By Orhan Gafarli
January 28, 2021, the CACI Analyst
The Second Karabakh War lasted for 44 days, ending on November 10, 2020 with the 9-point ceasefire agreement agreed by Azerbaijan and Armenia under Russian mediation. According to the ceasefire, the Armenian side will withdraw from the seven regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; a Russian Peace Force will control the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia and Russia’s Border Service (FSB) will supervise the highway between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Turkey is also a party to ensuring compliance with the ceasefire, setting up observation points and cooperating with Russia regarding negotiations between the parties. The end of the war might eventually bring the parties to a peace agreement and allow for regular overland transport between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. This perspective could help revive the Silk Road between East and West in the South Caucasus.
By Robert M. Cutler
December 7, 2020, the CACI Analyst
After over 25 years of diplomatic stalemate, notwithstanding the efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and declarations on all sides that “there is no military solution” to the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan has successfully implemented a military solution and taken territorial control of almost all of its lands occupied by Armenian forces in the early 1990s. The event not only inaugurates a new era of international security in the South Caucasus. It actually opens the door to improved relations between the two countries, if realistic approaches based on their inevitable cohabitation of the neighborhood can be found.
By Brenda Shaffer
November 25, 2020, the CACI Analyst
The security architecture emerging in the South Caucasus following the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan led to significant changes for the region’s three main powers: Russia and Turkey gained increased power in the region, while Iran’s leverage in the region declined. The war outcomes also strengthened domestic challenges from Iran’s large ethnic Azerbaijani community, which opposed Tehran’s support for Armenia in the war.
By Natalia Konarzewska
September 25, 2020, the CACI Analyst
On July 12, clashes broke out between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan along the northern section of their internationally recognized border. The skirmishes receded after July 16 but armed incidents at the border still occurred throughout July and August. The July confrontation, resulting in over a dozen military and civilian deaths and the destruction of infrastructure on both sides of the border, is regarded as the most serious since the Four Day War between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016. The conflict also sparked unprecedented interethnic clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas across the world.
By Vali Kaleji
September 10, 2020, the CACI Analyst
Close bilateral ties between Iran and Armenia have been overshadowed by sudden expansion of Yerevan-Tel Aviv links. Tehran views Israel as a "third factor" playing a negative role in Iranian relations with its neighbors including Armenia, and threatening security and stability throughout the South Caucasus. Armenian officals mantain that the decision made by Yerevan was known to Tehran at the outset, and the boosting of Yerevan-Tel Aviv ties is not directly against others, including Iran.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
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