By Nargiza Umarova

Azerbaijan is strengthening its political and economic ties with the Taliban government by playing an active role in creating and developing promising transport routes to South Asia. At the forefront is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, launched in 2018 through a joint initiative of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Turkmenistan, similar to the ancient route of the Great Silk Road. The possibility of extending the corridor to South Asia is being considered, which would have geo-economic and geopolitical implications for Uzbekistan.

                                                                       Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The US$2 billion Lapis Lazuli Agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan on 15 November 2017. The route runs from the Afghan cities of Aqina in Faryab Province and Torghundi in Herat Province, through the Caspian Sea ports of Turkmenbashi and Baku, and the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti or Batumi, to Istanbul or Kars in Turkey, with further access to the European transport system.

The first test shipment along the Lapis Lazuli logistics chain was carried out in 2018. In January 2021, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan signed a trilateral roadmap to develop this route. However, implementation of the document was suspended due to the Taliban's seizure of power in Kabul in August 2021.

Against the backdrop of pragmatic interactions between Central Asian states — particularly Uzbekistan — and the current Afghan leadership, Azerbaijan is also seeking to strengthen its position in Afghanistan as a partner in trade, the economy, transport, and logistics.

Baku’s main priority is the Middle Corridor project, a vital logistics link between China and Europe. The Lapis Lazuli Corridor essentially extends the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan. This enables Kabul to take part in trans-Caspian shipping and to redirect some of its export cargo bound for the European market from Pakistan or Iran, to the South Caucasus and Turkey.

In 2024, Afghanistan’s total trade with the EU was approximately US$ 42 million, which is 15.9 percent higher than the previous year’s figure. Experts predict that this growth trend will continue. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is attempting to accelerate these processes by adopting a proactive approach to its relations with the Taliban.

On July 2, 2025, on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, met with Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov. They emphasized Baku’s readiness to increase export and import volumes with Afghanistan. The Afghan delegation visited the Baku International Seaport, where they discussed expanding the geography of freight transport along the South Asia-Caucasus-Europe route and integrating Afghanistan into the Middle Corridor.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have made significant efforts to develop the infrastructure of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. Azerbaijan has invested approximately US$ 1 billion in two vital elements of the project: the Alat Port in Baku and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan constructed the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Aqina railway in 2016, and connected the Afghan cities of Aqina and Andkhoy by rail in 2021. The Caspian port of Turkmenbashi is also being modernized to increase its capacity. In order to generate economic returns on their investments and reap the long-term benefits of transport service exports, it is crucial for Baku, Ashgabat and other stakeholders along the route to maximize its utilization. This justifies the idea of extending the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to Pakistan and India, which would run contrary to Uzbekistan’s interests.

IMPLICATIONS: It is assumed that the transport corridor from Europe to India via the South Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan will become an alternative to Tashkent’s strategic plan for connecting Eastern Europe with the Indian subcontinent. This plan involves linking the Trans-Afghan Railway (Kabul Corridor) with the Northern Railway Corridor through Russia. To this end, Uzbekistan has initiated the formation of the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Ocean ports transit route, which is set to launch in multimodal format soon.

The main benchmark for calculating the Kabul Corridor’s economic efficiency and feasibility is India’s growing potential for trade with Central Asian countries, the EU, China and Russia.

In the 2024 fiscal year, India’s trade turnover with the EU exceeded US$ 137 billion, with China US$ 118 billion, with Russia US$ 70 billion, and with Central Asian countries US$ 1.7 billion. The majority of Indian goods are delivered to promising markets by sea, which incurs high financial and time costs. The integration of India and Pakistan's transport space into the Eurasian road network is expected to stimulate land transportation along the South Asia-Europe axis. This shift holds great potential for the Kabul Corridor, with a projected annual cargo volume of up to 22 million tons, most of which will be in transit. 

However, the extension of the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan and the development of further access to Pakistan and India will redistribute the flow of cargo from South Asian countries to Europe in favor of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, who are connected by the Caspian Sea. In turn, this risks diminishing Uzbekistan’s exclusive role as a trans-Eurasian transport link. 

In theory, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to Pakistan by constructing a railway line from Torghundi station on the Afghan-Turkmen border to Naibabad station, which marks the beginning of the Afghan section of the Kabul Corridor. Although this would exclude Uzbekistan from the India-EU supply chain, it would enable the Kabul Corridor to attract additional cargo from the South Caucasus and Turkmenistan. However, this advantage would not offset Uzbekistan’s loss of transit flows from the larger economic centers of Eurasia.

Connecting the Lapis Lazuli and Kabul corridors would motivate constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway, which would breathe new life into the long-standing Five Nations Railway Corridor project, running through China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The Five Nations Route bypasses Uzbekistan, significantly reducing the distance between East and West. This will probably diminish the importance of the Southern Railway Corridor, which runs through Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which is intended to be an important component of this route.

At the same time, constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway could undermine the Lapis Lazuli Corridor’s competitive advantage by increasing Iranian transit. Iran already has rail access to northern Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat route, which is used to deliver Afghan cargo to Europe. Extending the Khaf-Herat railway to Naibabad station near Mazar-i-Sharif and connecting it to the Kabul Corridor would enable Iran to divert potential cargo traffic from India and Pakistan to Turkey and Europe via itself, thereby depriving Central Asian and South Caucasian countries of transit benefits. Consequently, there is a possibility that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to South Asia, bypassing Kabul and instead passing through Kandahar. This would stimulate the development of the western Trans-Afghan Railway along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak route. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan promote the project as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor. 

Russia should be considered a potential stakeholder in the extension of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor along any of the trans-Afghan routes. Moscow has already announced plans to connect with Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea, utilising Turkmenistan’s port and rail infrastructure, which would integrate Russia into the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. This would establish a connection between India and Russia, and potentially Europe, through Turkmenistan and the Caspian port of Turkmenbashi, rather than through Uzbekistan.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s best option for maintaining and enhancing its competitive advantages in trans-Eurasian and trans-Afghan transport is to accelerate construction of the Kabul Corridor, involving all Central Asian states financially to the maximum extent possible. Kazakhstan’s practical support for developing the Kabul Corridor is important, as connecting it to the Northern Railway Route to Europe will enable Astana to receive an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons per year. This will preempt any potential competition from Astana and Ashgabat in developing trans-Afghan transport connections. 

It would be worth proposing to Baku the joint promotion of a new multimodal corridor from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the EU. This would stimulate the development of the Middle Corridor by increasing transport from South Asia and Afghanistan to Europe via the Caspian Sea.

Moreover, an alternative should be developed to the Five Nations Route, instead envisaging a connection between China, Afghanistan and Iran through Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. This would ensure the profitability of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway project for Tashkent.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Umair Jamal

On July 3, 2025, Russia became the first major state to formally recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. This decision, framed as a strategic partnership aimed at countering the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), seeks to employ Taliban authority to stabilize Afghanistan and curb regional terrorism. Yet, the move entails legitimizing a regime with longstanding and ongoing associations with jihadist networks, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and other extremist actors. These linkages, encompassing ideological affinities, logistical cooperation, and territorial safe havens, generate concern regarding the exacerbation of extremism, the destabilization of neighboring states such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, and the complication of global counterterrorism strategies.

                                                                 City of Kabul (Image Courtesy of Pexel)

BACKGROUND: Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government on 3 July 2025 represents a significant reorientation in its Afghan policy. This decision is underpinned by Moscow’s security imperatives and broader geopolitical calculations.

After the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Taliban rapidly reasserted control over Afghanistan, creating a power vacuum that has permitted diverse extremist organizations to expand within ungoverned spaces. Russia’s engagement is shaped by the Taliban’s asserted opposition to the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a shared adversary responsible for the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, which claimed more than 140 lives. This incident highlighted ISIS-K’s transnational capabilities, leading Russia to regard the Taliban as a prospective partner in constraining its influence.

In April 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court annulled the Taliban’s terrorist designation, maintained since 2003, thereby facilitating formal recognition and reflecting a pragmatic effort to stabilize Afghanistan and safeguard Russian interests in Central Asia. The Taliban’s governance, however, remains highly contested owing to their strict enforcement of Islamic law and enduring connections with extremist organizations. The movement appears to have openly violated the 2020 Doha Agreement commitment undertaken with the international community to prevent Afghan territory from serving as a base for terrorism.

During their 1996–2001 rule, the Taliban provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda, a relationship that endures through both operational and ideological linkages, as documented in recent UN assessments. The Haqqani Network, a semi-autonomous Taliban faction under Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, remains pivotal in orchestrating attacks and sheltering terrorists. In addition to al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban sustain ties with organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which targets China’s Xinjiang region. Since 2021, at least 21 extremist groups have exploited Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training, recruitment, and logistical operations, according to the UN’s 15th Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report.

ISIS-K, which emerged in 2015 with an estimated 4,000–6,000 combatants, persists in conducting attacks across Iran, Pakistan, and Europe, reinforcing Russia’s calculated yet precarious reliance on the Taliban to confront this threat while potentially disregarding their wider patronage of jihadist networks.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban carries substantial implications for regional stability and global counterterrorism. On the one hand, it may enhance collaboration against militant organizations such as ISIS-K, which pose threats to both Russia and Central Asian states. The Taliban have undertaken operations that reduce ISIS-K’s local activity, though the group’s international reach endures, as demonstrated by the 2024 Moscow attack. On the other hand, such engagement entails risks, as legitimizing the Taliban may strengthen a regime that continues to shelter, protect, and support multiple extremist factions.

A recent United Nations assessment warns that al-Qaeda and its affiliated jihadist groups now control facilities in 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and are increasingly assisting anti-Pakistani militants, such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in conducting cross-border attacks. Another UN report indicates that the TTP has established new training camps in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika (Barmal) Provinces and is expanding recruitment within its ranks, including from the Afghan Taliban. The UN further notes that the Taliban continues to provide the TTP with logistical, operational, and financial support, with leader Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly receiving a “monthly payment” of approximately 43,000 USD. Evidence also suggests that TTP cadres sustain tactical-level ties with ISIL-K in Afghanistan while offering training and assistance to militant networks in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. Moreover, the de facto authorities in Kabul have deployed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) combatants within law enforcement and military units to provide domestic security, particularly in northern Afghanistan.

In recent months, foreign terrorist combatants of Central Asian origin with affiliations to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have relocated from the Syrian Arab Republic to northern Afghanistan. These fighters have been characterized as “scouts,” serving as a vanguard to establish conditions for the subsequent arrival of their families and additional militants into Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Uyghur militant organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), continues to operate within Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, ETIM enjoys “unprecedented levels of freedom” under Taliban governance. In some instances, the Taliban have relocated ETIM militants from Badakhshan, near China’s border, to other regions under pressure from Beijing. This relocation appears to constitute partial restraint rather than elimination, enabling the group and its ideology to persist in Afghanistan. The Taliban have further refused to extradite senior figures such as TIP leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, who remains in Kabul directing the group’s global activities, including those of its Syrian contingents. Turkistani reportedly mediates internal Taliban disputes and represents al-Qaeda in the Taliban’s Shura Majlis, particularly on military affairs. This situation directly contradicts Taliban denials of hosting foreign fighters and demonstrates high-level endorsement and protection.

Another pressing concern is that the Taliban are deploying and mobilizing foreign militant organizations such as Jamaat Ansarullah, which undermines Tajikistan’s stability, and the IMU, to combat ISIS-K in Afghanistan. This operational integration is troubling, as it demonstrates the incorporation of such groups into military roles. A recent UN assessment highlights “closer ETIM/TIP collaboration with the Taliban in Afghanistan,” encompassing alliances with TIP’s Syrian affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The report further noted that “Regional Member States reported that, in December 2024, a three-person delegation, including one representative from ETIM/TIP, traveled from Damascus to Kabul and engaged the de facto authorities on the eastward movement of foreign terrorist fighters.” Such partnerships and dialogues indicate that the Taliban regard groups like ETIM and IMU as allies rather than adversaries, despite their destabilizing implications for Central Asia and Russian interests.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government constitutes a high-risk gamble that may ultimately backfire by strengthening a regime deeply enmeshed with jihadist networks. United Nations reports substantiate the Taliban’s continued support for organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, TTP, and ETIM, which exploit Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training and cross-border operations, thereby undermining stability across Central and South Asia.

By legitimizing the Taliban, Russia may unintentionally reinforce a wider terrorist ecosystem, thereby weakening international counterterrorism norms and complicating collaboration with Western and regional partners. The Taliban’s accommodation of at least 21 extremist organizations, documented since 2021, heightens the risk of Afghanistan reemerging as a central hub of global terrorism.

To balance its security interests while mitigating associated risks, Russia should pursue a cautious and multifaceted strategy. First, it should employ platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to coordinate with China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on intelligence exchange and border security to limit extremist spillover. Second, Moscow should make its support for the Taliban conditional upon verifiable commitments to sever links with groups such as TTP and ETIM, reinforced through targeted sanctions to ensure compliance. Third, Russia ought to engage both Pakistan and India in addressing cross-border threats posed by TTP and Kashmir-oriented organizations like LeT and JeM, fostering regional dialogue to avert escalation. Finally, it should strengthen its domestic counterterrorism capacity by investing in real-time surveillance of Afghan-based groups and reducing reliance on Taliban assurances.

By combining pragmatic engagement with rigorous oversight, Russia can advance its objective of constraining ISIS-K while avoiding the amplification of a broader jihadist threat and ensuring that Afghanistan does not further destabilize the region.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Nargiza Umarova

The fourth session of the India–Central Asia Dialogue at the level of foreign ministers convened in New Delhi on 6 June 2025. The concluding communiqué underscored the significance of Iran’s Chabahar Port in advancing trade connectivity between the Central Asian republics and India, and beyond. 

The Indo-Iranian Chabahar initiative competes with the port of Gwadar, a pivotal component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which envisages the integration of Central Asia through the development of a trans-Afghan railway. Concurrently, Russia is pursuing its distinct agenda by engaging with the Taliban to extend the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) into Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the Central Asian republics face the risk of becoming entangled in a cycle of great power competition, thereby endangering their own national interests.

BACKGROUND: Since 2020, Uzbekistan has engaged in dialogue with India and Iran regarding the joint utilization of the deep-water port of Chabahar, which provides direct access to the Indian Ocean. Situated in southeastern Iran, the port constitutes a critical component of Tashkent’s strategy to develop southern transit corridors and diversify freight transportation routes. Chabahar functions as a commercial gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan, affording major global economies—especially India—access to key regional resources. This underlies New Delhi’s commitment to upgrading the Shahid Beheshti terminal in Chabahar and enhancing the surrounding transport infrastructure. 

Moreover, transit through Iran reduces the cost and duration of Indian cargo shipments to and from Central Asia by nearly one-third relative to maritime routes via Europe or China. India’s objective extends beyond securing efficient and affordable access to uranium, oil, coal, and other raw materials from Central Asia; it also involves circumventing its principal rival, Pakistan.

The Indian transit corridor to Central Asia, originating at Chabahar, may proceed through both Iran and Afghanistan. In 2020, Iran commenced construction of the 628-kilometer Chabahar–Zahedan railway line, with financial assistance from India. Work on this segment is nearing completion. The route is projected to continue toward the Turkmenistan border, traversing the northern Iranian cities of Mashhad and Serakhs. En route, the Chabahar–Zahedan–Mashhad railway will diverge toward the city of Khaf, where the inaugural cross-border rail link between Iran and Afghanistan begins.

The construction of the 225-kilometer railway linking Khaf to Herat in Afghanistan is also approaching completion. Its designed capacity is estimated at up to three million tons annually, with transit cargo expected to comprise more than half of this volume. Consequently, the Khaf–Herat railway is poised to be integrated into a broader China-led transport initiative connecting East and West through Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran. Owing to its direct linkage with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan stands to benefit from this configuration by enhancing its own transit capacity. The Taliban administration seeks comparable advantages for Afghanistan and is actively encouraging Tashkent to extend the railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat. While such an extension would grant Uzbekistan additional access to Chabahar by circumventing Turkmenistan, it could also redirect China–Europe–China transit cargo toward other neighboring states bordering Afghanistan. 

IMPLICATIONS: For several years, Iran has actively pursued the realization of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran railway corridor, commonly referred to as the “Five Nation Road.” The Afghan segment of this 2,100-kilometre overland route will primarily comprise the railway currently under construction between Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. From Mazar-i-Sharif, the transportation network would require only an extension to Sherkhan Bandar in Kunduz Province to establish a connection with the Tajik border. This development would facilitate Tajikistan’s access to Iran through Afghan territory, thereby definitely weakening Uzbekistan’s competitive position in regional transit logistics.

The Taliban regard the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat railway as an integral element of a broader initiative aimed at establishing a Trans-Afghan corridor extending through Kandahar to Pakistan, analogous to Uzbekistan’s proposed Kabul Corridor. In 2023, the Afghan authorities announced plans to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar railway, which, according to media sources, is projected to provide the shortest overland route between Moscow and New Delhi via Afghanistan. Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and even Turkey have been invited to invest in the venture. 

The attractiveness of the Kandahar Corridor lies in its capacity to extend toward both Iran and Pakistan. Ashgabat and Astana are already advancing a new transit route from the Torghundi railway station, located at the Afghan–Turkmen border, toward Pakistan, traversing western Afghanistan. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced the initiation of a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan railway, covering the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar–Chaman route. 

Without reaching Kandahar in the city of Delaram, both lines could be redirected westward and linked to Iran’s Zahedan via Zaranj in Nimroz Province, ultimately reaching the port of Chabahar.

Consequently, the Central Asian states will gain an additional opportunity to access the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. However, this scenario presents significant implications for Uzbekistan. Foremost, the advancement of the Kandahar Corridor—regardless of whether it extends toward Iran—raises concerns regarding the viability of the Trans-Afghan Railway via Kabul, which Tashkent has identified as a core interest. The simultaneous operation of both routes will inevitably result in competition for transit cargo, thereby impacting their overall profitability. Uzbekistan is will unlikely be able to impede the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat railway, as the initiative partially aligns with the interests of Russia, India, Iran, and China. Under such circumstances, preserving the relevance of the Kabul Corridor—particularly amid funding constraints—becomes exceedingly challenging.

Secondly, the construction of the Zaranj–Delaram railway line will establish conditions conducive to the redistribution of cargo flows transiting Afghanistan toward South Asia and beyond, in favor of Chabahar. This development represents a direct challenge to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the most costly and prominent flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative, which prioritizes the expansion of the Gwadar port on Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast. Enhancing Chabahar’s transit capacity through the creation of a comprehensive network of rail and roads linking the port to neighboring countries and regions within Iran’s periphery may diminish the significance of the Kabul Corridor as a land bridge between the poles of continental Asia.

Should the Kandahar route be developed and extended into Iran, Gwadar will be compelled to share prospective cargo flows with Chabahar, thereby intensifying the rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing. Russia must also be considered, as it views the Trans-Afghan Railway as a means to extend its flagship International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) into Afghanistan. Preliminary estimates place the volume of Russian cargo on the Trans-Afghan route at between 8 and 15 million tons annually. In light of escalating tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, as well as the generally unstable security climate in Pakistan—particularly in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, through which two proposed railway branches from Central Asia to Indian Ocean ports are planned—Russia may opt to reroute a portion of its exports to Chabahar via Afghanistan. Over time, this shift could also influence freight transit patterns from Northern Europe to India.

Nevertheless, the ongoing escalation of armed conflict between Iran and Israel introduces significant uncertainty regarding the feasibility of such transport configurations. A protracted period of hostilities, accompanied by potential political destabilization within Iran, will unavoidably impact the reliability of established logistics networks in West Asia, potentially necessitating their complete reconfiguration. Under these conditions, both the trans-Afghan corridors leading to Iran and the Indian access route to Central Asia via Afghanistan will be placed at considerable risk. This situation will undoubtedly compel stakeholders to revise their strategies concerning the Chabahar project and to place greater emphasis on leveraging Pakistan’s transit capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s proactive engagement in the development of a network of trans-Afghan trade routes is anticipated to yield both economic and political advantages by enhancing its national and regional transit capacity. However, realizing these outcomes will require Tashkent to navigate carefully among the interests of global and regional powers, whose influence may significantly shape the implementation of specific transport initiatives within Afghanistan.

For the Central Asian states, maintaining diversified access to the southern ports of Iran and Pakistan is advantageous, provided that intra-regional competition is avoided, as such rivalry could undermine their collective competitiveness along the trans-Afghan corridor. Accordingly, it is essential to implement a coordinated policy aimed at identifying and advancing mutually beneficial transport routes through Afghanistan. Reaching consensus on a unified negotiating stance in engagements with the Afghan leadership is vital to mitigate the risk of the Taliban enacting externally influenced political decisions that may contradict the interests of Central Asian states.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi

On March 31, 2025, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation submitted a proposal to the Supreme Court to allow the Taliban to operate in the country. On April 17, 2025, the Supreme Court officially removed the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations. A year earlier, there had been no legal mechanism to delist terrorist groups. That mechanism was introduced through amendments to the Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice in May 2024, with the endorsement of President Vladimir Putin. The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list is the product of a steady normalization of Russia’s relations with the Taliban.

BACKGROUND: Russia’s complex relationship with the Taliban dates back to the movement’s rise to power in the 1990s. After the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, Russia made several attempts to restore relations, despite having supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Russian diplomats traveled to Pakistan and met with both Pakistani and Taliban officials to explore the possibility of recognizing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Moscow’s key concern at the time was the Taliban’s recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which Russia viewed as a serious threat to its territorial integrity. However, the Taliban, still wary of Moscow’s role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, rebuffed Russian overtures.

In August 1998, the Taliban embassy in the United Arab Emirates informed Kabul that a Russian delegation, led by Alexander Oblov, intended to visit Afghanistan to discuss reopening the Russian embassy and possibly recognize the Taliban regime. Yet, the Taliban Foreign Ministry instructed officials not to issue visas to any Russian representative, citing Moscow's role in the destruction of Afghanistan and stating that “all the troubles of our nation are due to Russian interference.”

The rise of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and growing security threats in Central Asia pushed Moscow toward a pragmatic re-engagement with the Taliban. Russia’s concerns over ISIS-K have grown significantly since 2014, especially in light of the group's ability to operate in northern Afghanistan, close to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These concerns have helped shift Russia’s strategic calculus.

Uzbekistan’s involvement in the peace process with the Taliban—including its invitation to a high-level Taliban delegation to visit Tashkent—prompted Russia to deepen its own engagement. Moscow responded by inviting the Taliban for separate discussions, as well as joint talks alongside the Afghan government delegation, to address the peace process and the post-withdrawal landscape following the exit of U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai played an instrumental role in reshaping Moscow's perception of the Taliban. Karzai has argued that ISIS-K has no Afghan roots, and its fighters were introduced from abroad to destabilize the region. According to Karzai, only the Taliban are capable of effectively fighting ISIS-K. This narrative found a receptive audience in Moscow, which has long feared the potential spillover of instability into the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and a former ambassador to Kabul, has been central to the evolution of Russia’s Taliban policy. Known for his deep knowledge of Afghan affairs, Kabulov has publicly advocated for recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate political force. Under his guidance, Moscow hosted several rounds of intra-Afghan talks, including Taliban representatives, even before the group's return to power in 2021. In November 2016, reports emerged that Russian representatives had allegedly met with Taliban commanders at a Russian military base in Tajikistan, and that unidentified helicopters delivered weapons to Taliban fighters in Badakhshan province, claims that Moscow, Tajikistan, and the former Afghan government denied. Still, the optics suggested a growing convergence of interests between Russia and the Taliban, particularly in countering ISIS-K and limiting Western military influence in the region.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s return to power, Russia was among the few countries that kept its embassy in Kabul operational. While Moscow has not formally recognized the Taliban government, it has significantly expanded its diplomatic engagement. Taliban delegations have visited Moscow multiple times, and Russia has reciprocated by including Taliban officials in regional security dialogues such as the Moscow Format.

The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list reflects the culmination of this slow but steady normalization. According to Russian officials, this step is primarily aimed at fostering dialogue and enhancing regional security cooperation. While some critics in Russia have questioned the wisdom of legitimizing a group with a violent past, proponents argue that engagement with the de facto authorities in Kabul is a geopolitical necessity. Moreover, economic considerations have also played a role. Since 2022, Afghanistan has expressed interest in purchasing Russian oil and wheat. The Taliban have also invited Russian companies to invest in mining, infrastructure, and energy projects. Removing the terrorist designation facilitates such cooperation, especially given Western sanctions that have pushed Moscow to diversify its foreign partnerships.

The removal of the Taliban from Russia’s terrorist list is likely to have a ripple effect across Central Asia and beyond. For Central Asian countries, Russia’s policy shift may serve as a green light to expand their own engagement with the Taliban. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which share borders with Afghanistan, have already established pragmatic relations with the Taliban, primarily driven by security and economic interests. Uzbekistan’s active involvement with the Taliban on trade and transit connectivity to South Asia has influenced Russian policymakers to adjust their strategy in favor of smoother economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Russia viewed Uzbekistan as a regional competitor. The recent Termez Dialogue, hosted by Uzbekistan with the participation of Central Asian countries and the Taliban, heightened Moscow’s concerns over Uzbekistan’s growing role as a regional player and the potential challenge it poses to Russia’s influence in Central Asia.

Tajikistan has also begun expanding trade and transit relations with Kabul, opening joint border markets in the Badakhshan provinces of both countries, as well as utilizing Sher Khan Port in Kunduz province. The extension of electricity exports to Afghanistan and the recent CASA-1000 meeting in Dushanbe—attended by a Taliban delegation—signal a growing interest in fostering mutual economic ties between Kabul and Central Asia. However, this normalization also comes with risks. The Taliban's refusal to form an inclusive government or ensure basic human rights—particularly for women and minorities—has prevented broader international recognition. By legitimizing the Taliban without demanding reforms, Moscow risks enabling continued repression and governance failures that could fuel further instability.

In terms of security, closer cooperation between Russia and the Taliban might strengthen the fight against ISIS-K, particularly in northern Afghanistan. However, it may also deepen regional rivalries, especially if Iran, China, and Russia begin to compete for influence in post-U.S. Afghanistan. The recent participation of Taliban officials in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) dialogue formats and The Termez Dialogue in Uzbekistan signals a growing desire among regional powers to integrate Afghanistan into new security architectures that exclude the West. Economic and political relations between the Central Asian countries and the Taliban are growing fast.

Finally, the implications extend to the global geopolitical sphere. Russia’s embrace of the Taliban may signal a broader strategy of contesting Western norms by engaging with non-Western, often pariah, regimes. Moscow’s willingness to engage with the Taliban mirrors its outreach to other sanctioned or controversial governments, from Syria to North Korea. This aligns with the Kremlin’s effort to promote a multipolar world order, one that challenges U.S.-led international structures.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations marks a pivotal moment in its Afghanistan policy. While it reflects pragmatic calculations tied to regional security concerns and economic interests—particularly in light of Central Asia’s growing engagement with the Taliban—it also signals a broader shift in Moscow’s diplomatic approach amid sanctions and geopolitical isolation. The long-term success of this engagement will depend not only on the Taliban’s capacity to deliver security, uphold governance, and respect international laws and human rights, but also on Russia’s ability to balance its strategic ambitions with regional stability and global legitimacy.

AUTHORS’ BIOS: Aigerim Turgunbaeva, journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

At the conclusion of a five-day visit to China by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on February 8, China and Pakistan issued a joint statement urging the Taliban government to take decisive measures to eliminate all terrorist organizations operating within Afghanistan and to prevent the use of Afghan territory for hostile activities against other nations. Over the past three years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban administration of providing refuge to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for attacks on Pakistani security forces and Chinese nationals within Pakistan. Despite being the largest foreign investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, China has thus far remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Pakistan is poised to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of Afghan territory that extends to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan and Pakistan. This corridor not only facilitates China's direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia but also holds strategic significance, positioning it as a potential focal point in China's evolving geopolitical interests in the region.

Photo by Ninara.

BACKGROUND: The airstrikes conducted by Pakistan inside Afghanistan on December 24 heightened tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, leading to an increase in skirmishes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan targeted TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, resulting in the deaths of 46 individuals. In response, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on multiple locations along the Pakistan border, killing one Pakistani soldier.

This was not the first instance of Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan. In March 2024, Pakistani airstrikes targeted TTP bases within Afghan territory, resulting in the deaths of eight militants. The strikes occurred a day after President Asif Ali Zardari pledged retaliation following an attack by the TTP in Pakistan's northwestern tribal are bordering Afghanistan, which claimed the lives of seven soldiers, including two officers. 

As tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalate and border clashes intensify, Pakistan is reportedly preparing to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of territory in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province that extends 350 kilometers to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region. Control of Wakhan would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan, effectively bypassing Afghanistan. In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s top intelligence official to Tajikistan on December 30, 2024, holds particular significance. Tajikistan hosts the leadership of the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. During his visit, the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Asim Malik, met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe. The ISI chief is believed to have been on a strategic mission to establish an alliance with the NRF as a counterbalance against the Taliban. 

China' has remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although a potential conflict between the two countries could jeopardize Chinese investments worth billions of U.S. dollars in both states, Beijing has opted for a "wait and watch" approach toward the ongoing hostilities. However, China is closely monitoring developments in the Wakhan Corridor, a strategically significant passage that provides direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

On December 30, 2024, during the visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Dushanbe, China’s Ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, was simultaneously meeting with Afghanistan’s acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. This meeting took place amid media reports suggesting that Pakistan’s military was advancing to seize control of the Wakhan Corridor. Both sides emphasized the corridor’s strategic significance for bilateral trade. Taliban authorities dismissed claims regarding the presence of foreign (Pakistani) military forces in the corridor and pledged to address any security threats along Afghanistan’s borders. In September 2023, the Taliban government inaugurated a 50-kilometer road extending from the Wakhan Corridor to the Chinese border.

IMPLICATIONS: A key factor behind China’s silence on the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is its own security concerns regarding Uyghur militancy in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares a border with Afghanistan. The Taliban could potentially leverage the "Uyghur card" to destabilize Xinjiang, given that the previous Taliban regime (1996–2001) provided sanctuary to Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. The Taliban has issued a warning to Beijing against adopting a pro-Pakistan stance in the ongoing conflict, cautioning that Islamabad is attempting to draw China into its proxy war. China remains apprehensive that Uyghur jihadists could gain ideological and operational support under Taliban rule. Consequently, Beijing has consistently sought to avoid antagonizing the Taliban, opting instead for diplomatic engagement and substantial investments in Afghanistan’s energy, infrastructure and mining sectors following the US withdrawal from the war-torn country in 2021.

The Taliban’s warning to China came just days after China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, visited Islamabad in November 2024 and stated that at least 20 militant groups were operating in Afghanistan, posing security threats to China. 

Strategically positioned at the intersection of three major mountain ranges—the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and Pamir—the Wakhan Corridor has the potential to become the focal point of China’s evolving geopolitical strategy in the region. At present, control over the Wakhan Corridor appears to be at the center of the geopolitical contest in Afghanistan, with Pakistan and Afghanistan seemingly acting as mere pawns in this larger game. As a silent yet influential player, China is subtly maneuvering these pawns on the regional chessboard. 

Pakistan aligned itself with China’s broader ambitions to expand its influence across South and Central Asia through Afghanistan long before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. However, rather than directly involving itself in the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, China appears committed to a strategy of cautious observation, continuously monitoring shifting geopolitical dynamics. Beijing seems to be waiting for an opportune moment to assert its influence. 

For China, the Wakhan Corridor—often referred to as Afghanistan's "chicken neck"—serves as a crucial strategic node for establishing and securing connectivity with South and Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This narrow strip of land has the potential to function as a pivotal junction, enabling China to expand its geopolitical and economic influence across the broader region. 

However, security concerns remain a significant challenge in China's plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the BRI, into Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

Several strategic projects planned or initiated by China align with its broader geopolitical strategy. One such initiative involves China's plans to establish a military base in Wakhan to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities. China has already set up a military base in eastern Tajikistan, near the Wakhan Corridor. A military foothold in Wakhan would serve as a critical buffer, preventing terrorism and instability from spilling over from Afghanistan into China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 

Additionally, China has constructed the Taxkorgan Airport on the Pamir Plateau in northwest Xinjiang, situated at an altitude of 3,258 meters and in close proximity of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Beyond providing a new "air passage" that enhances connectivity between Central and South Asia, this ultra-high-altitude airport reinforces China's military and economic influence in the region. 

While Beijing continues to invest in Afghanistan—despite its global isolation and international sanctions—it is simultaneously financing multiple projects under the US$ 62 billion CPEC in Pakistan. However, despite its deep economic and strategic engagements in both countries, China has remained silent regarding the escalating armed confrontations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

CONCLUSION: China should take an active role in mediating the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict rather than attempting to balance its interests with both sides. Leveraging its influence over both states, Beijing can push for diplomatic negotiations to address their disputes. At present, neither Islamabad nor Kabul is in a position to disregard China's calls for restraint, making it a crucial player in de-escalating tensions and ensuring regional stability. 

China should take a definitive stance and clarify its official position on the TTP, which has been responsible for attacks on Chinese nationals and security forces in Pakistan. Beijing should deliver an unequivocal message to Kabul, asserting that if the Taliban government fails to dismantle terrorist networks operating from Afghan territory, China will align with Pakistan in conducting targeted airstrikes against anti-China militant hideouts within Afghanistan. 

While China has remained silent on escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, the U.S. has endorsed Pakistan’s stance regarding the Taliban’s policy of sheltering terrorist groups, which violates the U.S.-Taliban Doha Accord. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 enabled the TTP to operate with greater impunity. For Islamabad, the Afghan endgame has effectively become a zero-sum game. In response, some factions within Pakistan have advocated for collaboration with the U.S. to carry out airstrikes targeting terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan. 

AUTHOR BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation. Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .