By Stephen Blank
The Pakistan-Afghanistan war, on top of the war against Iran, is forcing Moscow to attempt to balance its security and economic interests in and beyond Central Asia with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is critical to Russia because it provides an alternative to Iran, allowing Moscow’s transcontinental trade project INSTC to move forward and offering a gateway to Asia. Concurrently, Moscow has upgraded its ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan both to deter ISIS-K terrorists and to secure broader geostrategic aims. Yet it also increasingly appears that Moscow is willing to offer Afghanistan arms, ostensibly to deter terrorists. However, in the broader regional context, this move underscores Moscow’s propensity for playing a double game with and against its partners.

BACKGROUND:
The Iran war and Pakistan’s war with Afghanistan threaten the further erosion of Russian influence in Central Asia. Consequently, Russia has embarked on what can only be called a double game vis-à-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has attacked Afghanistan because it claims Afghanistan harbors the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorist group, which performs attacks against Pakistan. This complaint is more than a little ironic given Pakistan’s own long-standing and well-known record of sponsoring terrorism against India. More significant, however, is the fact that this charge, if true, signifies that Kabul has escaped Islamabad’s tutelage. However, the war also disrupts Russia’s ambition to sell Russian gas to South and Southeast Asia through pipelines traversing Afghanistan and Pakistan.
At the same time, Russia has steadily built a “full-fledged” and “pragmatic” partnership with Afghanistan to prevent it from sponsoring terrorist groups like ISIS-K and their targeting of Russia and Central Asia, where Russia still claims to be the ultimate security manager. According to Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, full-fledged partnership includes bilateral defense and security cooperation. Indeed, Shoigu openly proclaimed Russia’s opposition to any third-party military presence in Afghanistan or neighboring countries, a shot across both Pakistan’s and the U.S.’s bow and a sign of its ambition to establish a protectorate over Afghanistan.
However, Russia’s interests transcend defense. The war against Iran has ruptured the feasibility of Russia’s, Iran’s and India’s major transit, trade and connectivity route through Central Asia and then through Russia to Europe, the INSTC (multi-modal International North-South Transportation Corridor). The other existing corridor, the increasingly lucrative Middle Corridor or TITR (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) from China to Central Asia and then to the Caucasus and Europe bypasses Russia. Thus, since failure to find an alternative to Iran for INSTC will have dire geoeconomic and geopolitical consequences for Russia, it has turned to Pakistan for help. Pakistan cannot afford exclusion from transcontinental trade routes and has agreed to explore connecting its port at Gwadar either by land or by sea to INSTC.
IMPLICATIONS:
Moscow typically has sought to have a foot in both camps in every conflict scenario throughout the Global South and the Pakistan-Afghan war is no exception. But this case is far more central to Moscow’s interests than its power projection in for example Africa or the Middle East. In order to maintain its self-appointed “leading position” in Central Asia, it is crucial for Russia to exercise leverage over Afghanistan to deter an outbreak of Islamic terrorism targeting either Central Asia or Russia.
Likewise, it is critical to Russia’s economic health and continuing ability to finance its war against Ukraine and its heavily strained state budget that it continues to find Asian markets for its oil and gas. Doing so also entails developing trade routes like INSTC to Pakistan, India and Southeast Asia, especially given its desire to be acknowledged as an independent Asian power. Therefore, balancing between Pakistan and Afghanistan while developing alternatives to Iran’s connectivity have become requirements of Russian policies to realize vital Russian interests, especially as its economy is reeling and its position in Central Asia erodes.
Further erosion is inevitable if Islamic terrorism “migrates” to Central Asia without Moscow being able to deter or stop it. By the same token, exclusion from transcontinental trade routes will undermine Moscow’s ideological and rhetorical pretense of hegemony, and demonstrate that Russia lacks the means in terms of tangible material capability to back up its arguments or sustain a position that answers to Central Asia’s most pressing questions, i.e. economic development.
Concurrently, if Russia cannot develop let alone sustain viable, economically justifiable outreach to South and Southeast Asia, its hard-won influence and standing in those countries will diminish by an order of magnitude, negating its claims of being an Asian power and making it still more dependent on China.
Despite its vital need to keep the balance between Pakistan and Afghanistan, many recent reports suggest that Moscow is secretly negotiating an arms deal with the Taliban. Ostensibly, the aim would be to use the weapons to suppress ISIS-K and prevent further terrorist strikes in Central Asia and or Russia. While this makes sense if leveraging Russia’s Central Asian position and ambitions vis-à-vis Afghanistan are the priority; in reality, it highlights the priority of security over economic development in Russian policy. It also illustrates the abiding temptation to make secret deals involving the security services or force structures as primary instruments of foreign policy.
Given the Taliban’s track record, it is unlikely that it can or will hold up its end of the bargain. Moreover, should these reports be true this news will enrage Pakistan and likely torpedo efforts to have it join INSTC. That trade project, unlike the Middle Corridor, never got off the ground and is therefore already being eclipsed. This has gravely serious and negative implications for Russia and is likely to aggravate all the trends making for the decline of Russian power in the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as South and Southeast Asia.
An arms deal with the Taliban will further entrench the belief among governments who monitor Russian behavior that Moscow is cannot be relied on as a partner. It will also confirm the notion held by many Western governments that Russia, like the Soviet Union, remains a sponsor of state terrorism and must, at best, be kept at arm’s length.
CONCLUSIONS:
Thus Russia continues to play a double game towards its partners, attempting to have both an empire and prosperous foreign trade relations, even though their logics are quite incompatible. Moscow also has yet to grasp that it cannot denounce and support terrorism at the same time without paying an incommensurate price for its quest after short-term gains. In Central Asia, Russia still seeks to pursue wildly contradictory aims without paying the price for doing so. If Moscow does, in fact, arm the Afghan government, it will once again be playing with dynamite.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.
By Eldaniz Gusseinov, Rassul Kospanov
The Pakistan–Afghanistan war has accelerated Kabul's economic reorientation toward Central Asia, a structural shift that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have moved most visibly to institutionalize. Less visible, but strategically consequential, is the parallel track that Russia has been constructing through the Republic of Tatarstan. Over the course of 2024 and 2025, Tatarstan has signed memoranda worth US$ 183 million with Afghan private-sector counterparts, doubled bilateral trade to US$ 51 million in the first eleven months of 2025, and prepared a trilateral Russia–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan transport corridor agreement for signature at KazanForum 2026. The pattern suggests that Moscow has delegated a substantial component of its Afghan engagement to a subnational actor as a calibrated instrument of paradiplomacy, a model that carries implications for how external powers compete for position in the emerging trans-Afghan corridor system.

BACKGROUND:
Tatarstan's suitability as Moscow's Afghan channel rests on a combination of confessional, communal, and institutional factors that no other Russian federal subject combines. The republic's Islamic identity provides a register of communication with the Taliban authorities that federal Russian institutions cannot easily replicate.
Kazan hosts the annual Russia–Islamic World: KazanForum, which since 2023 has carried federal status and functions as one of the few large-format venues where Taliban officials are received. An additional advantage is the presence of a historically established Tatar diaspora in Afghanistan. A notable Tatar community has lived in the country since the nineteenth century, having been formed largely by merchants and trading intermediaries from the Russian Empire who gradually settled in Afghan cities and integrated into local society.
Today, descendants of this diaspora are concentrated primarily in the northern provinces of Balkh, Samangan, and Baghlan, providing Kazan with an important human infrastructure for engagement that predates the events of 2021. In March 2021, the Afghan government formally recognized "Tatar" as a nationality category in civil documentation, which anchored the community's relationship with Kazan more durably than informal ties had previously allowed.
The institutional architecture developed in parallel. In 2023, a Russian business center affiliated with the Kazan-based Charitable Patriotic Fund of Muslims opened in Kabul. Russia became the first country to open a business representative office in Afghanistan after August 2021.
Tatarstani firms entered the market before the federal center had resolved the legal status of the Taliban movement, which remained on Russia's list of banned organizations until April 2025, when the Supreme Court suspended the ban and Russia became the first state to formally recognize the government in Kabul.
During that pre-recognition period, Tatarstan's engagement operated in a space that federal diplomacy could not formally occupy, and the institutional relationships established during those years have persisted after recognition.
As CEO of the Charitable Patriotic Foundation of Muslims of Russia, Rustam Khabibullin headed the business representative office. Even before the Taliban movement came to power, the patriotic foundation of Muslims had maintained relations with Afghanistan, in particular with Afghans of Tatar origin. Trade volumes reflect the accumulated weight of this engagement.
Tatarstan–Afghanistan commerce doubled in the first eleven months of 2025 to US$ 51 million, accounting for roughly 10 percent of total Russian–Afghan trade. Tatarstan exports petroleum products, grain, KAMAZ trucks, and specialized equipment; Afghanistan exports dried fruits and minerals.
In May 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar led an Afghan delegation to Kazan for meetings with Rais Rustam Minnikhanov and federal ministers.
In August 2025, a Tatarstani delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Korobchenko travelled to Kabul, the first regional Russian delegation of such standing to visit in the post-2021 period.
IMPLICATIONS:
The paradiplomatic model offers Moscow operational flexibility that formal diplomacy cannot match, even after recognition. Industrial cooperation, equipment supplies, and energy projects can be advanced through Kazan without elevating every transaction to state-to-state protocol.
The confessional and historical background that Tatarstan brings to the engagement is quite unique. Recognition has regularized the legal environment without altering the functional logic that made Kazan the preferred channel in the first place.
The federal center has therefore continued to route substantial engagement through the republic rather than absorbing the Afghan file fully into the standard Ministry of Foreign Affairs framework.
This model also has historical precedents. During the Soviet period, Moscow often used Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as showcase republics of the “Soviet East” — modernized Muslim-majority regions meant to demonstrate the compatibility of socialism with development, secular governance, and industrial progress.
Tashkent in particular hosted Afro-Asian conferences and served as a symbolic bridge to the decolonizing world, while Kazakhstan projected an image of industrial modernity and frontier development. In this sense, the current use of Tatarstan as Russia’s preferred Afghan channel reflects not an innovation, but a revival of an older practice: governing external peripheries through carefully selected internal Muslim intermediaries.
The trilateral Tatarstan–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan transport corridor scheduled for signature at KazanForum 2026 in May represents the most consequential element of this architecture. The route is conceived as an alternative to the International North-South Transport Corridor, whose Iranian segment has been disrupted by regional conflict.
Nuruddin Azizi, the Afghan Minister of Industry and Trade, has been one of the driving forces behind the project from Afghanistan, and Oleg Korobchenko, Tatarstan's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade, has overseen the Tatarstani component through regular meetings with the Afghan side. First shipments are planned from Tatarstan. Khabibullin has identified Afghanistan as Tatarstan's leading importer of halal-certified goods. In 2024, companies in Tatarstan exported US$ 37 million worth of halal products to Afghanistan. This figure is 20 times higher than in 2023.
If the corridor materializes, it will deepen Russian participation in the trans-Afghan railway architecture that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been actively advancing. Uzbekistan's project, which runs from Termez through Mazar-i-Sharif toward South Asian ports via the Salang Pass. Kazakhstan's alternative route, with approximately US$ 500 million committed including a logistics hub in Herat, follows the technically simpler Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak corridor across western Afghanistan.
A parallel track runs through Uzbekistan's Surkhandarya region, where the Aritom free economic zone in Termez borders Afghanistan and offers multimodal logistics including rail, road, and river port. At the Russia–Uzbekistan interregional conference held in Termez in autumn 2026, Tatarstani and Surkhandarya officials advanced a cooperation framework covering industrial localization, agro-processing, and transit through Aritom toward Afghan and broader South Asian markets. The Uzbek side has positioned the zone as a 250-million-consumer gateway; Tatarstan's two industrial parks at Chirchik and Jizzakh, where more than half of resident firms are Russian, provide a productive base that can be articulated with the transit infrastructure at Termez. The architecture allows Russian exports to reach Afghan markets either through the Turkmen corridor or through Uzbek infrastructure, which diversifies the operational risk inherent in a single route.
Energy and resource cooperation extends the model further. At the Tatarstan Oil and Gas Chemical Forum, the Taliban's acting Minister of Mines and Petroleum Hedayatullah Badri publicly invited Tatarstani firms to invest in Afghan hydrocarbon projects, while the acting Minister of Energy and Water Resources Abdul Latif Mansur proposed Tatarstani participation in the Panjshir-to-Kabul water transfer project. Memoranda on exploration, extraction, and processing of oil and gas were signed in Kazan in 2025, and KER-Holding has advanced proposals for coal-fired power generation in Afghanistan. This is a role that China lost when its oil extraction project in northern Afghanistan was cancelled, and which Kazakhstan is now beginning to contest through Kazatomprom's and Kazakhmys's exploration activities in Laghman.
The labor migration track, opened in late 2025, adds a further dimension. Kabul has formally proposed directing Afghan labor migrants to Tatarstan, with an initial cohort of approximately 1,000 workers for the agricultural sector and potential expansion across industries. This inverts the direction of the Afghan exodus of the 2021–2024 period and establishes a formal channel through which Afghan labor enters Russia via a subnational agreement, a configuration that the federal labor migration framework has not previously accommodated.
The limits of the model are also visible. Banking infrastructure remains the principal operational constraint. Rustam Khabibullin has publicly identified transaction commissions of approximately 30 percent as a substantial barrier to Russia–Afghanistan commercial settlement and has proposed that Russia develop an international payments system modelled on hawala for transactions with member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Nur Ahmad Agha, the chairman of Da Afghanistan Bank, is expected to attend the first congress of OIC national bank representatives at KazanForum 2026, which has been identified as the venue for this discussion. Without a payments architecture that can absorb Afghan transactions at scale, the trade volumes reported will remain concentrated in a narrow band of fuel, grain, and equipment.
CONCLUSIONS:
Tatarstan's Afghan engagement is neither a humanitarian gesture nor a purely commercial venture. It is the operational layer of Russian policy in a region where the confessional and communal dimensions of the relationship carry weight that standard diplomatic instruments cannot supply.
Russia's formal recognition of the Taliban government in April 2025 regularized the legal environment without displacing the Tatarstani channel, because the republic's combination of Islamic identity, a diaspora community in northern Afghanistan, an institutional platform in KazanForum, and a productive industrial base constitutes an instrument that no federal subject of Russia could replicate.
The trilateral corridor agreement prepared for May 2026 and the parallel track through Surkhandarya indicate that the model is scaling from bilateral commerce toward regional transit infrastructure. Whether Tatarstan's engagement consolidates into a durable Russian presence in Afghanistan will depend on the resolution of payment-system constraints and on whether Moscow formalizes the paradiplomatic arrangement through a trade representation in Kabul.
The broader significance lies in what the case illustrates: in the northward reorientation of Afghanistan that began with the closure of the Pakistani corridor, external powers are not only competing through state-level instruments but through the subnational channels that carry confessional, communal, and industrial advantages.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Eldaniz Gusseinov is Head of Research and сo-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int. and a non-resident research fellow at Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of the Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul. Rassul Kospanov is a Senior Researcher at the National Analytical Center under Nazarbayev University, where he coordinates socio-political research projects and prepares analytical reports and policy recommendations for central and local government bodies. His work focuses on political processes in Kazakhstan and across Central Asia, as well as issues of regional cooperation.
By Sudha Ramachandran
Afghanistan currently finds itself in an exceptionally precarious position. To the west, neighboring Iran has become an active war zone, while to the east, Pakistan has initiated what it describes as an “open war” against Afghanistan. After decades of conflict, Afghanistan’s capacity to manage the far-reaching consequences of the situation in Iran remains severely limited. The country’s already fragile economy is being further strained by rising global oil prices. At the same time, its access to maritime trade routes via Pakistan has been effectively closed for several months, while alternative trade corridors through Iran, the only viable substitute, are increasingly under threat. The likelihood of a substantial influx of refugees, including returning Afghan nationals, is expected to exacerbate an already critical humanitarian situation. Concurrently, the Taliban authorities are closely observing how the Iranian government responds to external pressures aimed at regime change.

BACKGROUND:
On the night of February 21-22, Pakistan launched “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq” against Afghanistan. Islamabad said that its missile and air strikes were targeting camps and hideouts of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province based on Afghan soil. Over the past month, Pakistan’s strikes have intensified and expanded in terms of the nature of targets and their geography. If initially Islamabad targeted border posts and alleged terrorist camps in Afghanistan’s border provinces, soon it was hitting Taliban military assets and ammunition depots as well as civilian targets, including a drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s western neighbor, Iran, came under devastating missile and air strikes launched by the U.S. and Israel on February 28. Since then, leadership compounds, military infrastructure, and economic and energy locations, including the country’s oil production and storage facilities have been destroyed. Top Iranian political and military leaders have been killed in the strikes as have hundreds of civilians. The war has spread beyond Iran. Tehran retaliated to the U.S.-Israel attacks by hitting Israeli targets as well as U.S. bases and oil infrastructure in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. South Asia was soon drawn into the war when the U.S. torpedoed an Iranian warship, IRIS Dena, 40 nautical miles off the Sri Lankan coast. On March 20, Iranian missiles reached deep into the Indian Ocean to target the U.S.-UK base in Diego Garcia. The war could draw in more countries, such as Pakistan. The destruction of production and refining infrastructure in the Gulf and Iran’s blocking of the Strait of Hormuz have led to fuel shortages and surging prices worldwide. What started as a war on Iran has set economies across continents ablaze.
Among the countries that will be hit the hardest by the Iran war is Afghanistan. Several factors make it particularly vulnerable. It is Iran’s neighbor; the two countries share a 921 km-long border. Afghanistan is also a landlocked country, dependent on Iran and Pakistan for access to ports. Importantly, Afghanistan was ravaged by war for decades and internationally isolated since the Taliban captured power in August 2021. Its capacity to withstand the impact of the war in West Asia was limited to begin with. This capacity is being further weakened by Pakistan’s ongoing military strikes on Afghanistan.
IMPLICATIONS:
The Taliban regime strongly condemned the U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran, describing them as an “act of aggression.” Following the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it expressed its condolences to the Iranian government and people. Especially since the Taliban came to power in August 2021, relations between Iran and Afghanistan have grown, especially with regard to trade. Although there are several issues of conflict between the two, anti-Americanism serves as glue. The Taliban’s chief spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, has said in the past that if Tehran requests assistance in the event of a U.S. attack, Afghanistan is ready and willing to extend help.
So far, Afghanistan has not been hit by Iranian or U.S/Israeli drones or missiles. Indeed, it is western and south-western Iran that has borne the brunt of U.S. and Israeli strikes. Eastern Iran, which borders Afghanistan, has escaped being hit so far. It is therefore an attractive safe haven for those fleeing western Iranian cities and towns. These internally displaced people can be expected to cross into Afghanistan and Iran’s other eastern neighbors should the war intensify, prolong or spread to eastern Iran. Afghanistan is already grappling with the economic burden imposed by the mass deportation of an estimated 5.4 million Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan since October 2023. The new refugee flows from Iran will substantially intensify the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Persecution of Afghan refugees in Iran is set to increase as Iranians have often suspected that they are spying for Israel. Such perceptions are likely to intensify. They will be hounded by Iranian police and people, forcing them to join the exodus into Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s weak economy is poised to fray further amid fuel shortages and surging prices. Given its low capacity for manufacturing, Afghanistan has depended on Iran for consumer goods. Afghanistan’s landlocked status has made it dependent on Pakistan and Iran for access to the sea, however, as access to Pakistani ports has been shut off, Afghan dependence on Iranian markets and trade corridors to the sea have deepened. Although Iranian border posts remain open to Afghan goods, the trade corridor through Iran to the sea is insecure as it runs through the conflict zone. While it continues to function, it is vulnerable to missile strikes as the war in Iran intensifies. There is a risk that Chabahar port could be bombed. The closure of the Iranian trade corridor would bring the Afghan economy to its knees and shatter Afghan lives and livelihoods. Afghanistan will have to strengthen its trade and transit ties with other Central Asian states.
Notwithstanding its condemnation of the U.S and Israeli strikes on Iran, Pakistan has benefited somewhat from the war in Iran. As the international community is preoccupied with the West Asia crisis, it has ignored the Pakistani military strikes on Afghanistan. Pakistan has therefore escaped global opprobrium for the horrific suffering its strikes have caused to Afghan civilians. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime is watching how Pakistan is responding to the crisis in West Asia. Should the Saudis decide to join the war against Iran, Pakistan, which has a mutual defense pact with Riyadh, is obligated to join the Saudis. Drawn into the West Asian crisis, the Pakistani military would need to halt its ongoing “open war” against Afghanistan. A termination of ‘Operation Ghazab Lil Haq’ would be welcomed by Afghanistan.
Taliban leaders will also be watching Iran closely to see how pressure from outside in the form of military strikes and war impacts an authoritarian regime. Will decapitation and war trigger unrest and lead to regime change? Or will it strengthen national unity and see the population rally behind the regime against the foreign invader? In the event of regime change in Iran, its leaders could seek sanctuary in Afghanistan.
CONCLUSIONS:
The conflict involving Iran has arisen at a particularly challenging moment for Afghanistan, which is simultaneously facing missile and air strikes from Pakistan. As a landlocked state, Afghanistan is especially vulnerable to external disruptions; its economic difficulties are likely to intensify due to fuel shortages linked to the conflict in Iran and the resulting constraints on access to seaports. In addition to its geographic proximity to the West Asian conflict zone, Afghanistan’s already limited institutional and economic capacity is expected to come under severe strain. This pressure will be exacerbated by a further economic downturn and by the anticipated influx of refugees, including returning Afghan nationals, from Iran.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Dr Sudha Ramachandran is an independent South Asian political and security analyst. She is also South Asia editor at The Diplomat. Her articles have appeared in publications like The Diplomat, Asia Times, China Brief and Terrorism Monitor.
By Nargiza Umarova
This article addresses the geopolitical and economic dynamics surrounding the development of the Wakhan Corridor as a potential trade route connecting Afghanistan and China through the high-altitude Wakhjir Pass. It highlights the Wakhan Corridor’s competitive advantages over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and analyses the risks and challenges posed by political instability, security threats, and infrastructural limitations in the region. It also examines China’s cautious stance, Tajikistan’s interest, and broader implications for regional connectivity. The primary objective is to evaluate the feasibility of the Wakhan Corridor, its comparative advantages over existing trade routes like CPEC, and its potential implications for regional connectivity. By examining these aspects, the paper seeks to analyze how the corridor could influence the geopolitical and economic landscape of Central Asia, Afghanistan, and China. In this context, the following analysis delves into the intricacies of the Wakhan Initiative, assessing its inherent risks and opportunities, while evaluating its potential for successful implementation.
By Syed Fazl-e-Haider
On February 26, Pakistan launched Operation Ghazab lil-Haq (Righteous Fury) against the Taliban regime in Kabul. The operation is widely interpreted as an attempt by Islamabad to pursue regime change in Afghanistan. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has effectively become a base for terrorist activities targeting not only Pakistan but also other Central Asian states, including Tajikistan. Russia has warned that Afghanistan-based ISIS seeks to expand its so-called caliphate in Central Asia, while China has expressed concern over the presence of Uyghur militants and other anti-China groups in the country. In this context, regime change in Kabul has emerged as a strategic priority for Islamabad and Beijing. Meanwhile, the persistence of terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan and the ongoing war has stalled major trans-Afghan connectivity projects intended to link Central Asia with Pakistani seaports. 
BACKGROUND:
Since 2021, following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal under the Doha Agreement, Pakistan has experienced a significant increase in terrorist attacks. Islamabad has accused Afghanistan-based militant groups of conducting cross-border operations within its territory. Prominent among these are Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which have been responsible for numerous high-profile attacks. Pakistan has repeatedly urged the Taliban government to take action against these groups, which continue to operate from Afghan territory with relative impunity; however, these requests have largely gone unheeded.
China, which shares a 47-mile border with Afghanistan, has long been concerned that the country could become as a sanctuary for Uyghur separatists in proximity of its Xinjiang region. The Taliban government has assured Beijing that Afghan territory would not be used for activities against China. In return, China has offered economic assistance and investment to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, and has since emerged as the largest foreign investor in the country.
Other anti-China groups operating from safe havens in Afghanistan include the TTP and the BLA. Both organizations have been implicated in several high-profile attacks targeting Chinese nationals in Pakistan.
In March 2024, a suicide attack on a van killed five Chinese engineers working on the Dasu dam project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A similar attack at the same site in 2021 resulted in the deaths of nine Chinese engineers. The TTP was implicated in both incidents. The BLA, in turn, has conducted more attacks on Chinese nationals and assets than any other separatist organization. Notably, in 2022, the BLA deployed its first female suicide bomber, who carried out an attack outside the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi, killing three Chinese instructors.
Although China has pursued a pragmatic engagement policy toward the Taliban since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, investing in mining, energy, and infrastructure, the Taliban have shown limited willingness or capacity to dismantle militant networks such as the TTP and BLA operating from Afghan territory.
Tajikistan, which shares a 1,400-kilometre border with Afghanistan, has also been affected by cross-border militancy. In December 2025, five individuals, including two Tajik security officers, were killed in an armed confrontation on the Tajik–Afghan border when militants attempted to infiltrate Tajik territory.
Russia, the only country that has formally recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has expressed concern that the regime undermines regional stability by allowing jihadist groups to operate from Afghan territory. These concerns intensified following a suicide attack on February 24 outside Moscow’s Savyolovsky Railway Station, which killed a police officer. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov linked the incident to Afghanistan-based groups. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has estimated that Afghanistan hosts between 20,000 and 23,000 militants, including approximately 5,000 to 7,000 affiliated with the TTP. Notably, Russia released this assessment of terrorist networks in Afghanistan two days before Pakistan initiated its military campaign against the Taliban, a move that may be interpreted as implicit political support.
The Taliban have also moved closer to Pakistan’s regional rival, India. Islamabad has alleged that groups such as the TTP and BLA operate as Indian proxies, a claim that New Delhi denies. The Taliban’s growing engagement with India has further raised concerns in Beijing. Amid mounting frustration over the Taliban’s inaction against militant groups operating from Afghan territory, Pakistan launched a large-scale military operation against the Taliban government on February 26, involving airstrikes across major Afghan cities, including Kabul.
IMPLICATIONS:
Operation Ghazab lil-Haq can be interpreted as an attempt to impose regime change in Kabul, though Pakistan is unlikely to achieve such an objective independently, without securing China’s support and involving Tajikistan. It must also obtain backing from anti-Taliban groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Tajik leader Ahmad Massoud, son of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud. Tajikistan presently hosts the NRF leadership. Pakistan’s airstrikes against the Taliban regime may create opportunities for the NRF and other opposition forces to weaken the Taliban’s internal control over Afghanistan.
Officially, Beijing has called on both Islamabad and Kabul to exercise restraint and has advocated a ceasefire. However, Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign against the Taliban likely carries tacit Chinese approval and support for a potential regime change effort. For such an operation, Islamabad would first need to secure control over the Wakhan Corridor in northeastern Afghanistan. This narrow strip of territory, often referred to as Afghanistan’s “Chicken Neck,” extends approximately 350 kilometers to China’s Xinjiang region, separating Tajikistan from Pakistan. Control of the corridor would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan and Central Asia beyond Afghanistan. For China, the Wakhan Corridor represents a critical node for safeguarding its strategic connectivity with South and Central Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While China appears to be adopting a cautious, “wait and watch” approach, Pakistan is actively seeking to reshape Afghanistan’s political landscape.
The Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict is likely to adversely affect trans-Afghan connectivity projects aimed at linking Central and South Asia, whether in the planning, negotiation, or implementation stages. For example, regional connectivity featured prominently in Pakistan–Kazakhstan discussions during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Islamabad in February 2026. A proposed US$ 7 billion railway project envisaged connecting Kazakhstan to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar via Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.
Similarly, the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway project is a trilateral initiative designed to connect Central Asia with the ports of Gwadar and Karachi through Afghanistan. Envisioned in 2021, the 850-kilometer corridor is expected to provide the first direct railway link between Central and South Asia. The US$ 4.8 billion project, scheduled for completion by 2027, will connect Tashkent to the Pakistani city of Peshawar via Kabul.
The US$ 10 billion Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline is a major strategic energy project intended to transport gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field, the world’s second largest, to energy-deficient markets in South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan. However, the project has already been delayed for over three decades due to persistent instability and conflict in Afghanistan.
Regime change in Kabul that ensures peace and stability in Afghanistan would facilitate a conducive environment for the implementation and completion of strategic connectivity projects between Central and South Asia. Conversely, if such efforts intensify conflict in the already war-torn country, these projects are likely to face indefinite delays.
CONCLUSIONS:
Officially, Islamabad frames its military campaign as an effort to compel the Taliban regime to withdraw support for Afghanistan-based militant groups targeting Pakistan. However, the operation also appears intended to convey that regime change is a clear option, should the Taliban fail to take verifiable action against such groups operating from Afghan territory. For a comprehensive regime change effort, Pakistan, China, and Tajikistan would have to align their positions on the jihadist threats emanating from Afghanistan, which, after more than four years of Taliban rule, has effectively become a safe haven for militant groups. The outcomes of the current operation will in turn have a significant impact on the future of trans-Afghan connectivity projects.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
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