as a commercial gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan, affording major global economies—especially India—access to key regional resources. This underlies New Delhi’s commitment to upgrading the Shahid Beheshti terminal in Chabahar and enhancing the surrounding transport infrastructure.
Moreover, transit through Iran reduces the cost and duration of Indian cargo shipments to and from Central Asia by nearly one-third relative to maritime routes via Europe or China. India’s objective extends beyond securing efficient and affordable access to uranium, oil, coal, and other raw materials from Central Asia; it also involves circumventing its principal rival, Pakistan.
The Indian transit corridor to Central Asia, originating at Chabahar, may proceed through both Iran and Afghanistan. In 2020, Iran commenced construction of the 628-kilometer Chabahar–Zahedan railway line, with financial assistance from India. Work on this segment is nearing completion. The route is projected to continue toward the Turkmenistan border, traversing the northern Iranian cities of Mashhad and Serakhs. En route, the Chabahar–Zahedan–Mashhad railway will diverge toward the city of Khaf, where the inaugural cross-border rail link between Iran and Afghanistan begins.
The construction of the 225-kilometer railway linking Khaf to Herat in Afghanistan is also approaching completion. Its designed capacity is estimated at up to three million tons annually, with transit cargo expected to comprise more than half of this volume. Consequently, the Khaf–Herat railway is poised to be integrated into a broader China-led transport initiative connecting East and West through Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran. Owing to its direct linkage with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan stands to benefit from this configuration by enhancing its own transit capacity. The Taliban administration seeks comparable advantages for Afghanistan and is actively encouraging Tashkent to extend the railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat. While such an extension would grant Uzbekistan additional access to Chabahar by circumventing Turkmenistan, it could also redirect China–Europe–China transit cargo toward other neighboring states bordering Afghanistan.
IMPLICATIONS: For several years, Iran has actively pursued the realization of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran railway corridor, commonly referred to as the “Five Nation Road.” The Afghan segment of this 2,100-kilometre overland route will primarily comprise the railway currently under construction between Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. From Mazar-i-Sharif, the transportation network would require only an extension to Sherkhan Bandar in Kunduz Province to establish a connection with the Tajik border. This development would facilitate Tajikistan’s access to Iran through Afghan territory, thereby definitely weakening Uzbekistan’s competitive position in regional transit logistics.
The Taliban regard the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat railway as an integral element of a broader initiative aimed at establishing a Trans-Afghan corridor extending through Kandahar to Pakistan, analogous to Uzbekistan’s proposed Kabul Corridor. In 2023, the Afghan authorities announced plans to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar railway, which, according to media sources, is projected to provide the shortest overland route between Moscow and New Delhi via Afghanistan. Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and even Turkey have been invited to invest in the venture.
The attractiveness of the Kandahar Corridor lies in its capacity to extend toward both Iran and Pakistan. Ashgabat and Astana are already advancing a new transit route from the Torghundi railway station, located at the Afghan–Turkmen border, toward Pakistan, traversing western Afghanistan. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced the initiation of a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan railway, covering the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar–Chaman route.
Without reaching Kandahar in the city of Delaram, both lines could be redirected westward and linked to Iran’s Zahedan via Zaranj in Nimroz Province, ultimately reaching the port of Chabahar.
Consequently, the Central Asian states will gain an additional opportunity to access the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. However, this scenario presents significant implications for Uzbekistan. Foremost, the advancement of the Kandahar Corridor—regardless of whether it extends toward Iran—raises concerns regarding the viability of the Trans-Afghan Railway via Kabul, which Tashkent has identified as a core interest. The simultaneous operation of both routes will inevitably result in competition for transit cargo, thereby impacting their overall profitability. Uzbekistan is will unlikely be able to impede the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat railway, as the initiative partially aligns with the interests of Russia, India, Iran, and China. Under such circumstances, preserving the relevance of the Kabul Corridor—particularly amid funding constraints—becomes exceedingly challenging.
Secondly, the construction of the Zaranj–Delaram railway line will establish conditions conducive to the redistribution of cargo flows transiting Afghanistan toward South Asia and beyond, in favor of Chabahar. This development represents a direct challenge to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the most costly and prominent flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative, which prioritizes the expansion of the Gwadar port on Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast. Enhancing Chabahar’s transit capacity through the creation of a comprehensive network of rail and roads linking the port to neighboring countries and regions within Iran’s periphery may diminish the significance of the Kabul Corridor as a land bridge between the poles of continental Asia.
Should the Kandahar route be developed and extended into Iran, Gwadar will be compelled to share prospective cargo flows with Chabahar, thereby intensifying the rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing. Russia must also be considered, as it views the Trans-Afghan Railway as a means to extend its flagship International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) into Afghanistan. Preliminary estimates place the volume of Russian cargo on the Trans-Afghan route at between 8 and 15 million tons annually. In light of escalating tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, as well as the generally unstable security climate in Pakistan—particularly in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, through which two proposed railway branches from Central Asia to Indian Ocean ports are planned—Russia may opt to reroute a portion of its exports to Chabahar via Afghanistan. Over time, this shift could also influence freight transit patterns from Northern Europe to India.
Nevertheless, the ongoing escalation of armed conflict between Iran and Israel introduces significant uncertainty regarding the feasibility of such transport configurations. A protracted period of hostilities, accompanied by potential political destabilization within Iran, will unavoidably impact the reliability of established logistics networks in West Asia, potentially necessitating their complete reconfiguration. Under these conditions, both the trans-Afghan corridors leading to Iran and the Indian access route to Central Asia via Afghanistan will be placed at considerable risk. This situation will undoubtedly compel stakeholders to revise their strategies concerning the Chabahar project and to place greater emphasis on leveraging Pakistan’s transit capabilities.
CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s proactive engagement in the development of a network of trans-Afghan trade routes is anticipated to yield both economic and political advantages by enhancing its national and regional transit capacity. However, realizing these outcomes will require Tashkent to navigate carefully among the interests of global and regional powers, whose influence may significantly shape the implementation of specific transport initiatives within Afghanistan.
For the Central Asian states, maintaining diversified access to the southern ports of Iran and Pakistan is advantageous, provided that intra-regional competition is avoided, as such rivalry could undermine their collective competitiveness along the trans-Afghan corridor. Accordingly, it is essential to implement a coordinated policy aimed at identifying and advancing mutually beneficial transport routes through Afghanistan. Reaching consensus on a unified negotiating stance in engagements with the Afghan leadership is vital to mitigate the risk of the Taliban enacting externally influenced political decisions that may contradict the interests of Central Asian states.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at nargiza.umarova@iais.uz.
By Syed Fazl-e-Haider
The downing of three expensive French-made Rafale fighter jets by low-cost, Chinese-manufactured J-10C aircraft during the Pakistan–India aerial conflict on May 7 highlighted the affordability and operational capability of Chinese fighters. In light of this encounter, several countries are now reassessing their Rafale procurement plans. Uzbekistan, which had previously expressed interest in acquiring 24 Rafale jets, is currently engaged in negotiations with China to purchase JF-17 aircraft. China has increasingly focused on expanding arms exports to Central Asia, a market traditionally dominated by Russia.
BACKGROUND: On May 7, India launched missile strikes against six locations in Pakistan, attributing responsibility to its long-standing rival for the April 22 attack that claimed the lives of 26 tourists in Pahalgam, located in Indian-administered Kashmir. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) deployed Chinese-manufactured J-10C fighter jets, which succeeded in downing five Indian aircraft, including three Rafale jets recently procured from France. Pakistan utilized China’s advanced PL-15E air-to-air missiles to carry out the strikes on the Indian fighters. The India–Pakistan confrontation, characterized by missile exchanges, drone attacks, and artillery shelling, concluded on May 10 following a ceasefire agreement brokered by the U.S.
In 2016, India concluded a US$ 8.8 billion agreement with France for the procurement of 36 Rafale fighter jets. Pakistan entered into a US$ 1.525 billion deal with China for the acquisition of 20 J-10C aircraft.
China ranks as the fourth-largest supplier of conventional weapons globally, following the U.S., France, and Russia. The country produces the majority of its military equipment domestically and primarily exports to developing nations. China is increasingly asserting itself as the dominant arms exporter in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, while also expanding its presence in Central Asia. Chinese aircraft have gained recognition as cost-effective alternatives to Western models, particularly among developing states.
China has been consolidating its defense partnerships with Central Asian nations in recent years. In 2015, it supplied FD-2000 long-range air defense systems to both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, following defense equipment contracts signed by the two countries with China in 2013. The FD-2000 is capable of intercepting a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, armed helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles. In 2022, China further deepened its regional security ties by signing bilateral security cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan during a visit by former Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe.
China has now emerged as a principal defense supplier to Central Asia. At the China–Central Asia Summit in 2023, Beijing articulated its intention to strengthen military cooperation and security engagement with the region at a time when Russia is increasingly preoccupied and resource-constrained due to its ongoing war in Ukraine.
China is actively capitalizing on the current geopolitical landscape. Last year, it supplied EVOMax unmanned systems to Kazakhstan, whereas Tajikistan in 2024 procured the Chinese-manufactured HQ-17AE air defense system, which significantly enhances its capacity to defend against a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Uzbekistan also continues to enhance its military cooperation with China, procuring FM-90 and KS-1C air defense systems in February. The FM-90, an upgraded version of the HQ-7, is designed for short-range defense against threats such as cruise missiles and drones. In contrast, the KS-1C serves as a medium-to-long-range air defense system. Together, these systems provide Uzbekistan with a layered and integrated air defense architecture capable of countering a broad spectrum of aerial threats.
China’s defense exports to Central Asia were minimal between 2010 and 2014, accounting for only 1.5 percent of the region’s total arms imports. However, this figure rose substantially to 18 percent during the 2015–2019 period, reflecting a marked increase in Beijing’s regional defense engagement. According to one estimate, Russia’s arms exports to Central Asia declined by 64 percent between 2020 and 2024. This downturn created a vacuum, which other suppliers—including India and China—moved to fill. During this period, China accounted for 17 percent of the replacement in arms supply, further solidifying its growing influence in the region’s defense sector.
BACKGROUND: The performance of Chinese-manufactured aircraft during the brief military confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian Air Forces has not only reignited global interest in Chinese defense technology but also challenged the perceived superiority of Western military hardware.
China has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the recent India–Pakistan conflict. The market valuation of Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC)—a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and the producer of the J-10C fighter jets—surged by over US$ 7.6 billion following the aerial engagement on May 7. On the same day, CAC’s share price on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange rose by more than 17 percent, coinciding with Pakistan’s Defence Minister’s confirmation that five Indian fighter jets had been downed overnight.
The air warfare offered China an opportunity to showcase its advancements in aviation technology on the global stage, underscoring the effectiveness of China’s “low-cost, high-capacity” production model in the defense sector. The performance of Chinese J-10C against French Rafale, which is over three times more expensive, highlights the operational competitiveness of more affordable Chinese alternatives. This event is likely to accelerate the expansion of China’s military exports in the coming years. Although the Rafale retains technological advantages over Chinese platforms such as the JF-17 Thunder and J-10C, the results of this live combat scenario is expected to adversely affect the export prospects of France’s Dassault Aviation.
The J-10C fighter jet is scheduled to make its debut at the 2025 Paris Air Show—one of the world’s premier aerospace exhibitions, historically dominated by Western manufacturers. The inclusion of the J-10C in this prestigious event signifies a growing recognition among global industry leaders of China’s rising aerospace capabilities.
In the aftermath of the India–Pakistan aerial confrontation, China’s J-10C and JF-17 Thunder fighter jets have gained increased appeal among Central Asian countries. For instance, Uzbekistan expressed interest in purchasing 24 Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tashkent in November 2023. However, Uzbekistan has earlier this year engaged in negotiations with China to procure JF-17 jets. The recent air combat between India and Pakistan is likely to further incentivize Tashkent to finalize a deal with Beijing. China’s appeal as an arms supplier is also enhanced by its willingness to facilitate technology transfers to recipient states. Notably, China is assisting Uzbekistan in establishing its own domestic defense industry.
China is poised to capture a significant share of Central Asia’s arms market, capitalizing on shifting regional dynamics. All five Central Asian republics have increased their defense expenditures at a time when Russia’s long-standing dominance in arms sales to the region has eroded following the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022.
CONCLUSIONS: The live air combat between India and Pakistan has significantly elevated the global market value and demand for Chinese arms and aircraft, strengthening Beijing’s defense sales narrative, particularly in Central Asia. The recent acquisition of Chinese defense systems by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signals a departure from traditional defense alignments in the region, reflecting a broader pivot among Central Asian states toward Chinese military technology.
China views Central Asia as a strategic gateway to West Asia and the Black Sea region. Its growing security engagement and expanding arms sales serve as crucial instruments for deepening its strategic foothold in the region through sustained defense collaboration with Central Asian states.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation Email, sfazlehaider05@yahoo.com.
By Emil Avdaliani
Azerbaijan, akin to nations in Central Asia and the Gulf, endeavors to balance relations among major powers in order to avoid exclusive alignment with any singular geopolitical axis. Baku’s recent diplomatic initiatives reflect this strategy, which has contributed to enhancing the nation’s regional standing: relations with Iran have improved, engagement with China has intensified, and the European Union now seeks deeper political cooperation with Baku.
BACKGROUND: Ever since the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023 the country has pursued a much more diversified foreign policy by simultaneously building closer ties, beyond what it already had with Turkey and Russia, with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan, Israel and has moved to improve relations with the United States, which suffered during the Biden administration due to the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy building issues.
Since the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 2023, the country has adopted a markedly more diversified foreign policy, strengthening existing ties with Turkey and Russia while simultaneously deepening relations with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf states, Pakistan, and Israel, and taking steps to improve strained relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated under the Biden administration due to its prioritization of human rights and democratic governance.
This dynamic has become particularly pronounced in recent months. In April, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Baku to engage in discussions aimed at enhancing bilateral relations. Similarly, in April, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, visited Baku, where she met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov; during the visit, both parties agreed to resume negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.
A significant shift occurred in Baku–Beijing relations when, in April, the two countries elevated their ties to the level of a comprehensive partnership during the Azerbaijani president’s visit to China. While the development of the Middle Corridor remains a priority, the agreement with Azerbaijan places additional emphasis on enhancing bilateral cooperation in investment and business. As the largest economy in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan serves as a key entry point for China into the region.
Similarly, in April and May, Azerbaijan conducted meetings with Ukrainian officials—an uncommon move given Baku’s cautious stance on the war. However, in the context of increasingly strained relations with Russia, Baku’s outreach to Kyiv appears intended to signal displeasure to Moscow. Russia continues to deny any involvement in the downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft over its territory, a claim Baku maintains. Consequently, relations have deteriorated, with President Ilham Aliyev declining to attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in May.
In May, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan formalized their strategic partnership, enabling Tashkent to become a party to the Shusha Declaration, originally signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in 2021. Azerbaijan has maintained an active diplomatic presence in Central Asia, and although the Caspian Sea functions as a geographic divider, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are increasingly interconnected.
In late May, Azerbaijan hosted a trilateral summit with the leaders of Turkey and Pakistan, marking a new chapter in their cooperative relations. The geopolitical dimension of this partnership is becoming increasingly significant, particularly in light of Pakistan–India tensions and New Delhi’s growing ties with Armenia. The three Islamic nations also advanced collaboration in the political, economic, and military spheres.
Azerbaijan has also recently emerged as a venue for negotiations between opposing parties. For example, in April, Turkish and Israeli delegations convened in Baku to discuss the establishment of a potential “deconfliction mechanism” aimed at preventing direct clashes between the two states in Syria. In May, Baku also hosted Russian and German political representatives for talks on reviving the “Petersburg Dialogue,” which had been suspended since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This dimension of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy is particularly noteworthy, underscoring the country’s growing reputation as a credible and impartial facilitator of dialogue between the conflicting sides.
IMPLICATIONS: This diplomatic activism underscores Azerbaijan’s rising regional significance and its strategic efforts to position itself as a capable middle power—one that can exert influence within its immediate neighborhood while simultaneously acting as a crucial partner to rival great powers.
Evolving patterns of connectivity across Eurasia have been a key factor in enhancing Azerbaijan’s regional role. The Middle Corridor, which extends from the Black Sea to Central Asia and effectively links the EU with China, traverses Azerbaijan (alongside Georgia). This route enables both the EU and China to circumvent Russian territory, while Azerbaijan’s significance is further elevated by the EU’s demand for Caspian gas. Additionally, Brussels has intensified outreach to Central Asia, with which European leaders are increasingly engaging in trade and investment. The recent EU–Central Asia summit, where the Union pledged €12 billion in investments, exemplifies the rising importance of the Middle Corridor. A portion of this investment is earmarked for infrastructure upgrades along the route, particularly in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan has also assumed a more critical role for China than in previous years. From Beijing’s perspective, Azerbaijan functions as a gateway to the Black Sea region. Moreover, China views Azerbaijan as a promising market for its rapidly expanding electric vehicle (EV) industry. Data from the past year indicate that Chinese brands are gaining increasing popularity in Azerbaijan, with discussions underway regarding potential joint production ventures. The country may also serve as a strategic hub for the distribution of Chinese EV models throughout the South Caucasus and beyond.
Azerbaijan’s increasing regional significance has prompted Iran to pursue full normalization of relations with its northern neighbor. During the Iranian president’s visit to Baku, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared, “Our goal, our primary goal is to raise Azerbaijani–Iranian interstate relations to a higher level.” This aspiration was accompanied by tangible measures. On May 21, Iran announced the execution of the sole assailant responsible for the 2023 attack on the Azerbaijani embassy. Additionally, Iran and Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises—Araz-2025. Diplomatic relations have now been fully restored, and cooperation on the International North–South Transport Corridor has been expanded. Consequently, Tehran and Baku have reduced tensions to levels seen prior to 2020, before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Iran’s strategic calculations also reflect concerns about preventing Azerbaijan from decisively aligning with Israel or the U.S. Azerbaijan has recently been identified as a prospective candidate for inclusion in the Abraham Accords, a U.S.-led initiative aimed at improving Israel’s relations with the Islamic world. The U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, indicated that Azerbaijan could join the Accords in the near future. While he mentioned other potential members—including Armenia, Syria, and Lebanon—Azerbaijan stands out due to its geographic location north of Iran. Although Baku and Tel Aviv have historically maintained close ties, formal accession to the Accords would significantly elevate Azerbaijan’s stature in the Middle East and strengthen its relationship with the U.S. Given the persistent challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program, the Islamic Republic will remain a central focus of U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Azerbaijan’s position north of Iran will only enhance its strategic relevance for both the U.S. and Israel. This development will, in turn, improve Baku’s bargaining leverage, thereby motivating Iran to pursue increasingly cordial relations with its northern neighbor.
Another factor driving normalization is the Islamic Republic’s growing interest in maintaining peaceful relations with Azerbaijan, particularly as it faces mounting challenges. These include sustained Israeli strikes against its Axis of Resistance, the continued impact of the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, and tensions with Turkey arising from the evolving balance of power in Syria. In this context, Tehran appears increasingly inclined to avoid additional regional friction. Indeed, it may ultimately be compelled to tolerate Azerbaijan’s potential accession to the Abraham Accords, provided such a development does not constitute a direct security threat to the Islamic Republic.
CONCLUSIONS: The recent flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding Azerbaijan underscores the country’s rising significance in regional affairs. Transit, trade, and investment constitute the central pillars of Baku’s engagement with regional and global powers. This approach aligns with what is commonly termed a multi-vector foreign policy—a strategic orientation wherein no single major power is prioritized. Instead, multi-alignment is pursued as a means to enhance a country’s international standing. In a global context marked by great power rivalry, the erosion of international norms, and the ascendance of middle powers, Azerbaijan—like many states in Central Asia and the Middle East—seeks to balance among dominant actors to avoid exclusive alignment with any one geopolitical center. Thus far, this strategy has served Baku well, and it is likely to persist amid the continuing emergence of an increasingly multipolar international system.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is Professor of International Relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi
On March 31, 2025, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation submitted a proposal to the Supreme Court to allow the Taliban to operate in the country. On April 17, 2025, the Supreme Court officially removed the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations. A year earlier, there had been no legal mechanism to delist terrorist groups. That mechanism was introduced through amendments to the Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice in May 2024, with the endorsement of President Vladimir Putin. The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list is the product of a steady normalization of Russia’s relations with the Taliban.
BACKGROUND: Russia’s complex relationship with the Taliban dates back to the movement’s rise to power in the 1990s. After the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, Russia made several attempts to restore relations, despite having supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Russian diplomats traveled to Pakistan and met with both Pakistani and Taliban officials to explore the possibility of recognizing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Moscow’s key concern at the time was the Taliban’s recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which Russia viewed as a serious threat to its territorial integrity. However, the Taliban, still wary of Moscow’s role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, rebuffed Russian overtures.
In August 1998, the Taliban embassy in the United Arab Emirates informed Kabul that a Russian delegation, led by Alexander Oblov, intended to visit Afghanistan to discuss reopening the Russian embassy and possibly recognize the Taliban regime. Yet, the Taliban Foreign Ministry instructed officials not to issue visas to any Russian representative, citing Moscow's role in the destruction of Afghanistan and stating that “all the troubles of our nation are due to Russian interference.”
The rise of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and growing security threats in Central Asia pushed Moscow toward a pragmatic re-engagement with the Taliban. Russia’s concerns over ISIS-K have grown significantly since 2014, especially in light of the group's ability to operate in northern Afghanistan, close to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These concerns have helped shift Russia’s strategic calculus.
Uzbekistan’s involvement in the peace process with the Taliban—including its invitation to a high-level Taliban delegation to visit Tashkent—prompted Russia to deepen its own engagement. Moscow responded by inviting the Taliban for separate discussions, as well as joint talks alongside the Afghan government delegation, to address the peace process and the post-withdrawal landscape following the exit of U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai played an instrumental role in reshaping Moscow's perception of the Taliban. Karzai has argued that ISIS-K has no Afghan roots, and its fighters were introduced from abroad to destabilize the region. According to Karzai, only the Taliban are capable of effectively fighting ISIS-K. This narrative found a receptive audience in Moscow, which has long feared the potential spillover of instability into the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and a former ambassador to Kabul, has been central to the evolution of Russia’s Taliban policy. Known for his deep knowledge of Afghan affairs, Kabulov has publicly advocated for recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate political force. Under his guidance, Moscow hosted several rounds of intra-Afghan talks, including Taliban representatives, even before the group's return to power in 2021. In November 2016, reports emerged that Russian representatives had allegedly met with Taliban commanders at a Russian military base in Tajikistan, and that unidentified helicopters delivered weapons to Taliban fighters in Badakhshan province, claims that Moscow, Tajikistan, and the former Afghan government denied. Still, the optics suggested a growing convergence of interests between Russia and the Taliban, particularly in countering ISIS-K and limiting Western military influence in the region.
IMPLICATIONS: Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s return to power, Russia was among the few countries that kept its embassy in Kabul operational. While Moscow has not formally recognized the Taliban government, it has significantly expanded its diplomatic engagement. Taliban delegations have visited Moscow multiple times, and Russia has reciprocated by including Taliban officials in regional security dialogues such as the Moscow Format.
The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list reflects the culmination of this slow but steady normalization. According to Russian officials, this step is primarily aimed at fostering dialogue and enhancing regional security cooperation. While some critics in Russia have questioned the wisdom of legitimizing a group with a violent past, proponents argue that engagement with the de facto authorities in Kabul is a geopolitical necessity. Moreover, economic considerations have also played a role. Since 2022, Afghanistan has expressed interest in purchasing Russian oil and wheat. The Taliban have also invited Russian companies to invest in mining, infrastructure, and energy projects. Removing the terrorist designation facilitates such cooperation, especially given Western sanctions that have pushed Moscow to diversify its foreign partnerships.
The removal of the Taliban from Russia’s terrorist list is likely to have a ripple effect across Central Asia and beyond. For Central Asian countries, Russia’s policy shift may serve as a green light to expand their own engagement with the Taliban. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which share borders with Afghanistan, have already established pragmatic relations with the Taliban, primarily driven by security and economic interests. Uzbekistan’s active involvement with the Taliban on trade and transit connectivity to South Asia has influenced Russian policymakers to adjust their strategy in favor of smoother economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Russia viewed Uzbekistan as a regional competitor. The recent Termez Dialogue, hosted by Uzbekistan with the participation of Central Asian countries and the Taliban, heightened Moscow’s concerns over Uzbekistan’s growing role as a regional player and the potential challenge it poses to Russia’s influence in Central Asia.
Tajikistan has also begun expanding trade and transit relations with Kabul, opening joint border markets in the Badakhshan provinces of both countries, as well as utilizing Sher Khan Port in Kunduz province. The extension of electricity exports to Afghanistan and the recent CASA-1000 meeting in Dushanbe—attended by a Taliban delegation—signal a growing interest in fostering mutual economic ties between Kabul and Central Asia. However, this normalization also comes with risks. The Taliban's refusal to form an inclusive government or ensure basic human rights—particularly for women and minorities—has prevented broader international recognition. By legitimizing the Taliban without demanding reforms, Moscow risks enabling continued repression and governance failures that could fuel further instability.
In terms of security, closer cooperation between Russia and the Taliban might strengthen the fight against ISIS-K, particularly in northern Afghanistan. However, it may also deepen regional rivalries, especially if Iran, China, and Russia begin to compete for influence in post-U.S. Afghanistan. The recent participation of Taliban officials in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) dialogue formats and The Termez Dialogue in Uzbekistan signals a growing desire among regional powers to integrate Afghanistan into new security architectures that exclude the West. Economic and political relations between the Central Asian countries and the Taliban are growing fast.
Finally, the implications extend to the global geopolitical sphere. Russia’s embrace of the Taliban may signal a broader strategy of contesting Western norms by engaging with non-Western, often pariah, regimes. Moscow’s willingness to engage with the Taliban mirrors its outreach to other sanctioned or controversial governments, from Syria to North Korea. This aligns with the Kremlin’s effort to promote a multipolar world order, one that challenges U.S.-led international structures.
CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations marks a pivotal moment in its Afghanistan policy. While it reflects pragmatic calculations tied to regional security concerns and economic interests—particularly in light of Central Asia’s growing engagement with the Taliban—it also signals a broader shift in Moscow’s diplomatic approach amid sanctions and geopolitical isolation. The long-term success of this engagement will depend not only on the Taliban’s capacity to deliver security, uphold governance, and respect international laws and human rights, but also on Russia’s ability to balance its strategic ambitions with regional stability and global legitimacy.
AUTHORS’ BIOS: Aigerim Turgunbaeva, journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.
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