By Stephen Blank

May 12, 2017, the CACI Analyst

Since the occurrence of large scale fighting around Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016, resulting in some Azerbaijani gains, there has been a widespread fear that this crisis could easily escalate out of control drawing in not only the two belligerents but also Russia and Turkey. Armenia’s response to the visible enhancement of Azerbaijan’s military capability has marked a qualitative escalation of the crisis’ military potential. Moreover, it has further unmasked the Russian policy of abetting the crisis rather than trying to resolve it, even though Moscow professes to be against renewed hostilities and to want a solution.

By Armen Grigoryan

March 20, 2017, the CACI Analyst

March 5 marked the start of official campaigning for Armenia’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for April 2, after which a parliamentary system will replace the current presidential one. Yet these elections are unlikely to bring about any significant changes in either the economic and social spheres or in Armenia’s pro-Russian foreign policy, given the dominant position of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA). The opposition running for election is fragmented and short of resources, and will compete in an election system favoring the RPA. 

By Armen Grigoryan

January 12th, 2017, The CACI Analyst

Further negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue seem to be practically postponed until Armenia completes its parliamentary elections in April 2017. At the same time, the government demonstrates an unwillingness to proceed beyond rhetoric with governance and economic reforms. The administration’s inability to deliver satisfactory economic results and ensure social development, as well as its close connections with Russia with a strong clientelism component, suggest a further growth of dependence and compliance with Moscow’s political agenda.

By Armen Grigoryan

October 21st, 2016, The CACI Analyst

Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan has reshuffled the government only months before the general elections, after which the presidential system will be replaced with a parliamentary one. The new appointments seemingly aim to ensure the continued rule of the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) after next year’s elections. The current foreign policy course based on loyalty to Russia and its Eurasian project will likely remain unchanged, despite its dire economic consequences.

By Erik Davtyan

October 3rd, the CACI Analyst

On September 5, Georgia’s Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili, along with Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Kakha Kaladze, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs David Dondua, paid a one-day visit to Yerevan. Kvirikashvili has previously visited Armenia as Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development, however this was his first official visit after he became Prime Minister in December 2015. The visit came nearly a month before parliamentary elections in Georgia, which are set for October 8. Less than one week before, Kvirikashvili made a similar visit to Azerbaijan. During both visits, the Georgian delegation was composed of exactly the same level of representatives, although another deputy foreign minister was present in Azerbaijan – indicating the importance that Georgian authorities attach to demonstrating a balanced policy towards its two neighbor states.