By Umair Jamal

The June 25 meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers in China illuminated how enduring tensions between Pakistan and India are hindering the bloc’s counterterrorism initiatives while compounding New Delhi’s diplomatic challenges within the organization. India’s refusal to endorse the meeting’s joint communiqué, following its unsuccessful attempt to include references to the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, demonstrated its waning influence in Eurasian multilateralism. Whereas Pakistan succeeded in presenting the unrest in Baluchistan as a matter of SCO concern, India was unable to garner support for its narrative on Kashmir. Concurrently, China’s advocacy for a more pronounced Iranian role in the SCO—evident in the forum’s condemnation of Israeli military actions, which India opposed—suggests a growing divide, potentially transforming the organization into a venue for great-power rivalry. This impasse accentuates India’s strategic dilemma: it must either align with the SCO’s emerging anti-Western consensus or risk marginalization within the China-dominated security framework of Central Asia.

The 2022 Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in Samarqand, Uzbekistan. Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

BACKGROUND: The SCO evolved from the 1996 Shanghai Five, initially established as a Sino-Russian initiative aimed at stabilizing Central Asia. However, its enlargement in 2017 to include both Pakistan and India introduced volatile bilateral dynamics into the organization. Traditionally, the SCO has concentrated on combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, yet the divergent stances of India and Pakistan have increasingly politicized these very concerns. Pakistan characterizes India’s actions in Kashmir as constituting state terrorism. Islamabad maintains its support for the region’s right to self-determination and remains committed to a negotiated resolution of the dispute. In contrast, India accuses Pakistan of facilitating cross-border militancy, resulting in an impasse that has repeatedly obstructed consensus within the SCO.

The April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, which resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, along with India’s subsequent missile strikes on Pakistan, significantly escalated bilateral tensions in the weeks leading up to the SCO meeting in China. India’s effort to raise the Kashmir issue during the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting proved unsuccessful, as references to the matter were excluded from the preliminary joint communiqué intended for endorsement by all member states. In contrast, Pakistan’s inclusion of references to unrest in Baluchistan in the draft appeared to align more closely with the organization’s stance against external interference, thereby garnering broader resonance within the bloc.

China’s discreet yet consistent support for Pakistan has altered the internal dynamics of the SCO in recent years. On multiple occasions, Beijing has permitted Islamabad to obstruct India’s terrorism-related narratives, while simultaneously advancing its own conception of the SCO as a counterweight to the U.S.-led international order. For example, India’s recent refusal to endorse the SCO’s condemnation of Israel’s attack on Iran further isolated New Delhi from the prevailing consensus within the group, highlighting its increasing divergence from the bloc’s anti-Western trajectory. This discord is structural in nature. India’s strategic alignments with the U.S. through frameworks such as the QUAD and I2U2 are at odds with the SCO’s objectives, whereas Pakistan’s China-backed diplomatic strategy aims to leverage the organization to constrain India’s influence. With Iran’s accession as a full member, the SCO is likely to intensify its anti-Israel and anti-American rhetoric, thereby compelling India to confront progressively more difficult diplomatic trade-offs.

IMPLICATIONS: The persistent tensions between India and Pakistan during SCO meetings are generating substantial obstacles for the organization while reshaping regional power dynamics. India increasingly finds itself in a strategic quandary. Remaining within the SCO necessitates engagement with both Pakistan and China on contentious issues such as Baluchistan and may compel tacit support for initiatives aligned with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conversely, a complete withdrawal from the forum would entail forfeiting strategic influence in Central Asia, thereby ceding greater regional influence to China and Russia.

Recent military confrontations between India and Pakistan underscore how their bilateral disputes are impeding the SCO’s capacity to foster effective security cooperation. Although the U.S. facilitated a ceasefire between the two countries following the latest clashes, the underlying issue persists: India aspires to leadership within the Global South, yet its strategic vision diverges from the SCO’s predominantly anti-Western orientation. India’s choice not to utilize the SCO platform to present its case against Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack reflects a diminishing confidence in the organization. Despite actively engaging Western capitals to highlight the issue of cross-border terrorism in the aftermath of its retaliatory strikes, India conspicuously refrained from advancing its position during the SCO summit.

This pattern of selective engagement suggests that New Delhi perceives the China-led forum as increasingly peripheral to its core security interests—a perception that stands in sharp contrast to its intensified diplomatic outreach to the U.S. and EU in recent weeks. India’s disengagement from the forum conveys a clear signal to states such as Pakistan and China: New Delhi prioritizes its Western alliances over participation in Eurasian multilateral mechanisms. By choosing not to raise the Pahalgam incident within the SCO framework, India implicitly acknowledged the organization’s limited utility in addressing its counterterrorism agenda. However, this strategy entails certain risks, as India’s terrorism-centric narrative, promoted primarily through its Western partnerships, has recently received limited international traction. Many states remain preoccupied with the potential nuclear implications of India-Pakistan tensions, while terrorism-related issues have garnered comparatively little global attention.

India’s marginalization within the SCO may inadvertently enhance Pakistan’s standing as the more engaged and consistent Eurasian partner, thereby exposing the limitations of New Delhi’s multi-alignment strategy. Pakistan has strategically leveraged the SCO platform to elevate its international profile, presenting itself as a cooperative actor aligned with the organization’s principles. 

Meanwhile, Islamabad actively seeks to obstruct Indian statements that conflict with its strategic interests, while simultaneously reinforcing its alliance with Beijing. By focusing on shared security concerns—such as terrorism—that resonate with Central Asian member states, Pakistan positions itself as a more constructive and cooperative actor within the SCO framework. In contrast, India’s persistent emphasis on Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism in Kashmir is perceived by other members as invoking a protracted bilateral conflict that necessitates substantive dialogue between the two parties. Within this context, the SCO is viewed as a potential facilitator, but only if both countries demonstrate a willingness to engage. While Pakistan has signaled openness to such mediation through the SCO, India has consistently rejected third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute.

China appears to be the primary beneficiary of the ongoing India-Pakistan rivalry within the SCO. It leverages these divisions to diminish India’s influence in Eurasian institutions, to assess the reliability of Russia—traditionally a neutral actor—and to advance its own financial mechanisms as alternatives to Western systems. In this context, Iran’s accession as a full member introduces additional complexities for India, compelling it to navigate between aligning with SCO positions and preserving its expanding strategic relations with Israel. Moreover, Iran’s inclusion is likely to enhance coordination between China and Pakistan on issues such as Afghanistan and regional energy initiatives, thereby increasing the risk of India’s marginalization within the organization.

India’s challenges within the SCO undermine its credibility as a self-proclaimed leader of the Global South. Its positions frequently diverge from those of the majority of member states, thereby casting doubt on its representative claims. The SCO’s counterterrorism cooperation has also been significantly impeded by the India-Pakistan impasse, which prevents joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and meaningful dialogue on bilateral tensions. This persistent dysfunction has historically provided greater operational latitude for militant groups and carries the risk of escalating into open conflict, as illustrated by the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack.

CONCLUSIONS: The SCO has arrived at a critical juncture, as the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to obstruct its operational efficacy. India’s marginalization at recent meetings underscores its difficulty in reconciling strategic partnerships with the U.S. and effective engagement within a China-led multilateral framework. Meanwhile, Pakistan—bolstered by Chinese support—has adeptly utilized the SCO as a platform to contest India’s stance on Kashmir and to portray itself as a constructive and responsible partner in counterterrorism efforts.

Looking ahead, three scenarios appear increasingly plausible. First, the existing stalemate may persist, with India continuing to obstruct references to Kashmir and Baluchistan while opposing proposals perceived as anti-Western. Second, Iran’s recent accession to the forum may consolidate an anti-U.S. and anti-Israel bloc within the SCO, further marginalizing India’s influence. Third, China may exploit these internal divisions to transform the SCO into a vehicle for advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, thereby diminishing India’s strategic role within the organization.

For the SCO to retain its relevance, it would need to play a constructive role in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan; however, China’s evident alignment with Pakistan renders this prospect improbable. The organization’s viability as a significant security platform now hinges on its capacity to transcend its current status as merely another stage for persistent India-Pakistan rivalry. With each successive meeting concluding without consensus, the prospects for such a transformation appear increasingly uncertain.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The downing of three expensive French-made Rafale fighter jets by low-cost, Chinese-manufactured J-10C aircraft during the Pakistan–India aerial conflict on May 7 highlighted the affordability and operational capability of Chinese fighters. In light of this encounter, several countries are now reassessing their Rafale procurement plans. Uzbekistan, which had previously expressed interest in acquiring 24 Rafale jets, is currently engaged in negotiations with China to purchase JF-17 aircraft. China has increasingly focused on expanding arms exports to Central Asia, a market traditionally dominated by Russia.

BACKGROUND: On May 7, India launched missile strikes against six locations in Pakistan, attributing responsibility to its long-standing rival for the April 22 attack that claimed the lives of 26 tourists in Pahalgam, located in Indian-administered Kashmir. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) deployed Chinese-manufactured J-10C fighter jets, which succeeded in downing five Indian aircraft, including three Rafale jets recently procured from France. Pakistan utilized China’s advanced PL-15E air-to-air missiles to carry out the strikes on the Indian fighters. The India–Pakistan confrontation, characterized by missile exchanges, drone attacks, and artillery shelling, concluded on May 10 following a ceasefire agreement brokered by the U.S. 

In 2016, India concluded a US$ 8.8 billion agreement with France for the procurement of 36 Rafale fighter jets. Pakistan entered into a US$ 1.525 billion deal with China for the acquisition of 20 J-10C aircraft.

China ranks as the fourth-largest supplier of conventional weapons globally, following the U.S., France, and Russia. The country produces the majority of its military equipment domestically and primarily exports to developing nations. China is increasingly asserting itself as the dominant arms exporter in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, while also expanding its presence in Central Asia. Chinese aircraft have gained recognition as cost-effective alternatives to Western models, particularly among developing states. 

China has been consolidating its defense partnerships with Central Asian nations in recent years. In 2015, it supplied FD-2000 long-range air defense systems to both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, following defense equipment contracts signed by the two countries with China in 2013. The FD-2000 is capable of intercepting a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, armed helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles. In 2022, China further deepened its regional security ties by signing bilateral security cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan during a visit by former Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe. 

China has now emerged as a principal defense supplier to Central Asia. At the China–Central Asia Summit in 2023, Beijing articulated its intention to strengthen military cooperation and security engagement with the region at a time when Russia is increasingly preoccupied and resource-constrained due to its ongoing war in Ukraine.

China is actively capitalizing on the current geopolitical landscape. Last year, it supplied EVOMax unmanned systems to Kazakhstan, whereas Tajikistan in 2024 procured the Chinese-manufactured HQ-17AE air defense system, which significantly enhances its capacity to defend against a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Uzbekistan also continues to enhance its military cooperation with China, procuring FM-90 and KS-1C air defense systems in February. The FM-90, an upgraded version of the HQ-7, is designed for short-range defense against threats such as cruise missiles and drones. In contrast, the KS-1C serves as a medium-to-long-range air defense system. Together, these systems provide Uzbekistan with a layered and integrated air defense architecture capable of countering a broad spectrum of aerial threats.

China’s defense exports to Central Asia were minimal between 2010 and 2014, accounting for only 1.5 percent of the region’s total arms imports. However, this figure rose substantially to 18 percent during the 2015–2019 period, reflecting a marked increase in Beijing’s regional defense engagement. According to one estimate, Russia’s arms exports to Central Asia declined by 64 percent between 2020 and 2024. This downturn created a vacuum, which other suppliers—including India and China—moved to fill. During this period, China accounted for 17 percent of the replacement in arms supply, further solidifying its growing influence in the region’s defense sector.

BACKGROUND: The performance of Chinese-manufactured aircraft during the brief military confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian Air Forces has not only reignited global interest in Chinese defense technology but also challenged the perceived superiority of Western military hardware.

China has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the recent India–Pakistan conflict. The market valuation of Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC)—a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and the producer of the J-10C fighter jets—surged by over US$ 7.6 billion following the aerial engagement on May 7. On the same day, CAC’s share price on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange rose by more than 17 percent, coinciding with Pakistan’s Defence Minister’s confirmation that five Indian fighter jets had been downed overnight.

The air warfare offered China an opportunity to showcase its advancements in aviation technology on the global stage, underscoring the effectiveness of China’s “low-cost, high-capacity” production model in the defense sector. The performance of Chinese J-10C against French Rafale, which is over three times more expensive, highlights the operational competitiveness of more affordable Chinese alternatives. This event is likely to accelerate the expansion of China’s military exports in the coming years. Although the Rafale retains technological advantages over Chinese platforms such as the JF-17 Thunder and J-10C, the results of this live combat scenario is expected to adversely affect the export prospects of France’s Dassault Aviation.

The J-10C fighter jet is scheduled to make its debut at the 2025 Paris Air Show—one of the world’s premier aerospace exhibitions, historically dominated by Western manufacturers. The inclusion of the J-10C in this prestigious event signifies a growing recognition among global industry leaders of China’s rising aerospace capabilities.

In the aftermath of the India–Pakistan aerial confrontation, China’s J-10C and JF-17 Thunder fighter jets have gained increased appeal among Central Asian countries. For instance, Uzbekistan expressed interest in purchasing 24 Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tashkent in November 2023. However, Uzbekistan has earlier this year engaged in negotiations with China to procure JF-17 jets. The recent air combat between India and Pakistan is likely to further incentivize Tashkent to finalize a deal with Beijing. China’s appeal as an arms supplier is also enhanced by its willingness to facilitate technology transfers to recipient states. Notably, China is assisting Uzbekistan in establishing its own domestic defense industry. 

China is poised to capture a significant share of Central Asia’s arms market, capitalizing on shifting regional dynamics. All five Central Asian republics have increased their defense expenditures at a time when Russia’s long-standing dominance in arms sales to the region has eroded following the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. 

CONCLUSIONS: The live air combat between India and Pakistan has significantly elevated the global market value and demand for Chinese arms and aircraft, strengthening Beijing’s defense sales narrative, particularly in Central Asia. The recent acquisition of Chinese defense systems by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signals a departure from traditional defense alignments in the region, reflecting a broader pivot among Central Asian states toward Chinese military technology. 

China views Central Asia as a strategic gateway to West Asia and the Black Sea region. Its growing security engagement and expanding arms sales serve as crucial instruments for deepening its strategic foothold in the region through sustained defense collaboration with Central Asian states. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email,  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

Azerbaijan's acquisition of at least 50 JF-17 Block III fighter jets from Pakistan, to be equipped with Turkish-manufactured missiles, aims to enhance the aerial combat capabilities of the Azerbaijani Air Force. Jointly developed by China and Pakistan, the JF-17 Block III fighters will gain increased lethality through the integration of avionics from Türkiye’s advanced defense industry. This agreement has further consolidated the multi-dimensional defense collaboration between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, commonly referred to as "three brothers." Pakistan and Azerbaijan are also actively participating in Türkiye’s Kaan fifth-generation fighter aircraft program. The procurement of Türkiye’s fifth-generation jets, among the most advanced globally, is expected to be transformative for both Baku and Islamabad.

BACKGROUND:  Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan are collectively referred to as the "three brothers" since Türkiye was the first state, and Pakistan the second, to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. Both Türkiye and Pakistan provided military support to Baku during the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020. The states convened in Islamabad in January 2021 for a trilateral meeting, during which they agreed to expand cooperation in political, strategic, trade, economic, peace, and security, while reaffirming mutual support on issues of shared concern.

Initiated and launched by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 2010, the Kaan fifth-generation fighter program represents Türkiye’s indigenous jet fighter initiative. Following Türkiye’s exclusion from the U.S. F-35 fifth-generation fighter program in 2019, the Kaan remains Türkiye’s sole alternative and is intended to replace the country's aging fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The first prototype was tested in 2023; however, the development process is expected to span at least a decade. 

While Azerbaijan is providing financial assistance to Türkiye’s Kaan program, hundreds of Pakistani officials and engineers are actively engaged in the project. In 2023, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed an agreement during the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2023) in Istanbul to advance the development of the Kaan fighter program. As part of its contribution, Azerbaijan is expected to offer financial investment and industrial collaboration in support of the initiative.

In 2024, Azerbaijan’s Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov stated that his country was leveraging the defense capabilities of Türkiye, its primary partner in military cooperation. In January 2025, Türkiye and Pakistan finalized plans to establish and operate a joint facility for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jet, agreeing to collaborate on the development and manufacturing of the aircraft.

In February 2025, defense industry authorities from Azerbaijan and Türkiye, during a meeting held at the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX-2025) in Abu Dhabi, discussed the successful military-technical cooperation between the two nations and pledged to further strengthen defense industry ties by exploring prospects for joint projects.

The JF-17 Thunder Block III, a fourth-generation fighter jet, has been developed through a joint venture between Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation. Compared to earlier versions of JF-17, the Block III features superior maneuverability, enhanced combat capabilities, and improved stealth characteristics. In February 2024, Azerbaijan signed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement with Pakistan for the procurement of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal also included pilot training and armaments for the fighter jets. On 25 September 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced, “The JF-17 jets have already been integrated into the arsenal of Azerbaijan’s air force.”

IMPLICATIONS: Arming the JF-17 “Thunder” Block III fighter jets acquired by Baku with Türkiye’s Gökdoğan Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) and Bozdoğan Within-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (WVRAAM) will significantly enhance the aerial firepower of Azerbaijan's Air Force. It also underscores the progress of Türkiye’s defense industry. Türkiye is emerging as a major global arms exporter, after the leading five exporters—the U.S., France, Russia, China, and Germany.

With its advanced combat capabilities, the JF-17 aircraft surpasses the region’s Russian-made jets, including the MiG-29 and SU-25. Russia has been Azerbaijan’s primary arms supplier for decades, however, the JF-17 will replace Azerbaijan’s existing and aging fleet of Russian-manufactured MiG-29 fighters. The JF-17 are expected to enhance Azerbaijan’s airpower amid escalating regional security challenges. Equipped with improved avionics and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the Block III variant is adaptable to diverse combat scenarios. 

According to the Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSB), Türkiye’s defense and aerospace exports in 2024 totaled US$ 7.2 billion. Three Turkish defense firms are included in the ‘Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies’ list, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Jointly developed by Pakistan and China, the JF-17 fighter jet deal with Azerbaijan also creates opportunities for China to secure additional defense agreements with Azerbaijan and other countries in the region. Between 2019 and 2023, China accounted for 5.8 percent of global arms exports. During this period, China supplied arms to nearly 40 countries across Asia and Africa, ranking as the fourth largest exporter of conventional weapons after the U.S., France, and Russia.

By selling the JF-17 Thunder to Azerbaijan, Pakistan has effectively supported China in boosting demand and expanding its market for arms and military equipment in a region traditionally dominated by Russia. The JF-17 agreement with Azerbaijan is likely to facilitate the entry of Chinese weaponry and enhance China’s influence in the region.

Islamabad, Ankara, and Baku have integrated their tactical and strategic practice with the use of Turkish drone systems. In the Kaan project, Türkiye is experimenting with a ‘loyal wingman’ drone, to gather data in a range of different terrains and against a range of technologies.

The development of the Kaan fighter will significantly reduce Türkiye’s reliance on foreign aircraft. As a fifth-generation fighter program, Kaan demands extensive expertise, substantial financial resources, and international collaboration. Azerbaijan’s financial investment and Pakistan’s manufacturing expertise will not only support Türkiye’s Kaan project but also further reinforce the trilateral defense cooperation for long-term initiatives.

The joint factory established by Islamabad and Ankara for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jets will further consolidate the defense partnership between Pakistan and Türkiye. Pakistan’s role is expected to enable Türkiye to produce the Kaan jet at a reduced cost. Cost-effective joint production of the Kaan is expected to expand Türkiye’s defense exports, while also bolstering Pakistan’s aerial defense capabilities.

Yet the involvement of Pakistan—China’s longstanding strategic ally and “all-weather” friend—in the Kaan project may pose challenges in sourcing components from Western suppliers due to security concerns. China’s suspected indirect involvement in the Kaan program via Pakistan is viewed as a potential risk to the project. Although China has no official role in Türkiye’s Kaan initiative, critics suspect an indirect influence through Pakistan’s participation. A primary factor behind the rising demand for Chinese defense equipment is its competitive pricing, attributed to low-cost production. The anticipated cost-effective production of the Kaan fighters has further fueled suspicions regarding China’s indirect involvement in the project.

Pakistan’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan carries significant geopolitical implications. In the aftermath of the six-week Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, Armenia—Azerbaijan’s primary adversary—has become the largest importer of weapons from India, Pakistan’s principal regional rival.

CONCLUSION: The JF-17 and Kaan fighter jet agreements is a clear statement that Pakistan and Türkiye will continue to bolster Azerbaijan’s military capabilities, with trilateral defense cooperation expected to deepen further. If successful, the Kaan project will lay the groundwork for expanded trilateral collaboration among Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan in launching additional large-scale defense initiatives. It will also create opportunities for future bilateral or trilateral joint ventures in the defense industry among the three nations.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

At the conclusion of a five-day visit to China by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on February 8, China and Pakistan issued a joint statement urging the Taliban government to take decisive measures to eliminate all terrorist organizations operating within Afghanistan and to prevent the use of Afghan territory for hostile activities against other nations. Over the past three years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban administration of providing refuge to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for attacks on Pakistani security forces and Chinese nationals within Pakistan. Despite being the largest foreign investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, China has thus far remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Pakistan is poised to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of Afghan territory that extends to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan and Pakistan. This corridor not only facilitates China's direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia but also holds strategic significance, positioning it as a potential focal point in China's evolving geopolitical interests in the region.

Photo by Ninara.

BACKGROUND: The airstrikes conducted by Pakistan inside Afghanistan on December 24 heightened tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, leading to an increase in skirmishes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan targeted TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, resulting in the deaths of 46 individuals. In response, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on multiple locations along the Pakistan border, killing one Pakistani soldier.

This was not the first instance of Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan. In March 2024, Pakistani airstrikes targeted TTP bases within Afghan territory, resulting in the deaths of eight militants. The strikes occurred a day after President Asif Ali Zardari pledged retaliation following an attack by the TTP in Pakistan's northwestern tribal are bordering Afghanistan, which claimed the lives of seven soldiers, including two officers. 

As tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalate and border clashes intensify, Pakistan is reportedly preparing to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of territory in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province that extends 350 kilometers to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region. Control of Wakhan would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan, effectively bypassing Afghanistan. In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s top intelligence official to Tajikistan on December 30, 2024, holds particular significance. Tajikistan hosts the leadership of the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. During his visit, the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Asim Malik, met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe. The ISI chief is believed to have been on a strategic mission to establish an alliance with the NRF as a counterbalance against the Taliban. 

China' has remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although a potential conflict between the two countries could jeopardize Chinese investments worth billions of U.S. dollars in both states, Beijing has opted for a "wait and watch" approach toward the ongoing hostilities. However, China is closely monitoring developments in the Wakhan Corridor, a strategically significant passage that provides direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

On December 30, 2024, during the visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Dushanbe, China’s Ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, was simultaneously meeting with Afghanistan’s acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. This meeting took place amid media reports suggesting that Pakistan’s military was advancing to seize control of the Wakhan Corridor. Both sides emphasized the corridor’s strategic significance for bilateral trade. Taliban authorities dismissed claims regarding the presence of foreign (Pakistani) military forces in the corridor and pledged to address any security threats along Afghanistan’s borders. In September 2023, the Taliban government inaugurated a 50-kilometer road extending from the Wakhan Corridor to the Chinese border.

IMPLICATIONS: A key factor behind China’s silence on the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is its own security concerns regarding Uyghur militancy in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares a border with Afghanistan. The Taliban could potentially leverage the "Uyghur card" to destabilize Xinjiang, given that the previous Taliban regime (1996–2001) provided sanctuary to Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. The Taliban has issued a warning to Beijing against adopting a pro-Pakistan stance in the ongoing conflict, cautioning that Islamabad is attempting to draw China into its proxy war. China remains apprehensive that Uyghur jihadists could gain ideological and operational support under Taliban rule. Consequently, Beijing has consistently sought to avoid antagonizing the Taliban, opting instead for diplomatic engagement and substantial investments in Afghanistan’s energy, infrastructure and mining sectors following the US withdrawal from the war-torn country in 2021.

The Taliban’s warning to China came just days after China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, visited Islamabad in November 2024 and stated that at least 20 militant groups were operating in Afghanistan, posing security threats to China. 

Strategically positioned at the intersection of three major mountain ranges—the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and Pamir—the Wakhan Corridor has the potential to become the focal point of China’s evolving geopolitical strategy in the region. At present, control over the Wakhan Corridor appears to be at the center of the geopolitical contest in Afghanistan, with Pakistan and Afghanistan seemingly acting as mere pawns in this larger game. As a silent yet influential player, China is subtly maneuvering these pawns on the regional chessboard. 

Pakistan aligned itself with China’s broader ambitions to expand its influence across South and Central Asia through Afghanistan long before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. However, rather than directly involving itself in the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, China appears committed to a strategy of cautious observation, continuously monitoring shifting geopolitical dynamics. Beijing seems to be waiting for an opportune moment to assert its influence. 

For China, the Wakhan Corridor—often referred to as Afghanistan's "chicken neck"—serves as a crucial strategic node for establishing and securing connectivity with South and Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This narrow strip of land has the potential to function as a pivotal junction, enabling China to expand its geopolitical and economic influence across the broader region. 

However, security concerns remain a significant challenge in China's plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the BRI, into Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

Several strategic projects planned or initiated by China align with its broader geopolitical strategy. One such initiative involves China's plans to establish a military base in Wakhan to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities. China has already set up a military base in eastern Tajikistan, near the Wakhan Corridor. A military foothold in Wakhan would serve as a critical buffer, preventing terrorism and instability from spilling over from Afghanistan into China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 

Additionally, China has constructed the Taxkorgan Airport on the Pamir Plateau in northwest Xinjiang, situated at an altitude of 3,258 meters and in close proximity of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Beyond providing a new "air passage" that enhances connectivity between Central and South Asia, this ultra-high-altitude airport reinforces China's military and economic influence in the region. 

While Beijing continues to invest in Afghanistan—despite its global isolation and international sanctions—it is simultaneously financing multiple projects under the US$ 62 billion CPEC in Pakistan. However, despite its deep economic and strategic engagements in both countries, China has remained silent regarding the escalating armed confrontations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

CONCLUSION: China should take an active role in mediating the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict rather than attempting to balance its interests with both sides. Leveraging its influence over both states, Beijing can push for diplomatic negotiations to address their disputes. At present, neither Islamabad nor Kabul is in a position to disregard China's calls for restraint, making it a crucial player in de-escalating tensions and ensuring regional stability. 

China should take a definitive stance and clarify its official position on the TTP, which has been responsible for attacks on Chinese nationals and security forces in Pakistan. Beijing should deliver an unequivocal message to Kabul, asserting that if the Taliban government fails to dismantle terrorist networks operating from Afghan territory, China will align with Pakistan in conducting targeted airstrikes against anti-China militant hideouts within Afghanistan. 

While China has remained silent on escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, the U.S. has endorsed Pakistan’s stance regarding the Taliban’s policy of sheltering terrorist groups, which violates the U.S.-Taliban Doha Accord. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 enabled the TTP to operate with greater impunity. For Islamabad, the Afghan endgame has effectively become a zero-sum game. In response, some factions within Pakistan have advocated for collaboration with the U.S. to carry out airstrikes targeting terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan. 

AUTHOR BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation. Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Pakistan and India, the longstanding rivals in South Asia, have instigated an arms race in the South Caucasus region. This development comes amid a broader arms supply deficit caused by Russia's preoccupation with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While India is deepening its military partnership with Armenia, Pakistan is enhancing the defense capabilities of Azerbaijan. Both states are actively seeking to fill the vacuum in arms procurement left by Russia's reduced presence in the region. India has aligned with Armenia, leveraging this partnership to pursue strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus. Conversely, Pakistan views Azerbaijan as a strategic ally, with their collaboration deemed essential for countering India in the competition for regional influence.

BCKGROUND: India and Pakistan have shared a contentious relationship since their emergence as independent states in 1947. The two states have engaged in three full-scale wars, primarily over Kashmir, a territory claimed by both. In 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests shortly after India, marking a significant escalation in their rivalry. This ongoing antagonism often manifests in international forums, where the two countries accuse each other of fostering cross-border terrorism. Their rivalry extended to the South Caucasus in 2020, during the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Pakistan supported Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. However, the close relationship between the two countries predates this conflict, with their cordial ties dating back to Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was among the first nations to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, second only to Türkiye. After Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region shortly after its independence, both Türkiye and Pakistan strongly condemned Armenia's actions. Since then, they have consistently supported Azerbaijan’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in international forums, both politically and diplomatically. Pakistan has gone so far as to refrain from recognizing Armenia, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the country. In return, Azerbaijan has endorsed Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute, a position that has antagonized India.

During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Islamabad was alleged to have sent military advisers to support Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even claimed that Pakistani soldiers were actively fighting alongside the Azerbaijani army against Armenia during the 44-day conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan, however, categorically dismissed these allegations, labeling them as "baseless and unwarranted." Ultimately, Azerbaijan emerged victorious in the six-week war over the disputed region.

Türkiye strongly backed Pakistan's position on Kashmir, reciprocating Pakistan’s unequivocal support for Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war. The mutual endorsements of Islamabad's stance on Kashmir by Ankara and Baku provoked concern in New Delhi. Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan during the conflict played a pivotal role in fostering closer ties between India and Armenia in the aftermath of the war. Observing its rival’s activities during the Karabakh conflict, India responded by significantly enhancing its defense partnership with Armenia over the subsequent four years.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Türkiye formalized their alliance by signing the Trilateral Islamabad Declaration in 2021, underscoring their solidarity with Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war.

IMPLICATIONS: The supply of military equipment by India and Pakistan has significantly reduced Azerbaijan's and Armenia's dependence on Russia for weapons and ammunition. Historically, both South Caucasian nations relied heavily on Russia for defense supplies, particularly in the period preceding the 2020 Karabakh War. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia accounted for 94 percent of Armenia's major arms imports, including armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks. Similarly, Azerbaijan depended extensively on Russian military supplies during the same period, purchasing armored vehicles, air defense systems, Smerch rockets, transport and combat helicopters, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks.

India considers Armenia a strategic partner in the South Caucasus and has consequently deepened its military ties with Yerevan. Armenia has emerged as the largest foreign recipient of Indian weapons, with defense contracts concluded since 2020 estimated at US$ 2 billion. According to a report by the Indian Ministry of Finance, Armenia has become the leading importer of Indian arms, securing deals for the purchase of Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems and Akash anti-aircraft systems. This development reflects a significant realignment in the defense landscape of the region.

In September, Azerbaijan formally introduced Pakistan’s fourth-generation JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter jets to its air force, marking a significant milestone in defense cooperation between the two nations. This development followed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement signed in February for the acquisition of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal includes not only the supply of aircraft but also ammunition and pilot training provided by Pakistan. The advanced combat capabilities of the JF-17 Block III are expected to enhance Azerbaijan's military edge in the South Caucasus. Notably, Azerbaijan has requested 60 JF-17 jets, intended to replace its entire fleet of aircraft, making this the largest defense export deal in Pakistan’s history.

The defense agreements between India and Armenia, as well as those between Pakistan and Azerbaijan, have significantly diminished Russia’s position as the principal supplier of weapons and ammunition to the South Caucasian nations. This shift has been exacerbated by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, which has undermined its ability to deliver weapons in a timely manner under previously signed contracts. The entry of India and Pakistan into the regional defense market has provided Armenia and Azerbaijan with an opportunity to diversify their military procurement, reducing their historical reliance on Russian defense supplies.

The entry of India and Pakistan into the South Caucasus has resulted in the formation of two rival blocs competing for regional influence. One alliance, referred to as the Three Brothers, comprises Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan, while the opposing group includes Armenia, Iran, France, and India.

For India, Armenia holds strategic importance as a potential bridge to access the vast market of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). New Delhi views Armenia as a vital transit hub for connecting Indian goods to EU countries and envisions its role in facilitating bilateral or multilateral partnerships with nations such as Iran, France, and Greece to implement strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus.

Conversely, Islamabad considers its partnership with Azerbaijan critical for countering India's influence in the region. Azerbaijan has also emerged as a key player in the energy transit corridors connecting the Black Sea, South Caucasus, and Europe, further enhancing its geopolitical significance. This dynamic positions Azerbaijan as a strategic ally for Pakistan, particularly in the context of their shared interests in limiting India's regional ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan's defense cooperation with Azerbaijan and India's arms sales to Armenia are shaping new security dynamics that link the South Caucasus and South Asia. The extensive defense contracts between India and Armenia are poised to strengthen Armenia's position as a strategic ally for India in the region.

India's military partnership with Armenia is influenced by its geopolitical rivalry with Pakistan, which is actively supporting Azerbaijan's defense capabilities. Both Pakistan and India aim to secure reciprocal cooperation from the South Caucasian nations to advance their strategic interests. For Pakistan, Azerbaijan holds particular importance as a potential partner in trans-regional energy cooperation, given Pakistan's energy deficiencies. Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the energy transit corridor connecting South Asia and the South Caucasus further underscores this strategic alignment.

Conversely, India, as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), is working to deepen its cooperation with Armenia across economic sectors, with a particular emphasis on defense. Armenia's strategic position could also facilitate India's broader connectivity initiatives with Europe. Meanwhile, Pakistan is likely to leverage its relationship with Azerbaijan to counterbalance India's growing influence in the region, highlighting the interconnected and competitive geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and South Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst of the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.