By Robert M. Cutler
May 23, 2023
In mid-April, days before Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Tel Aviv, Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen visited Baku to discuss regional security and Israeli diplomacy in Central Asia with President Ilham Aliyev and other senior officials. Israel’s deepening relations with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries—and the significant assistance that it can provide to these countries’ domestic economies as well as their security—contributes to the stability and security of the broader region in the face of Iranian bellicosity. They also give the Central Asian countries another “vector” for escaping the visegrip of Russian and Chinese influence.
By Brenda Shaffer
May 8, 2023
From day one of the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Iran has been hostile toward Baku and consistently acted to undermine its security and independence. However, over the last year the ties between the two bordering countries have deteriorated to an unprecedented level, with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev describing relations between Azerbaijan and Iran as “at the lowest level ever.” President Aliyev in a recent meeting with researchers laid out the factors that have led to this downturn. President Aliyev stated that in Iran, “terror is organized on a governmental level.”
By Robert M. Cutler
May 9, 2022
Constructive developments in negotiations for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly those mediated by the European Union, have produced a further radicalization of the opponents of such a peace. Russia is unhappy with EU and Western attempts to take the initiative for the peaceful normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia is seeking to use the Karabakh Armenians to maintain its geopolitical position in the South Caucasus. Threats have been voiced, in both Moscow and Khankendi [Stepanakert], of the intention to seek an annexation to Russia of areas in Nagorno-Karabakh where Russian troops are located.
By Natalia Konarzewska
April 6, 2022
Like several other countries, Azerbaijan seeks to retain functioning relations with both Russia and Ukraine amid Russia’s invasion. Baku provides Ukraine with humanitarian aid yet avoids actions directly opposing Moscow for fear of retaliation. Baku’s position reflects its interest in maintaining Russia’s acceptance of Azerbaijan’s multi-vector foreign policy and in gaining Moscow’s support for its objectives in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the recent surge of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that Baku is taking advantage of the opportunity arising as Western and Russian attention is directed elsewhere to improve its own position vis-à-vis the separatist region.
By Natalia Konarzewska
September 25, 2020, the CACI Analyst
On July 12, clashes broke out between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan along the northern section of their internationally recognized border. The skirmishes receded after July 16 but armed incidents at the border still occurred throughout July and August. The July confrontation, resulting in over a dozen military and civilian deaths and the destruction of infrastructure on both sides of the border, is regarded as the most serious since the Four Day War between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016. The conflict also sparked unprecedented interethnic clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas across the world.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst