By Emil Avdaliani 

Azerbaijan, akin to nations in Central Asia and the Gulf, endeavors to balance relations among major powers in order to avoid exclusive alignment with any singular geopolitical axis. Baku’s recent diplomatic initiatives reflect this strategy, which has contributed to enhancing the nation’s regional standing: relations with Iran have improved, engagement with China has intensified, and the European Union now seeks deeper political cooperation with Baku.

BACKGROUND: Ever since the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023 the country has pursued a much more diversified foreign policy by simultaneously building closer ties, beyond what it already had with Turkey and Russia, with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan, Israel and has moved to improve relations with the United States, which suffered during the Biden administration due to the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy building issues.

Since the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 2023, the country has adopted a markedly more diversified foreign policy, strengthening existing ties with Turkey and Russia while simultaneously deepening relations with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf states, Pakistan, and Israel, and taking steps to improve strained relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated under the Biden administration due to its prioritization of human rights and democratic governance.

This dynamic has become particularly pronounced in recent months. In April, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Baku to engage in discussions aimed at enhancing bilateral relations. Similarly, in April, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, visited Baku, where she met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov; during the visit, both parties agreed to resume negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.

A significant shift occurred in Baku–Beijing relations when, in April, the two countries elevated their ties to the level of a comprehensive partnership during the Azerbaijani president’s visit to China. While the development of the Middle Corridor remains a priority, the agreement with Azerbaijan places additional emphasis on enhancing bilateral cooperation in investment and business. As the largest economy in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan serves as a key entry point for China into the region.

Similarly, in April and May, Azerbaijan conducted meetings with Ukrainian officials—an uncommon move given Baku’s cautious stance on the war. However, in the context of increasingly strained relations with Russia, Baku’s outreach to Kyiv appears intended to signal displeasure to Moscow. Russia continues to deny any involvement in the downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft over its territory, a claim Baku maintains. Consequently, relations have deteriorated, with President Ilham Aliyev declining to attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in May.

In May, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan formalized their strategic partnership, enabling Tashkent to become a party to the Shusha Declaration, originally signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in 2021. Azerbaijan has maintained an active diplomatic presence in Central Asia, and although the Caspian Sea functions as a geographic divider, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are increasingly interconnected.

In late May, Azerbaijan hosted a trilateral summit with the leaders of Turkey and Pakistan, marking a new chapter in their cooperative relations. The geopolitical dimension of this partnership is becoming increasingly significant, particularly in light of Pakistan–India tensions and New Delhi’s growing ties with Armenia. The three Islamic nations also advanced collaboration in the political, economic, and military spheres.

Azerbaijan has also recently emerged as a venue for negotiations between opposing parties. For example, in April, Turkish and Israeli delegations convened in Baku to discuss the establishment of a potential “deconfliction mechanism” aimed at preventing direct clashes between the two states in Syria. In May, Baku also hosted Russian and German political representatives for talks on reviving the “Petersburg Dialogue,” which had been suspended since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This dimension of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy is particularly noteworthy, underscoring the country’s growing reputation as a credible and impartial facilitator of dialogue between the conflicting sides.

IMPLICATIONS: This diplomatic activism underscores Azerbaijan’s rising regional significance and its strategic efforts to position itself as a capable middle power—one that can exert influence within its immediate neighborhood while simultaneously acting as a crucial partner to rival great powers.

Evolving patterns of connectivity across Eurasia have been a key factor in enhancing Azerbaijan’s regional role. The Middle Corridor, which extends from the Black Sea to Central Asia and effectively links the EU with China, traverses Azerbaijan (alongside Georgia). This route enables both the EU and China to circumvent Russian territory, while Azerbaijan’s significance is further elevated by the EU’s demand for Caspian gas. Additionally, Brussels has intensified outreach to Central Asia, with which European leaders are increasingly engaging in trade and investment. The recent EU–Central Asia summit, where the Union pledged €12 billion in investments, exemplifies the rising importance of the Middle Corridor. A portion of this investment is earmarked for infrastructure upgrades along the route, particularly in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has also assumed a more critical role for China than in previous years. From Beijing’s perspective, Azerbaijan functions as a gateway to the Black Sea region. Moreover, China views Azerbaijan as a promising market for its rapidly expanding electric vehicle (EV) industry. Data from the past year indicate that Chinese brands are gaining increasing popularity in Azerbaijan, with discussions underway regarding potential joint production ventures. The country may also serve as a strategic hub for the distribution of Chinese EV models throughout the South Caucasus and beyond.

Azerbaijan’s increasing regional significance has prompted Iran to pursue full normalization of relations with its northern neighbor. During the Iranian president’s visit to Baku, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared, “Our goal, our primary goal is to raise Azerbaijani–Iranian interstate relations to a higher level.” This aspiration was accompanied by tangible measures. On May 21, Iran announced the execution of the sole assailant responsible for the 2023 attack on the Azerbaijani embassy. Additionally, Iran and Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises—Araz-2025. Diplomatic relations have now been fully restored, and cooperation on the International North–South Transport Corridor has been expanded. Consequently, Tehran and Baku have reduced tensions to levels seen prior to 2020, before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Iran’s strategic calculations also reflect concerns about preventing Azerbaijan from decisively aligning with Israel or the U.S. Azerbaijan has recently been identified as a prospective candidate for inclusion in the Abraham Accords, a U.S.-led initiative aimed at improving Israel’s relations with the Islamic world. The U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, indicated that Azerbaijan could join the Accords in the near future. While he mentioned other potential members—including Armenia, Syria, and Lebanon—Azerbaijan stands out due to its geographic location north of Iran. Although Baku and Tel Aviv have historically maintained close ties, formal accession to the Accords would significantly elevate Azerbaijan’s stature in the Middle East and strengthen its relationship with the U.S. Given the persistent challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program, the Islamic Republic will remain a central focus of U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Azerbaijan’s position north of Iran will only enhance its strategic relevance for both the U.S. and Israel. This development will, in turn, improve Baku’s bargaining leverage, thereby motivating Iran to pursue increasingly cordial relations with its northern neighbor.

Another factor driving normalization is the Islamic Republic’s growing interest in maintaining peaceful relations with Azerbaijan, particularly as it faces mounting challenges. These include sustained Israeli strikes against its Axis of Resistance, the continued impact of the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, and tensions with Turkey arising from the evolving balance of power in Syria. In this context, Tehran appears increasingly inclined to avoid additional regional friction. Indeed, it may ultimately be compelled to tolerate Azerbaijan’s potential accession to the Abraham Accords, provided such a development does not constitute a direct security threat to the Islamic Republic.

CONCLUSIONS: The recent flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding Azerbaijan underscores the country’s rising significance in regional affairs. Transit, trade, and investment constitute the central pillars of Baku’s engagement with regional and global powers. This approach aligns with what is commonly termed a multi-vector foreign policy—a strategic orientation wherein no single major power is prioritized. Instead, multi-alignment is pursued as a means to enhance a country’s international standing. In a global context marked by great power rivalry, the erosion of international norms, and the ascendance of middle powers, Azerbaijan—like many states in Central Asia and the Middle East—seeks to balance among dominant actors to avoid exclusive alignment with any one geopolitical center. Thus far, this strategy has served Baku well, and it is likely to persist amid the continuing emergence of an increasingly multipolar international system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is Professor of International Relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Robert M. Cutler

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s April 2025 state visit to China, culminating in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marks a significant elevation in bilateral relations. The agreement is more than a symbolic gesture: it reflects a strategic convergence across infrastructure, energy, and digital development. It also signals a re-balancing of power in the South Caucasus in response to Western inertia. As China consolidates its position, the question is no longer whether the West leads but whether it has already surrendered the initiative.

BACKGROUND: The Second Karabakh War of 2020 abruptly exposed the obsolescence of entrenched diplomatic frameworks in the South Caucasus, most notably the OSCE Minsk Group. The November 2020 Trilateral Statement that ended the fighting, brokered under Russia’s aegis, signified an incipient restructuring of regional dynamics. Russia positioned itself as the nominal guarantor of stability, installing a contingent of so-called peacekeepers on Azerbaijani territory. Yet this maneuver, driven by residual influence and opportunistic calculus, underscored Moscow’s determination to preserve a semblance of relevance amid shifting fault lines.

While Russia acted following long-established and well-defined interests, the U.S. and the EU hesitated. The initiatives introduced by Western actors, preoccupied with internal crises and other entanglements, lacked coherence, confidence, and strategic vision. The mediation efforts were fragmented and the summits were ad hoc. As a result, the promising diplomatic overtures failed to generate substantive traction. The reactive nature of Western engagement post-2020 contrasts starkly with the proactive moves of regional and other stakeholders having more immediate stakes in the evolving South Caucasus order.

Turkey’s deepening military partnership with Azerbaijan, formalized through the Shusha Declaration of 2021, epitomized pragmatic alignment. Kazakhstan, seizing the moment, accelerated its integration into the emergent Middle Corridor, bolstering East-West logistics networks through the Caspian basin. Concurrently, Gulf states capitalized on Azerbaijan’s post-war stabilization by channeling substantial investments into renewable energy infrastructure, particularly solar and wind projects in the liberated territories. These tangible gestures did not just reflect geoeconomic calculations but represented a recognition of the region’s latent economic potential.

In this context, China modified its traditionally cautious posture in the South Caucasus. Historically deferential to Russia’s informal sphere of influence, Beijing began to reassess the region’s strategic significance following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The resulting destabilization of Eurasian corridors, compounded by Western sanctions and the geopolitical weaponization of supply chains, propelled the South Caucasus from peripheral concern to a central axis in China’s connectivity strategy. This shift was not reflexive or opportunistic. Rather, it reflected China’s measured strategic assessment of the structural transformations in the architecture of Eurasian trade.

By 2022, the foundations for a deepening Sino-Azerbaijani partnership had been firmly established. The signing of a joint declaration on strategic partnership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in July 2024 signaled a decisive commitment to broaden bilateral economic ties. The two countries’ trade in 2024 was over 20 percent above its 2023 level, reaching nearly US$ 3.74 billion. Chinese enterprises expanded into sectors previously peripheral to their Eurasian ambitions: telecommunications, green energy, and transport logistics. President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Beijing in April 2025 did not initiate this trend but rather consolidated it. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) agreement was the logical culmination of sustained and deliberate moves that anchored Azerbaijan’s strategic realignment toward the East.

IMPLICATIONS: The realignment is not mere economic opportunism. Rather, it signals a deeper geopolitical evolution driven by the inadequacy of Western engagement and the region’s preparedness to respond to actors willing to match rhetoric with decisive action. The failure of Western policy is not just about inattentiveness, but also about an inability to grasp the interplay between regional agency, emerging connectivity frameworks, and the geopolitical vacuum created by Russia’s shifting posture. In this unfolding dynamic, Azerbaijan has moved beyond waiting for Western recognition or support. It has instead begun to assert its own role within a rapidly realigning Eurasian order.

For China, Azerbaijan serves as a gateway not only to Europe through the Middle Corridor but also toward the Middle East, reinforcing China’s broader trade architecture and strategic depth in the region. The CSP is not a symbolic gesture. Its scope is broad and consequential, encompassing coordinated industrial development, infrastructure harmonization, technology transfer, and streamlined customs protocols. These measures are underpinned by capital investments and long-term industrial partnerships. 

For Azerbaijan, the CSP consolidates a deliberate move to attenuate traditional dependencies on Western and Russian interlocutors. It embodies Azerbaijan’s long-articulated aspirations for economic diversification, substantiated now by tangible capital flows and operational partnerships. The CSP’s provisions span petrochemicals, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and renewables. Agreements on aerospace and intellectual property signal a strategic depth, eschewing transactional engagement in favor of embedded, systemic collaboration. 

The transport dimension alone is reshaping regional dynamics. The Middle Corridor, stretching from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian basin, and into the South Caucasus and Europe, has demonstrated rapid growth. While still smaller in scale than northern routes traversing Russia, its year-on-year expansion has been notable. A trilateral joint venture among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia’s rail operators is actively synchronizing digital customs tracking and reducing delivery times to enhance competitiveness.

The Port of Alat, central to Azerbaijan’s maritime logistics, has already undergone substantial upgrades. Cross-border road transport agreements and operational protocols with China, concluded in 2024 and 2025, are streamlining east–west trade flows. China’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan as a "central transit node" underscores the strategic weight of this integration.

The significance of the CSP extends beyond ports and pipelines. Digital infrastructure has emerged as a foundational pillar. Huawei and ZTE, longstanding presences in the region, have solidified their positions through new agreements establishing joint research centers, expanding data infrastructure, and modernizing e-government frameworks. These initiatives are embedding Chinese technological standards into the South Caucasus and positioning Baku as a nascent digital hub.

Energy collaboration has similarly accelerated. China’s Universal Energy is backing the Gobustan solar project, with further discussions ongoing over potential wind energy developments along the Caspian coast. These initiatives are paralleled by an expansion of Chinese soft power, from Confucius Institutes to cultural exchanges and educational programs.

Azerbaijan has not “abandoned” the West. The reality is starker: the West has failed to keep pace with Azerbaijan’s evolving strategic calculus. President Aliyev’s visit to Beijing and the CSP with China are less an embrace of Beijing than a commentary on the chronic insufficiencies of Western engagement. For years, Baku signaled openness to deeper commercial ties, infrastructure investments, and a balanced diplomatic posture. What it often received were half-measures, symbolic gestures, and ideological critiques. 

The waning of Western diplomatic leverage in the South Caucasus is not a sudden anomaly. It is the cumulative outcome of incremental miscalculations, fragmentary approaches, and the persistent failure to integrate regional realities into a coherent strategic vision. The 2020 Second Karabakh War marked a decisive inflection point. Azerbaijan’s reintegration of its formerly occupied territories exposed the impotence of frameworks long regarded as the bedrock of resolution efforts. The abrupt reassertion of Azerbaijani territorial sovereignty in 2020, and its completion in 2023, underscored the extent to which Western actors had become disconnected from the region’s evolving dynamics.

Europe’s Global Gateway initiative, though nominally prioritizing the Middle Corridor, remains hesitant and underfunded. The U.S., preoccupied with broader geopolitical contests, has failed to sustain a coherent South Caucasus policy. When attention does surface, it is often filtered through domestic advocacy agendas misaligned with both regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. Thus, under the influence of domestic lobbies, two of the Biden administration’s last acts were to decline to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which bans direct assistance to the Azerbaijani government, and to sign a bilateral strategic partnership charter with the Armenian government.

CONCLUSIONS: The South Caucasus has shifted from constituting a peripheral zone to a strategic nexus. Capital and influence from East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are converging upon the region. Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf states have become active participants in this evolving matrix. Azerbaijan, far from merely serving as a bridge, has assumed the role of architect and builder of new routes. Aliyev’s visit to Beijing is emblematic of this shift. Baku no longer waits for external recognition; it engineers its own relevance. 

The West must recognize this not as a defection, but as an adaptation to opportunity over nostalgia. The coming months will be decisive. If the West wishes to remain a meaningful player, it must replace rhetorical overtures with substantive commitments: joint infrastructure ventures, credible support for energy transition, and diplomatic engagement rooted in regional realities rather than encumbered by historical preoccupations.

Azerbaijan’s choice is not between China and the West, but between agency and irrelevance. It has already chosen. The question now is whether the West retains both the capacity—and the will—to respond.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

Azerbaijan's acquisition of at least 50 JF-17 Block III fighter jets from Pakistan, to be equipped with Turkish-manufactured missiles, aims to enhance the aerial combat capabilities of the Azerbaijani Air Force. Jointly developed by China and Pakistan, the JF-17 Block III fighters will gain increased lethality through the integration of avionics from Türkiye’s advanced defense industry. This agreement has further consolidated the multi-dimensional defense collaboration between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, commonly referred to as "three brothers." Pakistan and Azerbaijan are also actively participating in Türkiye’s Kaan fifth-generation fighter aircraft program. The procurement of Türkiye’s fifth-generation jets, among the most advanced globally, is expected to be transformative for both Baku and Islamabad.

BACKGROUND:  Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan are collectively referred to as the "three brothers" since Türkiye was the first state, and Pakistan the second, to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. Both Türkiye and Pakistan provided military support to Baku during the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020. The states convened in Islamabad in January 2021 for a trilateral meeting, during which they agreed to expand cooperation in political, strategic, trade, economic, peace, and security, while reaffirming mutual support on issues of shared concern.

Initiated and launched by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 2010, the Kaan fifth-generation fighter program represents Türkiye’s indigenous jet fighter initiative. Following Türkiye’s exclusion from the U.S. F-35 fifth-generation fighter program in 2019, the Kaan remains Türkiye’s sole alternative and is intended to replace the country's aging fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The first prototype was tested in 2023; however, the development process is expected to span at least a decade. 

While Azerbaijan is providing financial assistance to Türkiye’s Kaan program, hundreds of Pakistani officials and engineers are actively engaged in the project. In 2023, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed an agreement during the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2023) in Istanbul to advance the development of the Kaan fighter program. As part of its contribution, Azerbaijan is expected to offer financial investment and industrial collaboration in support of the initiative.

In 2024, Azerbaijan’s Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov stated that his country was leveraging the defense capabilities of Türkiye, its primary partner in military cooperation. In January 2025, Türkiye and Pakistan finalized plans to establish and operate a joint facility for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jet, agreeing to collaborate on the development and manufacturing of the aircraft.

In February 2025, defense industry authorities from Azerbaijan and Türkiye, during a meeting held at the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX-2025) in Abu Dhabi, discussed the successful military-technical cooperation between the two nations and pledged to further strengthen defense industry ties by exploring prospects for joint projects.

The JF-17 Thunder Block III, a fourth-generation fighter jet, has been developed through a joint venture between Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation. Compared to earlier versions of JF-17, the Block III features superior maneuverability, enhanced combat capabilities, and improved stealth characteristics. In February 2024, Azerbaijan signed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement with Pakistan for the procurement of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal also included pilot training and armaments for the fighter jets. On 25 September 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced, “The JF-17 jets have already been integrated into the arsenal of Azerbaijan’s air force.”

IMPLICATIONS: Arming the JF-17 “Thunder” Block III fighter jets acquired by Baku with Türkiye’s Gökdoğan Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) and Bozdoğan Within-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (WVRAAM) will significantly enhance the aerial firepower of Azerbaijan's Air Force. It also underscores the progress of Türkiye’s defense industry. Türkiye is emerging as a major global arms exporter, after the leading five exporters—the U.S., France, Russia, China, and Germany.

With its advanced combat capabilities, the JF-17 aircraft surpasses the region’s Russian-made jets, including the MiG-29 and SU-25. Russia has been Azerbaijan’s primary arms supplier for decades, however, the JF-17 will replace Azerbaijan’s existing and aging fleet of Russian-manufactured MiG-29 fighters. The JF-17 are expected to enhance Azerbaijan’s airpower amid escalating regional security challenges. Equipped with improved avionics and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the Block III variant is adaptable to diverse combat scenarios. 

According to the Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSB), Türkiye’s defense and aerospace exports in 2024 totaled US$ 7.2 billion. Three Turkish defense firms are included in the ‘Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies’ list, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Jointly developed by Pakistan and China, the JF-17 fighter jet deal with Azerbaijan also creates opportunities for China to secure additional defense agreements with Azerbaijan and other countries in the region. Between 2019 and 2023, China accounted for 5.8 percent of global arms exports. During this period, China supplied arms to nearly 40 countries across Asia and Africa, ranking as the fourth largest exporter of conventional weapons after the U.S., France, and Russia.

By selling the JF-17 Thunder to Azerbaijan, Pakistan has effectively supported China in boosting demand and expanding its market for arms and military equipment in a region traditionally dominated by Russia. The JF-17 agreement with Azerbaijan is likely to facilitate the entry of Chinese weaponry and enhance China’s influence in the region.

Islamabad, Ankara, and Baku have integrated their tactical and strategic practice with the use of Turkish drone systems. In the Kaan project, Türkiye is experimenting with a ‘loyal wingman’ drone, to gather data in a range of different terrains and against a range of technologies.

The development of the Kaan fighter will significantly reduce Türkiye’s reliance on foreign aircraft. As a fifth-generation fighter program, Kaan demands extensive expertise, substantial financial resources, and international collaboration. Azerbaijan’s financial investment and Pakistan’s manufacturing expertise will not only support Türkiye’s Kaan project but also further reinforce the trilateral defense cooperation for long-term initiatives.

The joint factory established by Islamabad and Ankara for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jets will further consolidate the defense partnership between Pakistan and Türkiye. Pakistan’s role is expected to enable Türkiye to produce the Kaan jet at a reduced cost. Cost-effective joint production of the Kaan is expected to expand Türkiye’s defense exports, while also bolstering Pakistan’s aerial defense capabilities.

Yet the involvement of Pakistan—China’s longstanding strategic ally and “all-weather” friend—in the Kaan project may pose challenges in sourcing components from Western suppliers due to security concerns. China’s suspected indirect involvement in the Kaan program via Pakistan is viewed as a potential risk to the project. Although China has no official role in Türkiye’s Kaan initiative, critics suspect an indirect influence through Pakistan’s participation. A primary factor behind the rising demand for Chinese defense equipment is its competitive pricing, attributed to low-cost production. The anticipated cost-effective production of the Kaan fighters has further fueled suspicions regarding China’s indirect involvement in the project.

Pakistan’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan carries significant geopolitical implications. In the aftermath of the six-week Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, Armenia—Azerbaijan’s primary adversary—has become the largest importer of weapons from India, Pakistan’s principal regional rival.

CONCLUSION: The JF-17 and Kaan fighter jet agreements is a clear statement that Pakistan and Türkiye will continue to bolster Azerbaijan’s military capabilities, with trilateral defense cooperation expected to deepen further. If successful, the Kaan project will lay the groundwork for expanded trilateral collaboration among Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan in launching additional large-scale defense initiatives. It will also create opportunities for future bilateral or trilateral joint ventures in the defense industry among the three nations.

By Davit Petrosyan

On 13 March 2025, Yerevan and Baku announced consensus on the peace agreement text, raising hopes of ending the decades-long conflict. The U.S. described it as a “historic peace treaty,” while the European Council encouraged both parties to proceed with signing. However, closer analysis suggests the document is more about formally closing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict than achieving sustainable peace. The failure to resolve key disputes—such as unblocking regional transit routes and border delimitation—combined with growing military imbalance in Baku’s favor and Armenia’s concession of important deterrent tools, suggests that Azerbaijan may launch new escalations when the broader geopolitical climate becomes more permissive. 

Photo source: ffikretow

BACKGROUND: The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to the late 1980s, when a war (1988-1994) broke out between ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region—an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Armenians—and Azerbaijani forces. With backing from the Republic of Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians gained control not only over Nagorno-Karabakh but also seven adjacent districts. A ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia on 5 May 1994 effectively froze the conflict. Although Nagorno-Karabakh achieved de facto independence, it remained unrecognized by any country, including Armenia. The OSCE Minsk Group—co-chaired by Russia, the U.S., and France—was established to facilitate a peaceful resolution.

After sixteen years of stalled negotiations, the conflict reignited on 27 September 2020, when Azerbaijan—backed by Turkey—launched a large-scale offensive, reclaiming the seven surrounding districts and about a third of Nagorno-Karabakh. Following several failed mediation attempts by Russia, France, and the U.S., Russia brokered a ceasefire on 9 November 2020. The agreement commissioned the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the region; the establishment of a joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center; and the transferred control of the Lachin corridor, previously under Armenian control and connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, to Russian peacekeeping forces. 

In the following period, Yerevan and Baku engaged in several rounds of peace talks, initially mediated by Moscow. Over time, however, the EU and the U.S. assumed more active roles. Early negotiations focused on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and later evolved into discussions about the rights and security of Armenians living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Negotiations also centered on border delimitation, humanitarian issues including the return of prisoners of war and detainees, the handover of landmine maps, and the search for missing persons. A particularly contentious issue was the unblocking of regional transit routes (connectivity), including the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which would connect Azerbaijan to its western exclave, Nakhichevan. 

Despite ongoing talks, Azerbaijan launched military incursions into Armenia’s internationally recognized territory between 2021 and 2022, occupying approximately 215 square kilometers. In response, Armenia invited the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor its border with Azerbaijan. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blockaded the Lachin corridor—with the tacit approval of Russian peacekeepers—and, following a ten-month blockade, launched an offensive that resulted in the forced displacement of 120,000 ethnic Armenians from the region. 

Since then, peace talks have continued, with Armenia seeking to avoid further escalation and Azerbaijan advancing new demands. On 13 March 2025, both parties announced a consensus on the text of the peace agreement. However, Azerbaijan added two conditions: the “amendment” of Armenia’s Constitution and the dissolution the OSCE Minsk Group. 

IMPLICATIONS: The agreement fails to resolve all disputes, leaving flashpoints that could trigger new escalations. One major issue is connectivity—the modalities for restoring road links, which is absent from the finalized text. Azerbaijan continues demanding unhindered access to its western exclave Nakhichevan, and has repeatedly threatened to open the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” by force. Conversely, Armenia views any extraterritorial corridor as a red line, signaling its resolve to respond proportionally. This marks a shift from earlier Azerbaijani incursions, when Armenian forces adopted a defensive posture, with Prime Minister Pashinyan declaring that Armenia would not retake occupied territories militarily. 

The diverging stances of regional powers on connectivity could either deter or ignite a future conflict. On February 14, 2025, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova blamed Armenia for “freezing” trilateral efforts to reopen routes. On March 26, 2025, Turkish President Erdoğan declared plans to build regional trade corridors centered on Zangezur. Conversely, on September 7, 2024, a senior Iranian official reaffirmed that the “Zangezur Corridor” was a red line for Iran. Joint Armenia-Iran military exercises in April 2025, amid increased Azerbaijani activity along the border, aimed to demonstrate Iran’s readiness to deter Azerbaijani attempts to take the route by force.

The agreement also leaves border delimitation unresolved, which has already led to military clashes, with Azerbaijan occupying 215 km² of Armenian territory. To date, only one portion of the border has been delimited. Key areas where Azerbaijani forces have advanced remain undelimited. Azerbaijan has shown no intention of withdrawing, raising doubts about the agreement’s ability to resolve tensions and establish lasting peace. Importantly, Russia can leverage disputes on this issue and connectivity to maintain its influence in the region. 

The EUMA’s removal from the Armenian–Azerbaijani border would significantly weaken Armenia’s security. Since EUMA’s deployment in mid-February 2023, not a single square meter of Armenian territory has been occupied. The mission has served as an effective external balancing tool, deterring Azerbaijani advances. Given that large portions of the border remain undelimited, EUMA’s withdrawal would eliminate a key stabilizing presence and increase the risk of new Azerbaijani aggression. 

Under the peace deal, Armenia agreed to withdraw international lawsuits against Azerbaijan, forfeiting another deterrent. Four applications to the European Court of Human Rights documented widespread Azerbaijani human rights violations during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, while Armenia's complaint to the International Court of Justice accused Azerbaijan of systematic racial discrimination. Dropping these cases not only erases the record of violations but also removes a major constraint on Azerbaijan’s future actions, freeing its hands for provocations. 

The peace agreement lacks enforcement mechanisms. No third party is designated to oversee compliance, further increasing the risk of escalation. It also fails to address the fate of at least 106 Armenian prisoners of war (POWs) and detainees, making the document resemble a “punitive” conclusion to the war rather than a genuine peace agreement. 

One of the primary motivations behind Azerbaijan’s additional conditions, “amending” Armenia’s Constitution and dissolving the Minsk Group, is to bury the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Constitution’s preamble cites the 1990 Declaration of Independence and references the joint statement of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan portrays this as evidence of Armenian territorial claims. The dissolution of the Minsk Group is intended to symbolize the closure of the conflict it was created to resolve.

Finally, the military balance continues to shift in Azerbaijan’s favor. While both countries allocate 4–5 percent of their GDP to defense, Azerbaijan’s spending was 3.5 times higher in 2020, 4.4 times higher in 2021, 3.8 times higher in 2022, and 2.7 times higher in 2023. Projections show that Azerbaijan’s defense budget was 2.7 times higher in 2024 and is expected to be 2.9 times higher in 2025. As the imbalance grows, Azerbaijan’s confidence in resorting to force to compel Armenia into new concessions is likely to increase.

CONCLUSION: The current peace agreement fails to resolve crucial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, depriving Armenia of important balancing and deterrent mechanisms. The two additional conditions put forward by Azerbaijan suggest that at this stage, Baku's aim is not to achieve a comprehensive peace, but to decisively close the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The failure to address the issue of Armenian POWs and detainees held in Baku, as well as the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, demonstrates that this agreement is not aimed at bringing sustainable peace to the South Caucasus but rather at formally confirming Azerbaijan's achievements so far. 

The weak peace agreement and the continually shifting military balance in Azerbaijan's favor enables Baku to retain the necessary levers to escalate the situation when the geopolitical environment appears more favorable. It reserves options to compel Armenia into new concessions, such as securing the route to Nakhichevan on its own terms and constraining Armenia's post-conflict recovery efforts. Finally, diverging positions over the reopening of regional transit routes and conflicting interests among regional powers could serve as additional triggers for renewed escalation, providing Russia with opportunities to maintain its influence in the region. 

AUTHOR BIO: Davit Petrosyan is a Fulbright Scholar pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Previously, he served as an Assistant to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia and as Chief Program Officer of Restart Civic-Youth Foundation.

By Michael Tanchum

The Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea are one natural waterway forming the core of a multi-modal connectivity arc that can serve as the transportation backbone of a commercial corridor spanning the Middle East and Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s inclusion in a wider Abraham Accords framework could radically reconfigure trade patterns and manufacturing value chains across the southern rim of Eurasia, to the benefit of U.S. strategic interests and those of its partners. While strengthening U.S.-Israel-Azerbaijan trilateral defense cooperation is a response to the looming prospect of a military showdown with Iran, the geo-economic significance of Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords is of long-term strategic consequence. With the ports on Israel’s Eastern Mediterraneancoast and Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea coast serving as anchor points, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor can be linked to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, creating an crescent of commercial cooperation from India to the Central Asian Republics via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, providing counterweight to the westward expansion of Chinese economic hegemony across the Central Asia-Caucasus region and the Middle East.

Photo source: Michael Tanchum

BACKGROUND: In early March 2025, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu made public that it favors elevating the trilateral partnership between Israel, Azerbaijan and the U.S.. Following a motion in the Israeli Knesset on "Upgrading the Strategic Alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan," a flurry of calls arose for Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords. The September 15, 2020, agreement normalized relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, followed by the establishment of relations between Israel and Bahrain and Sudan, respectively, and the restoration of relations with Morocco. The Abraham Accords also consists of an expanded framework of strategic and economic initiatives among the participants, developed in partnership with the U.S.

Azerbaijan and Israel have enjoyed an all-weather strategic relationship since diplomatic relations were established in the early 1990s following Azerbaijan’s independence. The two states have developed deep defense cooperation over the past 30 years, based on countering the threat Iran poses to both Israel and Azerbaijan, which shares a 428-mile (689 km) border with the Islamic Republic. Key proponents of extending the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan have emphasized the Azerbaijani-Israeli defense relationship’s durability and Azerbaijan’s reliability as a principal oil supplier to Israel. Azerbaijan and Israel enjoy commercial cooperation in telecoms and other technology sectors. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) recently established the new subsidiary “SOCAR Tamar” following its March 17, 2025 acquisition of a 10 percent stake in Israel’s Tamar offshore natural gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. Azerbaijan has also played an important mediating role between Baku’s close partner Turkey and Israel during times of tension.

Netanyahu’s public commitment to strengthen Israel’s trilateral relationship with Azerbaijan and the U.S was preceded by a collection of letters sent to U.S. President Donald Trump at the end of February by prominent rabbis advocating Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords. Among them was a senior rabbi in the UAE and personal friend of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who played a key role in the signing of the Abraham Accords. Additionally, opinion pieces from Israeli and American policy communities, including in the Wall Street Journal, added further political momentum amidst escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Two days after Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s March 12, 2025, rejection of the U.S. proposal to hold negotiations about Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff visited Baku after an overnight visit to Moscow, in what appears to be a coordinated effort to prepare for possible military action against Iran by Israel or the U.S., following the exhaustion of diplomatic efforts.

IMPLICATIONS: Beyond defense cooperation, a compelling strategic and geo-economic logic exists to include Azerbaijan in a wider Abraham Accords framework, building upon the Azerbaijan’s parallel and separate bilateral economic relations with Israel and the UAE. Extending the Abraham Accords framework outside the Arab World has precedence in the quadrilateral cooperation among India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S. – the “I2U2” framework – emerging from India’s robust yet parallel commercial cooperation and joint venture investments with Israel and the UAE. Trilateral cooperation emerged organically from the synergies between India’s commercial ventures with Israel and the UAE, traditionally India’s third-largest trading partner and Arabian Sea neighbor.

In February 2022, the UAE signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India followed by the May 2022 signing of a similar UAE-Israel free trade agreement. The two trade agreements paved the way for initiating three-way coordination in developing an India-Middle East Corridor. Quadrilateral cooperation involving the U.S. was then formalized with the July 2022 I2U2 summit.

The extended Abraham Accords cooperation gave rise to a vision of an India-to-Europe commercial corridor in which the UAE’s ports serve as the Indian Ocean connectivity node with Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean ports serving as the maritime outlet to Europe, connected by a UAE-to-Israel railway network transiting Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Once the transportation route is operational, Indian goods leaving Mumbai could arrive on the European mainland in as little as 10 days. An initiative to realize this corridor, now known as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) was formalized with the signing of the September 9, 2023, Memorandum of Understanding at the New Delhi G20 Summit, with India, the U.S., the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the EU as signatories.

Research has shown that commercial corridors only emerge where the requisite large investments in port and rail infrastructure are coupled with an industrial base anchored in manufacturing value chains. The IMEC is highly conducive for value chain integration because of the existing synergies between India’s commercial ventures with its Arab Gulf partners and its commercial ventures with Israel, as exemplified by the manufacturing value chain in food production that is one of the leading drivers of the IMEC’s development. India’s “Food Corridor to the Middle East” is driven by India’s investment partnerships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia that rely on the transformation of India’s agriculture and water management sectors being implemented through India’s partnership with Israel. Similar synergies exist in other sectors, with the most promising in green energy and innovative technology, which has already lead to joint venture production facilities in green manufacturing.

The inclusion of Azerbaijan, along with Georgia, in the wider Abraham Accords framework holds a similar potential to create a new trans-regional commercial architecture. The UAE is Azerbaijan’s top Arab trading partner, accounting for 40 percent of Azerbaijan’s trade with the Arab World. The UAE is also the largest Arab investor in Azerbaijan and one of the top 10 global investors in Azerbaijan, accounting for 7 percent of Azerbaijan’s FDI inflow. In 2023, the UAE’s Abu Dhabi National Oil Company acquired a 30 percent stake in Azerbaijan’s Absheron natural gas field in the Caspian Sea. Similarly, the UAE is Georgia’s largest trading partner in the Arab world, accounting for 63 percent of Georgia’s trade with the region. Trade is likely to increase further with the UAE-Georgia CEPA, which came into effect in June 2024. The UAE is also invested in solar power plant development in both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Most significantly, in March 2024, the UAE’s AD Ports group, acquired a 60 percent ownership share in the Tbilisi Dry Port, a new custom-bonded and rail-connected intermodal logistics hub in Georgia. At the heart of the Trans-Caspian Route, the port is a key logistics facility for the rail connection linking Georgia’s Black Sea coast and Azerbaijan’s Caspian coast.

Azerbaijan’s Baku port is the connectivity node from where the Wider Black Sea region connects to Central Asia across the Caspian Sea. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) connecting the Caspian and Black Seas via Azerbaijan and Georgia, commonly referred to as the Middle Corridor, was developed as an alternative to the Russia-based Northern Corridor for China-to-Europe trade. The TITR consists of multi-modal transportation links for container transshipment via Kazakhstan’s Caspian port Aktau to the specially constructed port of Baku at Alat from where goods can be shipped by railway connection from Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea ports and in turn to Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean ports. By linking IMEC and the TITR, India will possess its own multi-modal corridor to access Central Asia, enabling India to effectively compete with China in Eurasia without being reliant on Russia or Iran. IMEC provides India with a streamlined alternative to its 25-year effort to establish the troubled International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) to access Central Asia through Iran’s Chabahar port, serving as the Indian Ocean connectivity node with overland transportation links running northward via Iran and Afghanistan.

The multi-modal corridor connecting India to Central Asia would also open the opportunity for Turkey to participate in IMEC. The UAE’s ports and logistics giant DP World operates Turkey’s Yarımca port, reputed to be the most technologically advanced in Turkey. Yarımca’s Marmara coast location is highly suited for intermodal transportation in which cargo can be transshipped to the Black Sea or Georgia and Azerbaijan by rail from Kars via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway.

CONCLUSION: The September 2023 signing of the IMEC declaration was preceded by the July 2022 I2U2 summit, the first convening of the heads of government of India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S. As a step toward linking IMEC with the Trans-Caspian Corridor, a CC-I2U2 summit should be convened with the heads of Azerbaijan and Georgia participating. The format can be extended to include Central Asian Republics as well as Saudi Arabia and Jordan in anticipation of the extended arc of joint venture manufacturing investments and commercial cooperation.

By including Azerbaijan in a wider Abraham Accords framework, the U.S. can upend the geopolitics of connectivity in Central Asia, halting the westward expansion of Chinese commercial hegemony across the Eurasian landmass. Linking the IMEC corridor to the Caspian shores of Kazakhstan via a multi-modal sea route with trans-shipment across Georgia and Azerbaijan will effectively end India’s isolation from Central Asia – a strategic objective long sought by New Delhi. Consolidating the triangle of bilateral economic relationships among Azerbaijan, Israel, and the UAE into a multilateral framework through U.S. facilitation under the Abraham Accords is a necessary first step and a boon to the U.S. strategic position across Eurasia’s southern rim.

AUTHOR BIO: Prof. Michaël Tanchum teaches international relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Navarra, Spain and an associate fellow in the Economics and Energy at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES) and an affiliated scholar of the Centre for Strategic Policy Implementation at Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM) and the NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies in Singapore. @michaeltanchum