Wednesday, 06 June 2001

BRANDED TRAITORS IN UZBEKISTAN

Published in Field Reports

By By Christine Iskandar (6/6/2001 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Having a ‘Wahhabi’ member of the family is not something Uzbeks speak openly about. In fact I only found out because the son in question called home. It was the first time the family had heard from him for over a year, and at last they knew that he was still alive.

Having a ‘Wahhabi’ member of the family is not something Uzbeks speak openly about. In fact I only found out because the son in question called home. It was the first time the family had heard from him for over a year, and at last they knew that he was still alive. His Mother ricocheted between ecstasy and fury with her wayward son as she peppered him with questions. He couldn’t say where he was. Not in Uzbekistan but nearby was all he would elaborate. He had been fighting in Chechnya, and been on various training camps in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was eating well and his health was fine. He knew his family was worried, but also knew it would be dangerous to re-enter Uzbekistan but, God willing, he would try and visit soon. His mother began crying as she hung the phone up, not knowing if she would ever see her son again but desperate for him to come home.

Her son is just one of the young Uzbek men who have joined the Islamic fundamentalists, or ‘Wahhabis’ as they are known here. They have become disillusioned with the empty promises of the post-Soviet government and a corrupt economy which offers them little future. Over the last decade, unemployment has soared and what jobs there are pay little, if at all. A monthly salary barely stretches a week and most people simply use their position to make money through the shadow economy of petty trade, bribery and cronyism. Also, there is less political freedom now than during the days of perestroika as the government retains the trappings of the authoritarian and repressive regime that it claims to have superseded. Leaders of opposition movements are either in exile or in prison and for many Uzbeks, the only viable form of political protest is to join a radical Islamic movement.

The largest of these is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has been making incursions into the country for two years now, retreating back to their mountain bases in Northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Funded by drug money, the Islamic movements pay well and provide a spiritual cause for young men with little to lose. The government refers to all such groups as Wahhabis, along with anyone else considered too Muslim for the government’s liking. Religion in its cultural form is acceptable, but as soon as it is perceived as a competitor to the rampant nationalism promoted by the government, it is suppressed. Young men have even been arrested for growing beards. Wahhabis, demonized by the state-owned media, make a convenient scapegoat for the nation’s ills and have even been blamed for the devastating summer drought. 

The young rebel’s brother was, of course, thrilled to hear from his brother, although he still fears for his safety. He would be wise to be concerned about his own. The government has adopted a policy of punishing family members of Wahhabis, stating that the father will be punished for the sins of his son. Family members have also proved the most effective form of leverage in the battle against radical Islam. Relatives are held in prison indefinitely until the Wahhabi gives himself up; often torture is used to speed up the process. Guards have found that rape of young men held in custody, whilst sometimes effective, does not lead to the same speedy signing of confessions as stripping a suspect’s elderly mother in front of him and threatening to rape her.

Even if the insurgent’s brother is not persecuted for the choices his brother has made, he still has enough problems of his own. Whilst his brother is an Islamic fundamentalist, he is an Uzbek Pentecostal. Not as threatening to the government, perhaps, but an illegal religious activity none the less. Not only is the small underground Church which he attends hounded by the authorities, they are also despised by others and accused of ‘turning Russian’. This can be trying for a Church that prides itself on its Uzbek identity, with meetings in homes, held only in Uzbek and worshipping with traditional songs and instruments. Ironically, it is precisely because of their ‘Uzbekness’ that they are unable to register as a legal religious organization as the government refuses to acknowledge that some Uzbeks wish to become Christians. This muddy policy towards religion means that in one interrogation cell the SMB (former KGB) berate an Uzbek Pentecostal, calling him a traitor to the State because he is not a Muslim. In the next cell along, a pious young Muslim is beaten and declared a traitor precisely because he is. 

The young Pentecostal has stopped meeting with the other members of his creed for now, because it makes his Mother too upset. Must she lose another son? For her, religion is not as important as the basics of a loving and caring family. She will love her sons whatever religion they follow. 

By Christine Iskandar
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