Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

Azerbaijan's acquisition of at least 50 JF-17 Block III fighter jets from Pakistan, to be equipped with Turkish-manufactured missiles, aims to enhance the aerial combat capabilities of the Azerbaijani Air Force. Jointly developed by China and Pakistan, the JF-17 Block III fighters will gain increased lethality through the integration of avionics from Türkiye’s advanced defense industry. This agreement has further consolidated the multi-dimensional defense collaboration between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, commonly referred to as "three brothers." Pakistan and Azerbaijan are also actively participating in Türkiye’s Kaan fifth-generation fighter aircraft program. The procurement of Türkiye’s fifth-generation jets, among the most advanced globally, is expected to be transformative for both Baku and Islamabad.

File:Pakistan JF-17 (modified).jpg - Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND:  Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan are collectively referred to as the "three brothers" since Türkiye was the first state, and Pakistan the second, to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. Both Türkiye and Pakistan provided military support to Baku during the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020. The states convened in Islamabad in January 2021 for a trilateral meeting, during which they agreed to expand cooperation in political, strategic, trade, economic, peace, and security, while reaffirming mutual support on issues of shared concern.

Initiated and launched by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 2010, the Kaan fifth-generation fighter program represents Türkiye’s indigenous jet fighter initiative. Following Türkiye’s exclusion from the U.S. F-35 fifth-generation fighter program in 2019, the Kaan remains Türkiye’s sole alternative and is intended to replace the country's aging fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The first prototype was tested in 2023; however, the development process is expected to span at least a decade. 

While Azerbaijan is providing financial assistance to Türkiye’s Kaan program, hundreds of Pakistani officials and engineers are actively engaged in the project. In 2023, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed an agreement during the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2023) in Istanbul to advance the development of the Kaan fighter program. As part of its contribution, Azerbaijan is expected to offer financial investment and industrial collaboration in support of the initiative.

In 2024, Azerbaijan’s Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov stated that his country was leveraging the defense capabilities of Türkiye, its primary partner in military cooperation. In January 2025, Türkiye and Pakistan finalized plans to establish and operate a joint facility for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jet, agreeing to collaborate on the development and manufacturing of the aircraft.

In February 2025, defense industry authorities from Azerbaijan and Türkiye, during a meeting held at the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX-2025) in Abu Dhabi, discussed the successful military-technical cooperation between the two nations and pledged to further strengthen defense industry ties by exploring prospects for joint projects.

The JF-17 Thunder Block III, a fourth-generation fighter jet, has been developed through a joint venture between Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation. Compared to earlier versions of JF-17, the Block III features superior maneuverability, enhanced combat capabilities, and improved stealth characteristics. In February 2024, Azerbaijan signed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement with Pakistan for the procurement of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal also included pilot training and armaments for the fighter jets. On 25 September 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced, “The JF-17 jets have already been integrated into the arsenal of Azerbaijan’s air force.”

IMPLICATIONS: Arming the JF-17 “Thunder” Block III fighter jets acquired by Baku with Türkiye’s Gökdoğan Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) and Bozdoğan Within-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (WVRAAM) will significantly enhance the aerial firepower of Azerbaijan's Air Force. It also underscores the progress of Türkiye’s defense industry. Türkiye is emerging as a major global arms exporter, after the leading five exporters—the U.S., France, Russia, China, and Germany.

With its advanced combat capabilities, the JF-17 aircraft surpasses the region’s Russian-made jets, including the MiG-29 and SU-25. Russia has been Azerbaijan’s primary arms supplier for decades, however, the JF-17 will replace Azerbaijan’s existing and aging fleet of Russian-manufactured MiG-29 fighters. The JF-17 are expected to enhance Azerbaijan’s airpower amid escalating regional security challenges. Equipped with improved avionics and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the Block III variant is adaptable to diverse combat scenarios. 

According to the Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSB), Türkiye’s defense and aerospace exports in 2024 totaled US$ 7.2 billion. Three Turkish defense firms are included in the ‘Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies’ list, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Jointly developed by Pakistan and China, the JF-17 fighter jet deal with Azerbaijan also creates opportunities for China to secure additional defense agreements with Azerbaijan and other countries in the region. Between 2019 and 2023, China accounted for 5.8 percent of global arms exports. During this period, China supplied arms to nearly 40 countries across Asia and Africa, ranking as the fourth largest exporter of conventional weapons after the U.S., France, and Russia.

By selling the JF-17 Thunder to Azerbaijan, Pakistan has effectively supported China in boosting demand and expanding its market for arms and military equipment in a region traditionally dominated by Russia. The JF-17 agreement with Azerbaijan is likely to facilitate the entry of Chinese weaponry and enhance China’s influence in the region.

Islamabad, Ankara, and Baku have integrated their tactical and strategic practice with the use of Turkish drone systems. In the Kaan project, Türkiye is experimenting with a ‘loyal wingman’ drone, to gather data in a range of different terrains and against a range of technologies.

The development of the Kaan fighter will significantly reduce Türkiye’s reliance on foreign aircraft. As a fifth-generation fighter program, Kaan demands extensive expertise, substantial financial resources, and international collaboration. Azerbaijan’s financial investment and Pakistan’s manufacturing expertise will not only support Türkiye’s Kaan project but also further reinforce the trilateral defense cooperation for long-term initiatives.

The joint factory established by Islamabad and Ankara for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jets will further consolidate the defense partnership between Pakistan and Türkiye. Pakistan’s role is expected to enable Türkiye to produce the Kaan jet at a reduced cost. Cost-effective joint production of the Kaan is expected to expand Türkiye’s defense exports, while also bolstering Pakistan’s aerial defense capabilities.

Yet the involvement of Pakistan—China’s longstanding strategic ally and “all-weather” friend—in the Kaan project may pose challenges in sourcing components from Western suppliers due to security concerns. China’s suspected indirect involvement in the Kaan program via Pakistan is viewed as a potential risk to the project. Although China has no official role in Türkiye’s Kaan initiative, critics suspect an indirect influence through Pakistan’s participation. A primary factor behind the rising demand for Chinese defense equipment is its competitive pricing, attributed to low-cost production. The anticipated cost-effective production of the Kaan fighters has further fueled suspicions regarding China’s indirect involvement in the project.

Pakistan’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan carries significant geopolitical implications. In the aftermath of the six-week Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, Armenia—Azerbaijan’s primary adversary—has become the largest importer of weapons from India, Pakistan’s principal regional rival.

CONCLUSION: The JF-17 and Kaan fighter jet agreements is a clear statement that Pakistan and Türkiye will continue to bolster Azerbaijan’s military capabilities, with trilateral defense cooperation expected to deepen further. If successful, the Kaan project will lay the groundwork for expanded trilateral collaboration among Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan in launching additional large-scale defense initiatives. It will also create opportunities for future bilateral or trilateral joint ventures in the defense industry among the three nations.

The Kaan jet will allow the three countries to enhance engineering capabilities within their domestic defense industries. As a strategic asset, the acquisition of Türkiye’s Kaan will represent a significant technological advancement for Azerbaijan’s and Pakistan’s air forces.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation.  He is reachable by email at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

 

 

 

Published in Analytical Articles

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

At the conclusion of a five-day visit to China by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on February 8, China and Pakistan issued a joint statement urging the Taliban government to take decisive measures to eliminate all terrorist organizations operating within Afghanistan and to prevent the use of Afghan territory for hostile activities against other nations. Over the past three years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban administration of providing refuge to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for attacks on Pakistani security forces and Chinese nationals within Pakistan. Despite being the largest foreign investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, China has thus far remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Pakistan is poised to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of Afghan territory that extends to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan and Pakistan. This corridor not only facilitates China's direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia but also holds strategic significance, positioning it as a potential focal point in China's evolving geopolitical interests in the region.

42246043070_35255ff2d0_c.jpg

Photo by Ninara.

BACKGROUND: The airstrikes conducted by Pakistan inside Afghanistan on December 24 heightened tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, leading to an increase in skirmishes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan targeted TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, resulting in the deaths of 46 individuals. In response, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on multiple locations along the Pakistan border, killing one Pakistani soldier.

This was not the first instance of Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan. In March 2024, Pakistani airstrikes targeted TTP bases within Afghan territory, resulting in the deaths of eight militants. The strikes occurred a day after President Asif Ali Zardari pledged retaliation following an attack by the TTP in Pakistan's northwestern tribal are bordering Afghanistan, which claimed the lives of seven soldiers, including two officers. 

As tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalate and border clashes intensify, Pakistan is reportedly preparing to assert control over the Wakhan Corridor—a narrow strip of territory in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province that extends 350 kilometers to China's Xinjiang region, serving as a geographical buffer between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region. Control of Wakhan would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan, effectively bypassing Afghanistan. In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s top intelligence official to Tajikistan on December 30, 2024, holds particular significance. Tajikistan hosts the leadership of the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. During his visit, the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Asim Malik, met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe. The ISI chief is believed to have been on a strategic mission to establish an alliance with the NRF as a counterbalance against the Taliban. 

China' has remained silent regarding the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although a potential conflict between the two countries could jeopardize Chinese investments worth billions of U.S. dollars in both states, Beijing has opted for a "wait and watch" approach toward the ongoing hostilities. However, China is closely monitoring developments in the Wakhan Corridor, a strategically significant passage that provides direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

On December 30, 2024, during the visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Dushanbe, China’s Ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, was simultaneously meeting with Afghanistan’s acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. This meeting took place amid media reports suggesting that Pakistan’s military was advancing to seize control of the Wakhan Corridor. Both sides emphasized the corridor’s strategic significance for bilateral trade. Taliban authorities dismissed claims regarding the presence of foreign (Pakistani) military forces in the corridor and pledged to address any security threats along Afghanistan’s borders. In September 2023, the Taliban government inaugurated a 50-kilometer road extending from the Wakhan Corridor to the Chinese border.

IMPLICATIONS: A key factor behind China’s silence on the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is its own security concerns regarding Uyghur militancy in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares a border with Afghanistan. The Taliban could potentially leverage the "Uyghur card" to destabilize Xinjiang, given that the previous Taliban regime (1996–2001) provided sanctuary to Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. The Taliban has issued a warning to Beijing against adopting a pro-Pakistan stance in the ongoing conflict, cautioning that Islamabad is attempting to draw China into its proxy war. China remains apprehensive that Uyghur jihadists could gain ideological and operational support under Taliban rule. Consequently, Beijing has consistently sought to avoid antagonizing the Taliban, opting instead for diplomatic engagement and substantial investments in Afghanistan’s energy, infrastructure and mining sectors following the US withdrawal from the war-torn country in 2021.

The Taliban’s warning to China came just days after China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, visited Islamabad in November 2024 and stated that at least 20 militant groups were operating in Afghanistan, posing security threats to China. 

Strategically positioned at the intersection of three major mountain ranges—the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and Pamir—the Wakhan Corridor has the potential to become the focal point of China’s evolving geopolitical strategy in the region. At present, control over the Wakhan Corridor appears to be at the center of the geopolitical contest in Afghanistan, with Pakistan and Afghanistan seemingly acting as mere pawns in this larger game. As a silent yet influential player, China is subtly maneuvering these pawns on the regional chessboard. 

Pakistan aligned itself with China’s broader ambitions to expand its influence across South and Central Asia through Afghanistan long before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. However, rather than directly involving itself in the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, China appears committed to a strategy of cautious observation, continuously monitoring shifting geopolitical dynamics. Beijing seems to be waiting for an opportune moment to assert its influence. 

For China, the Wakhan Corridor—often referred to as Afghanistan's "chicken neck"—serves as a crucial strategic node for establishing and securing connectivity with South and Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This narrow strip of land has the potential to function as a pivotal junction, enabling China to expand its geopolitical and economic influence across the broader region. 

However, security concerns remain a significant challenge in China's plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the BRI, into Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

Several strategic projects planned or initiated by China align with its broader geopolitical strategy. One such initiative involves China's plans to establish a military base in Wakhan to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities. China has already set up a military base in eastern Tajikistan, near the Wakhan Corridor. A military foothold in Wakhan would serve as a critical buffer, preventing terrorism and instability from spilling over from Afghanistan into China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 

Additionally, China has constructed the Taxkorgan Airport on the Pamir Plateau in northwest Xinjiang, situated at an altitude of 3,258 meters and in close proximity of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Beyond providing a new "air passage" that enhances connectivity between Central and South Asia, this ultra-high-altitude airport reinforces China's military and economic influence in the region. 

While Beijing continues to invest in Afghanistan—despite its global isolation and international sanctions—it is simultaneously financing multiple projects under the US$ 62 billion CPEC in Pakistan. However, despite its deep economic and strategic engagements in both countries, China has remained silent regarding the escalating armed confrontations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

CONCLUSION: China should take an active role in mediating the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict rather than attempting to balance its interests with both sides. Leveraging its influence over both states, Beijing can push for diplomatic negotiations to address their disputes. At present, neither Islamabad nor Kabul is in a position to disregard China's calls for restraint, making it a crucial player in de-escalating tensions and ensuring regional stability. 

China should take a definitive stance and clarify its official position on the TTP, which has been responsible for attacks on Chinese nationals and security forces in Pakistan. Beijing should deliver an unequivocal message to Kabul, asserting that if the Taliban government fails to dismantle terrorist networks operating from Afghan territory, China will align with Pakistan in conducting targeted airstrikes against anti-China militant hideouts within Afghanistan. 

While China has remained silent on escalating Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, the U.S. has endorsed Pakistan’s stance regarding the Taliban’s policy of sheltering terrorist groups, which violates the U.S.-Taliban Doha Accord. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 enabled the TTP to operate with greater impunity. For Islamabad, the Afghan endgame has effectively become a zero-sum game. In response, some factions within Pakistan have advocated for collaboration with the U.S. to carry out airstrikes targeting terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan. 

AUTHOR BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation. Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Published in Analytical Articles

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Pakistan and India, the longstanding rivals in South Asia, have instigated an arms race in the South Caucasus region. This development comes amid a broader arms supply deficit caused by Russia's preoccupation with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While India is deepening its military partnership with Armenia, Pakistan is enhancing the defense capabilities of Azerbaijan. Both states are actively seeking to fill the vacuum in arms procurement left by Russia's reduced presence in the region. India has aligned with Armenia, leveraging this partnership to pursue strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus. Conversely, Pakistan views Azerbaijan as a strategic ally, with their collaboration deemed essential for countering India in the competition for regional influence.

 caucasus complex

BCKGROUND: India and Pakistan have shared a contentious relationship since their emergence as independent states in 1947. The two states have engaged in three full-scale wars, primarily over Kashmir, a territory claimed by both. In 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests shortly after India, marking a significant escalation in their rivalry. This ongoing antagonism often manifests in international forums, where the two countries accuse each other of fostering cross-border terrorism. Their rivalry extended to the South Caucasus in 2020, during the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

 

Pakistan supported Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. However, the close relationship between the two countries predates this conflict, with their cordial ties dating back to Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was among the first nations to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, second only to Türkiye. After Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region shortly after its independence, both Türkiye and Pakistan strongly condemned Armenia's actions. Since then, they have consistently supported Azerbaijan’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in international forums, both politically and diplomatically. Pakistan has gone so far as to refrain from recognizing Armenia, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the country. In return, Azerbaijan has endorsed Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute, a position that has antagonized India.

 

During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Islamabad was alleged to have sent military advisers to support Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even claimed that Pakistani soldiers were actively fighting alongside the Azerbaijani army against Armenia during the 44-day conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan, however, categorically dismissed these allegations, labeling them as "baseless and unwarranted." Ultimately, Azerbaijan emerged victorious in the six-week war over the disputed region.

 

Türkiye strongly backed Pakistan's position on Kashmir, reciprocating Pakistan’s unequivocal support for Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war. The mutual endorsements of Islamabad's stance on Kashmir by Ankara and Baku provoked concern in New Delhi. Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan during the conflict played a pivotal role in fostering closer ties between India and Armenia in the aftermath of the war. Observing its rival’s activities during the Karabakh conflict, India responded by significantly enhancing its defense partnership with Armenia over the subsequent four years.

 

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Türkiye formalized their alliance by signing the Trilateral Islamabad Declaration in 2021, underscoring their solidarity with Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war.

IMPLICATIONS: The supply of military equipment by India and Pakistan has significantly reduced Azerbaijan's and Armenia's dependence on Russia for weapons and ammunition. Historically, both South Caucasian nations relied heavily on Russia for defense supplies, particularly in the period preceding the 2020 Karabakh War. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia accounted for 94 percent of Armenia's major arms imports, including armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks. Similarly, Azerbaijan depended extensively on Russian military supplies during the same period, purchasing armored vehicles, air defense systems, Smerch rockets, transport and combat helicopters, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks.

 

India considers Armenia a strategic partner in the South Caucasus and has consequently deepened its military ties with Yerevan. Armenia has emerged as the largest foreign recipient of Indian weapons, with defense contracts concluded since 2020 estimated at US$ 2 billion. According to a report by the Indian Ministry of Finance, Armenia has become the leading importer of Indian arms, securing deals for the purchase of Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems and Akash anti-aircraft systems. This development reflects a significant realignment in the defense landscape of the region.

 

In September, Azerbaijan formally introduced Pakistan’s fourth-generation JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter jets to its air force, marking a significant milestone in defense cooperation between the two nations. This development followed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement signed in February for the acquisition of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal includes not only the supply of aircraft but also ammunition and pilot training provided by Pakistan. The advanced combat capabilities of the JF-17 Block III are expected to enhance Azerbaijan's military edge in the South Caucasus. Notably, Azerbaijan has requested 60 JF-17 jets, intended to replace its entire fleet of aircraft, making this the largest defense export deal in Pakistan’s history.

 

The defense agreements between India and Armenia, as well as those between Pakistan and Azerbaijan, have significantly diminished Russia’s position as the principal supplier of weapons and ammunition to the South Caucasian nations. This shift has been exacerbated by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, which has undermined its ability to deliver weapons in a timely manner under previously signed contracts. The entry of India and Pakistan into the regional defense market has provided Armenia and Azerbaijan with an opportunity to diversify their military procurement, reducing their historical reliance on Russian defense supplies.

 

The entry of India and Pakistan into the South Caucasus has resulted in the formation of two rival blocs competing for regional influence. One alliance, referred to as the Three Brothers, comprises Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan, while the opposing group includes Armenia, Iran, France, and India.

 

For India, Armenia holds strategic importance as a potential bridge to access the vast market of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). New Delhi views Armenia as a vital transit hub for connecting Indian goods to EU countries and envisions its role in facilitating bilateral or multilateral partnerships with nations such as Iran, France, and Greece to implement strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus.

 

Conversely, Islamabad considers its partnership with Azerbaijan critical for countering India's influence in the region. Azerbaijan has also emerged as a key player in the energy transit corridors connecting the Black Sea, South Caucasus, and Europe, further enhancing its geopolitical significance. This dynamic positions Azerbaijan as a strategic ally for Pakistan, particularly in the context of their shared interests in limiting India's regional ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan's defense cooperation with Azerbaijan and India's arms sales to Armenia are shaping new security dynamics that link the South Caucasus and South Asia. The extensive defense contracts between India and Armenia are poised to strengthen Armenia's position as a strategic ally for India in the region.

 

India's military partnership with Armenia is influenced by its geopolitical rivalry with Pakistan, which is actively supporting Azerbaijan's defense capabilities. Both Pakistan and India aim to secure reciprocal cooperation from the South Caucasian nations to advance their strategic interests. For Pakistan, Azerbaijan holds particular importance as a potential partner in trans-regional energy cooperation, given Pakistan's energy deficiencies. Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the energy transit corridor connecting South Asia and the South Caucasus further underscores this strategic alignment.

 

Conversely, India, as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), is working to deepen its cooperation with Armenia across economic sectors, with a particular emphasis on defense. Armenia's strategic position could also facilitate India's broader connectivity initiatives with Europe. Meanwhile, Pakistan is likely to leverage its relationship with Azerbaijan to counterbalance India's growing influence in the region, highlighting the interconnected and competitive geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and South Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst of the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.

Published in Analytical Articles
Wednesday, 20 November 2024 21:47

Security Concerns Impede China-Pakistan Relations

By Ghulam Ali

Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Jiang Zaidong recently criticized the repeated attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, calling them “unacceptable” and citing security as the biggest challenge to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). His comments followed two fatal incidents within six months, which claimed seven Chinese lives. Pakistan’s Foreign Office, instead of addressing the concerns, dismissed the remarks as “perplexing,” revealing underlying tensions in the bilateral relationship. Despite China’s role as Pakistan’s key economic partner, security lapses and strained diplomacy are testing the limits of their traditionally strong ties, highlighting deeper challenges to the CPEC and broader cooperation. These tensions point to a more complex dynamic in bilateral relations, revealing that mutual dependency alone may not be sufficient to sustain smooth cooperation amidst mounting challenges.

China-Pakistan relations

BACKGROUND:  The diplomatic row between China and Pakistan intensified during a seminar in Islamabad on October 30, when Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong openly rebutted remarks by Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Dar claimed that China prioritized security in its overseas investments but made Pakistan an exception due to its friendship. The ambassador firmly countered, stating that President Xi Jinping consistently emphasizes the importance of ensuring the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions, and projects in Pakistan, reiterating that security remains China’s top concern and a major constraint to the CPEC.  This marked the first public expression of such sentiments by China and an equally unprecedented response from Pakistan's Foreign Office, which described the remarks as “perplexing” and “surprising.” Pakistan's English-language media reflected the gravity of the situation, with Dawn describing the exchange as rare and The Nation advising restraint from the Foreign Office. Further complicating matters, Pakistan canceled President Asif Ali Zardari’s planned visit to China on November 2, citing a dubious pretext of a foot injury, signaling deeper strains in the relationship amid growing concerns over security and diplomatic discord. This is not the first time China has urged Pakistan to ensure the security of its nationals. In several meetings with Pakistani leaders, China has consistently emphasized the importance of safeguarding Chinese citizens and interests in Pakistan. During his meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in June 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated the need for Pakistan to create a safe and stable environment, stressing the protection of Chinese nationals, projects, and institutions. In line with this, Beijing also sent Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Islamabad, where he echoed similar concerns regarding security during discussions with Pakistan’s political leaders. China has faced numerous attacks on its citizens in Pakistan, with over 21 Chinese nationals killed since 2017. The Balochistan Liberation Army, a separatist group seeking independence for the underdeveloped Balochistan province, which hosts the strategic Gwadar Port, is behind many of these attacks. The Balochi population has long expressed grievances over marginalization and resource extraction without benefiting from the region’s wealth, fueling insurgent movements. Currently, Balochistan is experiencing its fifth wave of insurgency. Another key source of attacks on Chinese nationals is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group primarily based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While the TTP has denied responsibility, Pakistani authorities have attributed the March 2024 suicide bombing that killed five Chinese engineers to the group. Allegations suggest that the TTP may be collaborating with Uyghur separatists, given their shared religious ideology, further complicating the security landscape for Chinese nationals in Pakistan.

IMPLICATIONS:  The Chinese ambassador’s public expression of frustration and his direct reprimand of Pakistani officials highlighted China’s increasing impatience with Pakistan’s handling of security for Chinese nationals. By emphasizing the gravity of the situation and warning against future incidents, the ambassador signaled that China would no longer shy away from bluntly addressing its concerns. This shift in tone underscores the growing tension in the bilateral relationship, with the potential for global attention if the situation deteriorates further. The security situation in Pakistan will be pivotal in determining China’s future investment decisions. If the security environment remains unstable, China may choose to complete ongoing projects but refrain from launching new ones. This was evident during Chinese Premier Li Qiang's mid-October visit to Pakistan for the SCO conference, where he did not explicitly endorse the second phase of the CPEC or any new initiatives. This lack of commitment signals that security concerns could heavily influence China’s willingness to deepen its involvement in Pakistan moving forward. China and Pakistan had already planned to review their counterterrorism cooperation, and recent developments are likely to expedite this process through three key trends. First, China may increase its security support by providing bomb-proof vehicles for the safe transport of Chinese engineers, offering specialized security training to Pakistani personnel, and expanding intelligence sharing and consultation between the two countries. Second, the idea of involving Chinese private security companies (PSCs) or establishing joint security arrangements with Pakistani counterparts could gain traction. China has expressed interest in deploying PSCs, especially in conflict zones worldwide, to safeguard its growing investments. However, the deployment of PSCs to Pakistan faces both legal and practical obstacles. Pakistani law prohibits foreign security companies from operating within its borders. Even if this hurdle is overcome, the concept is likely to face challenges due to the country’s security realities. The Pakistani military and intelligence agencies, despite having the necessary resources and capabilities, have struggled to protect Chinese nationals. Given this, private companies, with far fewer resources, may not be effective in improving security. Additionally, bringing in foreign security personnel, whether from China’s armed forces or private firms, could expose them to the same risks from terrorist groups that have targeted Chinese nationals in the past. Third, the worsening security situation in Pakistan could provide the military with a pretext for launching another large-scale military operation, something it has long advocated. In June 2024, the Pakistani government approved the counter-terrorism operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), but its implementation was delayed due to opposition from political parties and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), which advocates for the rights of Pashtuns. However, conducting a military operation during a period of economic difficulties, political polarization, and significant opposition would reduce its likelihood of success. Additionally, such an operation would come with substantial economic costs and the risk of collateral damage, particularly in already unstable regions, further complicating its execution and effectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS:  Although a seemingly minor incident, Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong's remarks have exposed long-standing issues between China and Pakistan, revealing underlying challenges in their relationship. These comments have sparked debate, both within Pakistan and internationally, regarding the durability of their "all-weather" friendship. If one factor has most damaged the Sino-Pakistani partnership, it is terrorism. Likewise, if there is one issue that will significantly determine the future of this relationship, it is the ongoing challenge of terrorism and its impact on security for both nations.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Dr. Ghulam Ali is the Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies (www.rcas.top). He received his PhD from Monash University in Australia and completed a postdoc at Peking University in Beijing. He has authored or edited four books and published articles in academic journals and media outlets.

Published in Analytical Articles

By Vali Kaleji

March 28, 2024

The development of military and defense relations between Azerbaijan and Pakistan and Armenia and India is an important consequence of the political arrangement and the balance of forces after the Second Karabakh War. However, Pakistan’s non-recognition of Israel has prevented Baku from forming a “quadruple alliance” with its three strategic allies, including Turkey, Israel and Pakistan. Armenia, after defeat in the war and amid dissatisfaction with its traditional ally Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), views India, France and Iran as new strategic options, however, Iran prefers Armenia to maintain its traditional and strategic relations with Russia. The tripartite cooperation between Armenia, Iran and India focus efforts on “soft balancing” (economic-transit) instead of “hard balancing” (military-security), against the tripartite ties of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan in the South Caucasus.turkey azerbaijan pakistan flags big

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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