By Eldaniz Gusseinov and Rassul Kospanov

Pakistan's declaration of “open war” on Afghanistan in late February 2026, following sustained airstrikes on Kabul, Kandahar, and Bagram airbase under Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, has effectively closed the principal corridor through which Afghan trade reached the sea. While attention has been concentrated to the immediate military dimension, a structurally more consequential process is unfolding in parallel: a reorientation of Afghanistan’s external economic links away from Pakistan and toward Central Asia. This shift was already underway, driven by periodic border disruptions, trade friction, and the steady maturation of northern infrastructure, but the war has compressed its timeline considerably. Three concurrent developments: the collapse of Pakistan-Afghanistan commerce, the ratification of a preferential trade agreement between Uzbekistan and Kabul, and the near-completion of the CASA-1000 power transmission project, suggest that Afghanistan's economic geography is quickly being redrawn.

Image Credit: View of the old city of Kabul, Afghanistan, first uploaded on Wikipedia Commons [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User: Casimiri]

BACKGROUND:

Afghanistan’s economic dependence on Pakistan long predated the current escalation. The Torkham and Chaman crossings served as the country’s principal gateways to Karachi and Gwadar, providing access to maritime trade routes that Central Asian landlocked corridors could not replicate. Yet the relationship was structurally vulnerable. Kabul’s refusal to formally recognize the Durand Line as an international border underpinned recurring post‑2001 border closures and trade disruptions, and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 added a new layer of friction as Islamabad’s demands that Kabul curb TTP sanctuaries went largely unmet. By 2024, divergence was increasingly visible: Pakistan substituted Afghan coal for sea‑borne coal imports and other suppliers while Afghan exporters faced tightening customs and transit restrictions. Bilateral commerce between Pakistan and Afghanistan contracted from approximately USD 2.46 billion in 2024 to USD 1.77 billion in 2025. At the same time, Afghanistan’s trade with Central Asian countries increased significantly, rising by 77 percent. The main driver of this growth was trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, which expanded by 53 percent, reaching approximately US$ 1.6 billion.

The February 2026 escalation removed whatever residual reliability the southern corridor retained. Pakistani airstrikes under Operation Ghazab Lil Haq targeted Taliban military infrastructure across multiple provinces, a full trade suspension was imposed, and buffer-zone operations along the Durand Line added a physical barrier to the political and commercial obstacles already in place. For Afghan business networks and logistics operators, the southern route shifted from periodically unreliable to operationally closed.

Uzbekistan’s Hairatan border crossing on the Amu Darya handled approximately 76 percent of Afghanistan’s northern freight transit before the current escalation, channeling goods toward Russia, China, and the Caspian. Afghanistan’s dependence on Central Asian electricity suppliers, principally Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, which together provide 80-85 percent of the country's power imports, had established dense operational relationships at the border long before formal trade policy followed. Total transit volumes through Afghanistan reached 5 million tons in 2024, demonstrating that the trans-Afghan corridor had become integral to Central Asian commerce with South Asia. The Central Asian factor in Afghanistan’s economy was already structural; yet the war changed its relative weight.

IMPLICATIONS:

The most immediate institutional development is the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Preferential Trade Agreement, signed at the Tashkent International Investment Forum on June 10, 2025, and ratified by President Mirziyoyev in March 2026. The agreement eliminates customs tariffs on 14 categories of goods, prioritizing Afghan agricultural exports, streamlines phytosanitary certification for Afghan farm produce, and formalizes 24-hour operations at the Hairatan-Termez border crossing to accommodate increased volumes. Tashkent’s stated ambition is to raise bilateral trade from roughly US$ 1.6 billion toward US$ 5 billion within five years. It is significant not merely as a commercial target but as a political signal. By institutionalizing preferences and creating a structured long-term framework, Uzbekistan has moved well beyond the ad hoc transactional engagement that characterized the immediate post-2021 period.

The CASA-1000 project, which will add approximately 300 megawatts to Afghanistan’s power supply via a transmission line from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has reached an advanced stage of completion on the Afghan segment, with commissioning targeted for 2027. Uzbekistan has separately committed US$ 1.15 billion in deals for gas-fired generation and transmission infrastructure within Afghanistan, while a 25-year contract for development of the Toti-Maidan gas field deepens the bilateral energy relationship further. In parallel, following the Kazakhstan–Afghanistan business forum held in Shymkent, Astana announced plans to begin geological exploration in Afghanistan’s Laghman province. As part of this initiative, the Kazakh companies Kazatomprom and Kazakhmys conducted two geological missions to assess the potential development of beryllium and lead deposits.

These linkages carry strategic weight beyond their technical specifications: a country that depends on Central Asia for the electricity powering its cities and industries has strong incentives to sustain institutional connectivity with the region, irrespective of the diplomatic nuances in its relations with individual Central Asian capitals.

The Trans-Afghan Railway, whose feasibility framework was signed in July 2025, constitutes the third pillar of this emerging architecture. The corridor, linking Uzbekistan through Mazar-i-Sharif toward South Asian ports, had historically been conceived as a north-south bridge serving Central Asian exporters seeking sea access through Afghanistan. 

Kazakhstan does not oppose Uzbekistan’s project but is promoting an alternative corridor through western Afghanistan. The route Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak is considered technically simpler due to its largely flat terrain, compared to the Uzbek route that passes through the high-altitude Salang Pass. Kazakhstan plans to invest around US$ 500 million, including the construction of railway segments and the creation of a logistics hub in Herat, which is expected to become a key “dry port” for Kazakh cargo.

If realized, this project would represent the first attempt since the nineteenth century to build a railway corridor in this direction. In 1879, British authorities considered constructing a railway to Kandahar. It was never implemented due to resistance from local tribal elites and the ongoing Anglo-Afghan War. After the Russian Empire captured the Panjdeh area north of Herat in 1885, Russian officials explored but never realized the possibility of extending the Trans-Caspian Railway from Krasnovodsk (now Turkmenbashi) through Merv to Herat. Kazakhstan is now demonstrating political boldness by advancing an ambitious initiative seeking to accomplish what the great empires of the past ultimately failed to achieve.

While the Pakistani military campaign has not eliminated the long-term logic of that corridor, it has introduced a medium-term disruption that reinforces Afghanistan’s own interest in northern connectivity, not merely as a transit function enabling others.

The structural dynamic underlying all three of these processes is that Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, have pursued a consistently pragmatic engagement with the Taliban since 2021. Tashkent, Astana, and Ashgabat have avoided formal recognition while building dense working relationships on trade, border management, energy supply, and security coordination. For the Taliban, whose options have narrowed sharply as a result of the Pakistan conflict, this transactional model is comparatively attractive. Central Asian partners do not demand regime change or condition economic engagement on governance reforms and are geographically indispensable for the country’s energy supply. Tashkent and Kabul are not natural allies but increasingly unavoidable partners.

The risks in this trajectory lie in its structural fragility. Afghanistan’s trade deficit reached approximately US$ 9.4 billion in 2024, its export base remains concentrated in agricultural goods and coal, and its settlement infrastructure relies heavily on informal hawala transfers rather than banking channels. Northern trade growth has been accompanied by a persistent imbalance: Central Asian exports to Afghanistan are growing in volume while narrowing in variety, concentrated in flour, fuel, and electricity, with volatility coefficients suggesting that these supply chains remain sensitive to disruption. A durable transformation will require not merely preferential tariff access but energy and industrial investment capable of shifting Afghanistan from a consumer of basic goods to a contributor of productive capacity. For Central Asian states, this is not merely an altruistic objective: without a functional industrial base in Afghanistan, Central Asian exporters will face continued concentration risk in a market that is simultaneously growing and fragile.

CONCLUSIONS:

The Pakistan-Afghanistan war has accelerated Afghanistan’s northward economic pivot. By severing the southern corridor at precisely the moment that Central Asian infrastructure like CASA-1000, the Hairatan-Termez corridor, and the Trans-Afghan Railway framework are reaching operational maturity, the conflict has compressed a decade-long structural transition into a period of months. Uzbekistan has moved most aggressively to institutionalize this realignment through the Preferential Trade Agreement and its energy investment commitments, but the broader dynamic reflects a regional logic that extends to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan: Central Asian states require a stable Afghanistan as a transit corridor and buffer against militant spillover, while Afghanistan requires Central Asian energy, markets, and institutional connectivity as substitutes for a now-hostile southern partner. Whether this convergence of interests consolidates into durable integration will depend on whether both sides can address structural fragilities such as payment infrastructure, export diversification, and logistics gaps, which continue to constrain the corridor’s full potential. The war has resolved an ambiguity in Afghanistan’s foreign economic orientation; the harder task of building a resilient northern integration architecture now begins.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Eldaniz Gusseinov is Head of Research and сo-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int. and a non-resident research fellow at Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of the Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul. Rassul Kospanov is a Senior Researcher at the National Analytical Center under Nazarbayev University, where he coordinates socio-political research projects and prepares analytical reports and policy recommendations for central and local government bodies. His work focuses on political processes in Kazakhstan and across Central Asia, as well as issues of regional cooperation.

By Umair Jamal

Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign against Afghanistan, initiated by airstrikes in late February 2026 targeting hideouts of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost, has escalated into a declared “open war” following retaliatory Taliban attacks and subsequent Pakistani strikes on Kabul, Kandahar, and other locations.

Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, announced Islamabad’s decision to wage war on Afghanistan on February 27, 2026, amid intense cross-border clashes. Pakistan claims hundreds of Taliban fighters have been killed and dozens of border positions seized. The conflict highlights the Afghan Taliban’s continued refusal to dismantle anti-Pakistan militant sanctuaries within Afghanistan, a factor fueling regional instability.

Islamabad’s operations, reportedly enjoying international backing including from the U.S., appear aimed at compelling Kabul to alter its policies. Such changes could curb the regional spread of militancy and enhance security across South and Central Asia by weakening a regime that has continued to enable extremist groups since returning to power in 2021.

BACKGROUND:

Tensions along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border have persisted for decades but intensified significantly following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Since returning to power, the Taliban have been accused by Pakistan of providing safe havens to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant alliance formed in 2007 with deep ethnic Pashtun and ideological ties to Kabul’s rulers.

The TTP has intensified attacks inside Pakistan since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Terrorist violence has risen sharply in recent months, with Afghanistan-based groups claiming responsibility for deadly incidents including the February 2026 bombing of a Shia mosque in Islamabad that killed 31 people, attacks in Bajaur district that killed 11 security personnel, and additional strikes in Bannu and other areas. Exploiting Afghan territory for training, recruitment, and cross-border operations, these groups have claimed hundreds of Pakistani lives in recent years.

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has long been shaped by mutual grievances. Pakistan supported the Taliban during the 1990s and throughout the post-2001 insurgency in Afghanistan. However, relations have deteriorated in recent years as the Taliban-led government in Kabul has refused Pakistan’s repeated demands to crack down on the TTP despite sustained diplomatic pressure.

Pakistan’s efforts to fence the border have also generated clashes with Afghan forces, as Kabul refuses to recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate international border. In 2025 Pakistan conducted airstrikes inside Afghanistan for the first time, targeting TTP strongholds in Khost and Paktika in response to cross-border militant attacks.

Economic relations have deteriorated alongside security tensions. Trade between the two countries, once worth billions annually, has faced repeated disruptions. Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan have nearly halted, while Kabul has been unable to access Pakistani ports for over a year.

The February 2026 escalation began with Pakistani airstrikes on February 21 targeting militant camps in Afghanistan in retaliation for terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The Taliban condemned the strikes as violations of Afghan sovereignty and claimed civilian casualties, including at a religious school. Taliban forces retaliated on February 26 by attacking Pakistani border positions.

Pakistan then declared “open war,” stating that military operations would continue until militant threats were eliminated. “Our patience has run out,” Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated.

Pakistan’s campaign, codenamed Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, has targeted Taliban military facilities in Kabul, including ammunition depots, as well as sites in Kandahar, Paktia, and other provinces. Notably, these strikes included direct attacks on urban centers for the first time. Pakistan has also struck Bagram airbase, which houses Taliban military infrastructure. Islamabad further claims to have captured 32 square kilometers of territory along the Afghan border to establish a buffer zone. Pakistani military officials state that operations will continue until all objectives are achieved.

IMPLICATIONS:

Pakistan’s war on Afghanistan carries significant implications and could reshape regional security by confronting the Taliban’s refusal to act against militant groups. More than a dozen organizations, including TTP, ISKP, and affiliated networks, reportedly use Afghan territory to conduct cross-border attacks. In recent months the TTP has intensified operations inside Pakistan, while ISKP activities near Central Asian borders pose security risks to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Pakistan’s strategic objectives appear broad and evolving. Islamabad is targeting infrastructure facilitating cross-border militancy, including TTP camps and hideouts in Nangarhar and Paktika. These strikes also seek to destroy logistical networks the Taliban uses—or tolerates—to enable cross-border operations, including suicide bomber facilitation networks and weapons depots.

According to Pakistani military sources, forces have captured several strategic positions across the border to create a buffer zone. Numerous Afghan Taliban posts along the Durand Line have reportedly been destroyed or seized in efforts to limit cross-border infiltration.

Pakistan also appears to be attempting to weaken the Taliban regime sufficiently to expose internal fissures. This could enable rival factions or opposition groups, including elements linked to resistance in Panjshir, to challenge Taliban authority. Such actions are intended to signal to Taliban leadership that providing sanctuary to anti-Pakistan militants will impose severe costs. From Islamabad’s perspective, sustained pressure could force Kabul to reconsider its ties with militant organizations.

The Taliban’s refusal to sever ties with the TTP, rooted partly in shared Deobandi ideology and Pashtun affiliations, has further isolated the regime diplomatically and economically. Pakistan’s strikes on weapons depots, bases, logistics networks, and Taliban military offices in Kabul and Kandahar aim to degrade the regime’s operational capacity and cohesion.

Economic pressure is also mounting. Pakistan’s full suspension of trade has significantly reduced Afghan exports. The ongoing conflict in Iran may further close alternative import routes for Afghanistan, intensifying economic constraints on the Taliban government.

In northern Afghanistan, resistance in the Panjshir Valley led by the National Resistance Front (NRF) has complicated Taliban control. Pakistan has reportedly targeted Taliban-linked bases in the valley in recent days, potentially weakening Taliban authority and creating space for resistance groups to expand operations. This could also disrupt Taliban access to Central Asian trade routes if resistance groups challenge Taliban control of northern corridors.

Pakistan appears likely to sustain pressure until the Taliban ceases harboring the TTP, remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other militant factions. Islamabad also appears to have secured a degree of international support. The U.S. State Department has affirmed Pakistan’s right to self-defense against cross-border terrorism. The EU has called for de-escalation but has not condemned the operations. Central Asian states and Russia have likewise refrained from criticizing Pakistan’s actions, suggesting tacit acceptance.

This international stance reinforces Pakistan’s position while increasing pressure on the Taliban. Although prolonged conflict risks refugee flows and humanitarian challenges, it could also compel the Taliban to reconsider policies that allow militant groups to operate from Afghan territory.

The Taliban leadership faces a difficult choice. Sustaining governance while harboring militant groups targeting neighboring states is increasingly untenable. According to officials, Pakistani actions are not intended to pursue regime change but rather to compel behavioral change in Kabul.

Such an outcome could align broader regional interests. An isolated Afghanistan where militancy thrives benefits no state in the region. Central Asian governments facing threats from ISKP may view Pakistan’s campaign as helping contain the northward spread of extremism. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could benefit from reduced militant sanctuaries. Meanwhile China, the U.S., and other regional actors have consistently pressured Kabul to cooperate in countering extremist networks.

Taken together, these developments suggest Pakistan may continue military operations without facing significant international opposition. The Taliban, meanwhile, face mounting economic and military pressure, with limited capacity to respond to sustained aerial strikes.

CONCLUSIONS:

Pakistan’s war on Afghanistan, though carrying risks of escalation, civilian suffering, and humanitarian crises, may ultimately serve broader regional interests by forcing the Taliban to confront its militant entanglements. By targeting TTP and ISKP sanctuaries and pursuing objectives such as buffer zones and the degradation of militant infrastructure, Pakistan seeks to address security threats destabilizing South and Central Asia.

International support for Pakistan’s actions, particularly U.S. recognition of its right to self-defense, reflects a growing consensus that unchecked extremism in Afghanistan poses regional dangers. Sustained pressure could compel Kabul to reconsider its policies, reduce the operational space of militant groups, and potentially open pathways toward more inclusive governance.

Ultimately, weakening an ideologically rigid regime sustained by militant alliances could contribute to greater stability across South and Central Asia and benefit neighboring states long threatened by cross-border violence.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Nargiza Umarova

During the first week of February, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan paid state visits to Pakistan. For Islamabad, these visits represented a new stage in relations with the Central Asian states, based on shared interests in trade, transport logistics, industrial production, and military affairs. Thus, the prospect of Pakistan becoming a key link in the emerging regional connectivity architecture is becoming increasingly realistic, which could accelerate the development of joint infrastructure projects with the active participation of Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND:

Due to its geographical isolation from the open seas, Central Asia is extremely interested in making effective use of Pakistan’s transit capabilities, particularly its maritime infrastructure, which has undergone extensive development in recent years thanks to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar are seen by regional countries as an alternative outlet to the Indian Ocean, complementing Iran’s southern ports. The fastest route to Pakistan is via neighboring Afghanistan, where large-scale infrastructure projects involving Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are underway. Despite continuing tensions on the Afghan–Pakistani border and the conflictual nature of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, these states are accelerating their strategic initiatives in Afghanistan. 

On January 27, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Pakistan announced that Astana was prepared to cover the full cost of constructing the western Trans-Afghan Railway, from Torghundi to Herat, Kandahar and Spin Boldak, with an extension to Chaman in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and on to the country’s seaports. The preliminary cost of the project is approximately US$ 7 billion, and the route’s length will be 687 kilometers. Construction is expected to be completed within three years.

This decision is clearly driven by Kazakhstan’s desire to strengthen its position in north-south transit transport, encompassing existing routes through Iran and emerging transport corridors crossing Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Astana expresses support for the creation of the Kabul Corridor along the Termez-Naibabad-Maidanshahr-Logar-Kharlachi route proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018. In July 2025, the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project entered a new stage of development when a trilateral intergovernmental framework agreement on the joint development of the project’s feasibility study was signed. On February 4, 2026, Uzbekistan ratified the agreement and agreed with Pakistan to begin field studies on the transport corridor.

The UAP project is paving the way for a new north-south trade route through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This route will provide the fastest land connection between Europe, Russia and South Asia, eliminating the need for sea crossings. Against this backdrop, Tashkent has proposed the creation of a multimodal corridor connecting Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is three times shorter than sea delivery routes. Following the launch of the Kabul Corridor, the 5,532-kilometer trade route to South Asia will be entirely rail-based. This will enable Kazakhstan to receive an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons per year — the same amount as Uzbekistan. The projected transit volumes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are estimated at 5 million tons per year, thanks to the attraction of Chinese cargo.

IMPLICATIONS:

Astana’s participation in transit traffic from Belarus to Pakistan was discussed during bilateral talks held during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Pakistan on February 4 , 2026. The parties also discussed the prospects for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) Railway Corridor.

Kazakhstan joined the initiative to construct a railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province, which represents an alternative to the Kabul Corridor, in 2024 at the invitation of the Turkmen side. In July 2025, Astana and Kabul signed a memorandum to implement the project. Kazakhstan has announced that it will allocate US$ 500 million towards the construction of a railway line to Herat and the necessary accompanying infrastructure, including a logistics hub in northern Afghanistan. The stake has now been raised to cover the entire budget for the Western Trans-Afghan Route.

Astana’s active interest in the TAP project may be linked to current dynamics regarding the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas transport corridor. Work began on laying the Afghan section of the 1,840-kilometer pipeline in December 2024. It is expected to reach Herat Province by the end of 2026.

Russia is paying close attention to TAPI, viewing it as an opportunity to diversify and stabilize its energy exports following the loss of the premium European market. In this context, Kazakhstan can expect to earn transit profits, providing additional expectations for the profitability of the railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak, as the two transport routes will clearly be synchronized.

On February 1, 2026, a meeting was held in Herat between Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, and Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister. They discussed the progress in constructing the TAPI gas pipeline, the power line between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Torghundi-Herat railway.

Both Ashgabat and Kabul are seeking to accelerate the TAPI project. At a recent meeting between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri, they noted the rapid pace of work on the Afghan section of the gas pipeline. It is reported that part of the route has already been prepared for pipe installation.

According to Afghan authorities, the Saudi Arabian company Delta International is interested in investing in the purchase of gas under the TAPI project, expanding Turkmenistan’s major gas fields and constructing and extending the gas pipeline from Guzara District of Herat Province to Spin Boldak District of Kandahar Province, and then on to the Indian border. The project would also involve building a large, modern gas hub at Pakistan’s Gwadar port.

CONCLUSIONS:

The dynamic development of relations with Afghanistan presents Central Asian states with the challenge of strengthening mutual coordination to ensure their infrastructure initiatives have complementary political and economic effects. To this end, it is advisable to hold regular consultations at the level of the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries in the region, to agree on a unified negotiating position when interacting with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to ensure the involvement of all five republics in interregional connectivity projects.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Nargiza Umarova is a Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Umair Jamal

Pakistan has upheld a policy of non-recognition of Israel since 1948, maintaining that diplomatic relations are contingent upon the establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital. However, in late 2025, Islamabad’s mediation in the Gaza ceasefire and its conditional readiness to contribute forces to a UN-mandated International Stabilization Force have elevated its diplomatic profile with the U.S. and Gulf partners. Washington, alongside Saudi and Emirati counterparts, appears intent on expanding the Abraham Accords following credible progress toward a two-state solution. Pakistani participation would constitute a historic shift and unlock new economic corridors extending into Central Asia, enhancing regional connectivity to global markets.

                                                          Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Pakistan’s official position on Israel remains firmly grounded in support for Palestinian self-determination, a stance that resonates strongly with domestic public opinion and has guided foreign policy since the country’s founding in 1947. Pakistani diplomatic passports explicitly prohibit travel to Israel, and public discourse frequently interprets the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through the lens of historical injustice, particularly the mass displacement of Palestinians in 1948.

Anti-Israel sentiment intensified across the Muslim world, including in Pakistan, following Israel’s large-scale military offensive in Gaza, which began in October 2023 in response to the Hamas attacks. The operation has thus far resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian casualties and extensive physical destruction across the territory.

A majority of Pakistanis regard recognition of Israel as untenable in the absence of a sovereign Palestinian state. At the governmental level, however, pragmatic considerations have increasingly shaped Islamabad’s approach amid intensifying economic pressures, including a foreign debt burden exceeding US$ 130 billion and continued dependence on international financial institutions.

In September 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took part in a multilateral summit convened by U.S. President Donald Trump, alongside leaders from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, to endorse a 20-point framework for a Gaza ceasefire. The initiative, which enabled hostage releases and expanded humanitarian access, marked a significant instance of Pakistan’s active mediation, coordinated through Doha and other Middle Eastern diplomatic channels.

Subsequently, in November 2025, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed Pakistan’s willingness to contribute troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803. He stressed, however, that the mission’s primary focus would be civilian protection and post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza rather than the disarmament of Palestinian groups. “Our job is peacekeeping, not peace enforcement,” Dar stated when questioned about the prospective deployment of Pakistani forces. This position aligns Pakistan with a coalition of eight Muslim-majority states cooperating with the U.S. to support efforts toward stabilizing Gaza.

These developments coincide with the strengthening of Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, formalized through a mutual defense pact signed in Riyadh on 17 September. The agreement commits both states to regard an attack on one as an attack on the other and encompasses broad provisions for military cooperation and joint deterrence. It underscores the two countries’ shared strategic interests amid heightened regional instability.

Saudi Arabia has signaled its openness to joining the Abraham Accords—a framework for the normalization of relations with Israel—conditional on credible progress toward a two-state solution. In recent remarks to President Trump, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that Riyadh is prepared to participate in the Accords but seeks to secure “a clear path toward a two-state solution.”

Similarly, U.S. officials, including envoys from the Trump administration, appear to have encouraged Pakistan’s inclusion in this framework as a way to extend normalization efforts beyond the Gulf region. Although Islamabad continues to emphasize that any movement in this direction would depend on firm guarantees of Palestinian statehood, reports of backchannel exchanges suggest that discussions on the issue are evolving.

These shifts carry significant implications for Central Asia. States such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are actively pursuing diversified connectivity options to reduce overreliance on Russian and Chinese infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s formal accession to the Abraham Accords in November 2025 illustrates this strategy, with the potential to strengthen its economic linkages with Israel and Western partners, particularly the U.S.

The prospective inclusion of Pakistan in the Accords could function as a pivotal connective link, but sustaining momentum would require careful management of domestic public opinion and sensitive regional dynamics.

IMPLICATIONS: If U.S. officials were to achieve their apparent objective of incorporating Pakistan into an expanded Abraham Accords framework, an outcome likely dependent on Saudi Arabia’s formal participation following progress toward a two-state solution, it would have significant ramifications for Central Asia’s economic landscape. The region’s republics, rich in hydrocarbons, uranium, and rare earth minerals yet constrained by geographic isolation, would benefit significantly from deeper integration into multimodal trade networks.

Foremost among these initiatives is the U.S.-backed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which incorporates Israeli routes and seeks to streamline freight transport from South Asia through Gulf ports to Europe. Designed to circumvent traditional chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the corridor could reduce transit times by up to 40 percent. Pakistan’s participation could extend IMEC’s eastern flank through its ports at Gwadar and Karachi, interfacing with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to provide Central Asian exporters, particularly those in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. with viable southern outlets.

Such diversification would mitigate the vulnerabilities inherent in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which, although operational, continues to face bottlenecks in Caspian Sea transit and persistent geopolitical frictions. In this context, enhanced Israeli technological inputs, such as advanced logistics software and desalination expertise, could improve the efficiency of these corridors, potentially generating annual trade gains amounting to billions of dollars for Central Asia by facilitating access to Mediterranean markets.

From a security standpoint, Pakistan’s prospective deployment of Islamic Security Forces (ISF) in Gaza, framed as a humanitarian stabilization mission, could serve as a model for multilateral engagement and potentially inspire analogous C5+1–style frameworks for managing Afghanistan’s borders. The Saudi–Pakistani defense pact concluded in September 2025 already signals deeper intelligence-sharing cooperation, which could extend northward to counter ISIS-K incursions threatening the frontiers of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s recent entry into the Abraham Accords, announced on 6 November during President Tokayev’s visit to the White House, further underscores this momentum.

Clear obstacles exist to the realization of this trajectory. Public opinion in Pakistan remains strongly opposed to normalization in the absence of Palestinian sovereignty, as demonstrated by sustained public protests and formal parliamentary resolutions. Consequently, any perceived capitulation to U.S. pressure could trigger political instability. Iranian concerns that IMEC represents an encirclement strategy, combined with its rivalry with Israel, could provoke proxy disruptions extending beyond Afghanistan into Central Asia. Moreover, China and Russia are likely to pursue countermeasures through their entrenched Belt and Road Initiative commitments, which already exceed US$ 25 billion in loans to Central Asian states. This could undermine regional cohesion and potentially exacerbate divisions, pitting Turkic-aligned states against Persian-influenced Tajikistan.

Yet a carefully calibrated strategy, linking reforms in Palestinian governance with the concurrent advancement of the IMEC corridor and an expanded role for Pakistan, could yield durable, region-wide dividends.

Israeli agricultural and water-management technologies, which have demonstrated effectiveness in arid environments, could contribute to the rehabilitation of the degraded Aral Sea basin and support the creation of tens of thousands of jobs across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Meanwhile, concrete U.S. incentives, such as the designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally Plus or the provision of security guarantees, could reinforce Islamabad’s willingness to resolve longstanding disputes with Afghanistan and India, facilitate full normalization with Israel, and finally enable the implementation of long-stalled connectivity projects, including the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway and the Trans-Afghan corridor.

The potential payoff could be transformative. Landlocked Central Asia would gain direct and competitive access to the warm-water ports of Gwadar, Karachi, and Mundra, unlocking billions of dollars in annual trade. This shift would also enable the region to diversify away from reliance on Russian and Chinese transit routes, thereby converting decades of geopolitical isolation into sustained economic prosperity.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan has conditioned recognition of Israel on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state for more than seven decades. That longstanding red line now appears to face its greatest pressure to date, as Islamabad’s effective mediation in Gaza and potential peacekeeping role have attracted praise from Washington and Riyadh. The U.S. is actively seeking to expand the Abraham Accords and aims to incorporate both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan once a credible two-state pathway is established. Should Pakistan ultimately accede, the economic payoff for Central Asia could be immediate, through faster IMEC and Trans-Caspian routes, expanded access to Gulf capital, and Israeli technology reaching the landlocked republics. Above all, this development could inaugurate a new era of integration adjacent to Central Asia that would benefit the region greatly.

Absent genuine Palestinian statehood, however, domestic opposition within Pakistan and regional resistance primarily from Iran could undermine these prospects. Ultimately, the outcome hinges on two factors: whether Pakistan can advance toward normalization with Israel without destabilizing its domestic political order, and whether the U.S. can deliver sufficient progress toward a credible and equitable two-state solution to provide Islamabad and other Muslim-majority states with the legitimacy required to take this step and unlock the region’s economic future.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Nargis Kassenova

The dramatic events of 2022 - the January unrest in Kazakhstan and Russia’s war against Ukraine - upended the status quo in Kazakhstan-Russia relations. Astana must now address both long-standing vulnerabilities—security, political, and economic—and new pressures in areas such as inter-elite relations (as they shape up in the process of "denazarbayevization"), nuclear energy, and history writing. The Tokayev government seeks to accommodate Russia as much as possible while advancing Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, which requires constant adjustments and trade-offs.

Read Kazakhstan-Russia Relations After 2022: Sources of Contention, Points of Pressure