By Umair Jamal

Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign against Afghanistan, initiated by airstrikes in late February 2026 targeting hideouts of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost, has escalated into a declared “open war” following retaliatory Taliban attacks and subsequent Pakistani strikes on Kabul, Kandahar, and other locations.

Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, announced Islamabad’s decision to wage war on Afghanistan on February 27, 2026, amid intense cross-border clashes. Pakistan claims hundreds of Taliban fighters have been killed and dozens of border positions seized. The conflict highlights the Afghan Taliban’s continued refusal to dismantle anti-Pakistan militant sanctuaries within Afghanistan, a factor fueling regional instability.

Islamabad’s operations, reportedly enjoying international backing including from the U.S., appear aimed at compelling Kabul to alter its policies. Such changes could curb the regional spread of militancy and enhance security across South and Central Asia by weakening a regime that has continued to enable extremist groups since returning to power in 2021.

BACKGROUND:

Tensions along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border have persisted for decades but intensified significantly following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Since returning to power, the Taliban have been accused by Pakistan of providing safe havens to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant alliance formed in 2007 with deep ethnic Pashtun and ideological ties to Kabul’s rulers.

The TTP has intensified attacks inside Pakistan since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Terrorist violence has risen sharply in recent months, with Afghanistan-based groups claiming responsibility for deadly incidents including the February 2026 bombing of a Shia mosque in Islamabad that killed 31 people, attacks in Bajaur district that killed 11 security personnel, and additional strikes in Bannu and other areas. Exploiting Afghan territory for training, recruitment, and cross-border operations, these groups have claimed hundreds of Pakistani lives in recent years.

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has long been shaped by mutual grievances. Pakistan supported the Taliban during the 1990s and throughout the post-2001 insurgency in Afghanistan. However, relations have deteriorated in recent years as the Taliban-led government in Kabul has refused Pakistan’s repeated demands to crack down on the TTP despite sustained diplomatic pressure.

Pakistan’s efforts to fence the border have also generated clashes with Afghan forces, as Kabul refuses to recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate international border. In 2025 Pakistan conducted airstrikes inside Afghanistan for the first time, targeting TTP strongholds in Khost and Paktika in response to cross-border militant attacks.

Economic relations have deteriorated alongside security tensions. Trade between the two countries, once worth billions annually, has faced repeated disruptions. Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan have nearly halted, while Kabul has been unable to access Pakistani ports for over a year.

The February 2026 escalation began with Pakistani airstrikes on February 21 targeting militant camps in Afghanistan in retaliation for terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The Taliban condemned the strikes as violations of Afghan sovereignty and claimed civilian casualties, including at a religious school. Taliban forces retaliated on February 26 by attacking Pakistani border positions.

Pakistan then declared “open war,” stating that military operations would continue until militant threats were eliminated. “Our patience has run out,” Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated.

Pakistan’s campaign, codenamed Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, has targeted Taliban military facilities in Kabul, including ammunition depots, as well as sites in Kandahar, Paktia, and other provinces. Notably, these strikes included direct attacks on urban centers for the first time. Pakistan has also struck Bagram airbase, which houses Taliban military infrastructure. Islamabad further claims to have captured 32 square kilometers of territory along the Afghan border to establish a buffer zone. Pakistani military officials state that operations will continue until all objectives are achieved.

IMPLICATIONS:

Pakistan’s war on Afghanistan carries significant implications and could reshape regional security by confronting the Taliban’s refusal to act against militant groups. More than a dozen organizations, including TTP, ISKP, and affiliated networks, reportedly use Afghan territory to conduct cross-border attacks. In recent months the TTP has intensified operations inside Pakistan, while ISKP activities near Central Asian borders pose security risks to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Pakistan’s strategic objectives appear broad and evolving. Islamabad is targeting infrastructure facilitating cross-border militancy, including TTP camps and hideouts in Nangarhar and Paktika. These strikes also seek to destroy logistical networks the Taliban uses—or tolerates—to enable cross-border operations, including suicide bomber facilitation networks and weapons depots.

According to Pakistani military sources, forces have captured several strategic positions across the border to create a buffer zone. Numerous Afghan Taliban posts along the Durand Line have reportedly been destroyed or seized in efforts to limit cross-border infiltration.

Pakistan also appears to be attempting to weaken the Taliban regime sufficiently to expose internal fissures. This could enable rival factions or opposition groups, including elements linked to resistance in Panjshir, to challenge Taliban authority. Such actions are intended to signal to Taliban leadership that providing sanctuary to anti-Pakistan militants will impose severe costs. From Islamabad’s perspective, sustained pressure could force Kabul to reconsider its ties with militant organizations.

The Taliban’s refusal to sever ties with the TTP, rooted partly in shared Deobandi ideology and Pashtun affiliations, has further isolated the regime diplomatically and economically. Pakistan’s strikes on weapons depots, bases, logistics networks, and Taliban military offices in Kabul and Kandahar aim to degrade the regime’s operational capacity and cohesion.

Economic pressure is also mounting. Pakistan’s full suspension of trade has significantly reduced Afghan exports. The ongoing conflict in Iran may further close alternative import routes for Afghanistan, intensifying economic constraints on the Taliban government.

In northern Afghanistan, resistance in the Panjshir Valley led by the National Resistance Front (NRF) has complicated Taliban control. Pakistan has reportedly targeted Taliban-linked bases in the valley in recent days, potentially weakening Taliban authority and creating space for resistance groups to expand operations. This could also disrupt Taliban access to Central Asian trade routes if resistance groups challenge Taliban control of northern corridors.

Pakistan appears likely to sustain pressure until the Taliban ceases harboring the TTP, remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other militant factions. Islamabad also appears to have secured a degree of international support. The U.S. State Department has affirmed Pakistan’s right to self-defense against cross-border terrorism. The EU has called for de-escalation but has not condemned the operations. Central Asian states and Russia have likewise refrained from criticizing Pakistan’s actions, suggesting tacit acceptance.

This international stance reinforces Pakistan’s position while increasing pressure on the Taliban. Although prolonged conflict risks refugee flows and humanitarian challenges, it could also compel the Taliban to reconsider policies that allow militant groups to operate from Afghan territory.

The Taliban leadership faces a difficult choice. Sustaining governance while harboring militant groups targeting neighboring states is increasingly untenable. According to officials, Pakistani actions are not intended to pursue regime change but rather to compel behavioral change in Kabul.

Such an outcome could align broader regional interests. An isolated Afghanistan where militancy thrives benefits no state in the region. Central Asian governments facing threats from ISKP may view Pakistan’s campaign as helping contain the northward spread of extremism. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could benefit from reduced militant sanctuaries. Meanwhile China, the U.S., and other regional actors have consistently pressured Kabul to cooperate in countering extremist networks.

Taken together, these developments suggest Pakistan may continue military operations without facing significant international opposition. The Taliban, meanwhile, face mounting economic and military pressure, with limited capacity to respond to sustained aerial strikes.

CONCLUSIONS:

Pakistan’s war on Afghanistan, though carrying risks of escalation, civilian suffering, and humanitarian crises, may ultimately serve broader regional interests by forcing the Taliban to confront its militant entanglements. By targeting TTP and ISKP sanctuaries and pursuing objectives such as buffer zones and the degradation of militant infrastructure, Pakistan seeks to address security threats destabilizing South and Central Asia.

International support for Pakistan’s actions, particularly U.S. recognition of its right to self-defense, reflects a growing consensus that unchecked extremism in Afghanistan poses regional dangers. Sustained pressure could compel Kabul to reconsider its policies, reduce the operational space of militant groups, and potentially open pathways toward more inclusive governance.

Ultimately, weakening an ideologically rigid regime sustained by militant alliances could contribute to greater stability across South and Central Asia and benefit neighboring states long threatened by cross-border violence.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Nargiza Umarova

During the first week of February, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan paid state visits to Pakistan. For Islamabad, these visits represented a new stage in relations with the Central Asian states, based on shared interests in trade, transport logistics, industrial production, and military affairs. Thus, the prospect of Pakistan becoming a key link in the emerging regional connectivity architecture is becoming increasingly realistic, which could accelerate the development of joint infrastructure projects with the active participation of Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND:

Due to its geographical isolation from the open seas, Central Asia is extremely interested in making effective use of Pakistan’s transit capabilities, particularly its maritime infrastructure, which has undergone extensive development in recent years thanks to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar are seen by regional countries as an alternative outlet to the Indian Ocean, complementing Iran’s southern ports. The fastest route to Pakistan is via neighboring Afghanistan, where large-scale infrastructure projects involving Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are underway. Despite continuing tensions on the Afghan–Pakistani border and the conflictual nature of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, these states are accelerating their strategic initiatives in Afghanistan. 

On January 27, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Pakistan announced that Astana was prepared to cover the full cost of constructing the western Trans-Afghan Railway, from Torghundi to Herat, Kandahar and Spin Boldak, with an extension to Chaman in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and on to the country’s seaports. The preliminary cost of the project is approximately US$ 7 billion, and the route’s length will be 687 kilometers. Construction is expected to be completed within three years.

This decision is clearly driven by Kazakhstan’s desire to strengthen its position in north-south transit transport, encompassing existing routes through Iran and emerging transport corridors crossing Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Astana expresses support for the creation of the Kabul Corridor along the Termez-Naibabad-Maidanshahr-Logar-Kharlachi route proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018. In July 2025, the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project entered a new stage of development when a trilateral intergovernmental framework agreement on the joint development of the project’s feasibility study was signed. On February 4, 2026, Uzbekistan ratified the agreement and agreed with Pakistan to begin field studies on the transport corridor.

The UAP project is paving the way for a new north-south trade route through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This route will provide the fastest land connection between Europe, Russia and South Asia, eliminating the need for sea crossings. Against this backdrop, Tashkent has proposed the creation of a multimodal corridor connecting Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is three times shorter than sea delivery routes. Following the launch of the Kabul Corridor, the 5,532-kilometer trade route to South Asia will be entirely rail-based. This will enable Kazakhstan to receive an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons per year — the same amount as Uzbekistan. The projected transit volumes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are estimated at 5 million tons per year, thanks to the attraction of Chinese cargo.

IMPLICATIONS:

Astana’s participation in transit traffic from Belarus to Pakistan was discussed during bilateral talks held during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Pakistan on February 4 , 2026. The parties also discussed the prospects for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) Railway Corridor.

Kazakhstan joined the initiative to construct a railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province, which represents an alternative to the Kabul Corridor, in 2024 at the invitation of the Turkmen side. In July 2025, Astana and Kabul signed a memorandum to implement the project. Kazakhstan has announced that it will allocate US$ 500 million towards the construction of a railway line to Herat and the necessary accompanying infrastructure, including a logistics hub in northern Afghanistan. The stake has now been raised to cover the entire budget for the Western Trans-Afghan Route.

Astana’s active interest in the TAP project may be linked to current dynamics regarding the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas transport corridor. Work began on laying the Afghan section of the 1,840-kilometer pipeline in December 2024. It is expected to reach Herat Province by the end of 2026.

Russia is paying close attention to TAPI, viewing it as an opportunity to diversify and stabilize its energy exports following the loss of the premium European market. In this context, Kazakhstan can expect to earn transit profits, providing additional expectations for the profitability of the railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak, as the two transport routes will clearly be synchronized.

On February 1, 2026, a meeting was held in Herat between Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, and Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister. They discussed the progress in constructing the TAPI gas pipeline, the power line between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Torghundi-Herat railway.

Both Ashgabat and Kabul are seeking to accelerate the TAPI project. At a recent meeting between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri, they noted the rapid pace of work on the Afghan section of the gas pipeline. It is reported that part of the route has already been prepared for pipe installation.

According to Afghan authorities, the Saudi Arabian company Delta International is interested in investing in the purchase of gas under the TAPI project, expanding Turkmenistan’s major gas fields and constructing and extending the gas pipeline from Guzara District of Herat Province to Spin Boldak District of Kandahar Province, and then on to the Indian border. The project would also involve building a large, modern gas hub at Pakistan’s Gwadar port.

CONCLUSIONS:

The dynamic development of relations with Afghanistan presents Central Asian states with the challenge of strengthening mutual coordination to ensure their infrastructure initiatives have complementary political and economic effects. To this end, it is advisable to hold regular consultations at the level of the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries in the region, to agree on a unified negotiating position when interacting with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to ensure the involvement of all five republics in interregional connectivity projects.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Nargiza Umarova is a Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Umair Jamal

Pakistan has upheld a policy of non-recognition of Israel since 1948, maintaining that diplomatic relations are contingent upon the establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital. However, in late 2025, Islamabad’s mediation in the Gaza ceasefire and its conditional readiness to contribute forces to a UN-mandated International Stabilization Force have elevated its diplomatic profile with the U.S. and Gulf partners. Washington, alongside Saudi and Emirati counterparts, appears intent on expanding the Abraham Accords following credible progress toward a two-state solution. Pakistani participation would constitute a historic shift and unlock new economic corridors extending into Central Asia, enhancing regional connectivity to global markets.

                                                          Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Pakistan’s official position on Israel remains firmly grounded in support for Palestinian self-determination, a stance that resonates strongly with domestic public opinion and has guided foreign policy since the country’s founding in 1947. Pakistani diplomatic passports explicitly prohibit travel to Israel, and public discourse frequently interprets the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through the lens of historical injustice, particularly the mass displacement of Palestinians in 1948.

Anti-Israel sentiment intensified across the Muslim world, including in Pakistan, following Israel’s large-scale military offensive in Gaza, which began in October 2023 in response to the Hamas attacks. The operation has thus far resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian casualties and extensive physical destruction across the territory.

A majority of Pakistanis regard recognition of Israel as untenable in the absence of a sovereign Palestinian state. At the governmental level, however, pragmatic considerations have increasingly shaped Islamabad’s approach amid intensifying economic pressures, including a foreign debt burden exceeding US$ 130 billion and continued dependence on international financial institutions.

In September 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took part in a multilateral summit convened by U.S. President Donald Trump, alongside leaders from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, to endorse a 20-point framework for a Gaza ceasefire. The initiative, which enabled hostage releases and expanded humanitarian access, marked a significant instance of Pakistan’s active mediation, coordinated through Doha and other Middle Eastern diplomatic channels.

Subsequently, in November 2025, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed Pakistan’s willingness to contribute troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803. He stressed, however, that the mission’s primary focus would be civilian protection and post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza rather than the disarmament of Palestinian groups. “Our job is peacekeeping, not peace enforcement,” Dar stated when questioned about the prospective deployment of Pakistani forces. This position aligns Pakistan with a coalition of eight Muslim-majority states cooperating with the U.S. to support efforts toward stabilizing Gaza.

These developments coincide with the strengthening of Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, formalized through a mutual defense pact signed in Riyadh on 17 September. The agreement commits both states to regard an attack on one as an attack on the other and encompasses broad provisions for military cooperation and joint deterrence. It underscores the two countries’ shared strategic interests amid heightened regional instability.

Saudi Arabia has signaled its openness to joining the Abraham Accords—a framework for the normalization of relations with Israel—conditional on credible progress toward a two-state solution. In recent remarks to President Trump, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that Riyadh is prepared to participate in the Accords but seeks to secure “a clear path toward a two-state solution.”

Similarly, U.S. officials, including envoys from the Trump administration, appear to have encouraged Pakistan’s inclusion in this framework as a way to extend normalization efforts beyond the Gulf region. Although Islamabad continues to emphasize that any movement in this direction would depend on firm guarantees of Palestinian statehood, reports of backchannel exchanges suggest that discussions on the issue are evolving.

These shifts carry significant implications for Central Asia. States such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are actively pursuing diversified connectivity options to reduce overreliance on Russian and Chinese infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s formal accession to the Abraham Accords in November 2025 illustrates this strategy, with the potential to strengthen its economic linkages with Israel and Western partners, particularly the U.S.

The prospective inclusion of Pakistan in the Accords could function as a pivotal connective link, but sustaining momentum would require careful management of domestic public opinion and sensitive regional dynamics.

IMPLICATIONS: If U.S. officials were to achieve their apparent objective of incorporating Pakistan into an expanded Abraham Accords framework, an outcome likely dependent on Saudi Arabia’s formal participation following progress toward a two-state solution, it would have significant ramifications for Central Asia’s economic landscape. The region’s republics, rich in hydrocarbons, uranium, and rare earth minerals yet constrained by geographic isolation, would benefit significantly from deeper integration into multimodal trade networks.

Foremost among these initiatives is the U.S.-backed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which incorporates Israeli routes and seeks to streamline freight transport from South Asia through Gulf ports to Europe. Designed to circumvent traditional chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the corridor could reduce transit times by up to 40 percent. Pakistan’s participation could extend IMEC’s eastern flank through its ports at Gwadar and Karachi, interfacing with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to provide Central Asian exporters, particularly those in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. with viable southern outlets.

Such diversification would mitigate the vulnerabilities inherent in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which, although operational, continues to face bottlenecks in Caspian Sea transit and persistent geopolitical frictions. In this context, enhanced Israeli technological inputs, such as advanced logistics software and desalination expertise, could improve the efficiency of these corridors, potentially generating annual trade gains amounting to billions of dollars for Central Asia by facilitating access to Mediterranean markets.

From a security standpoint, Pakistan’s prospective deployment of Islamic Security Forces (ISF) in Gaza, framed as a humanitarian stabilization mission, could serve as a model for multilateral engagement and potentially inspire analogous C5+1–style frameworks for managing Afghanistan’s borders. The Saudi–Pakistani defense pact concluded in September 2025 already signals deeper intelligence-sharing cooperation, which could extend northward to counter ISIS-K incursions threatening the frontiers of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s recent entry into the Abraham Accords, announced on 6 November during President Tokayev’s visit to the White House, further underscores this momentum.

Clear obstacles exist to the realization of this trajectory. Public opinion in Pakistan remains strongly opposed to normalization in the absence of Palestinian sovereignty, as demonstrated by sustained public protests and formal parliamentary resolutions. Consequently, any perceived capitulation to U.S. pressure could trigger political instability. Iranian concerns that IMEC represents an encirclement strategy, combined with its rivalry with Israel, could provoke proxy disruptions extending beyond Afghanistan into Central Asia. Moreover, China and Russia are likely to pursue countermeasures through their entrenched Belt and Road Initiative commitments, which already exceed US$ 25 billion in loans to Central Asian states. This could undermine regional cohesion and potentially exacerbate divisions, pitting Turkic-aligned states against Persian-influenced Tajikistan.

Yet a carefully calibrated strategy, linking reforms in Palestinian governance with the concurrent advancement of the IMEC corridor and an expanded role for Pakistan, could yield durable, region-wide dividends.

Israeli agricultural and water-management technologies, which have demonstrated effectiveness in arid environments, could contribute to the rehabilitation of the degraded Aral Sea basin and support the creation of tens of thousands of jobs across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Meanwhile, concrete U.S. incentives, such as the designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally Plus or the provision of security guarantees, could reinforce Islamabad’s willingness to resolve longstanding disputes with Afghanistan and India, facilitate full normalization with Israel, and finally enable the implementation of long-stalled connectivity projects, including the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway and the Trans-Afghan corridor.

The potential payoff could be transformative. Landlocked Central Asia would gain direct and competitive access to the warm-water ports of Gwadar, Karachi, and Mundra, unlocking billions of dollars in annual trade. This shift would also enable the region to diversify away from reliance on Russian and Chinese transit routes, thereby converting decades of geopolitical isolation into sustained economic prosperity.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan has conditioned recognition of Israel on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state for more than seven decades. That longstanding red line now appears to face its greatest pressure to date, as Islamabad’s effective mediation in Gaza and potential peacekeeping role have attracted praise from Washington and Riyadh. The U.S. is actively seeking to expand the Abraham Accords and aims to incorporate both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan once a credible two-state pathway is established. Should Pakistan ultimately accede, the economic payoff for Central Asia could be immediate, through faster IMEC and Trans-Caspian routes, expanded access to Gulf capital, and Israeli technology reaching the landlocked republics. Above all, this development could inaugurate a new era of integration adjacent to Central Asia that would benefit the region greatly.

Absent genuine Palestinian statehood, however, domestic opposition within Pakistan and regional resistance primarily from Iran could undermine these prospects. Ultimately, the outcome hinges on two factors: whether Pakistan can advance toward normalization with Israel without destabilizing its domestic political order, and whether the U.S. can deliver sufficient progress toward a credible and equitable two-state solution to provide Islamabad and other Muslim-majority states with the legitimacy required to take this step and unlock the region’s economic future.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Nargis Kassenova

The dramatic events of 2022 - the January unrest in Kazakhstan and Russia’s war against Ukraine - upended the status quo in Kazakhstan-Russia relations. Astana must now address both long-standing vulnerabilities—security, political, and economic—and new pressures in areas such as inter-elite relations (as they shape up in the process of "denazarbayevization"), nuclear energy, and history writing. The Tokayev government seeks to accommodate Russia as much as possible while advancing Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, which requires constant adjustments and trade-offs.

Read Kazakhstan-Russia Relations After 2022: Sources of Contention, Points of Pressure

By Stephen Blank

Just as Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to a cease-fire on October 19, representatives of the Taliban were in New Delhi reviving India’s long-standing ties with Afghanistan, demonstrating the interconnections between Afghanistan, Central Asia as a region, and the rivalries that drive Asian politics, i.e. the Indo-Pakistani-China triangle. In turn, this signifies the region’s increasing importance to major external actors as well as the growing importance and agency of Central Asian states. 

                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: India’s rapprochement with Afghanistan follows the examples of China, Russia, and Central Asian states. Although Pakistan promoted the Taliban during the insurgency against the U.S., their relations have deteriorated since 2021. Pakistan has increasingly charged the Taliban with sheltering and supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for a surge of deadly attacks inside Pakistan. This tension has led to frequent and sometimes deadly border clashes, airstrikes, and the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Despite the latest cease-fire, continued tensions can be expected along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

There are compelling reasons for India and Afghanistan to resume ties and connections, e.g., air flights from New Delhi to Kabul. Prior to the Taliban takeover, India had a thriving, strategically motivated, relationship with Afghanistan. India is in a permanent state of tension with Pakistan, which continues to sponsor terrorist attacks on India, while China supports Pakistan to prevent India from rivalling it as an Asian great power. These two states have consistently sought with considerable success to isolate India from Central Asia, thereby giving China a freer hand in the region.

Pakistan has long strived to have hegemonic influence over Afghan governments. It previously sponsored the Taliban against the pro-Western and pro-Indian Karzai and subsequent governments in Afghanistan. Consequently, as Taliban ties to Pakistan eroded and the need for economic support from abroad grew, India has emulated other actors in Central Asia to resume ties with Afghanistan.

India, Central Asian governments, Russia, and China have congruent economic-political reasons for restoring ties to Kabul. The same is true for Washington, although to a lesser degree. All these governments have concluded that if they wish to prevent the Afghan government from sponsoring terrorism, whether against Russia, Uzbekistan, or China, they must engage seriously, and enter into diplomatic relations, with Afghanistan.

Similarly, by virtue of its geographical location Afghanistan is instrumental to transcontinental trade and transportation routes, including the Middle Corridor and Belt and Road, leading from China through Central Asia to Europe. The construction of such corridors is now one of the most urgent issues on the agenda for these states, making a reasonably secure and robust economic engagement with Afghanistan a necessity for both Central Asian states and China. As a result of this awareness, we now see numerous proposals for a railway and other transportation routes connecting Central Asia and China. The Afghan government also evidently grasps the need for secure and thriving economic links with its Central Asian neighbors, China, and Russia.

The enhanced understanding on all sides of the urgent need for improved connectivity obliges foreign governments to press for an end to support for terrorists. It remains to be seen if Kabul can or will terminate this support. If it does not, it will be shunned by its neighbors and potential partners.

Great power interest in Afghanistan is also fueled by the fact that previous international studies estimate that Afghanistan is sitting on an estimated US$ 1 trillion of rare earths and minerals. As access to these goods has now become a central issue in global politics, and especially Sino-American relations, there is an intensifying competition to gain secure and uncontested access to them. Once again, Afghanistan could become a central arena for great power rivalry.

Moscow needs good ties to Kabul to reinforce its overall Central Asian policy goals and prevent domestic terrorism; and also aspires to sell arms to Kabul. Soviet arms sales provided the basis for its earlier influence in Afghanistan, and Russia hopes to repeat this especially as it has little to offer economically compared to Beijing and Washington. The Trump Administration, apart from its growing obsession with rare earths, wants to regain access to Bagram Air Base to monitor Chinese military developments. 

IMPLICATIONS: Rising interest in ties with Afghanistan across the board opens the way for the Taliban to play the traditional small state game of hedging and balancing among competing foreign governments. However, the developments outlined above tell us things about Central Asia that are prospectively much more important. First, Central Asian states that are displaying ever more interest in regional cooperation and integration now acknowledge that their region is incomplete if Afghanistan does not or cannot participate in it. This insight applies with equal force to economic issues as well as security concerns. For them, no discussion of the regional future is complete without including Afghanistan. Therefore, they are promoting bilateral and regional plans for projects to expand trade, transport, and technology projects to Afghanistan.

Second, it appears that all of the major foreign state actors appreciate the fact that for economic, political, and strategic reasons they all need to engage not only Afghanistan but the entire region. This awareness enhances their mutual rivalries throughout Central Asia but also prospects for Central Asian states to acquire much needed foreign assistance, on better terms than if they were dependent on only one foreign provider. This foreign rivalry enhances their economic and security capabilities while also creating a possibility to pacify Afghanistan’s domestic and foreign policies.

However, as is often the case, these potential benefits come at a price. Although Central Asian states, India, China, Russia, and the U.S, are all engaging Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they can induce it to stop supporting terrorism even if it is directed at Pakistan, itself a known supporter of terrorism. Thus, Central Asian states that depend to some degree on the economic-political development of Afghanistan cannot escape involvement in the tangled relations of South Asia. To the extent that Central Asian states hope to include Afghanistan in their future projects this involvement is unavoidable.

Meanwhile, Pakistan and China work steadily to impede India’s engagement with Central Asia. Chinese analysts increasingly frame the Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions with reference to a wider Indian role as manifested in India’s ties to Afghanistan. Pakistan fears such connections and strongly objected to the references to Jammu and Kashmir in the Indo-Afghan communique.

Moreover, Uzbekistan is now expressing its interest in obtaining a permanent berth at the Iranian port of Chabahar in Iran. It has held meetings with Iranian and Indian officials to gain this position because this port, apart from figuring prominently in Iran’s regional commercial ambitions, is critical to India’s efforts to leapfrog or bypass Pakistani obstruction of its Central Asian policies.

The entanglement in South Asia’s rivalries is part of a larger trend where Central Asia is increasingly tied to developments in other regions. Central Asian economies are profoundly affected by the war in Ukraine. Similarly, there is mounting interest in Central Asian countries joining the Abraham Accords, a move that increases their political and strategic involvement in the Middle East on top of their growing economic ties with states of the Persian Gulf.

CONCLUSIONS: The impending Sino-American rivalry over rare earths cannot but draw Central Asian states, including Afghanistan, into the Sino-American, and possibly Sino-European tensions. Thus, what we are now seeing in the spillover of South Asian tensions into Central Asia and vice versa, given the TTP raids into Pakistan, signify the full arrival and agency of Central Asian states as individual and regional actors of more than local significance. These trends will undoubtedly continue but how they develop depends on the actions of all the relevant policymakers involved. While those actions cannot be foreseen, Central Asian states will not be merely the object of other states’ designs but independent actors whose policies, be they support for terrorism or large-scale connectivity projects, will impact trends far beyond their borders.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.