By: Mathieu Lemoine 

South Korea’s first summit with all five Central Asian presidents, held in Seoul on September 16, gave new institutional weight to a relationship more than three decades old. Critical minerals and supply-chain security featured prominently, but the significance of the new framework will depend less on how many resources South Korea secures than on what its engagement leaves behind in Central Asia. Seoul wants more resilient and diversified supply chains. Central Asian governments increasingly want foreign interest in their resources to generate processing, technology, skills and industrial development. Seoul is seeking diversification; Central Asia is seeking transformation.

BACKGROUND:

The summit did not mark South Korea’s arrival in Central Asia. The Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum has existed since 2007, while successive governments in Seoul have incorporated the region into broader Eurasian strategies. Moon Jae-in’s New Northern Policy and Yoon Suk-yeol’s K-Silk Road initiative both preceded the current framework, and the summit itself had originally been envisaged under Yoon.

What changed in September was the level of institutionalization. For the first time, South Korea and all five Central Asian states met in a common presidential format, upgrading cooperation that had previously been conducted mainly through bilateral relations and ministerial-level mechanisms. An inaugural C5+1 Industry Ministers’ Meeting also created a multilateral channel focused on industry, supply chains and critical minerals.

The new framework nevertheless reflects a changing international economic environment. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, disruptions to global trade and growing competition over strategic inputs have increased South Korea’s incentive to diversify sources of key materials. Matteo Fumagalli, Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, sees this emphasis on resilience as an addition to longstanding Korean priorities rather than a fundamental change of direction.

Central Asia is attractive in this context because of its reserves of uranium, tungsten and other strategic resources. South Korea, meanwhile, depends heavily on imported minerals for industries including semiconductors, batteries and steel.

But the priorities announced around the summit went beyond extraction. The first C5+1 Industry Ministers’ Meeting identified industrial infrastructure, critical-mineral supply chains, technology cooperation and talent development among its main areas of work. Importantly for Central Asian governments, the stated ambition also included refining, smelting, higher-value processing and manufacturing.

The question is whether this political and institutional momentum can now be converted into commercially viable projects.

IMPLICATIONS:

The first test of the new framework is not how many agreements are signed, but what kind of economic relationship develops around Central Asia’s resources.

For the region, increasing mineral exports would represent only a limited form of success. The more consequential question is whether Korean investment creates capabilities that remain locally: processing facilities, engineering expertise, laboratories, trained workers and suppliers able to meet demanding industrial standards.

This distinction is particularly important when governments speak of technology transfer. Purchasing Korean machinery does not in itself create technological capacity. Aidar Kurmashev of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies argues that meaningful transfer requires local engineers able to control production processes, laboratories capable of testing quality, maintenance capacity and suppliers able to meet industrial specifications.

Kazakhstan’s automotive sector provides an indication of what a deeper model of cooperation could look like. Korean-backed vehicle production has increasingly been accompanied by efforts to localize components and connect industrial investment with technical education. Its longer-term significance will depend on whether domestic suppliers eventually acquire capabilities that allow them to serve several customers rather than remain dependent on a single assembly operation.

This is where South Korea could offer something distinctive. Korean companies can combine technology and production management with knowledge of the standards required by advanced industrial customers. If those capabilities are embedded locally, they could help Central Asian firms enter production networks that would otherwise be difficult to access.

Yet the constraints are considerable. Central Asia is landlocked, divided into several relatively small markets and geographically distant from Korean production centers. Transport therefore remains expensive and complex. The Middle Corridor has attracted growing attention as Central Asian governments seek additional routes across the Caspian and South Caucasus, but from South Korea even an overland Eurasian connection requires goods first to reach the continent by sea because transit through North Korea is unavailable.

A second challenge concerns the regional character of the new framework. A C5+1 mechanism does not automatically create a regional economic relationship.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have traditionally dominated South Korea’s engagement with Central Asia because of their larger markets, industrial bases, resource endowments and extensive human ties. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have different economic structures and offer different forms of cooperation. Replicating the Kazakh or Uzbek relationship across all five countries is therefore neither realistic nor necessary.

A more viable model would combine bilateral investment with regional economic effects. Large industrial projects will continue to be negotiated primarily between individual governments and companies, but they can acquire a regional dimension if they generate supply chains, services and commercial links across borders.

Smaller Central Asian economies do not each need a Korean assembly plant to benefit from deeper cooperation. They could participate through specialized suppliers, logistics, technical services, training or other activities connected to regional production networks. Jieon Lee, Professor in the Department of Central Asian Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, also points to areas such as water management, human-resource development, environmental policy and digital governance, where cooperation could create regional benefits even if not every country participates in the same way.

This differentiated model also changes how South Korea’s growing role should be understood geopolitically. Central Asian governments are not looking for Seoul to replace China, Russia, the European Union, Japan, Türkiye or the Gulf states. They are seeking additional options.

The value of diversification lies not in accumulating foreign partners for its own sake, but in reducing structural dependence. A producer with several potential customers, access to alternative technologies, multiple financing sources and more than one workable transport route has greater room for maneuver. Adding another external actor without changing those underlying dependencies achieves much less.

South Korea enters this environment with important advantages. It retains a comparatively non-threatening profile in Central Asia and does not carry the same geopolitical baggage as some larger powers. Korean culture, education and business also enjoy considerable visibility, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

But this goodwill should not be taken for granted. If Korean engagement becomes associated primarily with securing access to raw materials, it risks reproducing the same frustrations Central Asian governments increasingly express toward extractive forms of external partnership. The credibility of the new framework will therefore depend on whether industrial cooperation produces visible local value.

That makes implementation more important than diplomatic architecture. The summit and the new C5+1 mechanisms can create political direction and regular channels for cooperation, but they cannot by themselves make projects commercially viable. Financing, transport costs, regulatory conditions, reliable customers and private-sector incentives will ultimately determine which initiatives move forward.

CONCLUSIONS:

The September summit has institutionalized South Korea’s relationship with Central Asia. It has not yet transformed it.

The decisive phase will take place below the level of presidential diplomacy. Memoranda must become feasibility studies, financing agreements, actual investment and operating facilities. Progress should therefore be measured not only by the volume of minerals exported or the number of agreements announced, but by whether cooperation produces processing capacity, competitive suppliers, skilled engineers and commercially viable production networks.

The C5+1 format should likewise not be judged by whether it creates identical Korean relationships with all five Central Asian states. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will remain the principal economic anchors, while smaller economies can participate through supply chains, services and regional initiatives.

South Korea does not need to become Central Asia’s dominant external actor for the new framework to matter. Its opportunity lies in the overlap between Seoul’s search for resilient supply chains and the region’s search for investment, technology and greater productive capacity. If that overlap creates durable local capabilities, the summit may mark a substantive change. If it produces mainly new memoranda and meetings, the institutional architecture will have advanced further than the economic partnership.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Mathieu Lemoine is a governance, rule of law and public sector reform professional with experience across UNDP, USAID, OSCE, EU institutions and election observation missions. He has worked extensively on governance, elections, civil society and regional dynamics in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

By Rafis Abazov

As the global race for digital supremacy accelerates, Kazakhstan is positioning itself not merely as a participant, but as a regional architect of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure and foresight. Over the past decade, the Republic of Kazakhstan has methodically repositioned itself not just as a raw-material exporter in Central Asia but as a proactive knowledge and innovation actor. The recent launch of the AI Silknet initiative by the National Academy of Sciences marks a pivotal step in the country’s broader digital transformation strategy—one that seeks to fuse scientific modernization, regional leadership, and strategic foresight into a cohesive national vision. It may well mark its transition into a digital actor on a regional scale.

                                                                                Credit: Pexels

BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan’s digital transformation journey has been steadily gaining momentum over the past decade. From the “Digital Kazakhstan” program to the more recent “Digital Bridge” forums, the country has signaled its intent to become a regional hub for innovation and technology. The Government of Kazakhstan has invested over US$ 100 million into flagship AI-Sana (meaning “consciousness” or “intelligence” in Kazakh), a state-funded program launched to develop the country’s National AI Platform and position Kazakhstan as a regional leader in artificial intelligence.

In this context, the AI Silknet project, developed in partnership with the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information (KISTI), represents a new step in this trajectory. AI Silknet is not merely a technological platform; it is a national knowledge infrastructure designed to consolidate scientific, technological, and socio-economic data into a unified digital ecosystem. Its core function is to provide predictive analytics and strategic foresight for decision-makers, researchers, and policymakers. By integrating machine learning algorithms with vast datasets, the system aims to anticipate trends, model development scenarios, and support evidence-based governance.

This initiative reflects a growing recognition within Kazakhstan’s leadership that digital transformation must be underpinned by robust institutional frameworks. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), long a bastion of academic excellence, is now being retooled as a digital think tank, one capable of generating real-time insights and long-term strategies through AI-powered analysis.

The collaboration with South Korea’s KISTI illustrates Kazakhstan’s attempt to improve the management of the national economy and planning process. South Korea’s own transformation into a digital powerhouse offers a compelling model for Kazakhstan, particularly in the realm of AI-driven science and innovation policy. The AI Silknet project draws directly from KISTI’s experience with the NTIS (National Science & Technology Information Service), adapting its architecture to Kazakhstan’s unique developmental context.

This partnership is not merely technical, it is strategic. It signals Kazakhstan’s intent to align with leading digital economies while maintaining agency over its own data and development priorities. In doing so, Kazakhstan is crafting a hybrid model of digital modernization: one that leverages global expertise while reinforcing national sovereignty and regional relevance, improving efficiency of budget management and making its national economy more competitive.

IMPLICATIONS: The name of the initiative: AI Silknet, is no accident. It evokes the historical Silk Road, positioning Kazakhstan as a digital bridge between East and West. But unlike its ancient predecessor, this new Silk Road is not about the movement of goods; it is about the flow of data, knowledge, and innovation.

Kazakhstan’s leadership in AI infrastructure has significant implications for Central Asia. As the region grapples with uneven digital development, Kazakhstan’s model offers a scalable blueprint for integrating AI into national planning, education, and economic diversification. By opening AI Silknet to regional collaboration, Kazakhstan could catalyze a new era of scientific diplomacy and data-driven cooperation across borders.

Moreover, the initiative aligns with broader geopolitical trends. As global powers compete for influence in Eurasia’s digital space, Kazakhstan’s proactive stance allows it to shape—not merely respond to—the emerging rules of engagement. In this sense, AI Silknet is not just a tool of governance; it is a statement of intent.

At its core, AI Silknet is a foresight engine. It is designed to help Kazakhstan anticipate technological disruptions, model policy outcomes, and align national priorities with global trends. This is particularly critical in a world where the pace of change often outstrips the capacity of traditional institutions to respond.

Embedding AI into the heart of its scientific and policy apparatus carries many risks and uncertainty yet Kazakhstan is embracing a new paradigm of governance—one that is anticipatory, adaptive, and analytically grounded. This shift has the potential to transform how decisions are made, how resources are allocated, and how national goals are pursued.

The system’s ability to integrate diverse datasets, from academic publications to patent filings, from demographic trends to economic indicators, makes it a powerful tool for cross-sectoral analysis. Organizers claim that it can, for example, identify emerging research clusters, forecast labor market shifts, or simulate the impact of policy interventions. In doing so, it empowers decision-makers with the kind of strategic intelligence that is increasingly indispensable in the 21st century.

No digital transformation is complete without a corresponding investment in human capital. Kazakhstan’s AI Silknet initiative is closely tied to efforts to modernize the country’s education system and cultivate a new generation of data scientists, AI engineers, and digital policymakers.

The NAS, in collaboration with universities and research institutes, is developing training programs that align with the competencies required to operate and expand the AI Silknet system. These include courses in machine learning, data governance, computational modeling, and science policy.

CONCLUSION: Kazakhstan’s AI Silknet is more than a technological upgrade — it is a strategic platform for national renewal and regional leadership. By investing in predictive analytics, institutional capacity, and international collaboration, Kazakhstan is laying the groundwork for a digital future that is inclusive, intelligent, and interconnected.

By embedding the technologies into its national economy and new skills into academic curricula and professional development pathways, Kazakhstan is not only building technical capacity—it also aims at improving governance, budget spending and creating thousands of new jobs in the IT and AI sectors. This is essential to ensure that AI Silknet remains a living system—continuously evolving in response to new challenges and opportunities. According to estimates by Tengrinews Agency, Kazakhstan could undergo a workforce shift or restructuring affecting up to one million positions over the next 5 to 10 years due to automation and the implementation of AI.

As Central Asia navigates the complexities of digital transformation, Kazakhstan’s experience offers valuable lessons. It demonstrates that with vision, partnerships, and a commitment to data-driven governance, even mid-sized states can shape the contours of regional development.

In the years ahead, the success of AI Silknet will depend not only on its technical sophistication but on its ability to foster trust, transparency, and shared purpose—both within Kazakhstan and across its borders. If it succeeds, it may well become the backbone of a new digital Silk Road, linking the region’s past to its most promising futures.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), An Effective Project Manager (2025) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and facilitated the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

July 3, 2024

President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea recently visited the Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Prior to his tour, he introduced the “K-Silk Road” initiative, highlighting his role in guiding Korea’s future interactions with the region. While this initiative builds upon Korea’s longstanding policies, it signifies a desire to forge a new chapter in Central Asian relations. Despite its shortcomings and some neglected areas, this initiative is a significant step forward in the context of regional relations. 

By Mirzokhid Rakhimov and Sung Dong Ki

June 10th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

South Korea’s Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn visited Uzbekistan on May 19-20, 2016. The visit was the fifteenth official high-level meeting between the two countries. Over the last year, several new actors have increased their engagement with Central Asia, aside from South Korea also including Japan and India. South Korea is an important partner to the Central Asian republics, and especially to Uzbekistan. In May 2015, Islam Karimov made Seoul the destination of his first foreign visit after his reelection as president. The visit underscored the priority given to South Korea in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. South Korea is among the largest investors in Uzbekistan’s economy, and cooperation is growing in education, tourism, cultural exchanges, and security. 

By Richard Weitz

December 22nd, 2015, The CACI Analyst

In early November, John Kerry made a long overdue trip to Central Asia, becoming the first Secretary of State to visit all five Central Asian countries in one diplomatic tour. His agenda focused on reassuring the regional governments that the United States cares about their concerns, specifically Afghanistan and religious extremism. Kerry also highlighted U.S. support for region-wide economic integration, ecological protection, and cultural and humanitarian cooperation. He further developed bilateral cooperation with each Central Asian government. However, there were no major agreements or blockbuster initiatives announced during Kerry’s visit. It will require sustained follow-through by the current and next U.S. administrations to achieve enduringly positive results.