By Sudha Ramachandran

A recent attack by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) on a Chinese restaurant in a supposedly secure district in the Afghan capital, Kabul, is a setback for the Taliban regime. Not only was it an embarrassment to the regime as it laid bare its limited capacity to provide foolproof security to foreign nationals; it is also likely to have drawn the ire of the Chinese, who have promised investment in Afghanistan. Other countries keen on investing in Afghanistan will have taken note.

BACKGROUND:

A suicide attack in a Chinese restaurant in Kabul’s Shahr-e-Naw district on January 19 claimed the lives of seven people, including a Chinese Muslim man, who co-owned the restaurant with his wife and an Afghan partner. The others killed in the attack were Afghans. Over a dozen people, including a Chinese national, were injured in the explosion. Claiming responsibility for the attack, the ISKP warned that it “has placed Chinese nationals on its target list, especially in light of the increasing crimes committed by the Chinese government against the persecuted Uyghur Muslims.” Chinese nationals reportedly frequented the Kabul restaurant that was attacked. The bomber aimed to cause maximum Chinese casualties; according to the ISKP statement, he waited for a large number of Chinese to enter the restaurant before he blew himself up. 

The ISKP has been targeting China both in its propaganda and violence for several years. ISKP propaganda slams China’s persecution of Uighur Muslims. Its criticism of China’s policies and actions in Xinjiang is primarily aimed at drawing Uighur Muslims in the region into its fold. ISKP often calls on Muslims to take up arms against “red atheists whose hands are soaked with the blood of innocent Uyghur Muslims.” The ISKP has also targeted Chinese nationals and interests abroad, including the kidnapping and killing of two Chinese teachers in Quetta in Pakistan’s Balochistan province in 2017. ISKP attacks targeting Chinese nationals in Afghanistan include the January 2022 suicide bombing outside the Foreign Ministry building in Kabul, minutes ahead of the arrival of a Chinese delegation; the December 2022 attack on the Kabul Longan Hotel, which is frequented by Chinese businessmen, that left at least five Chinese nationals injured; and the January 2025 killing of a Chinese mining worker in Takhar. The targeted killing of Chinese nationals working in mines in Tajikistan has surged in recent months, although it is not clear whether the ISKP carried out these attacks.

Since the Taliban captured power in Kabul in August 2021, China’s role in Afghanistan has grown significantly. Chinese investment in the Afghan economy, particularly in the mineral sector, has grown. Such investment provides the internationally isolated Taliban regime in Kabul with much-needed funds and serves to help it consolidate control over power in Afghanistan. The ISKP’s targeting of Chinese nationals in Afghanistan is likely aimed at prompting Beijing to rethink its collaboration with the Taliban, the ISKP’s sworn enemy, and withdraw investments from the Afghan economy.

IMPLICATIONS:

Reports, including from the United Nations, from last year have stated that ISKP attacks have declined both in frequency and scale. ISKP propaganda publications have also fallen in frequency. They rarely provide new content, and often regurgitate topics and articles previously published. It is possible that the ISKP’s recent attack in Kabul on January 19 and the targeting of a Shia Mosque in Islamabad on February 6 were aimed at signaling that it remains a potent jihadist group. However, it may be too early to conclude that the ISKP is on the path of revival and resurgence, since the two major attacks this year were on soft targets. Yet, the fact that the ISKP was able to target a Chinese restaurant in the Shahr-e-Naw neighborhood cannot be dismissed lightly as this is a tightly guarded area of the Afghan capital. 

UN reports have been pointing out that terrorist groups like al-Qaida, ISKP and Tehreek-e-Taliban continue to operate from Afghanistan, a claim that the Taliban regime has often rejected. The January 19 attack reveals that at a minimum, the ISKP is present in Afghanistan, and remains a clear and present danger even in Kabul. This punches holes in the Taliban’s oft-repeated claims to prospective foreign partners that Afghanistan is safe for investment, and that their nationals are secure here, laying bare the fragility of these security guarantees. This is a major embarrassment and setback to the Taliban, which can be expected to further intensify operations against the ISKP in the coming days. The Taliban has been collaborating closely with China to crack down on Uighur Muslims living in Afghanistan and the regime can be expected to double down on them, especially since they form an important component of the ISKP’s fighting cadre.  

The January 19 attack in Kabul can be expected to prompt a strong response from the Chinese government. Although there were few Chinese nationals among the casualties in the restaurant attack, the fact that the bomber was able to enter a restaurant and areas reportedly secured by Chinese guards will rattle Beijing. It will raise the issue of security for its nationals and interests in Afghanistan with the Taliban regime and has already issued advisories to its nationals travelling to and living in Afghanistan. Yet while the Chinese government can be expected to step up pressure on the regime in Kabul, China is unlikely to throw in the towel with regard to investment in Afghanistan. Other countries that are looking to enhance their role in Afghanistan, for example India, will have taken note of the still unstable security environment in the country. They will be cautious in deciding on investments and taking on infrastructure-building activities in Afghanistan. 

For the ISKP, the January 19 attack on the Kabul restaurant brings mixed returns. Although the attack may not have resulted in many Chinese casualties, it has given the ISKP the propaganda boost it was looking for. This will enhance the group’s image, especially in jihadist circles. It also served to roil relations between Beijing and the Taliban regime, while the ISKP can expect a boost to its recruitment efforts. However, the group can also expect to increasingly be in Beijing’s crosshairs.

CONCLUSIONS:

The ISKP attack on a Chinese Muslim restaurant in Kabul has once again turned the spotlight on the jihadist group. While it may not signal a revival of the ISKP’s flagging image and declining capacity, it will serve to boost morale and recruitment of fighters. Importantly, it is a major setback for the Taliban regime’s credibility and for its relations with China, its most important international partner. While the attack may not prompt Beijing and Chinese businesses to review their decision to invest in Afghanistan or revise their investment strategies in the country, more such attacks, especially on hard targets and those that damage Chinese infrastructure could prompt China to go slow or scale down investment in Afghanistan. However, such a rethinking is not imminent.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr Sudha Ramachandran is an independent South Asian political and security analyst. She is also South Asia editor at The Diplomat. Her articles have appeared in publications like The Diplomat, Asia Times, China Brief and Terrorism Monitor.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

China is reshaping Central Asia’s nuclear energy sector, challenging Russia’s long-standing dominance in the region. In September 2025, Uzbekistan explored a contingency agreement with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), amid concerns that the contract signed in June with Russia’s state-owned nuclear monopoly, Rosatom, for the construction of nuclear power units might face delays. While Rosatom leads the consortium responsible for building Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, CNNC has emerged as the principal alternative competitor. Under current plans, CNNC would assume a leading role in the construction of Kazakhstan’s second and third nuclear power plants.

BACKGROUND: Nuclear energy has been a central instrument through which Russia has sustained its presence in Central Asia. Experts argue that nuclear power projects tend to create long-term dependencies for host states, particularly when nuclear energy constitutes a significant share of national electricity generation. Such projects also entail security risks, including the potential for sabotage. A 2023 study on Russian nuclear energy diplomacy published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs notes that “Central Asia has a special place in Russian nuclear energy diplomacy because of the post-Soviet heritage, meaning that Rosatom’s operations in the region are easier and smoother than elsewhere.”

Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 intensified Russia’s diplomatic isolation, undermining its dominance in Central Asia’s nuclear energy sector. As a sanctioned and increasingly isolated Russia gradually loses its influence in the region’s nuclear landscape, Beijing is capitalizing on the opportunity to secure new clients for its nuclear reactor technology.

During a visit to Uzbekistan in 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement with Tashkent for the construction of a 2.4-gigawatt nuclear power plant, valued at approximately US$ 11 billion. However, the project failed to progress as planned and was revised in 2024, when the two sides concluded a new agreement for a facility comprising six small reactors, each with a capacity of 55 megawatts (MW).

In June 2024, Russia concluded an agreement with Uzatom to carry out a feasibility study on constructing a nuclear power plant comprising two to four VVER-1000 reactors in Uzbekistan. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan held discussions with Rosatom on a small nuclear power plant with a capacity of 110 MW. However, the talks failed to progress after Bishkek lost interest.

In June 2025, Kazakhstan announced the selection of Rosatom to lead the construction of the country’s first nuclear power plant. In a separate statement, however, Astana also confirmed that CNNC would head the development of the country’s second nuclear facility. In August 2025, Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar further stated that CNNC would also lead the construction of the country’s third nuclear power plant. In September 2025, Uzbekistan’s nuclear agency, Uzatom, unveiled an upgrade plan for its two small nuclear reactors (RITM-200N), scheduled for completion by 2030, and for two large nuclear units (VVER-1000) by the mid-2030s. By pursuing a multi-vector diplomatic strategy, Uzbekistan has signed nuclear energy agreements with both Russia and China.

China’s nuclear energy cooperation in Central Asia is expanding rapidly. In September 2025, Beijing–Tashkent nuclear cooperation featured prominently in a meeting between Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Shen Yanfeng, Chairman of CNNC, held on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China. Following the Mirziyoyev–Yanfeng meeting, new mining agreements valued at US$ 5 billion, including a uranium mining deal, were announced.

IMPLICATIONS: Energy-constrained Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have looked to Rosatom, the world’s leading constructor and exporter of nuclear reactors. International sanctions imposed on Russia over its war in Ukraine have cast uncertainty over Rosatom’s future. As a result, Russia’s clients in Central Asia are increasingly turning to China as an alternative partner for nuclear energy cooperation. It was against this backdrop that Tashkent, in September 2025, discussed a contingency agreement with China for the construction of nuclear power plants, supplementing a deal signed with Rosatom in June 2025. While Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant is being built by Russia, China is set to lead the construction of the country’s second and third nuclear facilities.

China’s growing involvement in the nuclear energy sector is significantly eroding Russia’s long-standing dominance in the region. CNNC has emerged as a strong competitor to Russia’s Rosatom in nuclear projects in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as both Central Asian states expand their nuclear energy programs.

CNNC is posing strong competition to Russia’s Rosatom on cost considerations in nuclear energy projects. For Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, CNNC sought to attract Kazakh authorities by proposing the construction of two nuclear units with a combined capacity of 2.4 gigawatts at a cost of US$ 5.47 billion, a significantly lower bid. The comparatively lower cost of Chinese nuclear reactors gives China a competitive advantage over Russia in Central Asia, where affordability is a critical factor in ensuring the financial sustainability of host countries.

China’s policy of sharing nuclear technology and granting host countries full control over the nuclear fuel cycle emphasizes energy independence in states developing nuclear power projects. This approach is particularly attractive to Central Asian countries and gives China a competitive advantage over Russia. In Kazakhstan, for example, this policy aligns with Astana’s long-term objective of reducing dependence on external powers in the nuclear energy sector, and CNNC has offered technology transfer along with full control of the fuel cycle. By contrast, Russia follows a model that retains control over fuel supply and requires the repatriation of spent fuel for the duration of a plant’s operation in non-nuclear states.

Faster delivery timelines are another factor that make China more attractive to Central Asian countries than Russia in nuclear energy projects. Chinese companies typically complete nuclear power projects in seven years or less, whereas Rosatom generally requires between six and nine years to construct nuclear reactors.

Despite China’s competitive advantages in cost and delivery speed, Chinese nuclear projects involve technical and environmental risks. China does not provide Central Asian states with a long-term, reliable solution for radioactive waste management. Consequently, in the absence of advanced and transparent safety protocols, safety concerns remain a major obstacle to China’s nuclear ambitions in the region.

In September 2025, Almassadam Satkaliyev, Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency, emphasized the importance of ensuring safe operations at nuclear facilities. He stated that Kazakhstan would continue to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and nuclear fuel production to electricity generation at nuclear power plants, while strictly adhering to the country’s international obligations regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

CONCLUSIONS: Despite international sanctions imposed in response to the war in Ukraine, Russia is making concerted efforts to maintain its influence over nuclear energy projects in Central Asia. However, sanctions have increasingly eroded Russia’s primary source of leverage, nuclear cooperation, allowing China to challenge Moscow’s long-standing dominance in the region’s nuclear energy sector.

China’s nuclear power initiatives are poised to solidify its long-term strategic influence in Central Asia. These projects necessitate decades of engagement through fuel supply chains, technology transfer, and sustained operational oversight.

China is reshaping Central Asia's nuclear landscape by leveraging cost competitiveness, technology transfer, and expedited project timelines to erode Russia's traditional dominance in energy cooperation. However, despite these advantages, concerns persist regarding China’s comparatively lax safety standards.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation. Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Emil Avdaliani

China is closely assessing the outcomes of the November 6 U.S.-Central Asia summit and its implications for the region. From Beijing’s perspective, the relatively active U.S. engagement with this landlocked region is noteworthy but does not constitute a major geopolitical challenge. In terms of actual influence on the ground, China remains in a significantly stronger position. It enjoys geographical proximity to Central Asia and has made substantially larger investments than the U.S. is either able or willing to undertake. These investments span multiple sectors, including education, green energy, physical infrastructure development, and the extraction and processing of natural resources.

                                                           Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: On November 6, Washington hosted a summit between the U.S. and the five Central Asian republics. The meeting was notable for several reasons. It marked the first time such a summit had been held at the White House and it followed President Trump’s recent bilateral meetings with the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Washington approached the summit with a pragmatic agenda. Its priorities were twofold: to secure long-term access to critical mineral resources and to strengthen the Middle Corridor as a reliable route to Central Asia that bypasses sanctioned Russian and Iranian territory.

Notably absent from the discussions were themes that had dominated earlier decades, such as the promotion of human rights, democratization, and the export of Western governance models. This marks a clear departure from the period when the C5+1 format was first introduced under President Obama in 2015. At that time, the initiative was largely designed to counter Russian and Chinese influence, rather than to promote trade and investment from the U.S.

President Trump’s regional policy is explicitly transactional. An agreement with Uzbekistan envisages approximately US$ 100 billion in investments flowing into U.S. industries over the coming years. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has joined the Abraham Accords and concluded around US$ 17 billion in commercial agreements with the U.S., including a US$ 1 billion joint mining venture.

Cooperation on rare earths has emerged as a particularly promising area. China currently accounts for nearly 70 percent of global rare-earth production and up to 90 percent of processing capacity, which has increased Washington’s interest in diversifying its supply chains. Central Asia holds significant mineral potential, and the basis for cooperation already exists. In 2024, the U.S. and Uzbekistan signed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals, marking the beginning of more extensive collaboration.

Historically, Central Asia has not occupied a central position in U.S. foreign policy. Limited trade ties and an excessive emphasis on democratization yielded few strategic benefits for Washington. What has changed is the broader geopolitical context. Russia’s war in Ukraine has redirected Moscow’s focus, prompting Central Asian governments to seek greater engagement with other major powers.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite the progress achieved by the U.S. in Central Asia, Washington is unlikely to marginalize China. Geography remains decisive. Any long-term American presence in Central Asia depends on secure access through the South Caucasus. The Armenia–Azerbaijan TRIPP agreement, developed under U.S. supervision, proposes a new transit corridor connecting the two states, but building the required infrastructure will take time. Even so, the Armenian route lacks direct sea access, making the existing Georgian segment of the Middle Corridor the more practical choice for large-scale trade. Ultimately, because China borders the region, logistics are simpler, and Beijing’s expanding military and security role is significant. These factors support China’s increasingly dominant position in regional trade and investment flows.

Assuming that the U.S. seeks to replace China would be a misguided analysis. Under Trump’s second term, Washington has adopted a more transactional approach, favoring a foreign policy largely devoid of human rights and democracy-promotion elements. The U.S. aims to capitalize on the willingness of Central Asian states to diversify their foreign relations, thereby enabling them to reduce their dependence on China, Russia, or other major powers.

Moreover, the U.S. is focused on a limited set of cooperative areas. Resource extraction and processing, as well as the development of east–west infrastructure that would enable exports from Central Asia, are central to Washington’s approach. By contrast, China invests across nearly all sectors of the economy. It actively pursues cooperation in education, security, and military affairs as well. Chinese companies are deeply embedded in almost every sector, ranging from renewable energy and transport to mineral extraction and processing. Uzbekistan alone has recently secured US$ 2.7 billion in Chinese investment in copper and silver projects, while U.S. processing capacity for critical minerals continues to lag far behind that of China. In September, further evidence of China’s enduring influence emerged when energy agreements worth around US$ 1.5 billion were signed during the Kazakh president’s visit to Beijing. In addition, approximately 70 commercial agreements totaling about US$ 15 billion were concluded.

It is therefore unsurprising that, following the Washington summit, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi conducted a tour of Central Asia on November 19-22 to discuss trade and infrastructure issues, underscoring Beijing’s strong position in the region. Bilateral commercial relations continue to expand. In the first ten months of 2025, trade between China and the Central Asian states increased markedly compared with the same period in 2024. In Kyrgyzstan’s case, trade rose from US$ 17.4 billion to US$ 23.6 billion, while trade between Kazakhstan and China increased from US$ 36.5 billion to US$ 39.8 billion. More modest growth was recorded in China’s trade with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Central Asian states also do not seek to expand their ties with the U.S. in ways that could create tensions with China. The summit in Washington did not include cooperation on military and security issues, which are particularly sensitive for Beijing. Central Asian governments are concerned that a strong shift toward the U.S. could increase their geopolitical vulnerability vis-à-vis China. A similar logic shapes Central Asia’s relations with Russia. It is therefore notable that, following the Washington summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited Moscow, describing the trip as “perhaps the main event of this year.” Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Kyrgyzstan to sign several major agreements and to reaffirm the strength of bilateral relations.

Yet China is building an extraordinarily influential geopolitical position in Central Asia due to the broad multilateral framework through which it has engaged the region. Beijing now regularly hosts summits at the level of heads of state with Central Asian countries, marking a clear elevation from earlier formats in which delegations were led by the Chinese foreign minister or other senior officials. In addition, Central Asian states are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and have joined several China-led initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), as well as the more recent Global Governance Initiative (GGI).

CONCLUSIONS: The U.S. has intensified its engagement with Central Asia by elevating the level of cooperation with the region. However, its influence remains limited when compared with the range of tools available to China. Geographic proximity, together with increasingly close cooperation between Chinese and Central Asian political elites, provides a strong foundation for bilateral relations. As a result, the summit in Washington is not a major concern for Beijing but is instead viewed as part of a broader and well-established pattern in which Central Asian states engage multiple global actors through summits and major agreements. Central Asian countries also show little inclination to abandon, or even significantly reduce, their close economic and political ties with China in favor of the U.S. Rather, they continue to pursue a policy of multi-alignment, which offers greater flexibility in foreign affairs and does not generate significant concerns in Beijing.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

During Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s visit to China in April 2025, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Azerbaijan. For China, Azerbaijan represents a partner of considerable geostrategic importance, capable of functioning as a viable transit hub linking China, Central Asia, and Europe. Azerbaijan offers China access to the sole overland route to Europe that circumvents Russia. Furthermore, China’s pathway to the South Caucasus necessarily passes through Azerbaijan, positioning Baku as a pivotal actor in China’s Eurasian economic strategy. Conversely, Chinese investments have the potential to place Azerbaijan’s non-oil economy on a trajectory of diversification. A strategic partnership with Baku is thus poised to expand Beijing’s influence in the South Caucasus.

Credit: NAM

BACKGROUND: Historically, relations between China and Azerbaijan trace back to the ancient Silk Road, along which trade and cultural exchanges took place over 2,500 years ago. In December 1991, China recognized Azerbaijan’s independence, and diplomatic relations were formally established with the Caucasian state in April 1992. China inaugurated its embassy in Baku in 1992, while Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Beijing in 1993. Azerbaijan was among the first states to accede to China’s multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013. Designed to enhance global connectivity through investments in infrastructure, energy, and transportation, the BRI extends across more than 160 countries. In 2015, China and Azerbaijan concluded a memorandum of understanding on the joint development of the Silk Road Economic Belt.

In 2019, President Ilham Aliyev traveled to Beijing to attend the “Belt and Road” International Forum, during which the two states signed ten agreements to strengthen cooperation in industry, investment, trade, and other economic sectors. The BRI has functioned as a catalyst for the rapid expansion of China–Azerbaijan relations, which have evolved over the years from commercial, economic, transit, and logistics collaboration to cooperation in science, technology, and cultural exchange.

In 2024, the two nations, during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana, reached another milestone in bilateral relations by adopting the “Joint Declaration of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership.”

In April 2025, China–Azerbaijan relations were elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership, inaugurating a new chapter in bilateral ties. During talks with the visiting President Aliyev on April 23 in Beijing, President Xi emphasized that the two states should “continuously enhance political mutual trust, deepen practical cooperation, and strengthen international collaboration to open a new chapter of all-round cooperation.”

The timing and context of Azerbaijan’s decision to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with China were of considerable significance. In April, scarcely two weeks prior to the agreement with Beijing, President Aliyev warned that Azerbaijan might redirect its gas exports elsewhere should the EU fail to advance the expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor, a transit route currently functioning at near-capacity. Azerbaijan supplies gas to the EU via this corridor, and Baku wants the EU to support its enlargement, as exports fell to 2.84 bcm in the first quarter of 2025, compared with 3.2 bcm during the same period the previous year. While EU investment could enhance pipeline capacity to achieve the 20 bcm target by 2027, skepticism persists within the EU regarding Azerbaijan’s ability to sustain sufficient gas supplies.

IMPLICATIONS: Geographically, the South Caucasus is of interest to China as it offers a potential land route linking China with Europe. For this reason, Beijing last year formally joined the Middle Corridor, a trade route connecting Europe and China that bypasses Russia and serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia and to traditional maritime routes. Participation in the Middle Corridor is part of China’s broader strategy to diversify its trade routes.

For China, the present moment is opportune for expanding its presence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where Russia has been rapidly losing influence due to its war in Ukraine since February 2022. The ongoing transformation of the Eurasian geopolitical landscape has brought renewed attention to Azerbaijan’s role as a transit state between Europe and Asia. Within the rapidly evolving regional dynamics shaped by Russia’s war against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has gained centrality in China’s Eurasian economic strategy.

Situated at the intersection of China’s East–West and North–South transportation routes, Azerbaijan has figured prominently on Beijing’s agenda for advancing its economic and strategic objectives in the region. China regards Azerbaijan as a pivotal partner for extending its influence across Central Asia and the South Caucasus. As a key actor in the South Caucasus for the EU, Russia, and China alike, Azerbaijan plays an important role in the BRI by facilitating strategic connectivity projects. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway (BTKR), for instance, links the Trans-European and Trans-Asian railway systems. This project not only grants the five Central Asian republics and Afghanistan access to the EU but also expedites the movement of Chinese goods into European markets. Likewise, Azerbaijan provides China access to the Baku International Sea Trade Port within the BRI framework. Located on the historic Silk Road, the Port of Baku functions as a major transport and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia, and constitutes a vital component of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor.

Azerbaijan’s strategic connectivity initiatives possess the capacity to transform the Caucasian state into a major transport and logistics hub of the region. For this reason, China envisions a pivotal role for Azerbaijan in advancing the prospects of the BRI and ensuring the success of its Eurasian economic strategy.

At present, transport and logistics constitute the principal domains of China–Azerbaijan cooperation, though this partnership may expand to include military collaboration. Azerbaijan has already procured Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder Block-III fighter aircraft, a joint venture between the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation. Beijing could further augment Azerbaijan’s military capabilities as it consolidates its strategic presence in the South Caucasus in the capacity of Baku’s strategic partner.

The EU constitutes Azerbaijan’s principal export market and thus its leading trading partner. Baku’s intensifying relations with Beijing illustrate its efforts to lessen dependence on traditional routes and markets while diversifying foreign policy options. As this partnership deepens, Azerbaijan may permit Chinese state-owned enterprises to assume greater control over ports, railways, and other strategic infrastructure in the region, a development likely to raise concern in European capitals. Moreover, the competing interests of various geopolitical actors in the region could erode the degree of autonomy that Baku presently enjoys in shaping regional policies. Regional powers such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran may perceive a challenge to their strategic interests in the region arising from a deepening China–Azerbaijan strategic partnership.

CONCLUSIONS: By virtue of its position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Azerbaijan possesses significant potential to serve as a viable transit hub linking China, Central Asia, and Europe, particularly at a time when Beijing, engaged in a trade war with Washington, is actively seeking alternative routes for its exports.

Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with China is, however, likely to generate new foreign policy challenges for the Caucasian state. A further deepening of this partnership may constrain Azerbaijan’s capacity to sustain strategic balance in its foreign policy. The country’s integration with European energy markets and its relations with Western states could, at some point, come into conflict with China’s interests in the region.

At present, China is not in a position to shape the geopolitics of the South Caucasus given the presence of other key actors such as the EU, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the U.S. Beijing has, however, placed its bet on Azerbaijan, which it regards as a pivotal node in strategic connectivity initiatives such as the Middle Corridor. China further views a strengthened strategic partnership with Azerbaijan as essential to consolidating its position in the South Caucasus.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Umair Jamal

The June 25 meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers in China illuminated how enduring tensions between Pakistan and India are hindering the bloc’s counterterrorism initiatives while compounding New Delhi’s diplomatic challenges within the organization. India’s refusal to endorse the meeting’s joint communiqué, following its unsuccessful attempt to include references to the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, demonstrated its waning influence in Eurasian multilateralism. Whereas Pakistan succeeded in presenting the unrest in Baluchistan as a matter of SCO concern, India was unable to garner support for its narrative on Kashmir. Concurrently, China’s advocacy for a more pronounced Iranian role in the SCO—evident in the forum’s condemnation of Israeli military actions, which India opposed—suggests a growing divide, potentially transforming the organization into a venue for great-power rivalry. This impasse accentuates India’s strategic dilemma: it must either align with the SCO’s emerging anti-Western consensus or risk marginalization within the China-dominated security framework of Central Asia.

The 2022 Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in Samarqand, Uzbekistan. Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

BACKGROUND: The SCO evolved from the 1996 Shanghai Five, initially established as a Sino-Russian initiative aimed at stabilizing Central Asia. However, its enlargement in 2017 to include both Pakistan and India introduced volatile bilateral dynamics into the organization. Traditionally, the SCO has concentrated on combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, yet the divergent stances of India and Pakistan have increasingly politicized these very concerns. Pakistan characterizes India’s actions in Kashmir as constituting state terrorism. Islamabad maintains its support for the region’s right to self-determination and remains committed to a negotiated resolution of the dispute. In contrast, India accuses Pakistan of facilitating cross-border militancy, resulting in an impasse that has repeatedly obstructed consensus within the SCO.

The April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, which resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, along with India’s subsequent missile strikes on Pakistan, significantly escalated bilateral tensions in the weeks leading up to the SCO meeting in China. India’s effort to raise the Kashmir issue during the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting proved unsuccessful, as references to the matter were excluded from the preliminary joint communiqué intended for endorsement by all member states. In contrast, Pakistan’s inclusion of references to unrest in Baluchistan in the draft appeared to align more closely with the organization’s stance against external interference, thereby garnering broader resonance within the bloc.

China’s discreet yet consistent support for Pakistan has altered the internal dynamics of the SCO in recent years. On multiple occasions, Beijing has permitted Islamabad to obstruct India’s terrorism-related narratives, while simultaneously advancing its own conception of the SCO as a counterweight to the U.S.-led international order. For example, India’s recent refusal to endorse the SCO’s condemnation of Israel’s attack on Iran further isolated New Delhi from the prevailing consensus within the group, highlighting its increasing divergence from the bloc’s anti-Western trajectory. This discord is structural in nature. India’s strategic alignments with the U.S. through frameworks such as the QUAD and I2U2 are at odds with the SCO’s objectives, whereas Pakistan’s China-backed diplomatic strategy aims to leverage the organization to constrain India’s influence. With Iran’s accession as a full member, the SCO is likely to intensify its anti-Israel and anti-American rhetoric, thereby compelling India to confront progressively more difficult diplomatic trade-offs.

IMPLICATIONS: The persistent tensions between India and Pakistan during SCO meetings are generating substantial obstacles for the organization while reshaping regional power dynamics. India increasingly finds itself in a strategic quandary. Remaining within the SCO necessitates engagement with both Pakistan and China on contentious issues such as Baluchistan and may compel tacit support for initiatives aligned with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conversely, a complete withdrawal from the forum would entail forfeiting strategic influence in Central Asia, thereby ceding greater regional influence to China and Russia.

Recent military confrontations between India and Pakistan underscore how their bilateral disputes are impeding the SCO’s capacity to foster effective security cooperation. Although the U.S. facilitated a ceasefire between the two countries following the latest clashes, the underlying issue persists: India aspires to leadership within the Global South, yet its strategic vision diverges from the SCO’s predominantly anti-Western orientation. India’s choice not to utilize the SCO platform to present its case against Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack reflects a diminishing confidence in the organization. Despite actively engaging Western capitals to highlight the issue of cross-border terrorism in the aftermath of its retaliatory strikes, India conspicuously refrained from advancing its position during the SCO summit.

This pattern of selective engagement suggests that New Delhi perceives the China-led forum as increasingly peripheral to its core security interests—a perception that stands in sharp contrast to its intensified diplomatic outreach to the U.S. and EU in recent weeks. India’s disengagement from the forum conveys a clear signal to states such as Pakistan and China: New Delhi prioritizes its Western alliances over participation in Eurasian multilateral mechanisms. By choosing not to raise the Pahalgam incident within the SCO framework, India implicitly acknowledged the organization’s limited utility in addressing its counterterrorism agenda. However, this strategy entails certain risks, as India’s terrorism-centric narrative, promoted primarily through its Western partnerships, has recently received limited international traction. Many states remain preoccupied with the potential nuclear implications of India-Pakistan tensions, while terrorism-related issues have garnered comparatively little global attention.

India’s marginalization within the SCO may inadvertently enhance Pakistan’s standing as the more engaged and consistent Eurasian partner, thereby exposing the limitations of New Delhi’s multi-alignment strategy. Pakistan has strategically leveraged the SCO platform to elevate its international profile, presenting itself as a cooperative actor aligned with the organization’s principles. 

Meanwhile, Islamabad actively seeks to obstruct Indian statements that conflict with its strategic interests, while simultaneously reinforcing its alliance with Beijing. By focusing on shared security concerns—such as terrorism—that resonate with Central Asian member states, Pakistan positions itself as a more constructive and cooperative actor within the SCO framework. In contrast, India’s persistent emphasis on Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism in Kashmir is perceived by other members as invoking a protracted bilateral conflict that necessitates substantive dialogue between the two parties. Within this context, the SCO is viewed as a potential facilitator, but only if both countries demonstrate a willingness to engage. While Pakistan has signaled openness to such mediation through the SCO, India has consistently rejected third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute.

China appears to be the primary beneficiary of the ongoing India-Pakistan rivalry within the SCO. It leverages these divisions to diminish India’s influence in Eurasian institutions, to assess the reliability of Russia—traditionally a neutral actor—and to advance its own financial mechanisms as alternatives to Western systems. In this context, Iran’s accession as a full member introduces additional complexities for India, compelling it to navigate between aligning with SCO positions and preserving its expanding strategic relations with Israel. Moreover, Iran’s inclusion is likely to enhance coordination between China and Pakistan on issues such as Afghanistan and regional energy initiatives, thereby increasing the risk of India’s marginalization within the organization.

India’s challenges within the SCO undermine its credibility as a self-proclaimed leader of the Global South. Its positions frequently diverge from those of the majority of member states, thereby casting doubt on its representative claims. The SCO’s counterterrorism cooperation has also been significantly impeded by the India-Pakistan impasse, which prevents joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and meaningful dialogue on bilateral tensions. This persistent dysfunction has historically provided greater operational latitude for militant groups and carries the risk of escalating into open conflict, as illustrated by the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack.

CONCLUSIONS: The SCO has arrived at a critical juncture, as the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to obstruct its operational efficacy. India’s marginalization at recent meetings underscores its difficulty in reconciling strategic partnerships with the U.S. and effective engagement within a China-led multilateral framework. Meanwhile, Pakistan—bolstered by Chinese support—has adeptly utilized the SCO as a platform to contest India’s stance on Kashmir and to portray itself as a constructive and responsible partner in counterterrorism efforts.

Looking ahead, three scenarios appear increasingly plausible. First, the existing stalemate may persist, with India continuing to obstruct references to Kashmir and Baluchistan while opposing proposals perceived as anti-Western. Second, Iran’s recent accession to the forum may consolidate an anti-U.S. and anti-Israel bloc within the SCO, further marginalizing India’s influence. Third, China may exploit these internal divisions to transform the SCO into a vehicle for advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, thereby diminishing India’s strategic role within the organization.

For the SCO to retain its relevance, it would need to play a constructive role in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan; however, China’s evident alignment with Pakistan renders this prospect improbable. The organization’s viability as a significant security platform now hinges on its capacity to transcend its current status as merely another stage for persistent India-Pakistan rivalry. With each successive meeting concluding without consensus, the prospects for such a transformation appear increasingly uncertain.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.