By Eldaniz Gusseinov, Rassul Kospanov

The Pakistan–Afghanistan war has accelerated Kabul's economic reorientation toward Central Asia, a structural shift that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have moved most visibly to institutionalize. Less visible, but strategically consequential, is the parallel track that Russia has been constructing through the Republic of Tatarstan. Over the course of 2024 and 2025, Tatarstan has signed memoranda worth US$ 183 million with Afghan private-sector counterparts, doubled bilateral trade to US$ 51 million in the first eleven months of 2025, and prepared a trilateral Russia–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan transport corridor agreement for signature at KazanForum 2026. The pattern suggests that Moscow has delegated a substantial component of its Afghan engagement to a subnational actor as a calibrated instrument of paradiplomacy, a model that carries implications for how external powers compete for position in the emerging trans-Afghan corridor system.

BACKGROUND:

Tatarstan's suitability as Moscow's Afghan channel rests on a combination of confessional, communal, and institutional factors that no other Russian federal subject combines. The republic's Islamic identity provides a register of communication with the Taliban authorities that federal Russian institutions cannot easily replicate. 

Kazan hosts the annual Russia–Islamic World: KazanForum, which since 2023 has carried federal status and functions as one of the few large-format venues where Taliban officials are received. An additional advantage is the presence of a historically established Tatar diaspora in Afghanistan. A notable Tatar community has lived in the country since the nineteenth century, having been formed largely by merchants and trading intermediaries from the Russian Empire who gradually settled in Afghan cities and integrated into local society. 

Today, descendants of this diaspora are concentrated primarily in the northern provinces of Balkh, Samangan, and Baghlan, providing Kazan with an important human infrastructure for engagement that predates the events of 2021. In March 2021, the Afghan government formally recognized "Tatar" as a nationality category in civil documentation, which anchored the community's relationship with Kazan more durably than informal ties had previously allowed.

The institutional architecture developed in parallel. In 2023, a Russian business center affiliated with the Kazan-based Charitable Patriotic Fund of Muslims opened in Kabul. Russia became the first country to open a business representative office in Afghanistan after August 2021. 

Tatarstani firms entered the market before the federal center had resolved the legal status of the Taliban movement, which remained on Russia's list of banned organizations until April 2025, when the Supreme Court suspended the ban and Russia became the first state to formally recognize the government in Kabul. 

During that pre-recognition period, Tatarstan's engagement operated in a space that federal diplomacy could not formally occupy, and the institutional relationships established during those years have persisted after recognition. 

As CEO of the Charitable Patriotic Foundation of Muslims of Russia, Rustam Khabibullin headed the business representative office. Even before the Taliban movement came to power, the patriotic foundation of Muslims had maintained relations with Afghanistan, in particular with Afghans of Tatar origin. Trade volumes reflect the accumulated weight of this engagement. 

Tatarstan–Afghanistan commerce doubled in the first eleven months of 2025 to US$ 51 million, accounting for roughly 10 percent of total Russian–Afghan trade. Tatarstan exports petroleum products, grain, KAMAZ trucks, and specialized equipment; Afghanistan exports dried fruits and minerals. 

In May 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar led an Afghan delegation to Kazan for meetings with Rais Rustam Minnikhanov and federal ministers. 

In August 2025, a Tatarstani delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Korobchenko travelled to Kabul, the first regional Russian delegation of such standing to visit in the post-2021 period.

IMPLICATIONS:

The paradiplomatic model offers Moscow operational flexibility that formal diplomacy cannot match, even after recognition. Industrial cooperation, equipment supplies, and energy projects can be advanced through Kazan without elevating every transaction to state-to-state protocol. 

The confessional and historical background that Tatarstan brings to the engagement is quite unique. Recognition has regularized the legal environment without altering the functional logic that made Kazan the preferred channel in the first place. 

The federal center has therefore continued to route substantial engagement through the republic rather than absorbing the Afghan file fully into the standard Ministry of Foreign Affairs framework.

This model also has historical precedents. During the Soviet period, Moscow often used Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as showcase republics of the “Soviet East” — modernized Muslim-majority regions meant to demonstrate the compatibility of socialism with development, secular governance, and industrial progress. 

Tashkent in particular hosted Afro-Asian conferences and served as a symbolic bridge to the decolonizing world, while Kazakhstan projected an image of industrial modernity and frontier development. In this sense, the current use of Tatarstan as Russia’s preferred Afghan channel reflects not an innovation, but a revival of an older practice: governing external peripheries through carefully selected internal Muslim intermediaries.

The trilateral Tatarstan–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan transport corridor scheduled for signature at KazanForum 2026 in May represents the most consequential element of this architecture. The route is conceived as an alternative to the International North-South Transport Corridor, whose Iranian segment has been disrupted by regional conflict. 

Nuruddin Azizi, the Afghan Minister of Industry and Trade, has been one of the driving forces behind the project from Afghanistan, and Oleg Korobchenko, Tatarstan's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade, has overseen the Tatarstani component through regular meetings with the Afghan side. First shipments are planned from Tatarstan. Khabibullin has identified Afghanistan as Tatarstan's leading importer of halal-certified goods. In 2024, companies in Tatarstan exported US$ 37 million worth of halal products to Afghanistan. This figure is 20 times higher than in 2023.

If the corridor materializes, it will deepen Russian participation in the trans-Afghan railway architecture that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been actively advancing. Uzbekistan's project, which runs from Termez through Mazar-i-Sharif toward South Asian ports via the Salang Pass. Kazakhstan's alternative route, with approximately US$ 500 million committed including a logistics hub in Herat, follows the technically simpler Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak corridor across western Afghanistan.

A parallel track runs through Uzbekistan's Surkhandarya region, where the Aritom free economic zone in Termez borders Afghanistan and offers multimodal logistics including rail, road, and river port. At the Russia–Uzbekistan interregional conference held in Termez in autumn 2026, Tatarstani and Surkhandarya officials advanced a cooperation framework covering industrial localization, agro-processing, and transit through Aritom toward Afghan and broader South Asian markets. The Uzbek side has positioned the zone as a 250-million-consumer gateway; Tatarstan's two industrial parks at Chirchik and Jizzakh, where more than half of resident firms are Russian, provide a productive base that can be articulated with the transit infrastructure at Termez. The architecture allows Russian exports to reach Afghan markets either through the Turkmen corridor or through Uzbek infrastructure, which diversifies the operational risk inherent in a single route.

Energy and resource cooperation extends the model further. At the Tatarstan Oil and Gas Chemical Forum, the Taliban's acting Minister of Mines and Petroleum Hedayatullah Badri publicly invited Tatarstani firms to invest in Afghan hydrocarbon projects, while the acting Minister of Energy and Water Resources Abdul Latif Mansur proposed Tatarstani participation in the Panjshir-to-Kabul water transfer project. Memoranda on exploration, extraction, and processing of oil and gas were signed in Kazan in 2025, and KER-Holding has advanced proposals for coal-fired power generation in Afghanistan. This is a role that China lost when its oil extraction project in northern Afghanistan was cancelled, and which Kazakhstan is now beginning to contest through Kazatomprom's and Kazakhmys's exploration activities in Laghman.

The labor migration track, opened in late 2025, adds a further dimension. Kabul has formally proposed directing Afghan labor migrants to Tatarstan, with an initial cohort of approximately 1,000 workers for the agricultural sector and potential expansion across industries. This inverts the direction of the Afghan exodus of the 2021–2024 period and establishes a formal channel through which Afghan labor enters Russia via a subnational agreement, a configuration that the federal labor migration framework has not previously accommodated.

The limits of the model are also visible. Banking infrastructure remains the principal operational constraint. Rustam Khabibullin has publicly identified transaction commissions of approximately 30 percent as a substantial barrier to Russia–Afghanistan commercial settlement and has proposed that Russia develop an international payments system modelled on hawala for transactions with member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Nur Ahmad Agha, the chairman of Da Afghanistan Bank, is expected to attend the first congress of OIC national bank representatives at KazanForum 2026, which has been identified as the venue for this discussion. Without a payments architecture that can absorb Afghan transactions at scale, the trade volumes reported will remain concentrated in a narrow band of fuel, grain, and equipment.

CONCLUSIONS:

Tatarstan's Afghan engagement is neither a humanitarian gesture nor a purely commercial venture. It is the operational layer of Russian policy in a region where the confessional and communal dimensions of the relationship carry weight that standard diplomatic instruments cannot supply. 

Russia's formal recognition of the Taliban government in April 2025 regularized the legal environment without displacing the Tatarstani channel, because the republic's combination of Islamic identity, a diaspora community in northern Afghanistan, an institutional platform in KazanForum, and a productive industrial base constitutes an instrument that no federal subject of Russia could replicate. 

The trilateral corridor agreement prepared for May 2026 and the parallel track through Surkhandarya indicate that the model is scaling from bilateral commerce toward regional transit infrastructure. Whether Tatarstan's engagement consolidates into a durable Russian presence in Afghanistan will depend on the resolution of payment-system constraints and on whether Moscow formalizes the paradiplomatic arrangement through a trade representation in Kabul. 

The broader significance lies in what the case illustrates: in the northward reorientation of Afghanistan that began with the closure of the Pakistani corridor, external powers are not only competing through state-level instruments but through the subnational channels that carry confessional, communal, and industrial advantages.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Eldaniz Gusseinov is Head of Research and сo-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int. and a non-resident research fellow at Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of the Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul. Rassul Kospanov is a Senior Researcher at the National Analytical Center under Nazarbayev University, where he coordinates socio-political research projects and prepares analytical reports and policy recommendations for central and local government bodies. His work focuses on political processes in Kazakhstan and across Central Asia, as well as issues of regional cooperation.

By Stephen Blank

Recent trends in world politics have led several analysts to emphasize the idea of the retreat or recession of Russian power abroad. Yet few have commented on a key aspect of this retreat, namely the growing movement across Central Asia to unseat the Russian language from its position, often enshrined in law, as an official language on a par with the native tongue. Trends across the region demonstrate state action to diminish the role of the Russian language, growing political discussion of the issue, or socio-economic trends working to reduce the hegemony of the Russian language. These trends also display both Russia’s mounting anxiety about such trends and its increasingly visible inability to reverse or stop them.

BACKGROUND:

Russia’s recent reversals in Syria, Venezuela, the Caucasus and potentially Iran have triggered a flood of articles proclaiming the retreat of Russian power. However, none of these writings noticed the parallel ongoing dethronement of the Russian language from its previous eminence in Central Asia. Nevertheless, this epochal development, like Russia’s aforementioned geostrategic defeats, possesses profound political as well as cultural significance.  Given the importance of linguistic policies in the Tsarist, Soviet, and now post-Soviet regimes, the retreat of the Russian language from a position of linguistic-political primacy in Central Asia signifies major political and cultural transformations.

Specifically, Kazakhstan’s new constitution subtly but overtly downgrades the status of Russian as an official language. Article 9 of the new constitution establishes Kazakh as the dominant language of the country, relegating Russian to the status of an official language used by the government “alongside” Kazakh. This new constitution obtained massive public support although much of it was probably engineered from above, forcing Putin to congratulate President Tokayev on its ratification.  However, those congratulatory remarks, as Tokayev and his team well know, probably came through clenched teeth and were preceded by much Russian public criticism of Kazakhstan’s language policies.

An analysis of Russian press perspectives on the return of Kazakhstan’s Latin alphabet, originally introduced in the 1920’s, from the Cyrillicization of the alphabet during the height of Stalinism, displays a politicized perspective where this process is seen as a repudiation of a Russian orientation in favor of a Turkic-Western one. Insofar as Turkey and Western powers like the EU and the U.S. have stepped up their presence and interest in Kazakhstan and Central Asia as a whole, this politicized perspective sees language and alphabet policies as manifestations of the growing regional presence of those parties at Moscow’s expense. Thus, Russian press coverage warns Central Asian audiences against alleged foreign plots of an imperialist nature.

Russian media also minimize or deny the agency of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states in formulating and then executing their own alphabet and language policies while implicitly and often overtly extolling the superior, imperial role of Russia’s language and culture as a vehicle for connecting Central Asia with modern civilization and culture. In other words, much of this literature reflects an imperial echo with deep roots in late Tsarist and then Soviet imperial policies that Russian elites seek to preserve.

IMPLICATIONS:

Kazakhstan’s assertion of its linguistic sovereignty challenges the Russian dream of maintaining its cultural-political hegemony over Central Asia because it is losing the means to enforce that claim on Kazakhstan and because Astana’s example is being replicated across Central Asia, e.g. in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan, as a 2024 paper makes clear, Russian must coexist if not compete with Uzbek and Tajik while English, a global Lingua Franca, is rapidly gaining on it as well. In Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan’s example has simultaneously stimulated debates on emulating its language policy.

Predictably the Russian government, sensing another threat to its receding hegemonic pretensions, has reacted strongly. On March 19, its embassy in Bishkek forcefully demanded that Kyrgyzstan’s government suppress “provocative statements of certain public figures” about the place of Russian in Kyrgyz society. The statement also complains about “language patrols” where vigilantes purportedly try to intimidate people to stop speaking Russian and speak only Kyrgyz. The embassy deemed such calls incitement to ethnic hatred and a threat to Russo-Kyrgyz strategic partnership and, in a conscious echo of Soviet propaganda, “deep alliance between our fraternal peoples and countries – Russia and Kyrgyzstan.”

This atavistic employment of Soviet tropes is no accident. Whereas Lenin’s language policies, likely inspired by his father’s work in teaching Orthodoxy to Muslims, wagered that teaching socialism would lead Soviet Muslims to socialism; Stalin decisively imposed Russification by giving the Russian language primacy and Cyrillicizing Central Asian alphabets. Putin’s consistent attacks on Lenin’s nationality policies, many of which stemmed from an appreciation of socio-political realities during the early Soviet period, reflect his clear preference for the centralizing, Stalinist, and more openly imperialist policies of Stalin and his successors.

Nevertheless, a generation after independence and having devoted much effort to fostering large-scale national identification among their populations, Central Asian leaders are openly moving to assert not just their foreign policy sovereignty, but also their linguistic nationalism. The use of Russian across Central Asia will likely remain pervasive because of the benefits it offers in economic relations with Russian and possibly Central Asian entities. However, Russian will not be the only regional Lingua Franca or the language of Russian imperial hegemony either in the Caucasus or in Central Asia. Since we can readily imagine a similar outcome in Ukraine due Russia’s war against the country, which underlies many of the causes for the retreat of Russian hegemony, the trends discernible in Central Asia go far beyond its borders.

CONCLUSIONS:

Even as the Russian government is currently discussing legislation allowing it to intervene anywhere abroad on behalf of its citizens, Central Asian developments presage the ongoing erosion of Russian cultural and thus political power. The whole idea of the “Russkii Mir” (Russian World) based on speakers of the Russian language that furnishes a pretext for interventions abroad is rapidly falling to pieces. From Tsarist and Soviet times, Russian authorities consistently regarded Russian as the sole “civilized” and therefore hegemonic language of the empire and often sought to enforce that hegemony by coercion. Those days are visibly ending as Central Asian governments are, with increasing confidence, asserting their own native tongues while also opening up to greater economic-cultural interaction with other countries. While Russian will not disappear in Central Asia; it is being decentered and increasingly deprived of its superior legal-political standing.

This process is clearly linked to the global recession of Russian power even as Russia fights to retain its erstwhile imperial and global great power status. For its rulers, expression of that status through all the forms of cultural power, e.g. alphabets and languages, was a critical component of empire. Yet what we see today, despite Moscow’s threats or even forceful efforts to arrest or reverse that decline, is an imperial sunset that evidently cannot be stopped either in culture or in hard power.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

By Sergey Sukhankin

Armenia’s agreement with the U.S. on cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy may signify a major geopolitical shift in the South Caucasus. Specifically, the deal signals Yerevan’s effort to diversify its energy partnerships and reduce long-standing dependence on Russia, which has dominated Armenia’s nuclear sector since the Soviet era. Moscow`s response to the news has been very critical. Russian experts and policymakers warned about technological risks and questioned the feasibility of U.S.-supplied Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Russian officials and state media frame the initiative as both a security concern and a geopolitical challenge, emphasizing Rosatom’s experience and warning that Armenia could become a testing ground for unproven technologies.

BACKGROUND:

Armenia’s nuclear sector has historically been closely linked to Russia. Armenia’s Nuclear Power Plant at Metsamor, built during the Soviet period, supplies up to 31 percent of the country’s electricity. The plant’s second unit continues operating after modernization programs that extended its lifetime (until 2036) and upgraded its capacity. Due to particularities of the nuclear-producing energy sector, Armenia’s dependence on Russia is complex and multidimensional extending to maintenance of infrastructure, scientific cooperation and other aspects, deepening the dependency on Russian involvement in the country’s energy system. Metsamor’s aging reactors and the country’s growing electricity needs have forced Armenian authorities to consider constructing a replacement facility. Thus, the government began evaluating options for new nuclear capacity examining potential cooperation with multiple countries including Russia, the U.S., China, and South Korea. Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized that the government would select the partner offering the most competitive combination of price and technology. 

The turning point came in February 2026, when the U.S. and Armenia finalized a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement establishes the legal framework for exporting nuclear technology to Armenia and opens for U.S. companies to participate in building a new nuclear facility. Furthermore, during a visit to Yerevan (9–10 February), U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance announced that Washington could invest up to US$ 9 billion in Armenia’s nuclear energy sector, which includes long-term fuel and maintenance contracts. 

Small modular reactors are central to Armenia’s new strategy – this was clearly voiced by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in October 2024, when he mentioned that the Armenian government aims to build a small modular reactor as the next nuclear facility. The main competitive advantages of these facilities is that they are viewed as more flexible and potentially cheaper to deploy in smaller energy markets. Armenia’s government believes that over the years the technology could provide a suitable replacement for the Metsamor facility while maintaining the country’s energy security. 

Predictably, the initiative has triggered a strong and quite negative reaction in Moscow: Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom currently plays the key role in Armenia’s nuclear sector and has long been interested in building new reactors in the country. Therefore, the possibility that Armenia might select an American reactor technology threatens Russia’s economic interests and influence in a region traditionally considered part of Moscow’s geopolitical sphere. Russian media outlets have framed the agreement as a major strategic shift in Armenia`s foreign economic policy, and rather unfriendly toward Russia. Commentators in Russian publications argue that Pashinyan’s decision could weaken Russia’s position in the South Caucasus while strengthening US influence in Armenia’s energy infrastructure, establishing a long-term strategic foothold. Clearly, the debate therefore extends beyond energy policy and touches on the broader geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West.

IMPLICATIONS:

In Russian argumentation, Armenia’s nuclear agreement with the US carries multiple strategic implications where two factors tower above others. First, the deal is described as threatening both Russia’s dominance in Armenia’s energy sector and its global position as a leading actor in nuclear technologies. Rosatom has invested significant resources in maintaining the Metsamor plant and extending its operational life. Russia, primarily through Rosatom and state-backed financing, has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the modernization of Armenia’s nuclear plant, including a US$ 270 million loan, a US$ 30 million grant, and additional upgrade contracts. Russian officials have also repeatedly highlighted Russia`s global leadership in nuclear construction and its extensive experience in operating reactors abroad. In this context, losing the Armenian market to U.S. competitors would represent both an economic loss and a symbolic blow to Russia’s international nuclear industry. 

Second, Russian officials have emphasized safety concerns related to the proposed SMR project. Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, warned that Armenia’s location in a seismically active region makes nuclear construction particularly sensitive. According to Shoigu, Soviet engineers designed Metsamor’s foundation to withstand the devastating 1988 earthquake, demonstrating the reliability of Russian technology. He argued that the introduction of unfamiliar reactor designs could introduce new safety risks that regional governments would have to consider. 

Shoigu also questioned the technological maturity of U.S. SMR designs. He pointed out that the U.S. has yet to complete a fully operational SMR project domestically, suggesting that the technology remains largely untested in practice. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova warned that Armenia could effectively become a testing ground for experimental U.S. nuclear technologies if it proceeds with the project, and that the scale of the proposed US$ 9 billion agreement raises questions about financial risks and long-term feasibility. Safety concerns resonate strongly across the post-Soviet space due to the legacy of major nuclear accidents, most notably the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The memory of such incidents continues to shape public perceptions of nuclear energy from Belarus to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, arguments emphasizing nuclear safety, which Russian officials frequently invoke in discussions about Armenia’s potential adoption of small modular reactors, are not merely rhetorical but can find receptive audiences in societies where historical experience has made the risks associated with nuclear technology particularly salient.

Despite these tensions, Armenian officials insist that the decision regarding a new nuclear plant has not yet been finalized and that Yerevan continues to review proposals from multiple partners, including Russia. Armenian authorities have even requested additional technical briefings from Moscow regarding Russian modular reactor technologies, indicating that competition for the project remains open. 

Another factor that could affect a potential U.S.-Armenia nuclear deal is Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary election on June 7. Some Western experts believe that the U.S.-Armenia nuclear agreement would likely be weakened or delayed if Pashinyan is defeated in the elections, however not automatically disbanded. (Pro)Russian experts suggest that an opposition win could sharply change Armenia’s foreign-policy course, improving ties with Moscow. 

The Armenian side clearly understands that the final decision, should it not comply with Russia`s expectations, would have broader geopolitical implications for the country. This has an even more pronounced meaning given that over the past several years political relations between Russia and Armenia have deteriorated as Armenia has sought to diversify its foreign policy and strengthen ties with Western partners. For Russia, the potential loss of influence in Armenia’s nuclear sector represents much more than a commercial setback – it could manifest a broader erosion of Moscow’s role in the South Caucasus at a time when Western countries are expanding their presence in the region and Russia’s influence and posture are eroding.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. marks a potentially transformative moment in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. While the project remains at an early stage and Armenia continues to evaluate competing proposals, the possibility that U.S. companies could build the country’s next nuclear reactor has already triggered strong negative reactions in Moscow. Russian officials have criticized the proposal on technical, economic, security and geopolitical grounds, emphasizing safety concerns and highlighting Rosatom’s experience in nuclear construction. At the same time, Russian media portray the initiative as part of a broader Western strategy to expand influence in Armenia and weaken Russia’s traditional role in the region, in strategic proximity of southern Russia. For Armenia, the nuclear agreement represents an effort to diversify strategic partnerships and strengthen energy independence. Yet the decision also clearly carries risks, including exacerbated political friction with Russia. Ultimately, the competition over Armenia’s nuclear future illustrates the intensifying geopolitical rivalry shaping the South Caucasus. The outcome of this contest will influence not only Armenia’s energy security but also the balance of power in a region where infrastructure, economics, and geopolitics remain deeply intertwined.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Lydia Sawatsky

Azerbaijan is increasingly stepping away from Russian influence as Russia’s military dominance in the Caucasus slips due to its involvement in the war in Ukraine. Baku has responded to these changing dynamics through a series of policy measures, including border closures, restrictions on Russian soft power, and surveillance of Russian-aligned organizations.  This shift has only grown more visible in recent weeks as Vice President JD Vance made a historic visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and President Aliyev met Ukrainian President Zelensky for the third time at the Munich Security Conference. At Munich, Aliyev publicly accused Russia of deliberately striking the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Kyiv on three separate occasions, underscoring just how strained the Baku/Moscow relationship has become. 

BACKGROUND:

Historical episodes of Soviet and Russian military intervention in Azerbaijan, including the Soviet Union’s crackdown on Azerbaijani protesters in Baku in January 1990 and Moscow’s long-standing support for Armenia, have reinforced Azerbaijan’s efforts to safeguard its sovereignty. Azerbaijan has often maneuvered around the consequences of openly opposing Kremlin positions by maintaining a cautious and cordial relationship with Moscow despite recurring tensions. Even when differences emerged over regional conflicts or broader geopolitical alignments, Baku prioritized diplomatic stability within the structural constraints imposed by Russia’s dominant role in the South Caucasus. 

Azerbaijan gained regional confidence as Turkey stepped into the role of security guarantor. The alliance with Turkey signaled to Baku that it would not face regional threats alone. The Shusha Declaration promised military support against any foreign aggression. Military cooperation with Turkey intensified after Iran’s direct provocation of Azerbaijan by conducting a military exercise on the border simulating a military crossing of the Araz River. In response, Turkish troops, along with the Turkish Chief of the General Staff, participated in a similar joint drill to cross the river. Turkey’s promise of military aid and quick responses to military provocations reinforced Azerbaijan’s sense of security and showed Russia’s declining role as the primary regional power in the Caucasus. 

Despite diverging interests, Baku largely accommodated Moscow’s continued involvement in regional security affairs to preserve stability. Following Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Russia rapidly deployed “peacekeeping” forces to the region. Similarly, the 2022 Declaration of Allied Cooperation with Russia, signed two days before the Ukraine war, is most revealing for the reaction it provoked rather than its substance, as it sparked concerns that Azerbaijan was drifting back into Moscow’s sphere of influence. In practice, however, Baku’s foreign policy remained largely unchanged, showing how Azerbaijan used symbolic accommodation to create misleading perceptions of alignment. 

Russia’s withdrawal of its peacekeeping forces from Karabakh in 2024, largely driven by mounting military demands in Ukraine, marked a critical turning point in Azerbaijan’s assessment of its regional environment. The redeployment signaled a reduced Russian capacity to sustain its military presence in the region, giving Baku a window to increase its autonomy. While Azerbaijan did not pursue openly anti-Russian policies, Moscow’s growing preoccupation elsewhere encouraged a more assertive approach to Azerbaijani national sovereignty. 

Beyond the military realm, Russia’s persecution of ethnic minorities has grown more visible due to widespread social media use, as reports of unlawful arrests of Azerbaijani citizens, beatings across Russia, and Chechnya’s deportation of Azerbaijani nationals to forcibly fight in Ukraine have become increasingly more common. Azerbaijanis have become more vocal in voicing their anger, with one journalist going so far as to call for the destruction of the Embassy of Russia in Baku. 

Azerbaijan’s frustration with Russia intensified significantly after Russia shot down Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 over Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, in December 2024, allegedly mistaking the passenger aircraft for a Ukrainian drone. After the plane was hit, Russian authorities denied it permission to land and redirected it to the Kazakh city of Aktau, an action analysts suggest was meant to cover up the incident, possibly hoping the plane would crash into the Caspian Sea. The previously maintained cordial and diplomatic relationship between Chechnya and Azerbaijan devolved so rapidly that when Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov tried to call Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev on December 30, Aliyev refused his call. 

The crash of the Azerbaijani airline and the diplomatic fallout underscore why this matters for Azerbaijan. The incident exposed the risks of non-transparent and highly centralized security structures operating near its border. Azerbaijan’s refusal to allow the issue to be dismissed and its insistence on formal acknowledgment and compensation reinforced Baku’s insistence on formal state accountability rather than relying on informal crisis management.

As Azerbaijani-Russian relations were slowly returning to normal, Azerbaijan agreed to the US-backed TRIPP plan, moving towards closer economic ties with the U.S. and the West. Aliyev further raised the stakes at the February 2026 Munich Security Conference, publicly accusing Russia of deliberately striking Azerbaijan's Kyiv embassy three times in 2025, even after Baku had provided the coordinates of its diplomatic missions. Azerbaijan again directly and publicly criticized Russia, with little of the political cordiality that Azerbaijan has extended towards Russia in the past.

IMPLICATIONS:

These developments have coincided with a broader set of Azerbaijani policy adjustments. Azerbaijan's government is clearly considering the potential instability caused by its policies toward Russia. To mitigate the fallout, Azerbaijan is heavily restricting contact and influence with Russia in numerous ways. 

Despite its geographic proximity to Russia, Azerbaijan has separated itself significantly from its neighbor in the last few years. Azerbaijan closed its borders with all neighbors in 2020 during the COVID pandemic and has kept each of them closed for political reasons, severing many regional ties. Citizens who once crossed the border regularly to shop or visit relatives now face near-total separation. There are no longer direct flights from Baku International Airport to the Dagestani cities of Grozny, Makhachkala, or Derbent, forcing travelers to travel instead through Moscow, often with long layovers. This not only makes it more difficult to travel but also significantly raises the financial burden, with an average ticket costing around $500, which is more than the average monthly salary for most Azerbaijanis, especially outside the capital. This means that there is much less flexibility in migration across the border. 

Azerbaijani attitudes toward Russification and Kremlin narratives have also shifted dramatically.  Leaked Kremlin documents dated to December 2025 acknowledge this reality, noting that Russian-speaking Azerbaijani citizens now face increased security surveillance and that organizations protecting Russian minority interests have been eliminated or restricted to the purpose of promoting interethnic harmony between Russians and Azerbaijanis. 

Russia’s inability to pivot away from Ukraine or divert resources to the Caucasus has driven Azerbaijan’s move away from its neighbor and toward greater independence. This strategy will protect Azerbaijan from potential unrest in Russia spilling over into its borders and accelerate Azerbaijan's pivot away from Russian soft power toward diverse global partnerships. The border closures, flight cancellations, and restrictions on Russian influence are more than temporary precautions: they reflect a permanent change.

Azerbaijan has already structurally insulated itself from Russia’s northern periphery, and recent shocks have only revealed how far that decoupling has gone. Recent tensions did not create Azerbaijan’s distancing, but exposed Azerbaijan’s preexisting insulation strategy as it enacted restrictions on cross-border movement, limited soft power influence, and asserted itself diplomatically. Russia is an increasingly unpredictable and unstable partner, and though Azerbaijan remains economically and geographically tied to Russia, it can now better pursue multi-vector diplomacy and diversification. Azerbaijan’s recent actions and diplomatic posture suggest not a geopolitical realignment, but a calculated effort to reduce exposure to instability stemming from Russia while preserving functional interstate relations.

CONCLUSIONS:

Ultimately, Azerbaijan’s response to Russia’s declining power is a policy of calculated insulation. This shift is structural rather than merely reactionary, as the permanent closure of land borders and the dismantling of transport links to the North Caucasus serve as a physical barrier against potential Russian instability and soft power.

Measures such as increased surveillance of Russian-speaking citizens and the removal of pro-Kremlin interest groups indicate a shift away from Russian soft power toward a new era of regional cooperation with Central Asia and Turkey, as well as Western-led global partnerships. Vice President J.D. Vance's February 2026 visit to the South Caucasus signals the kind of high-level Western engagement that Azerbaijan and its neighbors are now actively courting. While the fundamental, pragmatic ties between Baku and Moscow are unlikely to fully rupture, Azerbaijan is working harder than ever to decouple its security from Russia’s influence. While Azerbaijan is unlikely to fully sever its ties with Russia, given enduring geographic and economic constraints, its current diplomatic trajectory marks an unprecedented departure from decades of accommodating Russian regional dominance, opening a timely window for deeper Western engagement and the advancement of a more durable strategic partnership in the South Caucasus.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Lydia Sawatsky is a researcher with American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. A recent graduate of Wheaton College, she grew up in Sumqayit, Azerbaijan, and has spent extensive time in the Caucasus and Central Asia. She previously worked with International Literacy and Development (ILAD) in Baku, Azerbaijan, researching access to education for Afghan and Pakistani refugees residing in the country.

By Laura Thornton

Armenians head to the polls on June 7 to elect all 101 members of parliament at a time of critical regional and geopolitical consequences. Following the 2018 Velvet Revolution and Nagorno-Karabakh war, the country has embarked on a new path of democratic reform and foreign policy alignments. Previously dependent on Russia for security guarantees and economic stability, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is now forging new ties with the European Union (EU) and United States, while redefining the country’s relationship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. The election presents a choice beyond minor policy options but a vision for the country’s governance and geopolitical alignment. Given the stakes, both domestic and foreign actors have intensified their tactics, manipulating existing vulnerabilities, and present serious threats to the election process.

BACKGROUND:

The election is taking place at a historic pivot point for Armenia’s positioning in the region and beyond. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia has tied to Russia militarily, economically, and ideologically. Armenia has been part of the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian initiative to ensure economic integration, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led security alliance. Russia has been Armenia’s largest supplier of military aid and key trading partner. Russia also owns key infrastructure in Armenia, including railways and telecommunications. However, Russia’s failure to defend Armenia during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts damaged ties between the two states, with Yerevan suspending its participation in the CSTO and demanding the removal of Russian border troops. 

While turning away from Russia, the government has pursued European Union (EU) accession and signed a framework to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which aims to establish a transit route in the south Caucasus. Further, regional calculations have dramatically changed, paving the way for a redefined relationship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a peace agreement being formed with the former and new border and trade discussions with the latter. 

Two main opposition blocs, which are closely tied to Russia, are challenging the ruling Civil Contract party of Pashinyan. The ruling party is running on “peace,” which it defines as continuing the negotiations with Azerbaijan and building closer ties with the EU and U.S. The opposition blocs oppose the government’s peace agreement, accuse the government of being under Azerbaijani and Turkish control, and say EU goals are unrealistic.

While the political contest does not fall along neat “pro-West vs. pro-Russian” divides as in some frontline democracies, and none of the viable parties embraces a full break from Russia (mindful that the plurality of Armenians believe Russia is the country’s most important political partner), the parties do differ significantly on the nature of the relationship. The Kremlin has taken note and activated its hybrid warfare playbook, employed in Georgia, Moldova, and other democracies, to defeat the ruling party.  

The political landscape is also shaped by a fierce conflict between the government and Church leaders. Church leaders – headed by Karekin II, the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians – accuse the Pashinyan government of “losing” the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and have called for the Prime Minister’s resignation. In turn, the government has prosecuted several bishops on charges ranging from “calling for a coup” to drug charges, prosecutions which many independent groups believe lack strong evidence. Opposition parties have seized on this issue, criticizing the government and defending the Church.

IMPLICATIONS:

Given the partisan divergence on the country’s foreign policy orientation, the geopolitical stakes in the election are high, activating malign actors. The Kremlin sees clearly the threat of the ruling Civil Contract, which has pledged more decoupling from Russia and greater alignment with Europe and the U.S. While recently on a pre-election assessment mission to Yerevan, government officials, civil society representatives, diplomats, and observers described Russia’s hybrid warfare in the country as “unprecedented.” There was also widespread agreement that the country was not adequately prepared for the threat, made worse by the elimination of USAID and its support in bolstering the country’s defenses.

Information is central to the Kremlin’s strategy. Russia dominates the airwaves, with Russian channels freely broadcast on national television, and social media, where there are few regulations. Narratives focus on Armenia’s need for Russian security, and how the Pashinyan government has ceded sovereignty to Azerbaijan, and for the Russian market. Emphasis is on Armenia as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Disinformation about elections, institutions, and democracy is prevalent, particularly sowing distrust in the integrity of the upcoming election. Russian information campaigns bolster opposition talking points, such as those accusing the government of suppressing speech and political prosecutions.   

The Kremlin has infiltrated charities, movements, and foundations, such as the “Foundation to Battle Injustice,” established by the late Wagner Head Yevgeniy Prigozhin. Russia and Armenian Church leaders are also in lockstep, each amplifying the other’s attacks on the government, messaging on traditional values, and criticism of Western institutions. Russia has also mobilized the Armenian diaspora to vote in previous elections, paying for transport and vote buying. Russian banks and businesses operate throughout the country making financing of influence operations and proxies easy. 

It is widely acknowledged in Yerevan that the country is not adequately prepared to defend against this threat. Government bodies are poorly resourced and often lack the mandate, technology, and tools to investigate or conduct counter efforts. There are also legal loopholes, such as the lack of regulation on third parties, which frequently engage in political activity. Civil society groups, research institutes, and independent media – central to building resilience to hybrid threats – are also poorly resourced, particularly since the elimination of USAID.

Electoral victory for the main opposition blocs, the beneficiaries of Russian influence, would signify a reversal on the country’s current trajectory. Russian citizen Samvel Karapetyan, owner of the Russian Tashir Group, founded the opposition Strong Armenia. The other main opposition bloc, Armenia Alliance, is led by former President Robert Kocharyan who serves on the board of directors for Sistema PJSFC, one of Russia’s largest investment companies. In addition to their obvious Russian ties, the parties reject Pashinyan’s peace agreement (and do not offer a clear alternative), do not approve of TRIPP, and believe Armenia is “not ready” for the EU. 

According to recent polling, Civil Contract is polling at 24 percent, Strong Armenia at nine percent, and everyone else below the threshold. This polling also shows the majority of support for the ruling party comes from older (56+) and more urban citizens. Importantly, those who select Civil Contract are far more likely to identify as “pro-Western” (73 percent) while those who support Strong Armenia believe the country’s policy should be “pro-Russian” (71 percent).

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s election could lead to the continuation of the country’s new foreign alignment course, forging new economic and security relationships and exerting greater freedom from Russian control. Alternatively, the country could abandon this direction, taking a closer path to that of neighboring Georgia, which has alienated the West and forged closer ties with Russia, China, and Iran. At a time of upheaval and uncertainty in the region, a strong alliance of pro-Russian governments along the vertical axis from Moscow to Tehran would have significant consequences. It could block Western interests in and access to the region and beyond, lead to new destabilization between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and embolden Russia to act elsewhere. 

Enhanced U.S. and European support would help fortify the elections from malign actors through increased technical assistance, intelligence, financing, and training to Armenian partners.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Laura Thornton has spent more than 30 years in the democracy, governance, and security space both as a practitioner and policy and advocacy expert. She lived more than two decades in Asia and the former Soviet Union and has held positions at the McCain Institute, the German Marshall Fund, International IDEA, and the National Democratic Institute.